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Supposing however that the Act [at issue] had said in terms, that
though a person sued in the island [of Tobago] had never been present
within the jurisdiction, yet that it should bind him upon proof of nailing
up the summons at the Court door; how could that be obligatory upon
the subjects of other countries? Can the island of Tobago pass a law to
bind the rights of the whole world? Would the world submit to such an
assumed jurisdiction? I
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[This] is a plea to grant all collective behavior entailing systematic
understandings of our commitments to future worlds equal claim to the
word "law." The upshot of such a claim, of course, is to deny to the nation state any special status for the collective behavior of its officials or
for their systematic understandings of some special set of "governing"
norms. The status of such "official" behavior and "official" norms is not
denied the dignity of "law." But it must share the dignity with thousands
of other social understandings. In each case the question of what is law
and for whom is a question of fact about what certain
communities be2
lieve and with what commitments to those beliefs.

Citizenship ought to be theorized as one of the multiple subject positions occupied by people as members of diversely spatialized, partially
overlapping, or nonoverlapping collectivities. The structures of feeling
that constitute nationalism need to be set in the context of other forms
of imagining community, other means of endowing
significance to space
3
in the production of location and "home."

In this context, what we need-we, who aspire to be academics, who
aspire to work things out-is permission to work things out freely. We
need a space where we can experiment with ideas without condemnation
reigning [sic] down around us.....
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... [T]his is cyberspace, where no one has the right to declare truth
is on their side; and where no one should claim the right to condemn.
This is a space where we need the space to try out different, and even
heretical, ideals. In this space, the heroes will be lunatics ... or crazies ....
... We need to imagine these problems differently, and we need to
encourage people to imagine them differently.
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INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, the terms "cyberspace" and "globalization"
have become buzzwords of a new generation. And it is probably not
surprising that the two have entered the lexicon simultaneously.
From its beginning, the Internet heralded a new world order of interconnection and decentralization," while the word "globalization"'' conr. See, e.g., DEIRDRE M.

CURTIN,

POSTNATIONAL

DEMOCRACY:

UNION IN SEARCH OF A POLITICAL PHILOSOiiHY 4 (1997)

THE EUROPEAN

('just think of how global
computer-based communications cut across territorial borders, creating a new realm of
human activity and undermining the feasibility-and legitimacy-of applying laws
based on geographic boundaries to this new sphere.").
I1 use the term "globalization" to mean both the worldwide process of liberalizing
state controls on the international movement of goods, services, and capital and the
social, economic, and political consequences of liberalization. See generally SASKIA
SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (1998) (analyzing globalization and its
economic, political, and cultural effects on the world). In addition, when I speak of
globalization, I also mean the attitude about the world that tends to come into being as
a result of frequent use of that term. Indeed, in a certain sense it does not really mat-
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jured for many the specter of increasing transnational and supranational governance as well as the growing mobility of persons and capital across geographical boundaries! Thus, both terms have reflected
a perception that territorial borders might no longer be as significant
as they once were."
On the other hand, nation-state governments have been quick to
reassert themselves. For example, there was a heady moment circa
1995 when it seemed as if the rise of cyberspace might cause us to rethink the relevance of nation-state boundaries. Most famously, David
Johnson and David Post argued that cyberspace could not legitimately
be governed by territorially based sovereigns and that the online
world should create its own legal jurisdiction (or multiple jurisdictions). Predictably, nation-states pushed in the opposite direction,
passing a slew of laws purporting to regulate almost every conceivable
ter whether, as an empirical matter, the world is more or less "globalized" than it used
to be. More important is the fact that people, whether governmental actors, corporations, scholars, or general citizens think and act as if the world is more interconnected
infra note 7 (citing sources deand treat globalization as a real phenomenon. See, e.g.,
scribing various scholars' view of globalization).
7 See, e.g., MICHAEL EDWARDS, FUTURE POSITIVE:
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 5-6 (1999) ("Globalisation challenges the authority of nation
states and international institutions to influence events, while the scale of private flows
of capital, technology, information and ideas makes official transfers look increasingly
How GLOBALIZATION IS
marginal."); ANTHONY GIDDENS, RUNAWAY WORLD:
RESHAPING OUR LIVES 24-37 (2000) (pointing to the increased level of trade, finance,
and capital flows, and describing the effects of the weakening hold of older nationstates); Arjun Appadurai, Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy, in
MODERNITY AT LARGE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION 27, 27-29 (1996)
("[T]oday's world involves inieractions of a new order and intensity.... [W]ith the
advent of the steamship, the automobile, the airplane, the camera, the computer and
the telephone, we have entered into an altogether new condition of neighborliness,
even with those most distant from ourselves.").
8 See, e.g., MATHEW HORSMAN & ANDREW MARSHALL, AFTER THE NATION-STATE:
CITIZENS, TRIBALISM AND THE NEW WORLD DISORDER, at ix (1994) ("The traditional
nation-state, the fruit of centuries of political, social and economic evolution, is under
threat."); George J. Demko & William B. Wood, Introduction: International Relations
GEOPOLITICAL
Through the Prism of Geography, in REORDERING THE WORLD:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 3, 10 (George J. Demko & William B.
Wood eds., 1994) ("Once sacrosanct, the concept of a state's sovereignty-the immutability of its international boundaries-is now under serious threat."); Seyla Benhabib, Strange Multiplicities: Democracy and Identity in a Global Era: Lecture 1, at 33 (on
file with author) ("In the era of globalization, the integrative powers of the nationstate.., are challenged.").
9 David R.Johnson & David Post, Law and
Borders-TheRise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); see also, e.g., David Post, Governing Cyberspace, 43 WAYNE L.
REV. 155, 165-71 (1996) (arguing that cyberspace should be governed through decentralized processes whereby network access providers decide what rules to impose and
individual users choose which online communities to join).
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online activity from gambling' to chat rooms" to auction sites,12 and
seeking to enforce territorially based rules regarding trademarks,"
contractual relations,"4 privacy norms, 5 "indecent" content, 6 and
crime," among others.

10E.g., Interactive Gambling Act, 2001, pts. 2 & 2A (Austl.) (prohibiting online
gambling services to customers in Australia and other designated countries), available
at http://www.noie.gov.au/projects/confidence/Archive/gambling/banact.pdf (last
visited Oct. 22, 2002); see also Humphrey ex rel. Minnesota v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc.,
568 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (asserting personal jurisdiction over nonresident corporation and its principal for deceptive trade practices, false advertising,
and consumer fraud in connection with an Internet gambling site); Vacco ex rel. People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 851-54 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999)
(enforcing state and federal laws to ban foreign corporation; its Antiguan subsidiary;
and their principals, officers, and directors from operating or offering gambling over
the Internet).
11 E.g., 47 U.S.C. § 254(l)(1)(A)(ii) (2001) (requiring schools
and libraries to
adopt and implement policies to ensure the safety and security of minors when using
chat rooms); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176A.413 (2001) (restricting ownership and use of online chatrooms by people previously convicted of cyber-stalking).
12 E.g., IND. CODE §§ 26-2-8-101 to -302
(2001) (containing the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act, which facilitates the use of online auction sites by giving legal effect
to electronic signatures and contracts); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 66-311 to -330 (2001)
(same); T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/
tgiparis200001120.pdf (enjoining Yahoo.com from permitting French users' access to
Nazi memorabilia via Yahoo!'s auction sites). For further discussion of this case, see
infra text accompanying notes 77-84.
13E.g., Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113
Stat. 1501 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 16, and 28 U.S.C.)
(providing for the "registration and protection of trademarks used in commerce"); Rachel Ross, China Demands Jurisdiction over Domain Names in Chinese, TORONTO STAR,
Nov. 13, 2000, LEXIS, Tstar File (reporting that China is seeking to ensure that it controls the distribution and administration of all Chinese-character domain names).
14 E.g., Electronic Transactions Act,
1999 (Austl.) (creating a regulatory regime
intended to support and encourage business and consumer confidence in the use of
electronic commerce),
http://www.law.gov.au/publications/ecommerce/;
UNIF.
COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT, 7 U.L.A. 200 (2002) (providing a model uniform
state law to govern online contracts), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/
ucita/cital Ost.doc.
15 E.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
18 U.S.C. § 2701 (a) (1) (2000)
(prohibiting unauthorized access to a "facility through which an electronic communication service is provided"); Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29 (Eng.) (requiring technical and organizational measures against unauthorized or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss of, destruction of, or damage to personal data),
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/actsl1998/19980029.htm.
16 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2000) (prohibiting the receipt or distribution of
sexually explicit photos of minors by any means including by computer); Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (striking down, on First Amendment grounds, provisions of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Supp. 11 1996), that criminalized certain content transmitted via online communication); ACLU v. Reno, 217
F.3d 162, 181 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming, on First Amendment grounds, preliminary
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Yet these assertions of national authority have raised many of the
legal conundrums regarding nation-state sovereignty, territorial borders, and legal jurisdiction thatJohnson and Post predicted. 18 For example, if a person posts content online that is legal where it was
posted but is illegal in some place where it is viewed, can that person
be subject to suit in the far-off location? Is online activity sufficient to
make one "present" in ajurisdiction for tax purposes? Is a patchwork
of national copyright laws feasible given the ability to transfer digital
information around the globe instantaneously? How might national
rules regarding the investigation and definition of criminal activity
complicate efforts to combat international computer crime? Should
the law of trademarks, which historically has permitted two firms to
retain the same name as long as they operated in different geographical areas, be expanded to provide an international cause of action regarding the ownership of an easily identifiable domain name? And, if
so, should such a system be enforced by national courts (and in which
country) or by an international body (and how should such a body be
constituted)? And on and on.
In the meantime, on the globalization front, annual meetings of
the world's industrialized countries have become sites for the expression of uncertainty and resentment about the effect of international
trade and monetary policy on local labor forces, the environment, and
nation-state sovereignty.1' ' Similar debates recur in the context of in-

injunction preventing the enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §
231 (Supp. IV 1998), which also criminalized certain content sent via online communication), vacated sub noain. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S. Ct. 1700 (2002); Regina v. Pecciarich, [1995] O.R.3d 748 (Prov. Ct.) (Can.) (holding that the distribution of child
pornography by uploading photos to an electronic bulletin board was in violation of
criminal statutes).
17 E.g., Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030
(2000) (applying federal
law to newly discovered forms of computer abuse and providing civil remedies for certain types of computer crimes); Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, c. 23
(Eng.) (defining criminal penalties for interception of traffic on all postal and telecommunications networks and any action that may cause the content of a message to
become known to people other than the sender or intended recipient); see also Am.
Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 446, 448 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that
defendants who harvested e-mail addresses of AOL members using an extractor program and then used those addresses to send unauthorized bulk e-mail advertising their
pornographic web sites were in violation of federal and state statutes).
Is SeeJohnson & Post, supra note 9, at 1371-76 (suggesting that the unique nature
of cyberspace, particularly the absence of any physical location, creates regulatory and
jurisdictional problems for governments).
19 See, e.g., After Genoa, THE NAFION, Aug. 6, 2001, at 3 (quoting French President
Chirac as saying, "[t]here is no demonstration drawing 100,000, 150,000 people without having a valid reason"); Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, What the Protestersin Genoa
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ternational human rights, where, increasingly, countries are asserting
extraterritorial jurisdiction to try those accused of genocide and
crimes against humanity in international or foreign domestic courts. 20
Although all of these issues, questions, and conundrums arise in a
variety of doctrinal areas and may involve a wide range of different legal and policy concerns, they have at least one common element: they
all touch on the idea of legal jurisdiction-the circumstances under
which a juridical body can assert authority to adjudicate or apply its
legal norms to a dispute. 2' And, in each of these cases, the question is
complicated by the fact that jurisdiction may be asserted in one physical location over activities or parties located in a different physical location. Thus, the issue of jurisdiction is deeply enmeshed with precisely the fixed conception of territorial boundaries that
contemporary events are challenging.

Want, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2001, at A21 (arguing that "[t]he protests themselves have
become global movements, and one of the clearest objectives is the democratization of
globalizing processes"); Jerry Useem, There's Something Happening Here, FORTUNE, May
15, 2000, at 234 (describing a "new breed of economic activism [that] has appeared
not only in Seattle but also in Davos, Switzerland; the City, London; and now Washington, D.C.").
20 See infra Part 1.1 (describing transnational
and international human rights activitY).-2

Under international law, the concept of jurisdiction is generally divided into

three categories: (1) jurisdiction to prescribe, i.e., to apply a community's norms to a
dispute (which I will also call choice of law); (2) jurisdiction to adjudicate, i.e., to subject persons or things to legal process; and (3) jurisdiction to enforce, i.e., to induce or
compel compliance with a determination reached. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 (1987). In speaking of the assertion ofjurisdiction in this Article, I refer to the first two categories. It is true that
some of the policy concerns underlying jurisdiction and choice of law might be different. For example, the question of adjudicative jurisdiction implicates issues of convenience to the parties in deciding a case in a given location, whereas choice of law addresses the actual norms to be applied. Nevertheless, both involve the symbolic
assertion of a community's dominion over a dispute and therefore many of the same
concerns about territorial borders, community definition, and the nation-state apply to
debates about both adjudicatory jurisdiction and choice of law. The third category,
enforcementjurisdiction, is separately addressed in this Article, not so much as a question of jurisdiction, but as the corollary question of recognition and enforcement of
judgments. In addition, this Article focuses primarily on jurisdiction over parties (what
in the United States is known as personal jurisdiction, see generally Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (describing the minimum requirements necessary
for a court to assert personal jurisdiction)), rather than jurisdiction over particular
subject matter. Subject matter jurisdiction is a separate inquiry that addresses both
which type of court in a given location is permitted to hear a case and what constitutes a
legitimate "case" for adjudicative purposes. Although my analysis here may have significant implications for subjict matter jurisdiction, exploration of those implications
is beyond the scope of this Article.
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The problem, of course, is that local communities are now far
more likely to be affected by activities and entities with no local presence. Cross-border interaction obviously is not a new phenomenon,
but in an electronically connected world the effects of any given action may immediately be felt elsewhere with no relationship to physical geography at all. Thus, although it is not surprising that local
communities might feel the need to apply their norms to extraterritorial activities based simply on the local harms such activities cause, assertions ofjurisdiction on this basis will almost inevitably tend toward
a system of universal jurisdiction because so many activities will have
effects far beyond their immediate geographical boundaries. Such a
system, for better or worse, would jettison any idea that the application of legal norms to a party depends in some way on the party's having consented to be governed by those norms.
Even more important, while courts, policy makers, and scholars
are scrambling simply to adapt existing jurisdictional models to the
new social context in order to "solve" these tensions in particular
situations, they are doing so without giving sufficient consideration to
the theoretical basis for the exercise of legal jurisdiction in an increasingly interconnected world. I aim to take a different approach. I believe the time is ripe to take a step back and reflect on the jurisdictional principles we are seeking to adapt. By doing so, I attempt to lay
the groundwork for a theoretical model that will allow us better to
understand and evaluate the increasing globalization of legal jurisdiction.
To construct such a model, we first need to remind ourselves that
conceptions of legal jurisdiction (by which I mean to include both the
jurisdiction to decide a dispute and the determination that ajurisdiction's law will apply)" are more than simply ideas about the appropriate boundaries for state regulation or the efficient allocation of governing authority. Jurisdiction is also the locus for debates about
community definition, sovereignty, and legitimacy. Moreover, the
idea of legal jurisdiction both reflects and reinforces social conceptions of space, distance, and identity. Too often, however, contemporary frameworks for thinking about jurisdictional authority unreflectively accept the assumption that nation-states defined by fixed
territorial borders are the only relevant jurisdictional entities, without
examining how people actually experience allegiance to community

22

See supra note 21 (discussing international law's tripartite classification scheme

for jurisdiction in international law).
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or understand their relationship to geographical distance and territorial borders. Moreover, by side-stepping these questions of community definition, borders, and the experience of place, legal thinkers
are ignoring a voluminous literature in anthropology, cultural studies,
and the social sciences concerning such issues. 3
Indeed, even a cursory examination reveals that our current territorially based rules for jurisdiction (and conflict of laws) were developed in an era when physical geography was more meaningful than it
is today and during a brief historical moment when the ideas of nation and state were being joined by a hyphen to create an historically
contingent Westphalian order. 4 Yet if the ideas of geographical territory and the nation-state are no longer treated as givens for defining
community," an entirely new set of questions can be asked. How are
communities appropriately defined in today's world? In what ways
might we say that the nation-state is an imagined community, 26 and
what other imaginings are possible? How do people actually experience the idea of membership in multiple, overlapping communities?
Should citizenship be theorized as one of the many subject positions
occupied by people as members of diverse, sometimes non-territorial,
collectivities? In what ways is our sense of place and community
membership constructed through social forces? And if ideas such as
"place," "community," "member," "nation," "citizen," "boundary," and

Cf. PeterJ. Spiro, Globalization, InternationalLaw, and the Academy, 32 N.Y.U.
J.
INT'L L. & POL. 567, 568 n.2 (2000) (noting that, although the term "postnational" has
crept into other disciplines, international law scholars have been slow to use it, having
"only recently caught on to 'globalization"').
24 The Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War. See Treaty of Peace
Between Sweden and the Empire and Treaty of Peace between France and the Empire,
Oct. 14,1648, 1 Consol. T.S. 119, 119-356 [hereinafter Westphalia Treaties] (outlining
agreements among almost every state in Europe at that time); Leo Gross, The Peace of
Westphalia, 1648-1948, in I ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAl. LAW AND ORGANIZATION 3, 5
(1984) (explaining that the Thirty Years War began partly because of religious intolerance and that the Peace of Westphalia "consecrated the principle of toleration").
Westphalia is generally thought to have ushered in an international legal order based
on individual state sovereignty. See infra notes 594-600 and accompanying text (discussing the terms of the treaties and how the sovereign state became the primary political unit). The historically contingent nature of the nation-state is discussed firther
infra at Part IV.B.
25 See Gupta, supra note 3, at 179 ("The
nation is so deeply implicated in the texture of everyday life and so thoroughly presupposed in academic discourses on 'culture' and 'society' [and jurisdiction] that it becomes difficult to remember that it is
only one, relatively recent, historically contingent form of organizing space in the
world.").
26 See generally BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES
(rev. ed. 1991) (analyzing the nation-state as an imagined community).
23
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"stranger ' ,2 7 are not natural and inevitable, but are instead constructed, imagined, and (sometimes) imposed, what does that say
about the presumed "naturalness" of our geographically based jurisdiction and choice-of-law rules?
This Article will ask these questions, drawing on humanities and
social science literature that complicates many of the premises most
lawmakers and legal scholars take for granted concerning jurisdiction.
This literature insists that we recognize the constructed nature of our
ideas about boundaries and community definition and that we acknowledge the historical contingency of the nation-state. Moreover,
by analyzing the social meaning of our affiliations across space, we can
think about alternative conceptions of community that are subnational, transnational, supranational, or cosmopolitan. Such an analysis provides a better understanding of the world of experience on
which the legal world is mapped and is therefore essential in order to
develop a richer descriptive account of what it means for a juridical
body to assertjurisdiction over a controversy.28
In addition, moving from the descriptive to the normative, I set
about the task of theorizing the idea ofjurisdiction in a way that might
take into consideration the contested and constantly shifting process
by which people imagine communities and their membership in
them. I argue that, just as a rigidly territorial conception of jurisdiction eventually gave way in the first part of the twentieth century to
the idea of jurisdiction based on contacts with a sovereign entity, so
too a contacts-based approach must now yield to a conception of jurisdiction based on community definition. In this Article, I offer one

27

See, e.g., Georg Simmel, The Stranger, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 402,

402 (Kurt H. Wolff ed., 1950) (arguing that the stranger "is fixed within a particular
spatial group, or within a group whose boundaries are similar to spatial boundaries,"
but that "his position in this group is determined, essentially, by the fact that he has
not belonged to it from the beginning, that he imports qualities into it, which do not
and cannot stem from the group itself').
28

Cf PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW:

RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL

SCIIOLARs-nP 91 (1999) (encouraging those studying law as a cultural system to move
"away from normative inquiries into particular reforms and toward thick description of
the world of meaning that is the rule of law"); Austin Sarat & Susan Silbey, The Pull of
the Policy Audience, 10 L. & POL'Y 97, 97 (1988) (arguing that sociolegal scholars would
benefit from resisting the demand for normative proposals). But see Paul Schiff Berman, The CulturalLife of Capital Punishment: Surveying the Benefits of a CulturalAnalysis of
Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1129, 1134 (2002) (book review) (arguing that "the cultural
analysis of law is both a vital field of academic knowledge in its own right and a way of
shedding new light on practical questions concerning legal rules and institutions").
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such conception, which I call a cosmopolitan pluralist conception of
jurisdiction.
A cosmopolitan'9 approach allows us to think of community not as a
geographically determined territory circumscribed by fixed boundaries, but as "articulated moments in networks of social relations and
understandings. 0 0 This dynamic understanding of the relationship
between the "local" community and other forms of community affiliation (regional, national, transnational, international, cosmopolitan)
permits us to conceptualize legal jurisdiction in terms of social interactions that are fluid processes, not motionless demarcations frozen in
time and space. A court in one country might therefore appropriately
assert community dominion over a legal dispute even if the court's
territorially based contacts with the dispute are minimal.3 ' Conversely,
a country that has certain "contacts" with a dispute might nevertheless
be unable to establish a tie between a local community and a distant
defendant sufficient tojustify asserting its dominion.
A cosmopolitan interrogation of conceptions of community,
therefore, might rein in some assertions of jurisdiction over distant
acts while permitting other extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction
that are currently unrecognized. Accordingly, the cosmopolitan pluralist conception of jurisdiction I propose seeks to capture a middle
ground between strict territorialism on the one hand and a system of
complete universal jurisdiction on the other. In any event, the jurisdictional inquiry would no longer be based on a reified counting of
contacts with, effects on, or interests of a territorially-bounded population. Rather, courts would take seriously the multiple definitions of
community that might be available, the symbolic significance of assert-

29 By "cosmopolitan," I refer to a multivalent perspective
that recognizes the wide
variety of affiliations people feel toward a range of communities, from the most local to
the most global. I therefore distinguish cosmopolitanism from a universalist vision (often associated with cosmopolitanism), which sees people solely, or primarily, as members of one world community. See infra text accompanying notes 778-782 (explaining
cosmopolitanism's recognition of the "multi-rootedness" of individuals). Cosmopolitanism, as I use the term, involves an ideal of multiple attachments; it does not necessarily entail the erasure of nonglobal community affiliations. See, e.g.,
Bruce Robbins,
Introduction PartI: Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism,in COSMOPOLITICS: THINKING AND
FEELING BEYOND THE NATION 1, 3 (Pheng Cheah & Bruce Robbins eds., 1998)
("[I]nstead of an ideal of detachment, actually existing cosmopolitanism is a reality of
(re)attachment, multiple attachment, or attachment at a distance.").
30 DOREEN MASSEY, SPACE, PLACE, AND GENDER 154 (1994).
31 Of course, even if a court asserted jurisdiction over a dispute, other doctrines,
such as standing or causation, might still lead a court to limit the scope of the available
relief.
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ing jurisdiction over an actor, and the normative desirability of conceptualizing the parties before the court as members of the same legal
jurisdiction.
In addition, if nation-states are imagined, historically contingent
communities defined by admittedly arbitrary geographical boundaries, and if those nation-states-because of transnational flows of information, capital, and people-no longer define unified communities (if they ever did), then there is no conceptual justification for
conceiving of nation-states as possessing a monopoly on the assertion
of jurisdiction. Instead, any comprehensive theory of jurisdiction
must acknowledge that non-state communities also assert various claims
to jurisdictional authority and articulate alternative norms that are often incorporated into more "official" legal regimes. This pluralist"
understanding ofjurisdiction helps us to see that law is not merely the
coercive command of a sovereign power, but a language for imagining
alternative future worlds. Moreover, various norm-generating communities (not just the sovereign) are always contesting the shape of
such worlds.
Of course, not all assertions of jurisdiction ultimately possess the
coercive force we often associate with law. One of the obvious reasons
that nation-states have been the primary jurisdictional entities of the
past several hundred years is that those states have wielded the power
to enforce theirjudgments. In contrast, many jurisdictional assertions
may never have such coercive force behind them. Crucial to my argument, however, is the distinction between the assertion of jurisdiction and the ability to enforce ajudgment. The assertion of jurisdiction opens a space for the articulation of a norm. Then, communities

"2 This broader conception of jurisdiction would necessarily affect choice of law as
well, but a more detailed exploration of how these ideas apply to choice of law must
await further elaboration in a future project.
.3 Political pluralism includes "theories that seek to organize and conceptualize
political phenomena on the basis of the plurality of groups to which individuals belong
and by which individuals seek to advance and, more important, to develop, their interests." AVIGAiL 1. EISENBERG, RECONSTRUCTING POLrIrICAL PLURALISM 2 (1995). Thus, I
use the term to refer to situations where "two or more legal systems coexist in the same
social field," Sally Engel Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC'Y REV. 869, 870 (1988),
even if one or both of those legal systems is not an "official," state-based system. For
further discussions of legal pluralism, see CAROL WEISBROD, EMBLEMS OF PLURALISM:
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND TH-E STATE (2002); David Engel, Legal Pluralism in an
American Community: Perspectives on a Civil Trial Court, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 425;
Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering,and Indigenous Law, 19 J.
LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 28-34 (1981);Jobn Griffiths, What Is LegalPluralism?, 24J. LEGAL PLURALISM& UNOFFICIAL L. 1 (1986).
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assertingjurisdiction must convince those with greater coercive power
to enforce those norms. For example, when a Spanish judge chose to
4
assert jurisdiction over former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet,
that seizure ofjurisdiction had no literal power unless the judge could
rhetorically persuade other countries to recognize thejudgment.>' Although the Spanish prosecution ultimately did not proceed,5 ' the rhetorical force of the assertion of jurisdiction has changed. the
environ37
ment for future international human rights prosecutions. In a very
real sense then, the assertion of jurisdiction has shaped the future
world.

Spanish magistrate Baltasar Garzon issued an arrest order stating that Pinochet
was "the leader of an international organization created .. to conceive, develop, and
execute the systematic planning of illegal detentions, [kidnappings], torture, forced
relocations, assassinations and/or disappearances of numerous persons, including Argentines, Spaniards, Britons, Americans, Chileans, and other nationalities." Anne
Swardson, Pinoehet Case 7fies Spanish Legal Establishment, WASH. POSr, Oct. 22, 1998, at
A27. On October 30, 1998, the Spanish National Court ruled unanimously that Spanish courLs had jurisdiction over the matter based both on the principle of universal jurisdiction (that crimes against humanity can he tried anywhere at any time) and the
passive personality principle ofjurisdiction (that courts may try cases if their nationals
are victims of crime, regardless of where the crime was committed). For an English
translation of the opinion, see S Audiencia Nacional, Nov. 5, 1998 (No. 173/98), rep/nled in TIE PINOCHET PAPERS: THE CASE OF AUGUSTO PINOCHET IN SPAIN AND
BRITAIN 95, 107 (Reed Brody & Michael Ratner eds., 2000) [hereinafter PINOCHET
PAPERS]. The Office of the Special Prosecutor had alleged that Spaniards living in
Chile were atnong those killed under Pinochet's rule. PINOCH ET PAPERS, supra, at 106;
see also inra text accompanying notes 186-88 (discussing the Pinochetcase).
'15 In this instance, Pinochet was physically in
Great Britain. The British House of
Lords Ultimately ruled that Pinochet was not entitled to head-of-state immunity for acts
of torture and could be extradited to Spain. See Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary
Magistrate, I A.C. 147 (H.L.1999) (holding that the International Convention Against
Torture, incorporated into United Kingdom law in 1988, prevented Pinochet from
claiming head-of-state immtnity after 1988, because the universal jurisdiction contemplated by the Convention is inconsistent with immnnity for ex-heads of state).
The British government refused to extradite, citing Pinochet's failing health, see
Foreign SecretaryJack Straw, Statement in the House of Commons (Mar. 2, 2000), in
PINOCHIET PAPERS, supra note 34, at 481, 482 ("[I]n the light of th[e] medical evidence ... I conclude[d] that no purpose would be served by continuing the Spanish
extradition request."), and Pinochet was returned to Chile where, after domestic proceedings, he was deemed mentally unfit to stand trial, see Pinochet Unfit for Trial, Chilean
Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES,July 10, 2001, at A2 ("An appeals court ruled that Gen. Augusto
Pinochet, 85, is mentally unfit to stand trial ....
").
7 See Philippe Sands, Turtles and Torturers: The Transformation
of InternationalLaw,
33 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POt. 527, 536 (2001) ("i a way that was not necessarily predictable, a national court ...[has] made a connection between international law and a
broader set of values than those to which states have given express approval."); see also
infra Parts 1.1,
V.B.3.
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Thus, if a community asserts jurisdiction, it must-if it wants its
judgment enforced-convince others of the justice of its ruling and
the legitimacy of its assertion of community dominion. As a result, jurisdiction becomes the rhetorical site for discussions of multiple overlapping and shifting conceptions of community, and recognition of
judgments becomes the terrain on which these alternative conceptions of community vie for persuasive power and legitimacy.
The cosmopolitan pluralist jurisdictional framework I propose,
therefore, has two distinct normative components. First, it offers statesanctioned courts an approach to questions of jurisdiction that attends
to the social meaning of community definition and the construction
of space. This approach, I argue, is not only more satisfying conceptually, but also identifies and makes explicit the sort of analysis judges
are already intuitively beginning to use as they struggle to fashion jurisdictional rules in difficult cases. Second, my framework provides a
way of both recognizing and evaluating non-state jurisdictional assertions that bind sub-, supra-, or transnational communities. Such nonstate jurisdictional assertions include a wide range of entities, from official transnational and international regulatory and adjudicative bodies, to non-governmental quasi-legal tribunals, to private standardsetting or regulatory organizations. More broadly, the idea of a nonstate jurisdictional assertion seeks to capture the development of
transnational common law through the accretion of norms in practice.
My discussion proceeds in five parts. First, I describe some of the
challenges that the rise of cyberspace and globalization pose to a legal
system based on territorially based jurisdiction and fixed borders. The
existence of such challenges suggests that, in a wide variety of legal
settings, the rise of online interaction (and global interconnectedness
more broadly) has raised difficult questions about the extraterritorial
assertion of legal norms or adjudicatory authority. Second, I summarize several leading theories regarding how to adapt (if necessary) existing legal doctrine to address these challenges. These theories include schemes that seek large changes in contemporary legal regimes,
as well as arguments that cyberspace and globalization present no true
practical problem at all, and a number of positions in between. Although both the challenges and the responses have been major topics
in the legal literature over the past few years, I believe that simply surveying conceptual difficulties that cut across a variety of doctrinal areas affords a more comprehensive view of the way in which territorially based understandings of legal rules have become problematic.
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Third, I argue that these various theories are unsatisfying because they
fail to pay sufficient attention to the social meaning of legal jurisdiction and community definition. Then I begin to develop a more
complex portrait of jurisdiction and its social meaning by identifying
four different ways in which jurisdiction operates to constitute communities and define borders. Fourth, I survey some of the literature
from other disciplines that complicates our understanding of the nation-state, community definition, territorial borders, and belonging.
This literature reveals that far from having fixed geographical
boundaries, community alliances are multiple, overlapping, and often
contested, and that they frequently operate at a sub-, supra-, or transnational level. Moreover, the definition of community emerges as a
politically charged (and sometimes hegemonic) social construction.
Fifth, drawing on this literature, I begin to construct a cosmopolitan
pluralist model for understanding the globalization ofjurisdiction. In
this model, jurisdictional assertions and contests about judgment recognition are placed at the center of debates about community definition and norm development. Finally, I discuss how such a conception
might operate-and in some cases already is operating-in both cyberspace and international law practice, revisiting a few of the challenges discussed in Part I. This discussion suggests ways in which a
cosmopolitan pluralist framework might contribute both to a more
satisfying framework for state-sanctioned courts considering jurisdictional issues and a more detailed understanding of the wide variety of
non-state assertions ofjurisdiction.
One must always be wary of claims that the environment we live in
today is radically different from anything that has come before. And,
undoubtedly, some of the breathless quality of globalization and cyberspace literature is unwarranted. Indeed, by some measures, the
world was just as "global" and interconnected at the end of the nineteenth century as it is today," and we have been communicating over
wires across nation-state borders for over a hundred years. In addition, although nation-states are historically contingent, they are, of
course, significantly embedded in historical, social, and political contexts and continue to exert a powerful psychological and symbolic
hold on the psyche of many. Thus, the idea of nation-state sovereignty is not likely to end anytime soon, though the nature of that
sovereignty certainly is shifting.
38 See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, At This Rate, We'll
Be Global in Another Hundred Years,
N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1999, at 5 (suggesting that labor, goods, and capital moved across
nation-state borders at least as much in the period from 1860 to 1900 as in the 1990s).

2002]

GLOBALIZA TION OFJURISDICTION

It is not my intention, however, to prove conclusively that the twin
engines of globalization and online interaction are necessarily creating an entirely new crisis that must be "solved" by revisiting the concept of legal jurisdiction (though I do not rule out that possibility either). Nor does my argument depend on any idea that the nationstate is dying or that it will cease to function as a primary means of defining political community anytime soon. Nevertheless, although it is
dubious to assume that everything has changed in the past decade, it
is also dubious to assume that nothing has. And while people in almost any given geographical location undoubtedly have always been
affected by extraterritorial activities to some degree, in the past those
effects were far more likely to be at least somewhat related to geographical proximity than they are today. ' Even a cursory glance at a
major newspaper on most days indicates, at the very least, that territorially based
sovereigns are facing challenges regulating in this new envi4
ronment. 0
Such periods of challenge and adaptation are also moments of
opportunity. Just as the increasing use of legal fictions in an area of
law often indicates that the area is in flux, so too the widespread acknowledgment that new social developments challenge traditional legal rules indicates that those rules may benefit from reexamination.
Thus, my aim in this Article is more limited: to lay out some of the
conceptual challenges nation-states currently face in attempting to
maintain distinctive territorially based regulatory regimes; to enrich
our descriptive understanding of what it means in social as well as legal terms to assert jurisdiction over a territorially distant act or actor;
to consider whether territorially based legal regimes fit people's experience of place, borders, and community affiliation; and to begin con-

39

See David G. Post, Against "Against Cyberanarchy," 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forth-

coming 2002) (manuscript at 18, on file with author) ("A plot of the location of all
events and transactions taking place in cyberspace that have an effect on persons and
property in [any particular location] will have virtually no geographic structure at
all."), available at http://www.temple.edu/lawschool/dpost/Cyberanarchy.PDF (last
visited Dec. 4, 2002).
40 See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Sovereignty Studies in Constitutional
Law: A
Comment, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 197, 201-02 (2000) (noting that "there is no reason to
assume that the nation-state form will be around forever" and identifying "serious challenges to nation-state sovereignty from three directions[:] supra-national norms and
structures [(including international human rights and trade law),] subnational
groups.., demanding (and receiving) increasing degrees of autonomy, [and] 'transnationalism'-the presence within state borders Of communities of non-nationals with
significant ties across borders").
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structing a model that might allow the jurisdictional inquiry to correspond more accurately to this lived experience.
Although I offer one possible alternative approach to jurisdiction,
it is less important that others embrace this particular framework than
that whatever models they develop attend to the social meaning of legal jurisdiction as an important field of discourse and study. Indeed,
those who argue that we need not change our jurisdictional framework at all will at least be forced to articulate a coherent understanding of community from which that framework arises and then test the
framework against the experience of people who supposedly belong
to such communities. Thus, if scholars wish to defend the nation-state
as the only relevant jurisdictional entity or adopt a particular test for
evaluating various assertions of jurisdiction, they must justify their
normative choices; they cannot simply assume the jurisdictional world
they assert is natural or inevitable.
In the end, this Article is premised on the belief that a more nuanced appreciation of the social meaning of jurisdiction helps bring
together central strands of thought within cyberspace law, international law, civil procedure, and the cultural analysis of law. By viewing
the problem ofjurisdiction from all of these disciplinary perspectives
at once, we can see that the traditional doctrinal boundaries interfere
with a fuller understanding ofjurisdictional rules. Indeed, it seems to
me that cyberspace legal theory and international law increasingly are
merging and that the place of intersection is the domain of jurisdiction and its social meaning. Like civil procedure, international law
has long since moved away from a model of strict territoriality, yet its
conceptualization of jurisdictional rules is similarly unsuccessful in
addressing the broad range of legal challenges and the multitude of
community affiliations at play in today's world. Even the recent U.S.
government efforts to detain and possibly prosecute suspected Al
Qaeda terrorists can perhaps more usefully be analyzed through a
conception of legal jurisdiction and community membership that focuses on social meaning4' Thus, the idea of jurisdiction provides a
particularly fruitful cross-disciplinary site for investigating the effects
of globalization on legal systems.

41

See infra text accompanying notes 930-43 (applying a cosmopolitan pluralist

model to the question of determining the community membership of U.S. citizens accused of aiding Al Qaeda terrorists).
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This Part surveys some of the conceptual challenges that have
arisen in the past few years concerning the extraterritorial assertion of
legal norms or adjudicatory authority to activity that, in one way or
another, creates effects across borders. Although the list of challenges
is by no means exhaustive, my goal is to suggest that in a wide array of
doctrinal areas the rise of online communication and global interconnectedness has forced courts and policy makers to wrestle with the
difficulty of mapping a jurisdictional system based on fixed borders2
onto a world that resists-in a myriad of ways-such neat divisions.
Moreover, many of the examples also challenge territorially based assumptions about nation-state sovereignty. Indeed, the traditional understanding of inviolate national boundaries has been called into
question by the increase of cross-border interaction and the rise of
transnational and international administrative and judicial bodies.
Thus, the precise contours of both extraterritorial adjudication and
nation-state sovereignty are in flux.
For those who follow the legal literature on Internet-related developments, none of these scenarios-except possibly the challenge of
international human rights-is new. Indeed, many of these issues
have been explored by various scholars during the past several years,
and many "solutions" to the challenges have been proposed. Nevertheless, although some (or perhaps all) of these challenges might be
resolved without rethinking the concept of jurisdiction, I believe the
existence of so many challenges creates the space for such rethinking
to occur. To take one example, discussed in more detail below,'* it
certainly is the case that U.S. courts are capable of adapting the InternationalShoe minimum contacts test44 to the online environment. And
perhaps this approach is best. But it seems to me that, before the new
adaptations become too entrenched, we might take this moment of
transition to ask the findamental questions that a narrow focus on
Such a jurisdictional system includes both adjudicatory jurisdiction and prescriptive jurisdiction (or choice of law). In this Article, I refer to both inquiries as issues of jurisdiction writ large. See supra note 21 (outlining the classification scheme for
jurisdiction and discussing the types of jurisdiction treated in this Article).
43 See infra Part llJ.1 (discussing various efforts to apply the International
Shoe
minimum contacts test to online interaction).
44 See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (establishing
a test.
for determining whether an assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with the Due
Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution based on whether the defendant had sufficient
contacts with the relevant state "such that maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice"').
42
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adaptation never permits one to ask. Moreover, as I discuss later in
the Article , there is at least some evidence that courts and policymakers are already embracing more flexible understandings of jurisdiction and national boundaries, and not simply adapting settled jurisdictional and choice-of-law rules. Thus, the time for reexamination
is now. The challenges discussed below may give some sense of why.
A. The Challenge of "Minimum Contacts" in Cyberspace
The U.S. Supreme Court's InternationalShoe test for determining
whether an assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with the Due
Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution asks whether the defendant
has sufficient contact with the relevant state "such that... maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. '"'4 This "minimum contacts" test is satisfied as long
as the "quality and nature of the activity" of the defendant within the
forum state is sufficient "in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to
insure." 7 Although this test is obviously a matter of U.S. constitutional law and therefore not binding on courts elsewhere, it provides a
useful starting point because the problems of extraterritorial activity
affect all territorially based jurisdictional systems, even those that define the scope ofjurisdiction (or choice of law) somewhat differently.
Since 1945, the minimum contacts test has provided the framework for determining the outer limits of personal jurisdiction under
the U.S. Constitution."8 Nevertheless, although the test's flexibility is

45

47

Infra Part lIJ.1.
Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
Id. at 319.

The minimum contacts test, of course, establishes only the outer limit for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction. Although states cannot assert jurisdiction beyond that
which the Federal Constitution allows, they may choose to exercise less than the full
authority granted by the Constitution. Some states have crafted their own statutes that
voluntarily restrict their jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants beyond that which the
Federal Constitution requires. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 2002) (restricting
New York's jurisdiction more than is required by the Federal Constitution); see also
FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 75 (5th ed. 2001) (noting that "legislatures adopting these [jurisdictional] statutes ... presumably do not wish to reach the
Constitutional limit"). In those states, courts may exercise personal jurisdiction only if
the case falls within the limits of the state statute and jurisdiction is permitted under
the Federal Constitution. See LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPrl V. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE
277 (1994) ("In addition to the issues of constitutional validity that arise whenever any
long-arm statute is applied to the facts of a specific case, there also exist questions of
statutory applicability that must be worked out on a case-by-case basis.").
48
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its greatest strength, such flexibility has meant that the minimum contacts analysis does not provide a clearly defined rule because it relies
instead on a highly particularized, fact-specific inquiry. Accordingly, it
is difficult to be certain in advance how many and what sort of contacts will be enough for a state to exercise personal jurisdiction under
the Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court has variously looked to
whether defendants have "purposefully avail[ed]" themselves of the
state's laws,41' whether they could "reasonably anticipate" that they
would be sued there, or whether the interests of the state in adjudicating a dispute outweighed the defendants' concerns about increased
cost, inconvenience, or potential bias. 1 In addition, some members of
the Court have indicated that a state may assert personal jurisdiction
even when the only link to the forum state is that a corporation "'dethat
livers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation
State.' 52
they will be purchased by consumers in the forum
Not surprisingly, the growth of the Internet has added new wrinkles to the minimum contacts test. After all, when I post information
on a website, it is immediately accessible throughout the world. Have

49 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) ("[I]t is essential in
each case

that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.").
50 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)
("[T]he foreseeability that is critical to [the exercise of state-court jurisdiction] ...is
that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.").
51 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77
(1985) (allowing a
court to consider establishment of minimum contacts "in light of other factors," such
as "'the burden on the defendant"' and "'the forum State's interest in adjudicating the
dispute"' (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292)).
52 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102,
119-20 (1987) (Brennan,J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298). In Asahi, four Justices indicated that simply placing a product into the stream of commerce would not be sufficient to establish
jurisdiction wherever that product happened to end up. Id. at 112 (O'Connor, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Powell, Scalia, 11.). Instead, these Justices would require
some sort of "additional conduct" by the defendant that would demonstrate that the
defendant had the specific "intent or purpose to serve the market" in the state exercising jurisdiction. Id. Four otherJustices (including Justice Brennan) disagreed, arguing that simply placing a product into the stream of commerce was sufficient. Id. at
117 (Brennan,J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment). The ninthJustice, Justice Stevens, found that, based on the facts of the case, jurisdiction was improper under either test and therefore declined to choose between them. Id. at 121-22
(Stevens,J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). As a result, neither
rationale achieved a majority, and the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
stream-of-commerce question since.
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I then "purposely availed" myself of any jurisdiction where someone
views that website? Can I "reasonably anticipate" that the information
posted will be viewed elsewhere? Have I placed my site into the
"stream of commerce" and if so; does that mean I should be amenable
to suit wherever the site is available?
B. The Challenge of E-Commerce
If a consumer purchases goods online, what law should apply to
the transaction, and which jurisdiction will adjudicate any subsequent
dispute? In many cases, the consumerwill not know whether the website she has just accessed is "located" on a server just down the street
or on a different continent (and indeed a single website may have
elements that reside on multiple servers in multiple locations). For
example, if a French consumer accesses a "Swedish" website, has she
somehow "entered" Sweden for purposes ofjurisdiction and choice of
law?
Moreover, the possibility that the site itself might require the consumer to agree to contractual terms that include choice-of-law and forum selection clauses may not fully resolve the dilemma.
Some
countries may determine that such "clickstream" agreements are enforceable,54 while others might view them as not being true bargains
because the bargaining power among the participants might be unequal. Or countries might determine that consumer protection issues

Cf Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 204-06 (2d Cir. 1955)
(FrankJ., dissenting) (arguing that a choice-of-law provision in a contract of adhesion
should not be honored). See generally, Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the
Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 1072, 1089-90 (1953) (arguing that American
courts should justify not enforcing choice-of-law provisions in adhesion contracts by
recognizing that the principle of party autonomy has no place in conflicts law, rather
than by misconstruing contract law).
54 See, e.g., Kilgallen v. Network Solutions Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d
125, 129 (D. Mass.
2000) (holding that forum selection clauses are enforceable unless proven unreasonable under the circumstances); Forrest v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 805 A.2d
1007, 1010-11 (D.C. 2002) (holding that a consumer received adequate notice of the
forum selection clause in an electronic contract); Rudder v. Microsoft Corp., [1999] 2
C.P.R.4th 474 (Ont. Super. Ct.J.) (holding that to find the forum selection clause unenforceable would undermine the integrity of any agreement entered into through the
web).
55 See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.,
No. 01-7870, 2002 WL
31166784, at *2-4 (2d Cir. Oct. 1, 2002) (ruling that Internet users could not be bound
by a license agreement mandating arbitration when the provision was buried on the
second page of a free software download program); Comb v. PayPal, Inc., No. C-021227JF, 2002 WL 2002171, at *6-9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2002) (refusing to enforce an
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implicate public values
. 56 that cannot simply be contracted away by parties to a transaction. If so, which jurisdiction's consumer protection
law should apply?
The European Union (EU), in an attempt to address these challenges, adopted a directive5' in early summer 2000 enshrining the
"country of origin" principle for such sales. Under the directive, the
law of the country of the merchant or service provider applies in the
event of a dispute . Several months later, however, the European
Commission5' indicated that it might adopt the so-called Rome I1
Regulation, which would reverse the directive and make the laws of
the consumer's country apply in cross-border e-commerce disputes, absent contractual provisions to the contrary. ° Since then, tinder heavy

pressure from business interests, the EU has backed off the idea of
enacting Rome ll.1'; These flip-flops demonstrate how contentious the
question ofjurisdiction over e-commerce activities has become.

arbitration clause in an electronic contract ol grounds of procedural and substantive
unconscionability).
56 See, e.g., Williams v. Am. Online, Inc., No. 00-0962,
2001 WL 135825, at. *3
(Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 2001) (refusing to enforce forum selection clause contained
in America Online's Terms of Service agreement in part because "[p]ublic policy suggests that Massachusetts consumers who individually have damages of only a few hundred dollars should not have to pursue AOL in Virginia").
57 A directive by the European Union is binding
legislation on the Member States
as to the result(s) achieved, but allows national authorities the choice of various methods of implementation. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPIAN COMMUNIlY, Nov.
10, 1997, art. 249, O.J. (C 340) 2 (1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY].
58 See Council Directive 2000/31, art. 22, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 4 ("[l]nformation
society services should ... be subject to the law of the Member State in which the service provider is established.").
.59
The European Commission is the EU's functional equivalent to the executive
branch in the United States. See EC TREA7IY, supra note 57, at arts. 211-19 (establishing
the European Commission and describing its powers and duties).
See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament on E-commerce and Financial Services, COM(01)66 final at 8 (holding
that, in the absence of a choice-of-law provision in a consumer contract, the contract is
governed by the law of the consumer's "habitual residence").
61 See John Duckers, Regudation Tide Begins to Recede, BIRMINGHAM POST, Feb. 15,
2002, at 24, 2002 WL 13710809 (reporting that the European Commission has
"shelved" its Rome II negotiations, indicating that "'business is making its voice heard
in Europe's corridors of power"' (quoting Andrew Sparrow, Partner, Lee Crowder Solicitors)); Paul Meller, Europe Panel Is Rethinking How It Views t-Commerce, N.Y. TIMES,
June 27, 2001, at W1 (noting the EC's reversal on the country-of-destination approach).
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C. The Challenge of InternationalTaxation
Historically, taxation regimes have been based on geography and
have depended on the traditional nation-state structure."' Thus, the
issue of who gets to collect a tax generally boils down to questions
such as: Where did the transaction take place? Where did the income
stream arise? Where is the company located? Needless to say, these
questions can be quite difficult to resolve in the context of digital
transactions. Indeed, one commentator has noted: "[T]he basic assumption underlying economic governance in the modern era is that,
regardless of how international the world economy, any transaction
can be located precisely in two dimensional geographic space."' 3! He
goes on to state bluntly, however, that "[gleography does not map on
cyberspace.""'
For example, imagine a company that provides online data services or that transmits wireless messages via satellite. Should the profits
from these services be taxed in any country where the business has
customers?
The overwhelming majority of bilateral income tax
agreements allow taxation if a business maintains a "permanent establishment" (PE) in a particular jurisdiction, but otherwise does not allow taxation of "business profits" derived from that jurisdiction.
In
an e-commerce world, the need to have such a permanent establishment is dramatically reduced. A company may maintain no particular

62

See Michael J. Graetz, Taxing InternationalIncome: InadequatePrinciples, Outdated

Concelts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 277-82 (2001) (discussing the
history of, and justifications for, the focus in tax policy on the prerogatives and inter-

ests of nation-states). In fact, most modern countries have based their tax policies on
traditional notions of a nation-state's sovereign authority over its subjects. See Stephen
G. Utz, Tax Harmonization and Coordination in Europe and America, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L.
767, 769 (1994) [hereinafter Utz, Tax Harmonization] ("Until recently, discussions of
tax policy usually assumed that a taxing sovereign could... [tax] almost exclusively...
the economic conduct of its own citizens."). Early tax policy analysts assumed that the
geographically fixed nation-state possessed inherent taxing authority, reflecting the
unrivalled view that "nations were natural units and that within their bounds national
governments were sovereign for all purposes." STEPHEN G. UTz, TAX POLICY: AN
INTRODUCTION AND SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPAL DEBATEs 56 (1993). Under this vision,
nation-states "claim full taxing authority over people, property, and transactions
'within' their territory." Id. at 195.
0
Stephen J. Kobrin, Taxing Internet Transactions, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.
L. 666,
671 (2000).
64 Id.

65 See, e.g., MODEL TAx CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL art.
7, § I (Org.
for Econ. Cooperation & Dev. Comm. on Fiscal Affairs 1997) (stating that an enterprise of one state doing business in another shall not be taxed in the second state unless it has a permanent establishment there).
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physical presence in the country at issue. Or the only presence may
be a server located in the country, but normally that server is owned
or operated by someone else. Are the electronic signals passing
through the server sufficient to create a presence or "permanent establishment" so as to justify taxation?
The Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which administers the
model income tax convention that forms the basis of most bilateral
agreements, recently attempted to clarify the definition of what constitutes a "permanent establishment" (PE):
[T]he clarification states that a web site cannot, in itself, constitute a PE;
that a web site hosting arrangement typically does not result in a PE for
the enterprise that carries on business through that web site; that an
Internet service provider normally will not constitute a dependent agent
of another enterprise so as to constitute a PE for that enterprise and that
while a place where computer equipment, such as a server, is located
may in certain circumstances constitute a permanent establishment, this
requires that the functions performed at that place be significant as well
as an essential or core part of the business activity of the enterprise.66

While this clarification may sound reasonable, it poses a major problem for developing countries that rely on tax revenue from foreign investment because corporations can now more easily avoid local taxation by maintaining only an "e-presence" in a given country.67
(f Press Release, Technical Advisory Group, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Progresses Towards Achieving an International Consensus on the Tax Treatment of E-Commerce (Dec. 2, 2001), at http://www.oecd.org/
EN/document/0,,EN-document-590-17-no-12-6697-590,00.htm; see also OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Claification on the Application of the Permanent Establishment Definition in E-Commerce: Changes to the Commentary on the Model Tax Convention on Article 5
para. 3., Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 3 (Dec. 22,
2000), at http://www.oecd.org/daf/fa/ecom/ec_lPE-Eng.pdf (providing the language used in the press release). Similarly, language on taxation in the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law requires that corporations have a physical presence within ajurisdiction before a state can tax its income. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 412 (1987) (noting that a state may tax corporations if they have a physical presence within the state or conduct business within
the state).
67 Even within the United States, the issue of physical nexus is
controversial. For
example, California's State Board of Equalization recently issued an opinion asserting
that Borders.com can be required to collect California sales tax despite the fact that
Borders.com has no property or employees in California. See Borders Online, Inc., SC
OHA 97-638364 56270, at 4 (Cal. Bd. Equalization Sept. 26, 2001) (mem.),
http://www.boe.ca.gov/legal/pdf/borders.pdf) (holding that Borders.com's in-state
authorized representatives for receiving product returns created a "substantial nexus"
between Borders.com and the state). The board based its opinion on the fact that
Borders Books stores-a separate corporation that does have a physical presence in
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Turning from income taxes to consumption taxes, while local
governments can impose a tax on residents' purchases from distant
vendors, they will find it difficult to impose an obligation on those8
vendors to collect the tax absent a physical presence in the locality.'
In addition, increasing e-commerce may lead to the gradual elimination of intermediaries, who have been crucial for identifying taxpayers.9 Finally, although so-called "low value" shipments across borders
historically have been granted de minimis relief from customs duties
and taxes, the rise of e-commerce may increase the number of direct
orders from foreign suppliers, leading either to substantial loss of tax
revenue or higher customs collection costs."' Thus, as with income
taxes, there are fears -that e-commerce will result in an erosion of the
consumption tax base, which might disproportionately affect the
economies of developing countries. '
Stephen J. Kobrin, Director of the Wharton School's Institute of
Management and International Studies, recently offered an example
of the difficulties. 72 Assume a software programmer in India is working in real time to upgrade a bank's computer system in New York; using the bank's servers, which are in New Jersey; so that the bank's accounting office, located in Ireland, can function more efficiently.
Certainly an economically valuable service 73is being rendered, but
where does the taxable transaction take place?
Kobrin argues that in discussions of Internet taxation issues such
as this one, four assumptions are generally at work. First, taxation

California-accepts returns of books purchased online at Borders.con, thus establishing the requisite "nexus" between the two. /(. at 5. While it is beyond the scope of this
Article to debate whether this particular determination isjustified, the tenuous nature
of the nexus inquily is clear.
CIS
See Richard Jones & Subhajit Basi, Taxation of Electronic Commerce: A Developing
Problem, 16 INT'L REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 35, 38 (2002) ("Whereas states can impose a tax on residents' purchases from out-of-state vendors, they cannot impose an
obligation on those vendors to collect the tax unless the vendor has a substantial presence, or nexus, in the state.").
See id. at 37 (arguing that e-commerce "leads to the gradual elimination of intermediaries, such as wholesalers or local retailers, who in the past have been critical
for identifying taxpayers, especially private consumers").
70 See id. at 37-38 (explaining the challenge that tax and customs authorities
face
from an increase in "low Value" shipments since the amount of tax due on such shipments is lower than the cost of collection).
71 See id. at 41 (discussing a study indicating that, although developing
countries
account for only sixteen percent of world imports of digitized goods, their share of tariff revenue loss for such goods is almost double that of industrialized countries).
72 Kobrin, supra note 63, at 670-71.
7. See id. (posing a hypothetical that presents the same problem).
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should be economically neutral-that is, it should not influence the
location or form of economic activity. Second, transactions that are
either doubly or triply taxed, or not taxed at all, should be avoided.
Third, there should be an equitable distribution of tax revenue.
Fourth, fiscal sovereignty based on geographically defined nation74
As the question of permanent estabstates should be maintained.
lishment indicates, however, it will be difficult to satisfy all four of
these principles simultaneously. Indeed, given the nongeographic nature of digital transactions, "it may be impossible to resolve 'jurisdictional' issues, distribute revenue, or even collect sufficient revenues to
sustain governmental activities while maintaining the practice or principle of mutually exclusive jurisdiction-political and economic control exercised through control over geography. '7 ' According to Kobrin, an efficient and just tax system may ultimately require a far
greater degree of international cooperation and redistribution than
we have seen in global tax policy thus far. 6
D. The Challenge of ExtraterritorialRegulation of Speech
Cyberspace creates the possibility (and perhaps even the likelihood) that content posted online by a person in one physical location
will violate the law in some other physical location. In such circumstances there is an inevitable problem of extraterritoriality. Will the
person who posts the content be required to conform her activities to
the norms of the most restrictive community of readers? Or, alternatively, will the community of readers, which has adopted a norm regarding Internet content, be subjected to the proscribed material regardless of its wishes? The answers to these questions depend in part
on whether the community of readers asserts the jurisdictional authority to impose its norms on the foreign content provider.
Recently, a French court addressed this jurisdictional issue and
claimed the power to regulate the content of an American website accessible in France. On May 22, 2000, the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris issued a preliminary injunction against Yahoo.com,

74 Id. at 672.
75 Id.
76

See id. ("In the digital age, effective, efficient, and just tax systems may require

substantive international cooperation."); see alsoJones & Basu, supra note 68, at 49 (arguing that the OECD is "dominated by the U.S. and the developed world," resulting in
"solutions devised for and beneficial to the developed world"). See generally Utz, Tax
Harmonization, supra note 62, at 767-72 (describing the difficulties of forging international tax policy).
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ordering the site to take all possible measures to dissuade and prevent
access in France of Yahoo! auction sites that sell Nazi memorabilia or
other items that are sympathetic to Nazism or constitute holocaust
denial." Undisputedly, selling such merchandise in France would violate French law,"' and Yahoo.fr, Yahoo!'s French subsidiary, complied
with requests that access to such sites be blocked.'' What made this
action noteworthy was the fact that the suit was brought not only
against Yahoo.fr, but against Yahoo.com, an American corporation,
and the fact that the court sought to enjoin access to non-French websites stored on Yahoo!'s non-French servers.
Of course, one can easily see why the court and the complainants
in this action would have taken this additional step. Shutting down
access to web pages on Yahoo.fr does no good at all if French citizens
can, with the click of a mouse, simply go to Yahoo.com and access
those same pages. On the other hand, Yahoo! argued that the French
assertion of jurisdiction was impermissibly extraterritorial in scope.80
According to Yahoo!, in order to comply with the injunction it would
need to remove the pages from its servers altogether (not just for
French people), thereby denying such material to non-French citizens, many of whom have the right to access the materials under the
laws of their countries."' Most important, Yahoo! argued that such extraterritorial censoring of American web content would run afoul of
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution." Thus, Yahoo! and
others"' contended that the French assertion of jurisdiction was an

77

T.G.l.

Paris,

May

22,

2000,

http://www.juriscoin.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/

tgiparis2000522.htm. An example of the type of auction page at issue can be found at
lhttp://www.legalis.net/jnet/illstration/yahoo_auctions.htm
(last visited Oct. 22,
2002).
78 See CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] art. R. 645-1 (Fr.)
(prohibiting the public display of
Nazi memorabilia except for the purposes of an historical film, show, or exhibit).
70 See T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 20, 2000 (noting that Yahoo! France had posted warnings
on its site that through Yahoo! U.S., the user could access revisionist sites, the visiting
of which is prohibited and punishable by French law), http://www.juriscom.net/txt/
jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20001 120.htm.
8)

81
82
83

id.

Id.
1i.
See, e.g., Carl S. Kaplan, Experts See Online Speech Case as Belwether, N.Y. TIMES,

Jan. 5, 2001, at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/05/technology/05CYBERLAW.
html?pagewanted=print (quoting the warning of Barry Steinhardt, associate director of
the American Civil Liberties Union, that if "litigants and governments in other countries ... go after American service providers ... we could easily wind tip with a lowest
common denominator standard for protected speech on the Net").
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impermissible attempt by France to impose global rules for Internet
84
expression.
Interestingly, an Australian case decided the previous year had
adopted this same logic in refusing to enjoin material posted on the
Internet by a person in the United States that was allegedly defama85
tory under Australian law. According to the court, "Once published
on the Internet material can be received anywhere, and it does not lie
within the competence of the publisher to restrict the reach of the
publication."86 The court went on to explain:
The difficulties are obvious. An injunction to restrain defamation in
NSW [New South Wales] is designed to ensure compliance with the laws
of NSW, and to protect the rights of plaintiffs, as those rights are defined
by the law of NSW. Such an injunction is not designed to superimpose
the law of NSW relating to defamation on every other state, territory and
country of the world. Yet that would be the effect of an order restraining
publication on the Internet. It is not to be assumed that the law of
defamation in other countries is coextensive with that of NSW, and indeed, one knows that it is not. It may very well be that, according to the
law of the Bahamas, Tazhakistan, or Mongolia, the defendant has an unfettered right to publish the material. To make an order interfering with
exceed the proper limits of the use of the injunctive
such a right would
•
87
power of this court.

Thus, the court adopted precisely the type of argument Yahoo! made
before the French investigating judge and declined to make a ruling
88
that it saw as unavoidably extraterritorial in scope.
The French judge took a different tack, however, and decided to
investigate the empirical basis for Yahoo!'s position. Thus, the court
engaged a panel of three technical experts to determine whether Yahoo! could, under existing technology, identify and filter out French
users from the auction sites in question, while maintaining access to

As Greg Wrenn, associate general counsel for Yahoo!'s international division,
put it: "We are not going to acquiesce in the notion that foreign countries have unlimited urisdiction to regulate the content of U.S.-based sites." Id.
See Macquarie Bank Ltd. v. Berg (N.S.W.S. Ct. June 2, 1999) (refusing to grant
an order restraining the publication of allegedly defamatory material on the Internet
because such an order would impose the defamation laws of New South Wales on
other countries), http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/supreme_ct.
86 Id. at para. 12.
87 Id. at para. 14.
88 But see Gumick v. DowJones & Co., (V.S. Ct. Aug. 28, 2001) (asserting jurisdic84

tion over an American publisher for publishing on its website an article allegedly defaming an Australian citizen), http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/cases/
vic/VSC/2001 /305.html?query=title+%28+%22gutnick%22+%29.
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those sites for other users.s9 The panel, though partially divided," ultimately concluded that for approximately seventy percent of the
French users of Yahoo.com, identifying the location of the user would
be feasible. " Armed with that information, the court then reissued its
injunction." Meanwhile, a group of Auschwitz survivors initiated a
separate action in France against Yahoo! CEO Timothy Koogle because of the availability of Nazi-related goods on the site.
Rather than filter out French users, Yahoo! decided to remove the
auction sites from its servers altogether. Although Yahoo! claimed
that its decision was "voluntary" and unrelated to the French court ruling, 4 civil libertarians viewed Yahoo!'s capitulation as evidence that

See T.G.I. Paris, Aug. 11, 2000 (ordering the formation of a panel
of technical
experts to determine whether Yahoo could identify and filter out French users from
the sites found to violate French law), http://www.legalis.net/cgi-iddn/french/
affiche-jnet.cgi?droite=decisions/responsabilite/ord-tgi-paris 110800.htm.
One of the three members, Vinton Cerf, objected to
the part of the experts' report recommending that Yahoo! be forced to ask users their location upon accessing
the site. See T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 20, 2000 (providing Cerf's objections), http://
www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis2OOOll20.htm.
According to Cerf, such a
requirement would be both ineffectual (because users could lie and because Yahoo!
could not force sites accessed through Yahoo! to ask about location) and an invasion of
privacy. Id. In addition, Cerf argued that any order should not extend to French citizens who are not in French territory at the time of their access to the Internet because
the court's jurisdiction as to those individuals is unclear. Id. Although a second member of the expert panel, Ben Laurie, did not dissent from the recommendation, he
subsequently posted to the web an open letter, titled "An Expert's Apology." Open
Letter from Ben Laurie, An Expert's Apology (Nov. 21, 2000), at http://www.apachessl.org/apology.html. In the letter, Laurie explained that though the panel had attempted to answer the narrow question posed by the court (to what extent was it technically possible for Yahoo! to comply with the court's order), the expert report did not
necessarily reflect his policy opinion on the question. Id. Laurie also argued that any
geographical filtering would be "inaccurate, ineffective and trivially avoid[able]" and
would impose a tremendous burden on services such as Yahoo!, which would be required "to maintain a huge matrix of pages versus jurisdictions to see who can and
can't see what." Id.
M See T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 6, 2000 (setting forth the report of
court-appointed
experts), http://www.jt, riscom.net/txt/jurisfi-/cti/tgiparis2000l]06-rp.htm.
'2 See T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, supra note 90 (ordering Yahoo! to comply with
8q

the court's order of May 22, 2000).
03 See, e.g., French Auschwitz Group Sues Yahoo. ,
REUTERS, Jan. 23, 2001, at http://
news.zdlnet.co.uk/stoiy/0,,t269-s2083893,00.html (reporting that the group seeks "a
symbolic one franc of damages").
94 See Press Release, Yahoo!, Yahoo! Enhances
Commerce Sites for Higher Quality
Online Experience (Jan. 2, 2001), at http://docs.yahoo.com/locs/pr/release675.html
(announcing new product guidelines for its auction sites that prohibit "items that are
associated with groups which promote or glorify hatred and violence"). But cf Troy
Wolverton & Jeff Pelline, Yahoo to Charge Auction Fees, Ban Hate Materials, CNET
NEWS.COM, Jan. 2, 2001, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1007-200-4352889.html
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the French court had successfully engaged in extraterritorial censorship. Indeed, on its face, the French ruling looked like the classic
1808 case in which Lord Ellenborough ruled that a default judgment
against a British citizen issued in Tobago should not be enforced and
asked rhetorically, "Can the island of Tobago pass a law to bind the
rights of the whole world?" 9
Although in conflict with the Australian defamation case, the
French judgment is not anomalous. Shortly after the French court
ruling, Italy's highest court, in an appeal of an online defamation
case, ruled that Italian courts can assertjurisdiction over foreign-based
websites and shut them down if they do not abide by Italian law." The
court determined, as in Yahoo., that Italian courts have jurisdiction either when an act or omission has actually been committed on Italian
territory or when simply the effects or consequences of an act are felt in
Italy. Likewise, Germany's second-highest court ruled that an Australian website owner-whose website questioning the Holocaust is illegal in Germany but not in Australia-could be jailed for violating
German speech laws. 99 Germany's interior minister subsequently announced that he was examining "the possibilities of using [German]
civil laws to sue the creators of right-wing web sites based in the USA
(noting that Yahoo!'s new policy regarding hate-related materials followed action by
the French court).
. See, e.g., Center for Democracy and Technology, A Briefing on Public Policy Issues
Affecting Civil Liberties Online, 6 CDT POLICY POST (Nov. 21, 2000), at http://
www.cdt.org/publications/pp-6.20.shtml (discussing the dangerous precedent set for
countries seeking to restrict free expression outside their borders); see alsoJen Muehlbauer, Borderless Net, RIP?, INDUSTRY STANDARD, Nov. 21, 2000, at http://
thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,20331,00.html (criticizing the French court's
ruling on the ground that it imposed international censorship on the Internet).
Buchanan v. Rucker, 103 Eng. Rep. 546, 547 (K.B. 1808).
97 Cass., 27 dec. 2000, translated at http://www.cdt.org/speech/international/
001227italiandecision.pdf; see also Italy: Foreign 'Net Sites Can Be Closed, UPI, Jan. 10,
2001, LEXIS, UPI File (reporting decision and noting that "[i]t was not immediately
clear, however, how [an order to shut down a foreign web site] could be implemented
or enforced"). The case was brought by a Jewish man who said he was defamed by a
number of websites that claimed he was holding his two daughters captive in the city of
Genoa and was preventing them from practicing Judaism. Cass., 27 dec. 2000, supra.
In fact, the man had been granted sole custody of the girls after his wife had taken
them to Israel and married an ultra-orthodox rabbi. Id.
9 Cass., 27 dec. 2000, supra note 97.
99 See Australian Faces Trial for Holocaust Denial, REUTERS, Dec.
14, 2000, at http://
www.zdnet.com.au/newstech/news/story/0,2000025345,20107617,00.htm
("[T] he
Federal Supreme Court in Germany ruled that the former school teacher could be
charged with inciting racial hatred under German law because the offending material,
which denied the deaths of millions ofJews during the Nazi era, could be accessed by

German Internet users.").
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that have an effect in Germany."'' 0 Even in Australia, a second ruling
has been issued in a separate online defamation case that contradicts
the earlier one.101
Most recently, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal ordered
Ernst Ziindel, a former Canadian resident now living in the United
States, to remove anti-Semitic hate speech from his California-based
Internet site. 0 2 The Tribunal's order recognized that the Tribunal
might have difficulty enforcing its ruling, but determined that there
would be "a significant symbolic value in the public denunciation" of
Zfindel's actions and a "potential educative and ultimately larger preventative benefit that can be achieved by open discussion of the principles enunciated in [its] decision.'"
For its part, Yahoo! continued its legal battle and recently won a
judgment in U.S. District Court in California declaring that the
French court ruling cannot be recognized or enforced in the United
States largely because the French judgment ran counter to the First
Amendment. °4 An appeal of that judgment is still pending.
No
matter how the American case is ultimately resolved, though, the
French court's willingness to assert its norms over cyberspace content
originating elsewhere demonstrates some of the difficulties that result
from the ease with which online content crosses territorial borders.

100Ned Stafford, German Official Seeks Hell) to Shut U.S.-Based Hate Sites, NEWSBXTES,
Aug. 6, 2001, LEXIS, Newsbytes File.
W Gumick v. Dow Jones & Co. (V.S. Ct. 2001), http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/
disp.pl/au/cases/vic/VSC/2001/305.html?query=title+%28+%22gutnick%22+%29.
Citron v. Zuindel (Canadian Human Rights Trib. Jan. 18, 2002), http://
www.chrt-tcdp.gc.ca/decisions/docs/citron-e.htm; see also Peter Cameron, Hate Web
Sites Have "No Place in Canadian Society ": Commission, LONDON FREE PRESS, Jan. 19,
2002, at B5 (describing a ruling that held "an Internet site that promotes hate against
any group contravenes the Canadian Human Rights Act" because "hate messaging has
no place in Canadian Society").
103Citron v. Zfindel, para. 57 (Canadian Human Rights
Trib. Jan. 18, 2002),
http://ww.chrt-tcdp.gc.ca/decisions/docs/citron-e.htm; see also Cameron, supra note
102 (quoting a Commission spokesperson as acknowledging that "[w]e have no experience with enforcing compliance in cases involving the Internet").
104 Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme,
169 F. Supp. 2d
1181, 1192 (N.D.Cal. 2001).
Mr, Similar issues of regulatory "spillover" from one jurisdiction to
another have
been raised in the United States in the context of the so-called "dormant" Commerce
Clause. See infra Part I.E.
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E. The Challenge of the Dormant Commerce Clause

In the United States, courts have begun to invoke many of the
same extraterritoriality concerns raised by Yahoo! to strike down state
regulation of Internet activity under the so-called "dormant" Commerce Clause. 10 6 Generally speaking, the dormant Commerce Clause
limits state regulations based on their effects outside the state.
Thus, as in the jurisdictional inquiry, the dormant Commerce Clause
analysis is premised upon the importance of fixed geographical
boundaries and the presumed danger of extraterritorial regulation.
In the cyberspace context, such an emphasis on territorial boundaries
threatens the validity of many state efforts to regulate Internet activity.
For example, in one of the first cases to apply the dormant Commerce
Clause to cyberspace, American Library Association v. Pataki,0 5 a federal
district court enjoined enforcement of a New York statute that prohibited the intentional use of the Internet "to initiate or engage" in certain pornographic communications deemed to be "harmful to minors. '"1') The court reasoned that, because materials posted to the web
anywhere are accessible in New York, application of the statute might
chill the activities of non-New York content providers and force them

106

The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power "To regulate Commerce

with Foreign nations, and among the several States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3. Implicit in this affirmative grant is the negative or "dormant" Commerce Clause-the
principle that the states impermissibly intrude on this federal power when they enact
laws that unduly burden interstate commerce. This idea is usually traced to Justice
Johnson's concurrence in Gibbons v. Ogden, where he stated:
And since the power to [regulate commerce] necessarily implies the power to
determine what shall remain unrestrained, it follows, that the power must be
exclusive; it can reside but in one potentate; and hence, the grant of this
power carries with it the whole subject, leaving nothing for the State to act
upon.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,227 (1824) (Johnson,J., concurring).
107 The Supreme Court has formulated the dormant Commerce
Clause analysis as
follows:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will
be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is
found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citation omitted).
108 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
109 Id. at 183-84
(enjoining enforcement of N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 235.20(6),
235.21(3) (McKinney 2000)).
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to conform their behavior to New York's standard."" Moreover, according to the court, because states regulate pornographic communications differently, "a single actor might be subject to haphazard, uncoordinated, and even outright inconsistent regulation by states that
the actor never intended to reach and possibly was unaware were being accessed."'. Thus, the court determined that the New York statute impermissibly regulated interstate commerce.
Other courts have struck down state Internet regulations concerning pornographic content on similar grounds. For example, courts
have used the dormant Commerce Clause to issue preliminary injunctions against the enforcement of a New Mexico statute criminalizing
dissemination by computer of materials harmful to minors," ' a Virginia law regulating pornographic communications," ' and a Michigan
statute criminalizing the
use of computers to distribute sexually ex•
114
plicit materials to minors.
But the reach of the dormant Commerce Clause has extended far
more broadly than that. Indeed, as commentators have pointed out,
under the logic of American Library, "nearly every state regulation of
Internet communications will have the extraterritorial consequences
the court bemoaned," including "state antigambling laws, computer
crime laws, various consumer protection laws, libel laws, licensing
laws, and many more.""' 5 A court in California, for example, invalidated, under the dormant Commerce Clause, a state law regulating
'junk" e-mail." 6 Likewise, the First Circuit ruled that a Massachusetts

110Id. at 177.
I d. at 168-69.
112 See ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1160-63 (10th Cir. 1999) (deciding that
the statute, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2(A) (Michie 1998), violates the Commerce
Clause because it regulates conduct that occurs wholly outside of New Mexico, burdens
interstate and foreign commerce unreasonably, and subjects "interstate use of the
Internet to inconsistent state regulation").
113 See PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 108 F. Supp. 2d 611,
626 (W.D. Va. 2000) ("[Virginia Code] § 18.2-391 constitutes an undue burden on interstate commerce because it
attempts to regulate commercial conduct wholly outside of Virginia's borders.").
11 See Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp, 2d 737,
751 (E.D.
Mich. 1999) ("The Act is,, as a direct regulation of interstate commerce, a per se violation of the Commerce Clause.").
115 Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet
and the Dormant Commerce Clause,
110 YALE L.J. 785, 787 (2001).
16 See Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 115
Cal. Rptr. 2d 258, 267-68 (Cal. App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 2002) (affirming the lower court's ruling sustaining demurrer); see
also Evan Hansen, Court Kills Key Parts of Bulk Email Law, CNET NEWS.COM, June 9,
2000,
at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-241711 .html?legacy=chet
(discussing
Ferguson v. Friendfinders); Carl S. Kaplan, In Spain Case, Another Defeat for State Internet
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cigar advertising law, if applied to Internet advertising, would violate
the dormant Commerce Clause,117 and a federal district court in Illinois similarly enjoined enforcement of a state statute prohibiting advertising of certain controlled substances, in part because the pharmaceutical company challenging the ban would not be able
to comply
8
with the statute unless it canceled all Internet advertising.'
Scholars are divided on whether the emerging dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence in cyberspace is justified,"' but it is clear
that the same concerns about cross-border regulation of the Internet
that appear in the international context raise challenges within a federal system as well. The most recent wrinkle on this question is the Ju-

Laws, N.Y. TIMES , Mar. 24, 2000, at http://www.nytimes.com/librax/tech/00/03/
cyber/cyberlaw/241aw.html (discussing the "string of decisions questioning the ability
of states to enforce their own Internet laws"). But see State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404
(Wash. 2001) (upholding, in the face of a dormant Commerce Clause challenge, a
Washington state law that prohibits both the transmission of commercial electronic
mail from an Internet domain without permission of a third part), who owns the domain and the transmission of e-mail that is false or misleading).
117 Consol. Cigar Corp. v. Reilly, 218 F.3d 30, 56-57 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding
that
requiring warnings on interstate advertisement is unconstitutional), aff'd in pt., rev'd in
pt. on other grounds sub nom., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); see
also Carl S. Kaplan, Ruling Favors Tobacco Companies, N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB, Nov. 17,
2000, at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11 / 17/technology/I7CYBERLAW.html (discussing a ruling in the Southern District of New York "that a New York law effectively
banning the direct sale of cigarettes to New Yorkers via the Internet is likely to be unconstitutional"); cf Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Co. v. Spitzer, No. 00 Civ. 7274 (LAP),
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7548, at *97 (S.D.N.Y.June 8, 2001) (permanently enjoining, on
dormant Commerce Clause grounds, enforcement of a state law that effectively prohibits Internet and mail order sales of cigarettes).
118 See Knoll Pharm. Co. v. Sherman, 57 F. Supp. 2d 615, 623 (N.D. 111.1999)
("[O]verwhelming evidence has been submitted showing that the practical effect of a
ban against advertising Meridia in Illinois would ... force the removal of advertising in
nationally distributed publications and broadcasts ....
There is no technological or
commercially realistic means to black Illinois out of a national advertising market.").
119Compare Dan L. Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REv. 1095,
1123-34
(1996) (arguing that the dormant Commerce Clause is an appropriate and "significant
check to individual states' regulation of Internet activity"), Bruce P. Keller, The Game's
the Same: Why Gambling in Cyberspace Violates Federal Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1569, 1593-96
(1999) (arguing that dormant Commerce Clause problems can be avoided by focusing
on federal regulation and prosecution), Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Virtual Reality and
"Virtual Welters": A Note on the Commerce Clause Implications of Regulating Cyberporn, 82 VA.
L. REV. 535, 540 (1996) (pointing out that state regulation of the Internet on obscenity
grounds probably violates the dormant Commerce Clause),,and David Post, Gambling
on Internet Laws, AM. LAW., Sept. 1998, at 95 (arguing that state attempts to regulate the
Internet likely violate the Constitution), with Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 115, at 827
(highlighting the errors made when courts have applied the dormant Commerce
Clause to the Internet).
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risdictional Certainty Over Digital Commerce Act,'2" which was recently introduced in Congress. The bill would reserve to Congress exclusively the right to regulate "commercial transactions of digital
goods and services conducted through the Internet,"' 2 thus seemingly
preempting all state regulation of online activity.'22
F. The Challenge of InternationalCopyright
In the online environment, works such as videos, recordings of
musical performances, and texts can be posted anywhere in the world,
retrieved from databases in foreign countries, or made available by
online service providers to subscribers located throughout the globe.
Our system of international copyright protection, however, historically
has been based on the application of national copyright laws with
strictly territorial effects and on the application of choice-of-law
rules
2 3
apply.
would
laws
copyright
country's
which
determine
to
Such a network of national codes may have sufficed in an era
when the distribution or performance of works occurred within easily
identifiable and discrete geographic boundaries. However, "instant
and simultaneous worldwide access to copyrighted works over digital
networks... fundamentally challenges territorial notions in copyright"'2 4 and complicates traditional choice-of-law doctrine because it
is often difficult to determine where particular acts have occurred in
order to determine which copyright law to apply.
Thus, as one
commentator has asked: "[I] f authors and their works are no longer
territorially tethered, can changes in the fundamental legal conceptions of existing regimes for the protection of authors be far be-

120
121

H.R. 2421, 107th Cong. (2001).
id.

For a discussion of the bill, see Margaret Kane, Digital Commerce Sparks. Tax
Tango, CNET NEws.coM, July 20, 2001, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1007-2006614719.html.
,23 See Paul Edward Geller, International Intellectual Property, Conflicts of Laws and
Internet Remedies, 22 EUROP. INTELL. PROP. REV. 125, 126-27 (2000) (describing reliance
of copyright treaties on national treatment and reliance of classic conflicts rule for intellectual property disputes on the "place of infringing acts").
124 Andreas P. Reindl, Choosing Law in Cyberspace: Copyright Conflicts on
Global Networks, 19 Micii.J. INT'L L. 799, 800-01 (1998) (footnote omitted).
2 See Geller, supra note 123, at 126 ("The points where
acts of infringement begin
and end become indistinguishable as transactions cross multiple borders simultaneously in global, interactive networks." (footnote omitted)).
12
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hind?" 2 6 These changes, though not literally concerned with the
scope of adjudicatory jurisdiction, are arguably necessary precisely because copyright laws, like laws concerning jurisdiction, rely upon geographical boundaries among nation-states
that may not be maintain127
able in the new online context.
For example, let us assume that a publisher produces a web page
that resides on a server in Holland.128 The web page includes photos
taken by both American and French authors. Some of the photos are
taken from magazines that the publisher has scanned and uploaded
without permission and other photos are simply copied from other
websites, again without permission. Assume further that the photographers now claim that the publisher has violated U.S. copyright law
on a theory similar to the one used by the French court in Yahoo!:
that the photos are available to be accessed by U.S. users via the website.
This scenario raises a number of challenges. First, with respect to
the photos that were simply copied from other sites, were those photos ever "published" and what are their countries of origin? Both of
these are important considerations under many copyright regimes.
Second, which country's copyright law applies? If we use Holland's,
where the website resides, we will encourage web publishers seeking to
evade onerous copyright regimes simply to locate their sites in a less
restrictive jurisdiction. On the other hand, if we are free to use the
law of any country where the work is accessible, then again we potentially have the Yahoo! dilemma that the law of the most restrictive
country would in effect apply extraterritorially throughout the world.
G. The Challenge of Domain Names as Trademarks
Historically, the boundaries of trademark law have been delineated in part by reference to physical geography. Thus, if I own a store
in New York City called "Berman's," I will not, as a general matter, be
able to prevent a person in Australia from opening a store that is also

126Jane C. Ginsburg, The Cyberian Captivity of Copyright: Territoriality
and Authors'

Rights in a Networked World, 15 SANITA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 347, 348-49
(1999).
127 See, e.g., Geller, supra note 123, at 126-27 (describing the "ambiguity of territoriality" with regard to the application of intellectual property laws).
128 This example is drawn from Ginsburg, supra note
126, at 349-50, and is based
on a controversy in France involving "the unauthorized scanning and uploading to a
cybercafe's website of Le Grand Secret, a banned biography of the late French President
[Francois] Mitterand," id. at 349 n.3.
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called "Berman's," even if I have previously established a trademark in
my name. The idea is that customers would be unlikely to confuse the
two stores because they are in markets that are spatially distinct."' In
the online world such clear spatial boundaries are collapsed because,
as the domain name system is currently organized, there can be only
one bermans.com domain name, and it can only point to one of the
two stores.
In the early to mid-1990s, as corporations and entrepreneurs began to understand the potential value of a recognizable domain name,
pressure increased to create trademark rights in domain names. For
example, one early Internet domain name dispute involved the
Panavision Corporation, which holds a trademark in the name
"Panavision."'' .0 In 1995, Panavision attempted to establish a website
with the domain name panavision.com, but found that the name had
already been registered to Dennis Toeppen."' When contacted by
Panavision, Toeppen offered to relinquish the name in exchange for
$13,000. '2 Panavision sued, arguing that Toeppen's registration violated trademark law despite the fact that Toeppen's Panavision site
(which included photographs of the city of Pana, Illinois) could
hardly be confused with the Panavision Corporation.
The Ninth
Circuit agreed with the trial court that Panavision's inability to use the
panavision.com website "diminished the 'capacity of the Panavision
marks to identify and distinguish Panavision's goods and services on
' 4
the Internet."-'"
In so doing, the court was, in effect, expanding the
geographical reach of trademark law, at least with regard to domain
names. While I still could not sue the Berman's store in Australia for
See Hanover Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 415 (1915) ("But where two
parties independently are employing the same mark upon goods of the same class, but
in separate markets wholly remote the one from the other, the question of prior appropriation is legally insignificant... [except in cases of bad faith]."), quoted in United
Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 101 (1918). This is not an absolute
rule, of course, because "famous or well-known marks may well leap oceans and rivers,
cross national borders, and span language barriers to achieve international recognition." Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV.
695, 720 (1998); see, e.g., Vaudable v. Montmarte, Inc., 193 N.Y.S.2d 332 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1959) (enjoining the use by a restaurant in New York of the name and d6cor of
Maxim's Restaurant in Paris). Nevertheless, the likelihood-of-confusion standard historically has tended to imbed a geographical limitation.
110Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 1998).
121)

1 1 ld.at 1319.
132 Id.
""
1,4Id.

Id.
at 1326 (quoting Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1304 (C.D.

Cal. 1996)).
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violating my trademark, I might now have a cause of action concerning the bermans.com domain name if the Australian store registered
the name ahead of me.
The U.S. Congress subsequently enacted legislation confirming
this expansion of trademark law. Under pressure from trademark
holders, Congress first passed the Federal Trademark Dilution Act135
and then the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA),
which provides an explicit federal remedy to combat so-called "cybersquatting.",3 6 According to the congressional reports, the ACPA is
meant to address cases like Panavision,where non-trademark holders
register well-known trademarks as domain names and then try to "ransom" the names back to the trademark owners.137
Nevertheless, even if one believes that reining in "cybersquatters"
138
is a laudable goal (and even that goal has been debated), there can

135 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub.
L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127 (Supp. 1996)).
1s Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, §

3001, 113 Stat. 545, 548-49 (1999); see H.R.REP. No. 106479, at 115 (1999) (detailing
the Act).
137 See H.R. REP. No. 106-412, at 5-7 (1999)
(noting that "s]ometimes these pirates put pornographic materials on theses sights [sic] in an effort to increase the likelihood of collecting ransom by damaging the integrity of a [trade] mark"); S. REP. No.
106-140, at 4-7 (1999) (highlighting testimony regarding attempts to ransom doinain
names to the highest bidder).
138 For example, Yochai Benkler has argued that the strong protection of trademarks in domain names has "maintain [ed] the value of brand names at the expense of
the efficiency of electronic commerce." Yochai Benkler, Net Regulation: Taking Stock
and Looking Forward, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 1203, 1256 (2000). According to Benkler,
the current approach assumes that consumers will, for the foreseeable future, seek out
websites primarily by typing into their browser a uniform resource locator (URL) such
as http://www.brandname.com, rather than by using search engines or product review
sites. This assumption is then employed to justify permitting the owner of the trademark in a brand name to control use of that brand name in a URL. Id. at 1256-57.
Such a legal d~termination, however, does not just assume a static model for the digital
environment where customer habits, browser configurations, and search engines will
continue as they are, but also enforces such a static model backed by the power of law.
Id. at 1257. As Benkler points out:
The private stakes for those corporations who have invested in building brand
recognition and plan to recoup their investments by exercising some price
discipline using the value of their brand name as a search-cost saving device
for consumers are obvious. The public benefits of protecting these costs by
encouraging consumers not to take advantage of the reduced search costs in
the electronic commerce environment are more questionable.
Id. He suggests that we might instead "accept the declining importance of trademarks
[in the digital environment,] ... limit legal protection to situations where competitors
try to use a mark to confuse consumers, and... abandon the notion of dilution as protection of goodwill, which developed to protect the famous marks most useful in the
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be little doubt that the application of trademark law to domain names
has meant that trademark law has become unmoored to physical geography and is now more likely to operate extraterritorially. Potentially, even those who are legitimately using a website that happens to
bear the name of a famous mark held by an entity across the globe
could be forced to relinquish the name.' 9 In addition, as Graeme
Dinwoodie has noted, this unmooring of trademarks from territory
creates the possibility that individual countries will interpret their
trademark laws expansively, thereby reducing trademark rights "to
their most destructive form": the mutual ability to block (or at least
interfere with) the online use of marks recognized in other countries.""
Moreover, each of the parties claiming ownership in a trademark
could sue in a different country, and. because of differences in substantive law, each party could win.
Thus, with the increasing scope

old environment." Id. at 1249; cf, Manchester Airport PLC v. Club Club Ltd., Case No.
D2000-0638, WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center Administrative Panel Decision
(Aug. 22, 2000), at http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000 /
d2000-0638.html (stating that respondent attempted to sell the domain name to the
complainant "for an amount well in excess of the registration fees," but noting that
"selling a domain name is not per se prohibited by the ICANN [Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers] Policy (nor is it illegal or even, in a capitalist system, ethically reprehensible)").
39 In response to this problem, the World
Intellectual Property Organization
adopted, in the fall of 2001, aJoint Recommendation calling for a definition of "use"
for purposes of trademark law that would protect legitimate users of marks who disclaimed any intent to engage in commerce in a particular country. Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Marks, and Other Industrial Property Rights in Signs on theInternet art. 2 (2001), http://www.wipo.org/about-ip/en/
index.h
tml?wipo-con tent frane=/about-ip/en/trademarks.html.
140
See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Private International Aspects
of the Protection of
Trademarks 27, Paper Presented at the WIPO Forum on Private International Law and
Intellectual Property (Jan. 30-31, 2001) (WIPO Doc. No. WIPO/PIL/01/4 2001) (noting that "[t]his 'mutual blocking' capacity is neither efficient nor a positive contribution to the globalization of markets or the development of ecommerce"), http://
www.wipo.org/pil-forum/en/documents/doc/pil 01_4.doc. Catherine T. Struve and
R. Polk Wagner have also raised the specter that realspace sovereigns may increasingly
attempt to segment the domain system itself, to insure that any trademark action involving domain names will have the requisite territorial nexus to support the assertion
ofjurisdiction. Catherine T. Struve & R. Polk Wagner, Realspare Sovereigns in Cyberspace:
The Case of Domain Names, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 1031-1034 (2002). As Struve
and Wagner point out, such territorially based segmentation of the domain name system would result in "the dramatic reduction in utility provided by the system itself" Id.
at 1031.
141 See, e.g., Mecklermedia Corp. v. D.C.
Cong. G.m.b.H., 1998 Ch. 40, 53 (Eng.)
(noting that the cause of action for using trademarked language is different in Germany and England and, thus, simultaneous proceedings could continue).
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of trademark law in cyberspace, the next question becomes: how shall
any domain name decision be enforced? The ACPA attempts to adover the domain
dress this problem by providing in rem jurisdiction
•
142
Thus, for example, if
name itself wherever that name is registered.
people register domain names online via a website owned by Network
Solutions, a domain name registrar... corporation located in Virginia,
they potentially can be forced, under the ACPA, to defend a trademark action in Virginia whether or not they have ever set foot in Virginia or knew Network Solutions was a Virginia corporation. This in
rem provision has proven to be controversial,' 4 however, and it remains to be seen whether courts will find that such assertions of jurisdiction comport with constitutional due process guarantees.145

See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000) ("In an in rem action ... a domain name shall
be deemed to have its situs in the judicial district in which ... the domain name registrar.. . is located.").
- 143 A registrar is one of several entities, for a given
top-level domain (such as .com,
142

.edu, .gov, .uk, etc.) that is authorized by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers to grant registration of domain names. DAVID BENDER, COMPUTER LAW
§ 3D.05[3], at 3D-104.
144 Compare FleetBoston Fin. Corp. v. Fleetbostonfinancial.com,
138 F. Supp. 2d
121, 135 (D. Mass. 2001) (finding that in rem provisions of ACPA violate due process
when domain name registration paper is subsequently transferred to a district other
than the district where the domain name registry, registrar, or other domain name
authority is located), Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d
860, 865-66 (E.D. Va. 2000) (finding that the registration of a domain name, without
further contact, does not constitute sufficient minimum contacts for the purposes of in
personam jurisdiction), and Am. Online, Inc. v. Chih-Hsien Huang, 106 F. Supp. 2d
848, 855-59 (E.D. Va. 2000) (finding that filing an online domain name registration
agreement with Network Solutions is not sufficient contact with Virginia to justify in
personam jurisdiction), with Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d
214, 224-25 (4th Cir. 2002) (ruling that because the lawsuit concerns the property itself, assertion of in rem jurisdiction comports with due process), Caesars World, Inc. v.
Caesars-Palace.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502, 504 (E.D. Va. 2000) (finding sufficient contacts for purposes of in rem jurisdiction because the domain name was registered in
the state), and Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95F Supp. 2d 528, 531 n.5
(E.D. Va. 2000) (finding that registration is sufficient minimum contact for in personam jurisdiction). For a more detailed discussion of the ACPA in rem provisions, see
Struve & Wagner, supra note 140, at 1006-19.
145 The resolution of this question probably rests
ultimately on whether courts interpret the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), to
have extended the constitutional requirements of InternationalShoe to all in rem actions (or at least those that do not involve real property). Some courts read Shaffer
narrowly. See, e.g., Caesars World, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 504 ("[U]nder Shaffer, there must
be minimum contacts to support personal jurisdiction only in those in rem proceedings where the underlying cause of action is unrelated to the property which is located
in the forum state."). Even some members of the U.S. Supreme Court have taken that
approach. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 620-21 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy, J.) (limiting Shaffer to quasi in rem actions unac-
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In the meantime, domain name trademark disputes are increasingly resolved through online arbitration under the auspices of the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, a not-forprofit corporation that administers the domain name system, 146 and
the World Intellectual Property Organization, a United Nations administrative body. While the ability of these organizations to govern
domain names transcends geographical borders, they face their own
legitimacy problems because they are quasi-governmental entities exercising de facto governing power over the Internet without structures
of democratic
accountability or transparency that some think may be
147
necessary.
Thus, even this alternative to the problem of territorially
based Internet governance faces substantial challenges.

companied by in-state service of process). On the other hand, dicta in Shaffer suggests
that the Supreme Court intended its holding to extend the minimum contacts test of
InternationalShoe to all in remjurisdiction, not solely to the subcategory of in rem cases
specifically at issue in Shaffer itself. See, e.g., Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212 (stating that, henceforth, "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the
standards set forth in InternationalShoe and its progeny." (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted)); id. ("The fiction that an assertion ofjurisdiction over property is anything
but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property supports an ancient
form without substantial modern justification."). Thus, Shaffer may be taken to stand
for the proposition that Congress cannot avoid the constitutional requirements of fair
play and substantial justice simply by calling an action "in rein" and limiting recovery
to the res itself.
146 For a brief description of ICANN and its history,
see generally Developments in
the Law--The Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1574, 1657-80 (1999). For a more
detailed discussion of many isstes surrounding the development of ICANN and the
idea of internet governance, see generally MILTON L. MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT:
INTERNEI GOVERNANCE. AND THE TAMING OF CYBERSPACE (2002).
147 For example, a recent study of ICANN and WIPO's Uniform Dispute
Resolution Policy suggests that the arbitration system is fundamentally biased in favor of
trademark holders. See Michael Geist, Fair.com?: An Examination of the Allegations of Systemic Unfairnessin the ICANN UDRP, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 903, 903-13 (2002) [hereinafter Geist, Fair.com?] (noting that the system is biased in favor of trademark holders);
Steven Bonisteel, Law Expert Charges Bias in Domain-Dispute Arbitrations, NEWSBYTES,
Aug. 20, 2001 (on file with aithor) ("[T]rademark holders who launch complaints
under [WIPO's Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy] win in an overwhelming majority
of cases.") see also MICHAEL GEIST, FUNDAMENTALLY FAIR.COM? AN UPDATE ON BIAS
ALLEGATIONS AND TIE ICANN UDRP 8 (2002), at http://aixI .uottawa.ca/-geist/
fairupdate.pdf (updating study, responding to methodological criticisms, and stating
that bias continues). For criticisms of ICANN from the perspective of democratic legitimacy and administrative transparency, see, for example, A. Michael Froomkin,
Wrong Turn in Cyberspace, Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50
DUKE L.J. 17, 18 (2000) [hereinafter Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace];Jonathan
Weinberg, ]CANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE LJ. 187, 188 (2000); David
Post, Governing Cyberspace, or "Where Is James Madison when We Need Him?," ICANN
Watch, at http://ww.icainnwatch.oig/archive/governingcyberspace.htn
(tine 6,
1999); Centre for Global Studies, Enhancing Legitimacy in the Internet Corporationfor As-

2002]

GLOBALIZA TION OFJURISDICTION
148

H. The Challenge of InternationalComputer Crime

In the past few years, the increasing problem of computer crime
has captured public attention. In the year 2000 alone, several incidents illuminated the scope of the challenge. In February, the websites of at least eight major U.S.-based Internet companies were crippled by so-called "denial of service" attacks unleashed by a computer
hacker.' 49 A few months later, the "I Love You" virus infected forty-five
million computers worldwide.1" And in November, FBI investigators
conducted a controversial sting operation in which they lured two

Russians suspected of participating in a hacking ring to the United
States, captured their passwords, and then used the passwords to connect to a Russian computer network and download incriminating data

signing Names and Numbers: Accountable and Transparent Governance Structures, Markle
Foundation, at http://www.markle.org/News/ICANN_Final-Septl8.pdf (Sept. 18,
2002). In addition, see generally www.ICANNWatch.org (last visited Nov. 20, 2002).
For similar criticisms of WIPO, see, for example, A. Michael Froomkin, Of Governments
and Governance, 14 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 617, 618 (1999):
As an international body all too willing to take up the reins of global governance, WIPO attempted to create global e-commerce friendly rules by a process
that, left to itself, seemed likely to consist predominantly of meeting with
commercial interest groups and giving little more than lip service to privacy
and freedom of expression concerns.
148 This subsection is largely derived from Patricia L. Bellia, Chasing
Bits Across Borders, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 35 (2001). For another recent article, which addresses
similar issues in the context of international computer fraud, see generally Ellen S.
Podgor, International Computer Fraud: A Paradigmfor Limiting NationalJurisdiction,35
U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 267 (2002).
149 The targeted sites included Amazon.com,
Buy.com, CNN.com, eBay, E*Trade,
MSN.com, Yahoo!, and ZDNet. See Charles Cooper, New Cybersport: Taking Out Web
Sites?, ZDNET NEws, Feb. 9, 2000, at http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/
0,4586,2435899,00.htnil (listing targeted sites). For a description of the attacks, see
Internet Denial of Service Attacks and the FederalResponse: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciaryand the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice Oversight
of the S. Comm. on theJudiciary, 106th Cong. 35-37 (2000) (statement of Michael A. Vatis,
Director, National Infrastructure Protection Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation);
Cybercrime: HearingBefore a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 106th Cong. 2337 (2000) (statement of LouisJ. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
150See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 2000, Digital Privacy Act
of 2000 and
Notice of Electronic MonitoringAct: Hearingon H.R. 5018, HR. 4987, and H.R. 4908 Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 16-27
(2000) (statement of Kevin DiGregory, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Division, Department of Justice) (describing the reach and cost of the "I Love You"
virus); Paul Festa & Joe Wilcox, Experts Estimate Damages in the Billions for Bug, CNET
NEWS.COM, May 5, 2000, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1003-200-1814907.html (describing the cost of the "I Love You" virus as exceeding several billion dollars).
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from the hackers' Russian servers, all before obtaining a search war151
rant.
Moreover, criminal conduct involving computers extends far beyond crimes perpetrated against computer networks, such as hacking.
For example, computer networks can be used
to facilitate
online
15,
11
forms of traditional crimes, such as gambling, child pornography,'"
fraud,15 4 and software piracy.155 In addition, a computer may simply
contain evidence relevant to a criminal investigation. 15 Certainly, with

151

See Mike Carter, E-sting Nets 2 Russian Hackers; FBI Alleges Pair Stole Credit Info,

SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 23, 2001, at Al (outlining how the two hackers were caught);
Robert Lemos, FBI "Hack" Raises Global Security Concerns, CNET NEWS.COM, May 1,
2001, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1003-202-5785729.html (discussing the concerns that some security experts and lawyers have over the techniques used by the
FBI); Robert Lemos, FBI Nabs Russian Hackers, ZDNET NEWS, Apr. 23, 2001, at
http://www.zdnet.com/zdnnn/stories/news/0,4586,508199,00.html
(discussing the
indictment of the two Russians). In May 2001, a district court denied a motion to suppress the evidence downloaded from the Russian servers. United States v. Gorshkov,
No. CROO-500C, 2001 WL 1024026, at *5 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2001).
152 See generally NAT'L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM'N, FINAL REPORT
ch. 5
(1999) (describing the emergence, rapid growth, and various forms of Internet gambling and recommending methods of federal regulation), available at http://
govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/5.pdf.
153 See PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON UNLAWFUL CONDUCT ON THE
INTERNET,
THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER: THE CHALLENGE OF UNLAWFUL CONDUCT INVOLVING THE
USE OF THE INTERNET app. C (2000) (addressing online child pornography, child luring, and related offenses and discussing federal laws and initiatives to protect children), availableat http://www.cybercrime.gov/append.pdf.
154 See Robin Fields, Fake Emulex Release Was Sent via E-Mail, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 31,
2000, at C3 (describing how e-mail and the Internet were used to distribute a false
press release); John F.X. Peloso & Ben A. Indek, Overview of SEC's Response to the Internet
in Securities Markets, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 19, 2000, at 3 (explaining various SEC actions taken
in response to the rise in cases of Internet securities fraud).
PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON UNLAWFUL CONDUCT ON THE INTERNET, supra note 153, at app. I (discussing software piracy and intellectual property theft and
describing federal laws and initiatives to prevent such crimes). The question of extraterritoriality in combating such piracy has arisen in the prosecution of Russian computer programmer Dmitry Sklyarov for violations of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). Sklyarov was accused of violating the Act based on his activities in
Russia, where they were legal. See Russian Police Say ProgrammerArrested in US. Broke No
Russian Laws, SiliconValley.com (July 27, 2001) (on file with author). For more on the
Sklyarov controversy, see, for example, Lawrence Lessig, Jail Time in the DigitalAge, N.Y.
TIMESJuly 30, 2001, at A] 7 (commenting on Skylarov's plight).
156 Commentators frequently distinguish among these
three types of criminal conduct: computer as target, computer as tool, and computer as incidental storage of material related to the crime. For examples of the use of this classification scheme, see
PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON UNLAWFUL CONDUCT ON THE INTERNET, supra note

153, at 7-9; Bellia, supra note 148, at 37 n.l; Scott Charney & Kent Alexander, Computer Crime, 45 EMORY L.J. 931, 934 (1996); Marc D. Goodman, Why the Police Don't Care
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the heightened interest of governments worldwide in combating terrorism, tracking crime through electronic means is increasingly a priority.
In these circumstances, nation-state borders may be inconsequential both to the commission of the crime and the location of the relevant evidence. The denial of service attacks on U.S. websites originated in Canada.1 5'
The "I Love You" virus originated in the
Philippines. 58 Gambling,'"') child pornography,"0 or "spar""" operations targeting users in one jurisdiction will often locate their servers
elsewhere. And, as online activities become ubiquitous, even cases
that do not otherwise have a computer component will increasingly
require electronic evidence that may or may not be located within the
jurisdiction. Indeed,
[t]he physical location of electronic evidence ... often depends upon
the fortuity of network architecture: an American subsidiary of a French
corporation may house all of its data on a server that is physically located
in France; two Japanese citizens might subscribe to America Online and
have their electronic mail stored on AOL's Virginia servers.

About Computer Crime, 10 HARV.J.L. & TECH. 465, 468-69 (1997); Michael A. Sussmann,
The Critical Challenges from InternationalHigh-Tech and Computer-Related Clime at the Millennium, 9 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 451, 455 (1999).
157 See CanadaBroadens Its Case Against Suspected
Hacke; N.Y TIMES, Aug 4, 2000, at
C5 (highlighting a Canadian youth's denial-of-service attacks, which paralyzed several
U.S. websites, including Yahoo!, Amazon, and eBay).
158 See ISP Tracks "Love" Bug Through Caller [D, CNET
NEWS.COM, May 15, 2000, at
http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1003-200-1877238.html
(stating that virus apparently
originated in Manila); "Love" Bug Release May Have Been Accidental, CNET NEWS.COM,
May 11, 2000, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1003-200-1855997.html (reporting that
a Filipino computer student may have accidentally released the virus).
l See, e.g., People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 847
(N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1999) (involving an Antiguan corporation that installed computer servers in
Antigua "to allow users [from] around the world to gamble from their home computers").
160 See, e.g.,
Crackdown on Net Child Porn, CNET NEws.CoM, Sept. 2, 1998, at
http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-332841.html (describing coordinated, worldwide raids on pedophiles operating on the Internet, resulting in the arrest of over one
hundred people in twelve countries).
See, e.g.,
Declan McCullagh, Spam Oozes Past Border Patrol, WIRED.COM, Feb. 23,
2001, at http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,41860,00.html (reporting that an
increasing amount of unsolicited commercial e-mail sent to the U.S. is originating
from overseas sites and flowing through non-U.S. servers).
162 Bellia, supra note 148, at 56 (citation omitted).
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Or, a criminal might deliberately store computer files in ajurisdiction
that affords greater privacy protection9
Moreover, as the FBI sting operation involving the Russian hackers demonstrates, the jurisdictional challenges of international computer crime include not only the enforcement of criminal laws across
borders, but also the investigation of the crimes themselves. As one
commentator has observed:
A state conducting a cross-border search and the target state are likely to
have different perspectives on the issue. The searching state may view its
actions as merely advancing a claimed power to regulate extraterritorial
conduct causing harmful effects within its own borders. The target state,
however, may view a remote cross-border
search itself as extraterritorial
4
conduct with harmful local effects.1

Indeed, the target state might well decide that it needs to protect its
citizens from the extraterritorial investigations of other countries either by imposing privacy or property protections that limit the scope
of investigations or by attempting to bar the investigations altogether."" Thus, as computers are increasingly involved in international criminal activities, we can expect continued debate about
whether, and under what circumstances, cross-border searches, international investigations, and extraterritorial enforcement actions are
permissible or legitimate.' 6"
I. The Challenge of Internationaland Transnational
Human Rights Enforcement
International law has traditionally been viewed as a set of rules
agreed upon by countries and meant to govern the relations among
163 SeeJonathan I. Edelstein, Note,
Anonymity and InternationalLaw Enforcement in
Cybertspace, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 231, 265-66 (1996) (discussing
the possibility of countries' using anonymous remailers and computer secrecy laws to
create database havens for criminals).
614 Bellia, supra note 148,
at 42.
165 See id. at 42-43 ("The target state
may believe that principles of territorial sovereignty likewise permit it to 'regulate' this harmful extraterritorial conduct-for example, by invoking certain privacy or property protections that prohibit the searching officials' conduct or by objecting to such conduct through diplomatic channels.").
6 In the United States, the Supreme Court has made
clear that crimes can only
be prosecuted in the district where the acts constituting the criminal offense occurred.
See United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1, 8 (1998) (ruling that a money laundering
charge could only be prosecuted in the district where the alleged acts of laundering
took place, not in the district where the crimes generating the money allegedly oc-

curred). Needless to say, determining the precise geographic location of criminal acts
that occur in cyberspace may pose difficulties under the Cabratesstandard.
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them.' 6 Indeed, until the twentieth century, the state was the primary
entity in international law, and the need to protect its sovereignty was
paramount. As one commentator has observed, "[t]here were relatively few rules of international law-and certainly no rules protecting
fundamental human rights or the environment which could be invoked to override immunity or to claim an interest in activities beyond

a state's territory. ,16 For example, in 1876, when an American citizen
asked a New York state court to assert jurisdiction over Buenaventura
Baez, the former President of the Dominican Republic, for injuries
caused by Baez when he was President, the court refused to hear the
case despite the fact that Baez was physically present in New York at
the time." According to the court, Baez was immune from jurisdiction because such immunity was "essential to preserve the peace and
70
harmony of nations.'
The world of international law looks very different today. As Peter
J. Sprio notes, "[w]e appear to be in the midst of a sweeping away of
foundations that had been in place if not for a millennium then at
least for several centuries.,'
Increasingly, international law is no
longer simply the preserve of nation-states, effective over a narrow
range of issues. Rather, we have seen the creation of regional and
global institutions, treaties, and other international obligations that
have established limits on sovereign autonomy.
Moreover, non-state

167 See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE,
INTERNATIONAL LAw 2 (2d. ed.
1995) (describing how international law was defined in James Brierly's classic treatise,
The Law of Nations, as "the body of rules and principles of action which are binding
upon civilized states in their relations with one another").
1V8 Sands, supra note 37, at 529.
169Hatch v. Baez, 14 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 596, 599-600 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1876).
170
171
7

Id. at 600.
Spiro, supra note 23, at 567.
See, e.g., Michael Byers, The Law and Politics of the Pinochet Case, 10 DUKEJ. COMP.

& INT'L L. 415, 441 (2000) (arguing that "[t]he development of international human
rights and the more recent growth of an 'international civil society' reflect an international system that is slowly but surely embracing the rule of law" and that, when global
institutions and rules exist, individuals and groups have the space to "challenge the
prerogatives of state sovereignty (along with its cynical politics and reliance on military
and economic power), with moral authority and the slow but sure evolution of binding
rules and effective judicial processes"). Philippe Sands has made a similar observation:
Regional and global institutions were created [in the twentieth century].
Treaties and other international obligations were adopted across a broad
range of subject areas, establishing limits on sovereign freedoms. New standards were adopted seeking to protect and promote fundamental human
rights and, more recently, conserve the environment. Gradually, new actors
emerged with an international voice, of which corporations and NGOs were to
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actors, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multinational corporations, worldwide religious movements, subnational governmental and administrative bodies, and regional and international
institutions, are playing a larger role. 7
What arises from these
changes is "the development of a new consciousness of international
public law governing legal relations beyond the nation-state, available
to influence public and administrative law at the national
level and
' 14
accessible to an emergent international civil society. 0
These developments challenge international law's traditional jurisdictional framework, which, though different from the U.S. minimum contacts approach, is similarly problematic because it is so focused on the nation-state, its boundaries, and its prerogatives.
Indeed, the two most common traditional bases for jurisdiction in international law are territory (jurisdiction over activities within a state's
borders)"' and nationality (jurisdiction over a state's citizens). 76
Thus, jurisdictional debates historically have been limited to whether
territorial sovereignty should be impinged upon even to admit a prin-

become the most active. Inherent in these clevelopments-but not explicitly
conceived-were the seeds for change ....
Sands, su/ra note 37, at 530.
173 See Harold Hongju Koh, The Globalization ofFreedom, 26
YALE]. INT'L L. 305, 305
(2001) ("[T]he most striking change in the law since I graduated from law school
more than two decades ago is the rise of a body of law that is genuinely transnationalneither fish nor fowl, in the sense that it is neither traditionally domestic nor traditionally international."); see aLso Boutros Boutros-Ghali,An Agenda for Democratization: Demorratization at the InternationalLevel, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 41, at para. 73,
U.N. Doc. A/51/761 (1996) (observing that international relations "are increasingly
shaped not only by the States themselves but also by an expanding array of non-State
actors on the 'international' scene").
174 Sands, supra note 37, at 530; see also KanishkaJayasuriya, Globalization,
Law, and
the Transformation of Sovereignty: The Emergence of Global Regulatoty Governance, 6 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 425, 425 (1999) (arguing that "globalization is transforming traditional conceptions and constructions of sovereignty," and that "the conventional image of a sovereignty associated with exclusive territorial jurisdiction ... is no longer
theoretically or empirically serviceable in the face of the internationalization of economic and social activity"); Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, InternationalInstitutions,
and the Erosion of NationalSovereignty and Democracy, 95 MIcH. L. REV. 1944, 1946 (1997)
("[Tihe new conditions loosely associated under the platitudinous rubric of 'globalism' Ipose new and quite visible challenges to national sovereignty.").
RESTATEMENT

(THIRD)

OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 402(1) (1987). For a discussion of territorial jurisdiction, see BARRY E.
CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 728-33 (2d ed. 1995).
176

RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 402(2) (1987). For a discussion of jurisdiction based on nationality, see
CARTER & TRIMBLE, sunra note 175, at 728, 733-34.
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ciple ofjurisdiction based on nationality. 77 A focus solely on territoriality or nationality, however, is unduly narrow and fails to respond
adequately to increasing cross-border interaction, flexible community
affiliations, and awareness of the transnational effects of seemingly local activities. For example, even though the territorial basis for jurisdiction permits some extraterritorial application by including within
its scope "conduct outside [a state's] territory that has or is intended
to have substantial effect within its territory,"'' 7 8 such a definition is
likely to be overinclusive, because so much activity can be deemed to
have cross-border effects. 7
Two other less often invoked international law bases of jurisdiction, the protective principlel s° and the pas177 For example, in discussing the territoriality
principle, Lord Macmillan stated:
"It is an essential attribute of the sovereignty of this realm, as it is of all sovereign independent states, that it should possess jurisdiction over all persons and things within its
territorial limits, and in all causes, civil and criminal, arising within these limits."
Compania Naviera Vascongada v. Steamship Christina, 1938 App. Cas. 485 (appeal
taken from Eng.); see also Gross, supra note 24, at 3 (articulating the notion of a Westphalian legal order based on "states exercising untrammeled sovereignty over certain
territories and subordinated to no earthly authority"); Harold G. Maier, Jurisdictional
Rules in Customary InternationalLaw, in EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 64, 67 (Karl M. Meessen ed., 1996) (asserting that the territoriality principle "is the most universally recognised [principle] because control over defined territory is not only a legal prerequisite for statehood but is also essential to permit a state's
government to be responsible to other nations for internal compliance with its external community commitments").
178

RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

OF THE FOREIGN

RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED

STATES § 402(1)(c) (1987); see also, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148
F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) ("[A]ny state may impose liabilities, even upon persons
not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within
its borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily

recognize.").

For example, the application of U.S. antitrust and securities laws to acts
committed abroad has generated resistance from foreign courts as well as the passage of
"blocking statutes" aimed at limiting the extraterritorial reach of U.S. laws. See CARTER
& TRIMBLE, supra note 175, at 738 (stating that foreign countries have responded to
the controversial practice of applying U.S. laws extraterritorially by passing statutes that
make it "illegal to comply with extraterritorial judicial orders and forbidding enforcement of judgments based on extraterritorial application of law"). Although the Restatement of Foreign Relations invokes a reasonableness standard to limitjurisdictional

assertions,

see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 403(1) (1987) ("[A] state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with
respect to a person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise
of such jurisdiction is unreasonable."), such a standard is unlikely to be effective absent
a more detailed theoretical framework for determining when a jurisdictional assertion
is reasonable. For more discussion of the use of an "effects test" for determining jurisdiction in cases involving online interaction, see infra text accompanying notes 432443.
18(See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED

STATES § 402(3) (1987) ("[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to...
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sive personality principle,'"' contemplate extraterritorial jurisdiction,
but they do so based solely on the prerogative of a state to exercise jurisdiction for reasons of national security or in response to harm to
one of its citizens abroad. Accordingly, none of the established bases
ofjurisdiction under international law sufficiently comes to grips with
the increasingly non-territorial nature of international activity.
The most striking challenge to international law's traditional jurisdictional scheme has been the increasing willingness of states to
apply principles of universal jurisdiction. l2 As Mary Robinson, former
United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, recently explained, "universal jurisdiction is based on the notion that certain
crimes are so harmful to international interests that states are entitled-and even obliged-to bring proceedings against the perpetrator, regardless of the location of the crime or the nationality of the
perpetrator or the victim. '" 8 ' While the principle of universal jurisdiction has long existed, it is rapidly becoming a significant challenge to
the assumed prerogatives of national sovereignty." "
Similarly, we are seeing an erosion of longstanding sovereignty
principles that gave heads of state immunity from prosecution before
foreign or international tribunals.""" For example, on October 16,
certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against
the sectrity of the state or against a limited class of other state interests."). Under the
protective principle, a state may assert jurisdiction over conduct occurring outside its
territory and not performed by its nationals if such conduct threatens the security of
the state or certain other classes of state functions, such as counterfeiting the state's
seal or currency, espionage, or perjury before consular officials. See id. § 402 cmt. f
(identifying section 402(3) as the protective principle and discussing its application).
See id. § 402 cmt. g (explaining that under the passive personality principle,
a
state may exercise jurisdiction whenever one of its nationals is harmed, even if the
harm occurred completely beyond the state's borders). This principle is not widely
recognized beyond circumstances involving international terrorism or other organized
attacks on a state's nationals because of their nationality. Id.
1K Universal jurisdiction derives from the idea that some crimes are
"recognized
by the community of nations" to be "of universal concern" and therefore can be prosecuted anywhere. Id. at §404.
183 Mary Robinson,
Foreword to THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL
JURISDICTION 15-16 (2001).
184 See Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalPublic
Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347,
2348-49 (1991) (discussing the increasing use of transnational public law litigation invoking "claims of right based not solely on domestic or international law, but rather,
on a body of 'trarsnational' law that blends the two"); see ato Robinson, supra note
183, at 25 (offering a set of "principles to guide, as well as to give greater coherence
and legitimacy to, the exercise of universal jurisdiction").
8" See Amber Fitzgerald, The Pinochet Case: Head of State Immunity Within the United
States, 22 WHITIER L. REV. 987, 1011-12 (2001) (citing cases that indicate an "international trend of denying immunity to heads of state").
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1998, a magistrate in London issued a provisional warrant for the arrest of Senator Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, pursuant to an extradition
request arising from a prosecution initiated by Spanish judge Juan
Garzon, who asserted universal jurisdiction over acts of genocide, hostage taking, and torture while Pinochet was Chile's head of state.""'
Although Pinochet claimed immunity, the British House of Lords
ruled, in contrast to the New York court ruling in Baez a century before, 87 that Pinochet had no entitlement to claim immunity for the
crimes of which he was accused. ""'
Pinochet appears not to be an isolated case. In February 2000, a
Senegalese court indicted Chad's exiled former dictator, Hiss~ne
Habr6, on torture charges and placed him under virtual house arrest,
marking the first time an African country had brought human rights
charges against another country's head of state.'
Likewise, Slobodan
186 See Provisional Arrest Warrant
by Nicholas Evans, Metropolitan Magistrate, Bow
Street Magistrates' Court, London, England for Augusto Pinochet Ugarte (Oct. 16,
1998), in PINOCHET PAPERS, supro note 34, at 61 (asserting Spanish jurisdiction over
AtIgusto Pinochet Ugarte). Although the House of Lords, in its final decision, ultimately determined that the International Convention Against Torture (rather than
general principles of universal jurisdiction) provided its soturce ofjurisdiction, Regina
v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate (No. 3), 1 A.C. 147, 189 (H.L. 1999), the convention itself can be seen as codifying the principles of universal jurisdiction, see id. at
201 ("[I]f the states with the most obvious jurisdiction ... do not seek to extradite, the
state where the alleged torturer is found must prosecute or, apparently, extradite to
another country, i.e. there is universaljurisdiction.").
187 Hatch v. Baez, 14 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 596, 599-600
(N.Y. Gen. Term 1876); see supra
text accompanying notes 169-170 (discussing the Baez case).
188 Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate,
I A.C. at 205. For the various Spanish and
English court. documents in the Pinochet case, see generally PINOCHET PAPERS, supra
note 34. For further discussion of the case, see generally THE PINOCHET CASE: A
LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (Diana Woodhouse ed., 2000); J. Craig Barker,
The FutIaure of l'ormer Head of State Immunity After Ex Parte Pinochet, 48 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 937 (1999); Andrea Bianchi, Immunity Versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case, 10
EUR. J. INT'L L. 237 (1999); Michael Byers, Decisions of British Courts During 1999 Involving Questions of Public or PrivateInternationalLaw, 1999 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 277, 277-95;
Byers, supra note 172; Christine M. Chinkin, InternationalDecision,United Kingdom House
of Lords: Regina v. Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte: Spanish Request for Extradition,93 AM.J. INT'L L. 703 (1999); Hazel Fox, The Pinochet Case No.
3, 48 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 687 (1999); Colin Warbrick, Extradition Law Aspects of Pinochet 3, 48 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 958 (1999).
189 Reed Brody, The Prosecution of Hisskne Habr--An "African
Pinochet," 35 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 321, 333-34 (2001). An appeals court subsequently quashed the indictment. Id. at 330. In March 2001, Senegal's highest court ruled that Senegal had no
jurisdiction to pursue crimes not committed in the country. Press Release, Human
Rights Watch, Senegal Bars Charges Against Ex Chad Dictator (Mar. 20, 2001), at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/03/habreO320.htm.
For background on the case,
see Brody, supra; Inbal Sansani, The Pinochet Precedent in Africa: Prosecution of Hissbne
Habr, 8 HuM. RTS. BRIEF, Winter 2001, at 32.
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Milogevik, the former Serbian leader, was compelled to stand trial before an international tribunal.'9
In addition, over the past two decades, aliens have begun to bring
human rights suits in the United States against foreign and U.S. governments and officials under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA).' ) Although the jurisdictional reach of this Act is governed by the same
due process/minimtIm contacts limitations as all other suits, the Act
does grant federal courts original subject matter jurisdiction over "any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the-United States." ' " Enacted as part of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, this statute, according to a 1980 ruling by
the Second Circuit, permits federal courts to hear suits by aliens alleging torture committed by officials of foreign governments.' 3 Later
decisions have upheld suits for genocide; war crimes; summary execution; disappearance; prolonged arbitrary detention; and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.'9 4 More recently, Congress passed the
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA),' ' which reinforces
and expands the ATCA by defining specific causes of action for torture and summary execution and by permitting U.S. citizens as well as
aliens to bring suit."'C Successful suits have been brought under these
statutes against various members of the Guatemalan military, 197 the es-

190See, e.g., R. Jeffrey Smith, Serb Leaders Hand over Milosevic for Trial by War Crimes
Tribunal, WASH. POST, June 29, 2001, at Al (discussing the extradition of former Yugoslav president Milogevi6 "to face a U.N. tribunal in the Netherlands on charges of
crimes against humanity committed during the Kosovo conflict of 1999"); see also Peter
Finn, Tribunal Lives up to Its Promise, WASH. POST, June 29, 2001, at Al ("When the war
crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was created by the United Nations in 1993,
its underlying promise was that no one ... was beyond the reach of international justice. Today, in the most dramatic moment in its history, the tribunal made good on
that pledge.").
'I 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(2000).
192 Id
193

.

Filartiga v. Pena-hala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).

194 See BETH STEPHENS & MICHAErL RATNER, INTERNA'IiONAI HUMAN RIGHTS
LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 343-48 (1996) (summarizing ATCA cases); see also William
Glaberson, U.S. Courts Become Arbiters of Global Rights and Wrongs, N.Y. TIMES, June 21,
2001, at Al (discussing "the growing use of the American legal system to judge rights
and wrongs all over the globe").
195 Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
196 Id.
197 See Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 179 (D.
Mass. 1995) (holding that the
alien plaintiffs could establish subject matter jurisdiction and a federal private cause of
action for tortious violations of international law under the ATCA).
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tate of former Philippine leader Ferdinand Marcos,' ' and Serbian
leader Radovan Karadi6. 9) Although these are civil cases, and many
of the monetary judgments issued may never actually be paid, the suits
have strong symbolic and emotional value to the victims-they may
deter potential defendants from entering U.S. territory, and they reinforce the principle of universal, or at least transnational, jurisdic200
tion.
International human rights suits against former and current governmental officials have been brought in courts outside the United
States as well. For example, in addition to the Pinochet and Habr
cases, lawyers representing survivors of the 1982 Israeli invasion of
Lebanon have asked a Belgian court to indict Israeli Prime Minister
20 1
Ariel Sharon, who was then the Defense Minister, for war crimes.
Indeed, the Israeli government takes the threat of foreign assertions
ofjurisdiction over human rights claims so seriously that it recently issued an advisory to all government, security, and army officials, warning them that foreign travel could subject them to lawsuits. 20 2 Although the International Court of Justice recently halted a Belgian
prosecution of the former Foreign Affairs Minister of the Democratic
Republic of Congo, citing the need for governmental immunity in

See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789, 791-92 (9th Cir. 1996) (approving
the district court's assertion of federal jurisdiction tinder the ATCA).
N9 See Kadic v. Karadii, 70 F.3d 232, 241-44 (2d Cir. 1995)
(finding subject matter
jurisdiction exists under the ATCA to bring claims of genocide, war crimes, and torture against the Bosnian-Serb leader).
200 See STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 194, at 234-38 (emphasizing the substantial
nonmonetary impact of ATCA and TVPA claims).
201 See The Complaint Against Ariel Sharon for His Involvement
in the Massacres at Sabra
and Shatila, The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights & the Environment, at http://www.mallat.com/articles/complaintenglish.htm (last visited Nov.
18, 2002) (claiming grave violations of international humanitarian laws). For press
coverage of the case, see, for example, Nicholas Blanford, Sharon Begins to Take WarCrimes Lawsuit Seriously, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 30, 2001, at 7; Clyde Haberman,
Israel Is Wary of Long Reach in Rights Cases, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2001, at Al; Constant
Brand, Court Asked to Indict Sharon over Palestinian Massacre, INDEP., June 18, 2001,
http://www.independent.co.uk/story.jsp?story=78822.
2 See Blanford, supra note 201 ("Israel is taking the threat of possible
prosecutions so seriously that it has begun to draw a map of countries where Israeli leaders
could face trial for war crimes.").
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some circumstances,
the sharp criticism this decision evoked0 4
demonstrates that the overall landscape for international human
rights suits has changed.
Finally, a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) has now
been established, after languishing during the Cold War era because
of concerns about incursions on national sovereignty.2 0 " The court's
jurisdiction is limited only to the most serious crimes, such as war
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. 7 Further, the court
is intended to function only in cases where there is little or no prospect of offenders being duly tried in national courts.... Nevertheless,
20.

See Arrest Warrant of II April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Bel-

gium), General List No. 121,
70 (Feb. 14, 2002), at http://www.icj-cij.org/icw'xv/
idocket/icobe/icobejudlgment/icobeitijudgmen t_20020214.pdf ("[G]iven the nature
and purpose of the warrant, its mere issue violated the immunity which Mr. Yerodia
enjoed as the Congo's incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs.").
For example, the dissenting judges in this case forcefully objected
to the majority's position that there are no exceptions to the immunity of high-ranking state officials, even when they are accused of crimes against humanity. Democratic Republic of
the Congo v. Belgium (AI-Khasawneh,j., dissenting), at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/
idocket./iCOBE/icobejudgment/icohe-ijjudlgment_20020214_al-khasawneh.plf;
see
also, e.g., Press Release, International Commission 01 Jurists, International Cotirt of Justice's Ruling on Belgian Arrest Warrant Undermines International Law (Feb. 15,
2002), at http://www.icj.org/article.php?sid=166 ("International humanitarian law
and international human rights law have accorded national States jurisdiction over
persons committing international crimes in order to combat impunity. Yesterday's decision is one that might have been expected sixty years ago, but not in the light of present-day law.").
205 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
art. 5, para. I, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), availableat http://www.un.org/icc.
206 See Benjamin B. Ferencz, An International Criminal
Code and Court: Were They
Stand and Whre They're Going, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 375, 383 (1992) ("[S] ome
sovereign states ... were not prepared to live by a universally binding rtle of international criminal law."); Robert Rosenstock, Remarks Made at the Pace International
Law Review Symposium (Oct. 23, 1993), in 6 PACE INT'L L. REV. 83, 84 (1994) ("The
split between East and West was sttch as to make any creation of an institution such as
an Iternational Criminal Court... all but unattainable."). Indeed, the United Nations Committee on International Criiminal Jurisdiction first submitted a draft statute
for an international criminal court as early as 1953. Revised Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court (Annex to the Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal jurisdiction), U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 23, U.N. Doc.
A/2645 (1954).
207 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, siu/pra
note 205, at art. 5,
para. 1.
208 See, e.g., id. at art. 20, para. 3 (stating that the
ICC does not have jurisdiction to
retry someone who has been tried in another court for condclit proscribed by the
Rome Statute "unless the proceedings in the other court ... were not condlucted independently or impartially in accordance with the norms of (lue process ... and were
conducted in a manner which, in the circtImstances, was inconsistent with an intent to
bring the person concerned to justice").
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the ICC represents another step along the path away from the national sovereignty paradigm that has traditionally dominated international relations. 0
J. The Challenge of InternationalTrade
We can see similar incursions to traditional ideas of nation-state
sovereignty in the area of international commercial relations. Indeed,
although this field is often considered a part of "private international
law," international trade issues are increasingly seen to implicate important societal values such as environmental protection and labor
standards. Therefore, it may be that the traditional distinction between "public" and "private" international law should be revisited.",
20'

The Bush administration continues to object to the ICC on the ground that it

will unduly interfere with U.S. sovereignty. See, e.g.,
Norman Kempster, U.S. May Back
Creation of Special Atrocity Tribunals, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2001, at A4 ("Opponents of a
global [war crimes] court have raised concerns that such a tribunal could be used to
prosecute American soldiers who are carrying out humanitarian missions."); lWty America Says No, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, July 22, 2001, at 18A (supporting the Bush administration's opposition to a permanent ICC because America's potential exposure to
misuse of the court is greater than that of most other nations); Bush Administration
Ponders Position Towards International Criminal Court, 17 INT'L ENFORCEMENTr L. REP.
(2001) (describing the Bush administration's resistance to the 1CC on the ground that
the court "infring[es] on the United States sovereignty and maneuverability in national
security policies"), http://www.globalpolicy.org/intijustice/icc/2001/05icc.htm; Jim
Lobe, Rights-US: Republicans Urge Clinton to Oppose ICC, Inter Press Service, at http://
www.oneworld.org/ips2/ju198/22_32_097.html (July 23, 1998) (describing Republican
senators' opposition to the ratification of the Rome Treaty, particularly to the court's
jurisdiction over the actions of a state that did not join the treaty); Brett D. Schaefer,
Overturning Clinton's Midnight Action on the International Criminal Court, EXECUTIVE
MEMORANDUM (Heritage Found., D.C.),.Jan. 9, 2001 (arguing that the U.S. should not
ratify the Rome Treaty because it contains "significant flaws that threaten the rights of
Americans and legitimate activities of the U.S. military"),
at http://
wwvv.heritage.org/Research/In ternationalOrgaiiizations/loader.cfin?uril=/commoiisp
ot/security/getfile.cfm&PagelD=3411; Press Release, Office of U.S. Representative
Ron Paul, Paul Introduces Resolution Opposing International Criminal Court (Feb. 7,
2001) (introducing H.R. Con. Res. 23, a resolution calling for Congress and the President to oppose the ICC, and "pointing out the threat to U.S. sovereignty posed by a
court with international jurisdiction"), at http://www.honse.gov/paul/press/
press2001/pr020701..htm.
210 According to Black's Law Dictionay, public law consists generally "of constitutional, administrative, criminal, and international law, concerned with the organization
of the state, the relations between the state and the people who compose it, the responsibilities of public officers to the state, to each other, and to private persons, and
the relations of states to one another." BLACK'S LAW DICIIONARY 1230 (6th ed. 1990).
Private law, in contrast, is defined as "[t]hat portion of the law which defines, regulates, enforces, and administers relationships among individuals, associations, and corporations." Id. at 1196. As Robert Post has pointed out, however, this distinction is
difficult to maintain in light of the American legal realist critique challenging the so-
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Traditionally, international law did not recognize the legitimacy of
public-law-type claims in international commercial disputes. For example, in 1893, when the U.S. government tried to prevent British fur
traders from trapping seals, arguing that the seals were in danger of
extinction, an international arbitral tribunal overwhelmingly rejected
the claim because there was no basis in international law for the U.S.
to apply its standards of conservation to measures taking place outside
its territory.2 ' Likewise, in the nineteenth century there were no international organizations and no permanent international courts, and

called public/private distinction. See Robert Post, The Challenge of Globalization to American Public Law Scholarship, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 323, 324 (2001) (noting that
"legal realists relentlessly demonstrated that rules of 'private' property actually structured social relations and thus were subject to evaluation in terms of the social structures they created"). From this perspective, government is always in the background,
regulating social life to establish and maintain the type of "private" relationships
deemed appropriate or desirable. Moreover, such regulation is always directed toward
the achievement of public goals. "All private law therefore ultimately involves 'the relations between the state and the people who compose it."' Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICIONARY, supra, at 1230).
211 See I JOHN BASSE'IT
MOORE, HISTORY & DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATIONS TO WHICIH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PAR'IY 755-961 (Washington,
Government Printing Office 1898) (containing records from Paciflc Fur Seal Arbitration
(U.S. v. Cr. Brit.)); see also Sands, supra note 37, at 529 (summarizing the case). Until
the Shrimp/Turtle case, discussed infra text accompanying notes 213-18, tribunals had
generally followed these same principles. Indeed, as recently as the early 1990s, the
territorial sovereignty doctrine in international trade disputes seemed alive and well.
See GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839, 898 (1994) (finding that the U.S., in pursuit of its environmental
objectives, could not "impose trade embargoes to secure changes in the policies which
other contracting parties pursued within their own jurisdiction"); United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155-205
(1993) (noting that although a party can adopt its own conservation policies, the panel
rejects the extrajurisdictional application of those policies); see also Benedict Kingsbury, The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy, The World Trade Organization, and the Liberal Project to
Reconceptualize InternationalLaw, 5 Y.B. INT'L ENvrL. L. 1, 20-21 (1994) ("The GATT
Secretariat... treat[s] territory (and perhaps nationality) as the essential basis for jurisdiction regardless of the trans-boundary or extra-jurisdictional dimensions of many
environmental and economic interests.... The WTO model is of state environmental
autonomy (from trade measures) within territorially-defined spheres ofjurisdiction.");
Torsten H. Strom, Another Kick at the Can: Tuna/Dolphin II, 33 CANADIAN Y.B. INT'L L.
149, 160 (1995) (describing the panel's "fear of extrajurisdictionality and unilateralism"); Friedl Weiss, TheSecond Tuna GA7Y'Panel Rq)ort, 8 LEIDENJ. INT'L L. 135, 148-49
(1995) ("[U]nilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be avoided." (citations omitted)); Stephen
Fleischer, Note, The Mexico-U.S. Tuna/Dolphin Dispute in GATYI- Exploring the Use of
Trade Restrictions to Enforce Environmental Standards, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 515, 547-48 (1993) (discussing the Panel's ruling that the United States may
not employ unilateral trade restrictions to impose conservation policies on other
members).
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if one state refused to submit a trade
• • 212 claim to arbitration, the possibilities for enforcement were minimal.
Yet, here too the assumption that national sovereignty trumps
other claims is under attack. Indeed, the same week that Pinochet was
arrested in London, the appellate body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) handed down a decision that, for the first time, recognized that one country can have a legitimate legal interest in activities
carried out in another country, at least when those activities are harmful to migratory endangered species.2 12 This case arose from a U.S.
government decision to ban the import of shrimp harvested in the waters of India, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand because the
shrimp were being caught using a method that incidentally killed sea
turtles. The four Asian countries objected to the U.S. ban, arguing
that it violated WTO free trade rules. Contrary to the decision in the
seal case, 214 the WTO appellate body ruled that the U.S. measures were
"provisionally justified" because the U.S. had a legal interest in the
protection of the sea turtles. 215 In other words, as in the human rights
cases, there is increasing recognition that "what one state does or
permits to be done within its territory
can be of legitimate interest in
21' 6
another state, however distant.
Not only does this decision represent a change in the way we conceive of state sovereignty, it is also significant that this case (and most
of the human rights cases discussed previously) originated with nonstate actors, rather than with actions taken by the executive branch of
a sovereign state. Thus, in the Shrimp/Turtle case, the U.S. export
restrictions at issue217 were the result of legal proceedings initiated in
federal courts by the Earth Island Institute, a non-governmental or-

212 See Sands, supra note 37, at 529-30 (describing
the international legal order at
the close of the nineteenth century).
21 Appellate Body Report on United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp

and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, at 75 (Oct. 12, 1998), http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop-e/dispue/distabase-wto-members4e.htm.
214 See supra note 211 and accompanying text (discussing that case).
215 Appellate Body Report on United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, supra note 213, at 51.
216 Sands, supra note 37, at 535. For an empirical analysis of the efficacy of unilateral trade sanctions to protect the global environmental commons, see Richard W.
Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What We Can
Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 1 (1999).
'1 YSee Revised Notice of Guidelines for Determining Comparability
of Foreign
Programs for the Protection of Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 61 Fed.
Reg. 17,342 (Apr. 19, 1996) (revising guidelines used to determine whether a shrimp
import prohibition should apply to a nation).
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ganization.2 1 In the Pinochet case, the extradition request was the result of an investigation and charges initiated by a judge based on a
complaint brought by non-state actors.2
Non-state actors can also initiate transnational legal proceedings
under Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA),221 which authorizes individuals and corporations to file
221
claims with arbitral panels
(rather than national courts) if the complainant's government is alleged to have "expropriated" the coinplainant's investment.2 2 2 Moreover, to take this step, no prior authorization is required from either the North American Free Trade

218 See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 948 F.
Supp. 1062, 1070 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1996) (denying motion to stay judgment clarifying embargo pending appeal), vacated
sub nom. Earth Island Inst. v. Albright, 147 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Earth Island
Inst. v. Christopher, 942 F. Supp. 597, 617 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996) (clarifying that an
embargo enacted by Congress in response to earlier legal proceedings does not allow
entry into the U.S. of any shrimp harvested by citizens or vessels of nations not certified under 16 U.S.C. 1537 (2000)), vacated sub nom. Earth Island Inst., 147 F.3d at 1352;
Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 922 F. Supp. 616, 627 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996) (denying
federal officials' request for extension of time for enforcing the Endangered Species
Act (ESA) internationally), vacated sub nom. Earth Island Inst., 147 F.3d at 1352; Earth
Island Inst. v. Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559, 575 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1995) (holding that
federal officials are required to enforce the ESA on a worldwide basis), vacated sub nom.
Earth Island Inst., 147 F.3d at 1352.
219 For a description of the process in Spain and links to Spanish
official documents relating to the Pinochet case, see the websites of DiplomatieJudiciaire, at http://
www.diplotnatieiudiciaire.com/Chili/Pinochet.htm, and Derechos Human Rights, at
http://www.derechos.org/niizkoi/chile/juicio/eng.html. For materials relating to the
Pinochet case, beginning with the general's arrest, see PINOCIIET PAPERS, supra note 34.
2'. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
605 (1993),
available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/english/index.htm.
221 Article 1120 of NAFI'A provides that investor
claimants may seek relief under
one of three sets of arbitral rules: (1) the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) Rules; (2) the ICSID Additional Facility Rules; or (3) the
United Nations Centre for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules.
32 I.L.M. at 643.
222 The relevant language of Article 1110 provides
that "[no] party may directly or
indirectly.., expropriate an investment.., or take a measure tantamount to... expropriation ... except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) on a non-discriminatory basis; (c)
in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and (d) on payment of
compensation." 32 I.L.M. at 641. For these purposes, Article 201 defines "measure" to
include "any law, regulation, procedure, requirement or practice." 32 I.L.M. 298. For
analyses of NAFTA's Chapter 11 investment expropriation provisions, see David A.
Gantz, Reconciling Environmental Protectionand Investor Rights Under Chapter1 of NAFIA,
31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,646 (2001); Paul S. Kibel, Awkward Evolution: Citizen Enforcement at the North American Environmental Commission, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10,769 (2002); J. Martin Wagner, InternationalInvestment, Expropriationand Environmental Protection, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 465 (1999); Daniel A. Seligman, The
reaty lse fUndermines EnvironmentalProtection, ENVTL. F., Mar./Apr. 2001, at 36.
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2
Commission or the Canadian, Mexican, or U.S. governments. 2
NAFTA's arbitration panels are even permitted to award the complainant monetary damages if it is determined that the government
violated or is violating NAFTA's investment provisions. 2'
Elsewhere, we see the widespread use of international nongovernmental regulatory frameworks. For example, the Apparel Industry Partnership, a joint undertaking of non-governmental organizations, international clothing manufacturers, and American universities, has established its own quasi-governmental (but non-state)
regulatory regime to help safeguard public values concerning international labor standards. The partnership has adopted a code of conduct on issues such as child labor, hours of work, and health and
safety conditions, along with a detailed structure for monitoring compliance (including a third-party complaint procedure).
In the
Internet context, the "TRUSTe" coalition of service providers, software companies, privacy advocates, and other actors has developed
(and monitors) widely adopted privacy standards for websites. 22'1 Similarly, the Global Business Dialogue on Electronic Commerce has

formed a series of working groups to develop uniform policies and

standards regarding a variety of e-commerce issues.2 7 And, of course,
223

See Kibel, snpra note 222, at 10,775 (highlighting the strong enforcement

mechanism for trade-investment law compared to the weak enforcement mechanism
for environmental law under NAFTA due to the fact that tinder Chapter 11, corporations can force countries into binding arbitration without prior approval from either
the Commission or any of the governments involved).
224 See id. (noting that the monetary damiages power under Chapter
11 has resuited in troubling environmental ottcomes as corporations have challenged and won
large settlements from governments over environmental regrlation); see aLso Vicki
Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment: NAFTAs Investment Protections and
the Misguided Quest Jbr an Intonational "Regulatoiy Takings" Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2003) (arguing that NAFTA tribunal decisions exceed U.S. regulatory
takings laws in several substantive and procedural reslpects, particularly in adoption of
a broader definition of property, imposition of a higher level of scrutiny over tie political process, and institution of procedural advantages as compared to litigation tinder the U.S. Fifth Amendment); Steve Louthan, Note, A Brave New Lochner Era? The
Constitutionalityof NA/TA Chapter 11, 34 VAND.J. TRANSNKU"L l,.1443, 1445 (2001) (arguing that Chapter I I constitutes "the most significant evisceration of state police
power since the Supreme Court freed the states from Lochnet's shackels in 1937").
225 See Workplace Code of Conduct, Apparel Industry Partnership (providing a "set of
standards defining decent and humane working conditions"), at http://w.dol.gov/
esa/nosweat/partnership/report.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2002).
226 See The TRUSTe Program: How It Protects Your Privacy, TRUSTe, at http://
www.truste.org/consumers/users-how.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2002) (describing its
program to ensure the protection of customer privacy).
2 See Global Business Dialogue on Electronic Commerce, at http://www'v.gl)de.org
(describing working groups as "a framework through which consensus continues to be
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the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, discussed
previously,2 is a non-state governmental body administering the domain name system.

I do not mean to suggest that any of the challenges surveyed in
this section are unsolvable. Nor do I argue that these challenges, even
taken together, mean that nation-states are on an inevitable path toward irrelevance or dissolution.'
Indeed, in the next section, I will
provide an overview of various approaches that have been advanced to
meet these challenges.
Nevertheless, although this tour through the contemporary legal
landscape has necessarily been brief, it should lead even the most
skeptical observer to believe that the challenges discussed are real
ones that require our attention. Moreover, these challenges share a
common tendency to complicate or unsettle our traditional assumption that the world order is and must be built from the ideas of territorially based state sovereignty and fixed, impermeable borders. And
if that is true, then this moment of unsettledness, when we are struggling to adapt to changes across a wide variety of doctrinal areas, provides an opportunity to rethink the assumption rather than simply try
to stabilize it.
II. TEN

RESPONSES

For those scholars, judges, and policy makers who have confronted cyberspace legal issues during the past decade, most of the ten
challenges discussed in the previous section are not new. To the contrary, numerous articles, judicial decisions, and domestic and international legislative and administrative bodies have wrestled with these
challenges, and the debate about appropriate responses has been robust. In this Part, I identify ten responses that appear to have received
the most attention, summarize each of the arguments, and briefly describe some of the criticisms most often raised about each response.
Significantly, however, though both the responses and the criticisms
are widely varied, they are primarily grounded either in political phiachieved between companies of different countries, cultures and sectors ... using the
tools of the digital medium with minimal bureaUcroacy [sic]").
2
See supra text accompanying notes 146-47 (discussing ICANN).
229 See, e.g., Michael Mann, Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents:
Diversifying,
Developing, Not Dying, 122 DiEDALUS 115, 139 (1993) ("The nation-state is not
hegemonic, nor is it obsolete, either as a reality or as an ideal.").
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losophy and its abstract conceptions of sovereignty and democratic
models of governance, or legal policy analysis, which focuses on the
development of effective and efficient rules. None attempts to explore in detail either the social meaning of jurisdiction or the multiple conceptions of space, borders, and community allegiance that
people experience on the ground and that might complicate the governance models being discussed.2 3 0 Thus, although many arguments
for and against the various strategies are outlined here, the debates
are being waged within an overly limited field of analysis. Neither the
responses nor the critiques they have engendered go far enough in
articulating a rich descriptive account ofjurisdiction in a global era.
A. E Pluribus Cyberspace
David Johnson and David Post were among the first legal scholars
to think seriously about the issues of jurisdiction and sovereignty in
cyberspace. Since 1996 they have staked out a simple but radical position. They argue (both in co-authored articles and in articles written
by Post alone) that cyberspace should be deemed a distinct "place" for
purposes of law-making sovereignty,23 and that the law applicable to
interactions in cyberspace "will not, could not, and should not be the
same law as that applicable to physical, geographically-defined territo230

Even David Johnson and David Post, who come the closest to this sort of in-

quiry, focus on jurisdiction as an issue primarily concerning the legitimate scope of
sovereignty as a matter of political philosophy and efficient organization. See infra
notes 231-48 and accompanying text (discussing the arguments Johnson and Post have
put forth).
231 See Johnson & Post, supra note 9, at 1378-79 (arguing that
cyberspace is a
unique "space" and cannot be governed by laws that rely on traditional territorial borders, instead requiring creation of a distinct and separate doctrine to be applied to cyberspace); see also Post, supra note 9 (arguing that the nature of the Internet destroys
the significance of physical location, eliminating the possibility of a single, uniform
legal standard); David G. Post, Of Black Holes and Decentralized Law-Making in Cyberspace,
2 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 70, 74-75 (2000) [hereinafter Post, Black Holes] (applying a
theory of decentralized lawmaking to the regulation ofjunk e-mail); David G. Post, The
"Unsettled Paradox": The Internet, the State, and the Consent of the Governed, 5 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 521, 527 (1998) (using the dilemma of Internet governance to
question the basis of state sovereignty); David G. Post & David R. Johnson, "Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent": Towards a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Makingin Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055, 1084-90 (1998) (using a problem-solving dilemma to argue in favor of decentralized decision making over the Internet); David G.
Post, Anarchy, State, and the Internet: An Essay on Law-Making in Cyberspace, 1995 J.
ONLINE L. art. 3, at http://warthog.cc.wm.edu/law/publications/ol/articles.post.
shtml [hereinafter Post, Anarchy] (examining the various groups and organizations
that can impose substantive rules on the Internet and arguing that the lack of physical
borders in cyberspace prevents effective rule making by centralized governments).
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ries. , '1 Thus, they contend that cyberspace should be its own jurisdictional entity. Given the onslaught of territorially based regulation in
cyberspace, this idea seems almost quaint a mere six years after it was
written. Nevertheless, the set of concerns Johnson and Post articulate
still haunt the cyberspace regulatory landscape.
Post's article Governing Cyberspace3 " summarizes what I am calling
the "e pluribus cyberspace" view quite nicely. Post starts with the
question: When is it legitimate for a court, or a territorial sovereign,
to exercise jurisdiction over someone? His answer is that "[llawmaking" sovereignty.., is defined ...by control over a physical terri2

tory.

3

Starting from this premise, Post then argues that cyberspace destroys the significance of physical location in three ways. First, he
notes, events in cyberspace do not merely cross geographical bounda-

232

Johnson & Post, suln'a note 9, at 1402.

Others have expressed similar skepti-

cism about the ability of territorial sovereigns to regulate cyberspace, at least in traditional forms. SeeJames Boyle, lhucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177, 205 (1997) (recognizing the difficulties states
have in regulating the global network, bUt arguing that certain private filtering and
control mechanisms will ultimately facilitate far greater state regulation); John T. Delacourt, The hIternationalInpact of Itternet Regulation, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 207, 234-35
(1997) (contending that national regulation of the Internet is inappropriate and that a
consensual regime of user self-regulation should be adopted); Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 911, 926 (1996) (arguing
that the transnational nature of the Internet requires governance by a collection of
state, business, technical, and citizen forces).
233Post, snupra note
9.
234 Id. at 158. For this proposition, Post cites the
RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (1987) ("Under international
law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory andt a permanent population, under
the control of its own government .. ")and MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 276-314 (3d ed. 1991) ("International law is based on the concept of the state
[which] in its turn lies upon the foundation of sovereignty [which itself] is founded
upon the fact of territory. Without territory, a legal person cannot be a state."). Post,
supra note 9, at 158 n.10. Nevertheless, this vision of sovereignty may be overly simplistic. See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt,.jr., The Internet as a Threat to Sovereignty? Thoughts on the
Internets Role in Strengthening National and Global Governance, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 423, 424-25 (1998) (arguing that the "Internet as a threat to sovereignty" thesis
only threatens a "Realist" theoty of international relations, not the "liberal tradition of
international relations" that already accotuts for the interaction of non-state actors
across borders); see also, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal InternationalRelations 7I'heoiy
and InternationalEconomic Law, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L 1. & POL'Y 717, 723 (1995) (distinguishing the liberal theory of international relations from realism, on the grounds that
realism assumes "that the primary actors are states, antd define[s] states as monolithic
units identifiable only by the functional characteristics that constitute them as states").
The question of how we might complicate the concept of sovereignty will be taken up
later in this Article. Infra Part IV.
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ries the way pollution does; they "ignore the existence of the boundaries altogether., 215 For example, the "cost and speed of message
transmission from one point on the net to any other is entirely independent of physical location: messages can be transmitted between
physical locations without any distance- or location-based degradation,
decay, or delay." 216 Second, even if in some cases there are physical
connections to a geographical locality, such as a server, many cyberspace transactions "consist of continuously changing collections of
messages that are routed from one network to another across the
global net, with no centralized location at all. 2, 2 Third, Post argues
that it is incoherent to discuss physical location with respect to cyberspace because "the net enables simultaneous transactions between
large numbers of people who do not and cannot know the physical location of the other party."2 311 Moreover, according to Post, even if one
tried to premise jurisdiction on whether an act had a substantial effect
within a particular state's territory (as Italy's highest court has at239
the formulation would be incoherent because "[t]he eftempted),
simultaneously and
fects of cyberspace transactions are felt everywhere,
24
1
network."
global
the
of
corners
all
in
equally
The problem, Johnson and Post contend, is that "[t]raditional legal doctrine treats the [Internet] as a mere transmission medium that
facilitates the exchange of messages sent from one legally significant
geographical location to another, each of which has its own applicable
laws. 41 Instead, "[m]any of the jurisdictional and substantive quandaries raised by border-crossing electronic communications could be
resolved by one simple principle: conceiving of [c]yberspace as a distinct 'place' for purposes of legal analysis by recognizing a legally significant border between [c]yberspace and the 'real world.' 2 42 Thus,
they argue for the creation of an indigenous law of cyberspace. According to Johnson and Post, such a law not only would sidestep most

235
236
237

Post, supra note 9, at 159.
Id. at 160.
id.

238 Id.

at 161.

See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (relating the facts of an Internet
jurisdiction case before the Italian Court of Cassation). American courts elaborating a
test for minimum contacts in cyberspace have also attempted to base jurisdiction on
the effects of online activity. See infra text accompanying notes 432-443 (providing a
sampling of such cases).
2,M

240

Post, supra note 9, at 162.

Johnson & Post, supra note 9, at 1378.
242Id.
241
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of the territorial dilemmas we encountered in the previous Section, it
would also allow for new law to develop that would take into account
many of the distinctive features of online interaction.24
Finally, Johnson and Post summon a radically decentralized vision
of law formation and enforcement wherein cyberspace will be its own
self-regulating jurisdiction.2 4 In his subsequent article, Anarchy, State,
and the Internet,245 for example, Post argues that communities in cyberspace will be governed by "rule-sets." These rule-sets are the underlying restrictions on behavior that are either promulgated in a contractual document (such as America Online's Terms of Service
Agreement) or embedded in the architecture of the website (such as a
screen that prevents the user from accessing information unless personal information or a credit card number is provided). Post envisions a kind of free market in law, whereby users will "vote" with their
browsers and only frequent those parts of cyberspace with rule-sets to
their liking 2 46 Thus, one could theoretically opt out of the "law" of
eBay and go somewhere else. Similarly, if AOL's terms of service are
distasteful, other Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are available. In
Post's view, this will mean that "[t]he 'law of the Internet' ...
emerges, not from the decision of some higher authority, but as the
aggregate of the choices made by individual system operators about
what rules to impose, and by individual users about which online
communities to join.,147 In addition, to the extent necessary, territo248
rial sovereigns would enforce cyberspace law as a matter of comity. "
While their "e pluribus cyberspace" view is provocative and has
forced scholars to grapple with important dilemmas, the Johnson and
Post approach is problematic in several respects. First, they appear to
have severely underestimated the ability of territorially based sovereigns to regulate cyberspace. Indeed, their implicit vision of the state

243 See id. at 1380-87 (applying the theory to various substantive areas of cyberspace
regulation).
244 See id. at 1396-1400 (arguing that as the development of
distinct "rule-sets" in

cyberspace proceeds, groups will come together to define the conduct and content
acceptable in their "area" of cyberspace).
Post, Anarchy, supra note 231.
246 See Post, supra note 9, at 169 (arguing that subscribers' ability to "vote with their
electrons" creates a veritable free market wherein subscribers will be able to choose a
set of rules that orders their online experience according to their preferences); see also
Post, Black Holes, supra note 231, at 70-73 (applying his approach to the problem of
junk e-mail).
247 Post, supra note
9,at 167.
248SeeJohnson & Post, supra note 9, at 1391-95.
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and its exercise of power is unduly limited. As James Boyle has
pointed out,24 their cyber-libertarian approach only makes sense if
one has an "Austinian"2 50 positivist vision of a lumbering state asserting
sovereign prerogatives only by enacting laws and arresting people who
disobey them. From that perspective, perhaps, states may face difficulties regulating cyberspace (though the recent success of authorities
in China and elsewhere to censor online content 5 suggests that states
may have maintained even this type of regulatory power). But enacting laws and arresting people is neither the only nor even the most effective way in which states regulate. Boyle posits a more subtle "Foucauldian '' 252 view, in which government regulates by changing the
architecture of the space itself.25 3 Thus, by affecting how the "code" of
cyberspace is constructed, governments might well be able to control

249) See

Boyle, supra note 232, at 184-85 (positing that cyber-libertarians can only

conceive of the law as "command[s] backed by threats, issued by a sovereign who acknowledges no superior, directed to a geographically defined population which renders that sovereign habitual obedience").
250See generally JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE
DETERMINED
(Isaiah Berlin et al. eds., Weidenfeld & Nicholson 1954) (1832) (presenting a positivist
theoiy of law, whereby law is seen as merely the command of the sovereign).
L, See, e.g., SHANTHI KALATHIL & TAYLOR C. BOAS,
THE INTERNET AND STATE
CONTROL IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES:

CHINA, CUBA, AND THE COUNTERREVOLUTION

4-10 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Working Paper No. 21, 2001) (detailing
the success of Chinese authorities in curtailing potentially challenging uses of the
Internet), available at http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/21kalathilboas.pdf; Chen May
Yee, Playing by Strict Rules Online, ASIAN WALL ST. J.,June 22, 2001, at NI (describing
Yahoo! China's acquiescence in removing Taiwanese content at the behest of the Chinese government); Freedom of Expression and the Internet in China, Human Rights Watch
(Aug. 1, 2001), at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/china-bck-0701.htm (describing the success of Chinese efforts to curb Internet use through regulation and enforcement actions). But see Jennifer Lee, Punching Holes in Internet Walls, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 26, 2001, at G1 (describing efforts of various web services to help users circumvent
government restrictions and technical gateways).
M See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND
PUNISH (Alan Sheridan trans.,
Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1978) (exploring how the eighteenth-century development of the panopticon prison architecture, with its centralized and omniscient gaze,
pervaded the mass psyche by conditioning individuals to internalize discipline and behave as if the authoritative, punitive gaze were always watching them).
25cI Lawrence Lessig's discussion of cyberspace regulation and policy takes a similar
approach. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 43-60
(1999) (describing ways in which government can regulate by controlling or dictating
technical architecture); see also Boyle, supra note 232, at 202-04 (discussing potential
means for regulating cyberspace through hardware and regulatory solutions); Alan
Hunt, Foucault's Expulsion of Law: Toward a Retrieval, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 8
(1992) (describing Foucault's belief that law-understood as centralized juridical state
power-had lost its importance in modernity and had been eclipsed by power that is
specific, local, fragmentary, and dispersed).
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online behavior even more effectively than they control behavior in
the "real world."
Second, even as a matter of political theory, theJohnson and Post
conception of sovereignty as necessarily tied to physical power and
territorial boundaries may be overly simplistic. As we will see later in
this Article, alternative conceptions of sovereignty pose challenges to
theJohnson and Post view.i
Third, their vision of competing rule-sets makes sense if, and only
if, alternative rule-sets are always available. For example, it is all well
and good to say that a user who does not like AOL's terms of service
can go elsewhere. But if there are no other ISPs or, more realistically,
if all other providers with similar capabilities to AOL also have the
same terms of service, the rule-set competition is meaningless.
Johnson and Post seem to assume that, in cyberspace, the cost to start
a competing service or website will always be low enough that options
will continue to be available. This assumption may or may not be
true, particularly as the online market becomes dominated by large
multinational content providers that could effectively monopolize a
given market. Johnson and Post might argue that antitrust laws would
prevent such an accretion of market power. Such laws, however,
would require the involvement of the state (or perhaps multiple
states) in the regulation of anticompetitive activities in cyberspace,
which .Johnson and Post wish to avoid.
Finally, the need for antitrust enforcement illustrates a larger
problem underlying Johnson and Post's libertarian approach. They
appear to assume that some state will be there to enforce underlying
background rules, most particularly rules of contract and property.
Both the legal realists, in their attacks on laissez-faire in the 1920s and
1930s," ; and members of the Critical Legal Studies movement, in

Infia Part IV.
See Patricia Fusco, Top U.S. ISPs by Subscriber: Q2 2001-Market Insights, ISP
Planet (Aug. 17, 2001), at http://wrv.isp-planet.com/research/rankings/usa-historyq22001.html (indicating that AOL's market share in the United States is one-third and
that "it would take United Online, EarthLink and MSN combined to rival AOL's current market share"). As a practical matter, the switching costs may also be more burdensome for most consumers than Johnson and Post assume.
256 See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 11-30
(1927) (discussing the treatment of property in American courts in a critique of laissezfaire philosophy); Robert L. Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison of "Political"and
"Economic" Coinpulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 199 (1935) (arguing for an expanded
role of the Fourteenth Amendment to curb the abuses of laissez-faire). See gemrally
BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEz FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND
254
255
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their efforts to challenge the public-private distinction, 2.7 however,
have repeatedly argued that this sort of assumption undermines the
whole idea of "private ordering" because it presupposes a "public" regime of enforcement and policing as well as a baseline of background
rights. If this is the case, the Johnson and Post scheme will run into
the very jurisdictional problems they seek to avoid because territorial
sovereigns will inevitably be called upon to establish and enforce those
background rights. Although a detailed discussion of this longstanding public-private debate is far beyond the scope of this Article, it is
worth recognizing that the issue resurfaces in the context of cyberspace.
B. Coase in Cyberspace
The Johnson and Post approach assumes that contract law increasingly will become the primary law of cyberspace. Without embracing
the entirety of Johnson and Post's vision, a number of other scholars
have similarly argued that the best response to the conundrums of cyberspace governance is to rely on the fact that cyberspace, by reducing
both transaction costs and barriers to entry and exit, enables a more

THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998) (discussing the work of Robert
Hale and the realist critique of libertarianism and the laissez-faire tradition).
257 See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUII)E TO CRITiCAL LEGAL
STUDIES 242-68 (1987)
(describing the Critical Legal Studies approach to the role of law in creating society
and society's actors); Kenneth M. Casebeer, Toward a CriticalJuri)prdence--AFirst Step
by Way of the Public-PrivateDistinction in Constitutional Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 379, 380
(1983) (critiquing "the public-private distinction in constitutional law"); Clare Dalton,
An Essay in the Deconstruction of ContractDoctrine,94 YALE L.J. 997, 1010-14 (1985) (considering the development of contract doctrine in light of the public-private distinction
and the realist critique); Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1350-57 (1982) (reviewing the decline of the public-private distinction in six stages); Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the
Family, 18 U. MIici. J.L. REFORM 835, 842-58 (1985) (contending that the distinction
between public and private action is meaningless in the family law context because
court actions take the form of state-sponsored policy decisions); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1196 (1985) (describing the "public/private" metaphor for representing the social world as "one of the primary representational constructs for the liberty of contractjurisprudence").
258 For further discussions of the public-private distinction with respect
to cyberspace, see Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural Value
ofApplying ConstitutionalNorms to "Private"Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1263 (2000);
MargaretJane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: RediscoveringLegal
Iealism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1295 (1998).
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perfect Coasean world
Such a world, premised on contractual relaions, seems to offer a way around jurisdictional puzzles by allowing
parties to construct their own legal relations, opt for a particular set of
legal rules, and designate the forum of their choice for dispute resolution.
Nevertheless, this vision has been controversial because it does not
provide sufficient space for public, noncontractual values. The battle
has been particularly fierce in the field of intellectual property.2 116 Increasingly, the creators of intellectual products are relying less on traditional intellectual property regimes to enable them to limit access to
their material, and more on a combination of contractual rights and
technological protections.
For example, if I purchase a book from a bookstore, American
copyright law grants me various entitlements. Under the so-called
"first sale" doctrine, I can sell it to a used bookstore or give it to a
friend to read.
Likewise, tinder the fair use doctrine, I can create
my own parody of the book or excerpt passages for critical or educational user.2 And there are various other copyright doctrines that aim

259

See generally R.IH. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (ex-

amining legal solutions to the problem of harmful effects in an ideal market with no
transaction costs).
260 For a sampling of articles staking out positions concerning
the use of contract
and other "private ordering" models for regulating intellectual property, see generally
Tom W. Bell, FairUse vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 579-600 (1998); James Boyle, Cruel, Mean,
or Lavish? Economic Analysis, PriceDiscriminationand DigitalIntellectual Property, 53 VAND.
L. REV. 2007, 2010-21 (2000);Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and theJurisprudenceof Self-Help,
13 BERKELEY TECH. .J.
1089, 1101-18 (1998); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect
Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799 (2000) [hereinafter Cohen, Perfect Curve]; Niva ElkinKoren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. LIJ. 93,
108-13 (1997); William W. Fisher Ill, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1203, 1218-40 (1998); David Friedman, In Defense of Private Orderings: Comments
onJulie Cohen's "Copyright and theJurisprudence of Self-Help, "13 BERKELEYTECH. L.J.
1151, 1163-71 (1998); Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy:
Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845, 876-93 (1997); Raymond T.
Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and IntellectualProperty Law, 13
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827, 844-60 (1998); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption
After the ProCD Case: A Market-Based Approach, 12 BERKELEYTECI-. LJ. 53, 81-91 (1997).
21 See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000) ("[T]he owner of a particular copy...
is entitled,
without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy ....). For a discussion of the history of the first sale doctrine and
concerns that the doctrine may be overly restricted in the digital environment, see
generallyJESSicA LFUMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 81-83 (2001).
Fair use, which began life as a judge-made defense to copyright infringement,
is now statutorily recognized under U.S. law. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) ("[T]he fair
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to strike a balance between granting incentives to copyright holders
and allowing the broadest possible dissemination of information.
If the same book were downloaded in electronic format, however,
the set of entitlements could well be different. Thus, the copyright
holder could provide me with a copy of the book only if I agree to
various conditions. These conditions, furthermore, could be unrelated to the rights that users hold under copyright law. For example, I
could be required to agree to purchase my electronic copy on the
condition that I neither give it to a friend nor sell it to a third party.
Such concessions would be extracted through a license whereby I
would be required to "click" an icon indicating agreement to a set of
terms.
So far, nothing about the Internet context has substantially
changed the analysis. After all, the bookstore theoretically could have
made the same demands. But with an electronic version, individualized agreements are more feasible because transaction costs are lower.
More significantly, technology increasingly makes it possible for the
owner actually to enforce such agreements. For example, the electronic file could be encoded with information that would make it impossible for me to distribute the file electronically to someone else
without paying additional money. Alternatively, it could be coded so
that the product can be used only a prescribed number of times or for
a prescribed period of time.
Such agreements, and the technology to enforce them, would be
governed by contract law, not copyright law. Thus, a coded work
could prevent me from electronically excerpting a passage even if it

use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies.., for purposes such as ...teaching ...is not an infringement of copyright.").
263 For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear
that, in order to serve
both First Amendment goals and the Copyright Clause's stated objective of "promot[ing] the Progress of Science and the useful Arts," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8,
copyright doctrine "assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work." Feist
Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991). This conception un-,
derlies the traditional copyright distinction between ideas, which are not copyrightable, and the expressions of those ideas, which are copyrightable, see Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1879) (holding that the publication of an accounting system is
copyrightable, but not the system itself), as well as the doctrine that expression must
have a "modicum" of originality in ordei to be protected, seeFeist Publns,499 U.S. at
345 ("The sine qua non of copyright is originality."). Whether or not these doctrines
sufficiently protect First Amendment values has been the subject of debate. See, e.g.,
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First
Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (2001) (arguing that copyright doctrines must be subjected to independent
First Amendment scrutiny).
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were for scholarly or educational purposes. My "fair use" rights under
copyright law would be irrelevant because the contract would be enforced through technological self-help. According to one commentator:
Programs might be tied to unique identifier numbers embedded in software or hardware. Content providers will declare that content is not being "sold," merely licensed subject to numerous restrictions. Self-help

sub-routines might be used to encrypt user-files in the event of contractual violation, with the key only being provided on payment of a fee and
a return to proper behavior. Digital fingerprints and watermarks will
help to identify texts. Encryption will be used to protect programs
against decompilation, or to scramble source code so that it cannot be
264
parsed.

Moreover, although theoretically I could develop a tool to circumvent
the protection, the controversial Digital Millennium Copyright Act
makes such circumvention (even for fair use purposes) a crine. '
264Boyle, supra note 260,
at 2025.
2,15

See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000) (setting forth the relevant provisions regarding cir-

cumvention of copyright protection systems). Critics have argued that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) has overly enhanced the ability of copyright owners to
wield electronic protective measures to control new kinds of exploitation of their
works. See, e.g., LITMAN, supra note 261, at 81-86 (describing ways in which technological self-help, enforced by the DMCA, could lead to the overexpansion of copyright);
Julie E. Cohen, WIPO Copyright Treaty Implementation in the United States: Will Iir Use
Survive?, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 236, 237-39 (1999) (arguing that the DMCA will
likely improperly narrow the fair use doctrine); Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to Copy,
108 YALE L.1. 1661, 1683-86 (1999) (expressing concern about recent expansion of private rights in copyright law); Robert C. Denicola, Mostly Dead? Copyright Law in the New
Millennium, 47J. COPYRIGrr Soc'Y USA 193, 204-07 (2000) (arguing that the balance
between incentives for copyright holders and public access has shifted toward "a free
market in property rights rooted in the natural entitlement of creators"); L. Ray Patterson, Understandingthe Copyright Clause, 47J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y USA 365, 387-89 (2000)
(arguing that Congress inappropriately granted a "natural law monopoly" in the
DMCA "comprised of rights for the creator to the exclusion of any duties"); Pamela
Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the DigitalEconomy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 566 (1999) (arguing that certain
provisions of the DMCA are overbroad and warning of "its potential for substantial unintended detrimental consequences"); Yochai Benkler, The Battle over the Institutional
Ecosystem in the Digital Environment, 44 COMM. ASS'N COMPUTING MACHINERY 84, 86
(2001) (arguing that "the expansion of exclusive private rights in information tilts the
institutional ecosystem within which information is produced against peer production
and in favor of industrial production"). But see, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and
Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1613, 1616-17 (2001)
(arguing that proper "resolution of tensions between the exercise of control under
copyright on the one hand and the availability of new technology on the other...
notwithstanding current critiques, supports a continued role for control in a new
technological environment," and suggesting that "the logic underlying [the DMCA] is
consistent with earlier approaches to copyright/technology conflicts").
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There are, of course, certain advantages to a contractarian system
such as this. Most significantly, scholars have pointed out that content
providers, armed with technological protection, could engage in
finely-grained price discrimination, potentially permitting more people to access material at a price closer to what they are able to afford.266 To conceptualize this, assume there is a book that person A
values at $10, person B values at $20, and person C values at $30. If
the book is priced at $20, B and C will buy it, but A will not. The producer has lost $20 that might have been reaped from the sale: the $10
A would have spent, as well as the additional $10 C would have been
willing to pay. In addition, A will not be able to buy the book, which
we might see as a social loss. If, however, the producer were able to
identify these individual valuations and could charge different prices
to different customers, both the producer's loss and the social loss
would disappear. Now C would be charged the full $30, and A could
get the book for $10.
This hypothetical scenario assumes, of course, that a producer
would be able to determine various buyers' actual valuations. Historically, one way of doing so has been by creating a variety of different
versions of a product with different price points. Some versions may
have stripped down features. Some versions simply may be available
sooner. The methods can also be combined: hardcover books are
generally distributed first at a higher cost, and lower-cost paperbacks
are distributed some time later.
Obviously, these mechanisms result in only rough approximations. Moreover, there is nothing to prevent a secondary used book
market from developing, thereby skewing the price discrimination altogether. Thus, "[e]ffective price discrimination requires restrictions
on transfer of the work to other users; price discrimination will not
work if high-value arbitrageurs can obtain low-cost access from redistributors. 't 7 Accordingly, advocates of such a contractarian approach
argue that copyright owners need to be able to contract around some
of the ground rules of copyright law. They argue that there will be
greater access to information and more incentive to create original
material if contract is allowed free reign.
There are, however, at least three problems with this approach.
First, the contractual price discrimination model may well favor cer266

Fisher, supra note 260, at 1239-40 (setting forth a hypothetical whereby
See, e.g.,

technology could be used to maximize returns while differentially charging consumo
ers) 267 Cohen,

Peifect Curve, supira note 260, at 1804.
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tain types of new creation over others. For example, fair use of copyrighted expression would no longer be permitted, and new creation
that uses existing uncopyrightable material would suddenly be subject
to licensing schemes. Second, such a model assumes that access to information is a purely private matter implicating concerns only about
efficiency and agreement among parties. However, "licensing decisions designed to maximize individual or private welfare may not
maximize societys."I5 Thus, the public as a whole may benefit from
access to information that no one individual would value sufficiently
to purchase. And even if an individual were to purchase the information, there is no guarantee that the information would be disseminated to those who could not afford it. Third, online licensing contracts are often not true bargains.
Rather, they are simply
"clickstream" agreements that are entered into by parties of different
bargaining power and sophistication. Indeed, the recent battle over
proposed Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code and the subsequent Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) has
been waged in part over the issue of whether such contracts should be
binding in all circumstances.26 Finally, as discussed previously, these
contractual "solutions" do not actually remove the need for state intervention because some government must always be in the background to enforce any contractual agreement.

268

Id. at 1809.

269 UCITA was formerly draft Article 2B of the U.C.C.,
until the American Law

Institute withdrew its support. UCITA would enforce these so-called "clickwrap" licenses in the mass-market context where the licensee manifests assent either before or
during the initial use. See UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACr § 209, 7 U.L.A.
288 (1999) ("A party adopts the terms of a mass-market license.., only if the party
agrees to the license, such as by manifesting assent, before or during the party's initial
performance or use of or access to the information."), available at http://www.law.
tIpenn.eCu/bll/ulc/ucita/citalOst.loc. One of the principal points of contention
about both Article 2B and UCITA is that they would make most of their default rules
subject to change by "agreement of the parties," including provisions on choice of law,
choice of forum, the remedies to be awarded, and the implied warranties of noninfringement, merchantability, and program content. Thus, as Mark Lemley has argued,
"asoftware vendor with a good lawyer can quite easily enforce virtually whatever terms it
likes simply by putting them 'conspicuously' in a multi-page document that the user
cannot even see (much less agree to) until after buying, installing, and beginning to
run the software." Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual
Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 122 (1999). And, although there is the possibility of such a contract being deemed unconscionable, that possibility is relatively remote
given courts' general reluctance to void contracts on nconscionability grounds.
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C. A World of Online Passports
In response to the French lawsuit concerning access to Nazi
memorabilia, Yahoo! argued that it could not feasibly block French
users from accessing the offensive websites without censoring those
sites altogether.27 ' According to Yahoo!, "no existing technology could
Uleffectively keep all French users from seeing" the sites at issue.
timately, the French court appointed a panel of three experts to test
Yahoo!'s technical argument.212
The panel estimated that, for approximately seventy percent of
those accessing the web from France, the Internet Protocol (IP) address of the user is associated with a French Internet Service Provider
and can be filtered accordingly.273 The IP addresses for French users
of America Online, however, would appear to originate in Virginia,
where the headquarters of AOL's network is located.27 ' Similarly, IP
addresses on the private networks of large corporations might indicate
the location of the server rather than the user. 275 Finally, the panel
noted that users could actively conceal their location by using
"anonymization sites" that replace the user's IP address with a different one from another location. 276 Thus, the panel concluded that one
hundred percent geographical identification was infeasible.277
Nevertheless, in imposing its order the French court appeared to
embrace the position that, even if Yahoo! could not block all French
users from sites displaying Nazi memorabilia, enough users could be
identified so as to make the judgment effective. Thus, although for
years cyber-libertarians have argued that cyberspace is unregulatable
by geographically based sovereigns, the Yahoo! decision reflects the
See Angela Doland, French Oppose Yahoo! on Nazi Items, ASSOCIATIED PRESS, July
24, 2000 ("[A]n expert witness called by Yahoo! testified [at today's hearing] ... that it
would be technically impossible to keep French cybernauts off the disputed Web
sites."), http://www.codoh.com/newsdesk/2000/000724ap.html.
271 Id.
272 T.G.I.
Paris, Aug. 11,
2000, http://www.legalis.net/cgi-iddn/french/
270

affichejnet.cgi?droite=decisions/responsabilite/ord-tgi-paris 110800.htn
(ordering
the formation of a panel of technical experts to determine whether Yahoo! could identify and filter out French users from the sites found to violate French law).
273 Document de travail sur le rapport d'expertise, T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 6, 2000,
http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis2OOOllO6-rp.htm
(presenting the
report of the three experts who tested whether Yahoo! could identify and filter out
French users).
274 Id.
275 Id.
276

Id.

277 Id.
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idea that, even if perfect regulation is impossible, such regulation can
still be effective. After all, the fact that locks can be picked does not
render locks useless as regulatory devices." 8
Moreover, the technology to zone cyberspace based on physical
geography is rapidly improving. In the past several years, companies
such as DoubleClick, Akamai, NetGeo, Digital Island, Quova, and
Digital Envoy have been racing to compile databases that match up
the 4.3 billion possible Internet "locations" with physical geography."9
Significantly, although commentators initially warned that governments might try to impose a digital identification requirement on cyberspace, it appears to be private industry and not government that
is leading the charge. For businesses, geographical tracking permits
marketing campaigns 'tailored to customers in specific locations 1 and
the ability to sell more targeted advertising. 82 Nevertheless, once the
technology exists, government regulators may insist Oust as the
French judge in Yahoo! did) that sites employ this technology to enforce local laws.
If geographical tracking technology becomes more accurate and
more widely used, then it is not hard to envision a cyberworld of digital passports, where users entering a website are immediately identified by country (or state, city, town, or zip code) and then offered
content that has been zoned for members of that geographical community. A recent legal battle concerning iCraveTV.com, a Canadian
corporation, illustrates how this would work. In 1999, the company
began offering a streaming version of seventeen Canadian and Ameri-

278

279

This example is drawn from LESSIG, sulyra note 253, at 57.
We Know Where You Live, FoRBES.COM (Nov. 13, 2000), at www.forbes.com/

global/2000/ 1113/0323130a-print.html; see Michael Geist, E-Borders Loom, for Better or
Worse, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, June 28, 2001 (discussing Internet content providers'
growing interest in determining the physical location of web resources and the people
who access them), littp://www.globetechnology.com/servlet/GAMArticleHTML.
Template?tf=globetechinology/; Stefanie Olsen, Geographic Tracking Raises Opportunities,
Fears, CNET NEwS.COM (Nov. 8, 2000), at http://news.cnet.com/2102-1023248274.htnil (discussing Internet providers' efforts to "pinpoint the physical location
of Web surfers").
2801 See, e.g., LESSIG, stpra note 253, at 49-53 (discussing the alternatives
governments could use to impose digital identification).
281 See Olsen, supro note 279 ("[A] traditional retailer such
as Banana Republic
could hawk swimming suits to Web visitors from Los Angeles as it pushes parkas to online shoppers from New York.").
282 See Geist, supra note 279 ("[N]ational
and global Web sites may now use geographic identification technology to guarantee advertisers that their ads will only be
displayed to a local audience.").
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can broadcast television stations online, uncut, and uninterrupted .
When challenged, the company argued that such retransmission was
permitted under Canadian copyright law, and that the site was intended for Canadian viewers only.2 85 Nevertheless, the steps taken by
the site to block access to Americans were trivially easy to circumvent.
First, a potential user was required to enter his or her local area code.
If the area code entered were not a Canadian area code, the user
286,
Users who negotiated the
would be denied access to the service.
first step were then confronted with two icons: "I'm in Canada" and
"Not in Canada" and were asked to click one. 7 Ultimately, a federal
judge in Pittsburgh ruled that "acts of [United States copyright] infringement were committed within the United States when United
States citizens received and viewed defendants' streaming of the copyrighted materials. 2 88 The judge issued a temporary restraining order
2 111
28))
against the Internet company, which subsequently settled the case
21
Since that time, however, a new corand later went out of business.
poration called JumpTV.com has announced its intention to launch a
similar service in Canada, claiming that it will use geographic identification technology to ensure that only Canadians will be able to access

28

See Nat'l Football League v. TVRadioNow Corp., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1831,

1834 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (alleging that "defendants have captured United States programming from television stations in Buffalo, New York and elsewhere, converted
these television signals into ...data and streamed them over the Internet from [their]
website"). For more details on the allegations, seeJohn Borland, Broadcasters Win Battle
Against iCraveTV.com, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 28, 2000, at http://news.cnet.com/
news/0-1004-200-1535528.html (reporting on the legal battle between the Internetbased television company and American broadcasters).
284 Because the suit was ultimately decided under U.S. law
and then settled, this
contention was never tested. For a discussion of the Canadian law with regard to this
case, see Michael A. Geist, iCraveTVand the Nezv Rules of Internet Broadcasting,23 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 223, 225-37 (2000).
285 See TVRadioNow Corp., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834 (recounting the defense
arguments).
286 See Geist, supra note 284, at 225-26 (noting that "this
approach was viewed, with
some justification, as rather gimmicky since iCraveTV's own Toronto area code was
posted on the site").
27

Id. at 226.

288

TVRadioNow Corp., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834-35.

289

1d. at 1833.
See Etan Viessing, iCraveTVSettles, Wraps Webcast, 361 HOLLYWOOD REP., Feb. 29,

290

2000, at 4.
291 Panel 11:
Digital Video, II FORDHIAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 317, 338
(2001) (remarks ofjeffrey Cunard).
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the site.
In a world of digital passports, a company like JumpTV
could go one step farther and automatically "read" the digital identification of each user attempting to access the site, which would more
effectively block access to those without Canadian identification.
Geographical tracing and digital identification technology therefore appear to "solve" the problem raised in cases such as Yahoo! and
TVRadioNow. Using this technology, website operators or Internet
Service Providers can simply allow access to some users while denying
access to others, based on the geographical location of the user.
Nevertheless, at least three difficulties remain. First, website operators arguably would be required to monitor continuously the laws
of every jurisdiction in order to determine which users to admit.2"
Second, Internet users (and regulators) worried about online privacy
may balk at technology that would pierce geographical anonymity and
link physical location to other data, such as the sites that the user visits. Such links might lead to increased invasion of privacy by marketers.2 1" Even more ominous is the possibility that the loss of geographical anonymity might make people more reluctant to visit certain sites,
for fear that they may be identified. '5 Finally, if, as in Yahoo!, a website
operator in the United States refuses to block French citizens accessing the site, how will France enforce its wishes? Thus, the jurisdictional puzzle may not be completely solved.

292 See Geist, supra note 279 ("Canada'sJumpTV
has garnered considerable publicity from its plans to use geographic identification technology to limit its Internet retransmission of TV signals to Canadians."); Ed Hore,JumpTV Wants to Put TVSignals on
the Internet, LAW. WKIY.,Jan. 12, 2001.
2
See Open Letter from Ben Laurie, supra note 90 (arguing that geographical fil-

tering would impose a tremendous burden on services such as Yahoo!, which would be
required "to maintain a huge matrix of pages versus jurisdictions to see who can and
can't see what").
294 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Privacy and E-Commerce,
7 B.U.J. SCI. & TECH. L. 223,
225 (2001) (arguing that cases such as Yohoo! and TVRadioNow, which give ISPs some
responsibility for controlling access to people in different geographic areas, will exacerbate privacy concerns because, if an ISP has to know where you are, then there will
be greater incentives to link web profiles with physical locations).
2 '5 See, e.g., Jonathan D. Glater, Hemming in the World Wide Web, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 7,
2001, § 4, at 5 ("'A lot of times people are looking for information on the Internet that
they wouldn't want people to know they're looking for."' (quoting Shari Steele, a lawyer for the not-fur-profit Electronic Frontier Foundation)).
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D. You Enforce My Laws, I'll Enforce Yours
Lawrence Lessig, in his book Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace,''
offers a theory of international regulation of cyberspace activity that
attempts to solve the question that the technological response in the
previous Section leaves open: even if a website operator could easily
identify the territorial location of each user, what is it that would
compel a website operator to enforce the laws enacted in other jurisdictions? One answer, of course, is that, at least for commercial sites,
the desire to operate internationally will exert a strong persuasive
force, as Yahoo!'s "voluntary" capitulation to the French order demonstrates. Nevertheless, Lessig's approach goes farther than that by
involving governments in a series of reciprocal enforcement arrangements.
Lessig starts by outlining the standard cyber-libertarian argument
This argument, reminiscent of
that the Internet is unregulatable.'
the Johnson and Post approach discussed previously,2 911 proceeds along
the following lines: Suppose the legislature of New York passes a statute banning online gambling. In the wake of the legislation, New
York's Attorney General moves to shut down all gambling sites located
on servers in New York. The sites can simply move their servers to
Connecticut, and New York citizens can still access online gambling
activities as easily as before. If the New York Attorney General is persistent, she may decide to seek prosecution in Connecticut as well and
may be able to persuade the Connecticut Attorney General to shut
down the servers, even if Connecticut does not have the same antigambling policy as New York. But then the website operators simply
move their servers offshore, to the Grand Caymans or the Bahamas, or
somewhere else where they will not be prosecuted. It is still no more
difficult for American citizens to gain access to the gambling sites, and
territorial regulation appears to have failed.
Lessig answers this dilemma with the concept of reciprocal enforcement. According to Lessig, "[e]ach state [or nation] would
promise to enforce on servers within its jurisdiction the regulations of
other states for citizens from those other states, in exchange for hav296
297

LESSIG, supna note 253.
See id. at 54-55 (describing Minnesota's attempt to enforce a law banning gam-

bling online and recounting the argument that it is "practically impossible for geolimited governments to enforce their rules over actors on the [Internet]").
graphically
298Suatetacmaynnoe23-.
299Supra

text accompanying notes 231-58.

Cf. LESSIG, supra note 253, at 54-55 (explaining that "[n]o matter what Minne-

sota does, it seems the [Internet] helps its citizens beat the government").
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ing its own regulations enforced in other jurisdictions.""' Lessig argues that although states do not necessarily have the same regulatory
goals, they all at least have some laws that they wish to have enforced
extraterritorially. Thus, New York may have an interest in preventing
its citizens from accessing gambling sites, while Florida may have an
interest in restricting access to pornography. In Lessig's scheme, Florida would simply require servers within Florida to block the access of
New Yorkers to gambling sites, in exchange for New York's keeping
Florida citizens away from New York servers offering content deemed
impermissible in Florida. According to Lessig, "[w]ith a simple way to
verify citizenship, a simple way to verify that servers are discriminating
on the basis of citizenship, and a federal commitment to support such
local discrimination, we could easily imagine an architecture that enables local regulation of Internet behavior."" " Indeed, such architecture would be similar to the online passports discussed in the previous
Section. Moreover, Lessig envisions this system of reciprocal enforcement operating internationally as well. He states, albeit without
explanation, that "[t]here is the same interest internationally in enforcing local laws 3'1
as there is nationally-indeed, the interest is most
likely even higher." 2
A selective certification system would, as Lessig observes, "dramatically increase the power of local governments to impose requirements on their citizens. ' Websites would condition access on the
presentation of digital certificates, and rules imposed by local jurisdictions would be enforced by sites worldwide.
The effect, in short, would be to zone cyberspace based on the qualifications carried by individual users. It would enal)le a degree of' control of'
cyberspace that few have ever imagined. Cyberspace would go from being an unregulable space to, depending on the depth of the certificates
in the space, the most regulable space imaginable.'
Nevertheless, one wonders whether countries would be as quick to
sign tip for this kind of mutual enforcement scheme as Lessig imagines. Take the Yahoo! case, for example. Had Yahoo! not chosen to
comply with the French order, how likely is it that the U.S. government or its courts would have required Yahoo! to block access to
French users? After all, the American commitment to First Amend300 Id.

at 55.
(d. at 55-56.
302 Id. at 56.
303 Id. at 56-57.
504/d. at 57.
301
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ment values is quite strong, and any governmental efforts to help
France enforce its order would surely be met by fierce opposition
(and lawsuits) within the United States. Indeed, the federal district
court order declaring the French judgment unenforceable in the
United States articulated such First Amendment concerns as part of its
justification.""
Moreover, Yahoo! and other businesses would likely argue that the
zoning scheme Lessig envisions would be costly to enforce even if the
technology to identify users geographically were cheap. As the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce recently argued in an amicus brief filed in Yahoo!'s U.S. declaratory judgment action:
Technology alone is not the issue.... Under the French court's jurisdictional theory... each individual or company with a presence on the
internet would have to constantly monitor the laws of every country in

the world, search out content that might be prohibited by one or more
of those countries, and implement some sort of blocking software that
would screen different categories of material from users in different
countries. This would be obviously too burdensome for even enormous

companies like Yahoo!, and would literally be a death knell for smaller
companies and non-profit organizations.406

Such arguments might well persuade jurisdictions to forgo reciprocal
enforcement in many cases.
Finally, as the discussion of Yahoo! indicates,
there is very little
global consensus about what constitutes appropriate web material.
France and Germany want to block Nazi sites; states within the U.S. try

305

It is unclear, however, whether or not the mere enforcement of a foreign order

should be deemed sufficient state action to trigger constitutional concerns. In Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that judicial enforcement
of racially restrictive covenants would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Krame; 334 U.S. at 20-21. On the
other hand, Shelley's logic "consistently applied, would require individuals to conform
their private agreements to constitutional standards whenever, as almost always, the
individuals might later seek the security of potential judicial enforcement." LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1697 (2d ed. 1988). This question, of
course, implicates longstanding debates about the coherence of trying to draw a distinction between "private" and "public" action for constitutional purposes. For a discussion of such debates, see Berman, supra note 258. 1 am grateful to Mark Rosen for
noting some of the problems inherent in the application of the state action doctrine to
the judicial enforcement of foreign "unconstitutional"judgments.
306 Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of
the United States et al. at 6-7,
Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. StIpp. 2d 1181
(N.D. Cal. 2001) (No. 00-21275).
307

Supra Part I.D.
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to prosecute gambling sites;... and governments in China, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and elsewhere try to block access to sites for political or
religious reasons.'"
Countries may be able to regulate such sites
within their borders, but they may well find it difficult to convince
other countries to enforce their restrictions, even in the reciprocal
scheme Lessig envisions. Moreover, efforts to enforce local norms
might run counter to the current trend of increasing international
norm-creation in the human rights area.
Thus, many would argue
that other nations' "sensitivities should not serve as an excuse to block
sites that promote the protection of human rights.""'
Lessig recognizes both that the "architecture" he describes may
never be universally enforced and that some individuals-if they desire it enough-will probably always be able to avoid technologies of
identity. Nevertheless, he argues that even partial control would have
powerful effects. According to Lessig, "it is as likely that the majority
of people would resist these small but efficient regulators of the
[Internet] as it is that cows would resist wire fences." '
An even more fundamental objection to this approach, one that
Lessig himself seems to share,"' is more normative. A cyberspace
:08 See, e.g., Humphrey ex rel.
State v. Granite Gates Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715,

721 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (affirming the exercise ofjurisdiction over a non-resident
corporation and its principal for deceptive trade practices, false advertising, and consumer fraud in connection with an Internet gambling site); Vacco ex rel.
People v.
World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 854 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (declaring
that the Attorney General of New York is entitled to injunctive relief against a nonresident corporation and subsidiaries for offering Internet gambling to residents of
New York).
.409
See, e.g., Mary Kwang, Internet Dreams: China's New Generation, STRAITS
TIMES
(Singapore), July 16, 2001 (quoting a Washington-based official of Human Rights
Watch as complaining that "'China's attempts to control access to the Internet through
politically-motivated regulations and detentions blatantly violate users' rights to free
expression"'); Tan Tarn How, Foreign Websites That Refuse to Register "Can Be Blocked,"
STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), Sept. I, 2001 (reporting that Singapore's government may
block access to foreign websites that do not register in Singapore as political websites as
required by a new law that limits political campaigning by websites during an election);
Tougher Regulations on Internet Cafes Planned, MIDDLE EAST NEWSFILE (Saudi Arabia),
Sept. 9, 2001, at LEXIS, Moclip File (describing regulations on Internet cafes that
would bar access to websites deemed offensive to Islam and the political system).
.10See supra Part 1.1 (discussing the challenge that international and transnational
human rights enforcement poses forjurisdiction).
.11 Glater, supra note 295 (quoting William F. Schulz, Executive Director of U.S.
Operations for Amnesty International).
12, LESSIG, suna note 253, at 57.
1.3 Lessig addresses the reader directly to make this point:
Stop. Don't turn away. I know at least some of the thousands of reasons you
have for rejecting the structure I've just described. Some of those reasons are
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where individuals could only access content that was approved by their
government would be a very different cyberspace from the one most
people have experienced so far. Indeed, many of the most highly
touted features of the Internet are functions of its relatively open architecture. Thus, observers have lauded the Internet's power (or at
least potential) to democratize where people315316
get their news; 314 to make
more accessible all forms of political"" and artistic expression;
to
alert the international community about environmental 317 and human

normative-you hate the world I am describing. Or you hate the idea that
cyberspace would become like this world. I do too. I am not promoting an
idea, I am arguing that this is the world we are moving to.
Id. at 56.
314
See, e.g., ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION 34-38 (1999) (describing the way in which the Internet facilitated resistance to a 1995 Time magazine
article about the availability of pornography online); see also id. at 40-43 (citing Matt
Drudge's online reporting of the Clinton-Lewinsky affair as an example of shifting
power away from exclusive reliance on mainstream news sources).
315See, e.g., Glater, supra note 295 ("[T]he Web allowed Amnesty
International to
get information into China about the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
about Chinese human rights violations, despite the government's efforts to block
them." (quoting William F. Schulz, Executive Director of U.S. Operations for Amnesty
International)).
316 See, e.g., John Perry Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottles:
The Economy of Mind on
the Global Net, Electronic Frontier Foundation, at http://www.eff.org/Publications/
JohnPerryBarlow/ideaeconomy.article (last visited Nov. 20, 2002) ("[A]l1 the goods
of the Information Age-all of the expressions once contained in books or film strips
or records or newsletters-will exist either as pure thought or something very much
like thought: voltage conditions darting around the Net at the speed of light ....).
317See, e.g., Environmentalists Use High Tech to Delay Dolphin
Massacre, Internet Images
Key to Strategy, Says BlueVoice.org Director, ASCRIBE NEWSWIRE, Oct. 26, 2001, LEXIS,
Ascrbe File ("'The Internet is absolutely crucial to [the] strategy of stopping these...
environmental abuses."' (quoting HardyJones, Executive Director of BlueVoice.org));
Jeffrey B. Gracer, Green Risks on the Rise, LATINFINANCE, Sept. 2000, LEXIS, Lain File
("As a result of, among other things, democratization and the Internet, the days of environmental impunity in the region are numbered. Opposition political parties, the
media, local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and indigenous groups are effectively shining the spotlight on companies and projects with significant environmental impacts."); Graham Searjeant, Globalisation Can Work Better ifWe
Try, TIMES (London), Jan. 25, 2001, LEXIS, Ttimes File ("The global power of information, often via the Internet, is already helping Western consumers to voice their
views on distant environmental abuse ....
");Mel Wilson & Rosie Lombardi, Globalization and Its Discontents: The Arrival of Triple-Bottom Line Reporting, IVEY BUSINESS
JOURNAL, Sept./Oct. 2001, LEXIS, Allnews File (linking the rise in anti-globalization
sentiment with the rise of the Internet in the mid-1990s, when "[r]eport after report
about the alleged environmental and human rights misdeeds of corporations appeared
in mainstream media, as advocacy groups used the Internet to organize and publicize
their causes").
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rights abuses"" occurring anywhere in the world; and to facilitate political organizing.)"' Without these benefits, we may lose some of the
attributes that have made the Internet both so popular and so significant.
E. Teaching the World to Sing in Pefect Harmony I: Treaties
One obvious response to the challenges of globalization and online communication is to seek increased international harmonization
of legal regimes. After all, if a universal substantive law were applied
around the world, many of the concerns about borders, conflicting
law, and impermissible extraterritorial regulation would disappear.
Nevertheless, as the discussions in the next two sections indicate, international norms are often difficult both to establish practically and
tojustify normatively.
The classical model of international harmonization is through bilateral and multilateral treaties. Two examples of such a treaty-based
approach will suffice to indicate its limitations. First, I will examine an
older treaty,T the320 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, which was designed to harmonize the various national copyright regimes. Second, I will outline the debates concerning the still-ongoing Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, which is being developed

As William F. Schulz, Executive Director of Amnesty International's United
States Operations, puts it:
Now it is virtually impossible for a violation to take place, or at least violations
in public, in any part of the world without being known almost instantaneously around the world. There has been virtually no development in the last
five years that has been any more important to the success of the human
rights movement than the growth of the Web.
Glater, supra note 295.
.919
See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet Is Changing the Public InternationalLegal
System, 88 KY. L.J. 885, 899 (1999-2000) (arguing that "[t]he Internet's low economic barriers to entry provide a voice to political actors who otherwise would be denied effective access to the public arena," and that "[)]ecatise the Internet gives them access,
and is inherently global, these actors can find like-minded people in other states, thus
enabling them to build political movements across national lines").
320 Paris Act Relating to the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works of September 9, 1886, concluded July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. The first version of the Berne Convention was concluded in
1886, and after several revisions the Convention was ultimately concluded in 1971. See
generally SAM RICKETrSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION oFrLITERARY
AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, at 3-125 (1987) (tracing the development of the
Berne Convention).
318

2002]

GLOBALIZA 770N OFIUISDICTION

under the auspices of the Hague Conference on Private International
32
Law. '
1. The Berne Convention
During the first meetings in 1883 to form the Berne Convention,
an attempt was made to institute a uniform international copyright
system.:
By the time the Convention concluded three years later,
however, that ambition had been rebuffed, and the Berne Convention
stopped far short of true harmonization.
Instead, the participating
countries agreed to a system of "national treatment," whereby member states agreed to give authors from other signatory states the same
rights as those states apply to domestic authors.:
Moreover, the Convention established a set of minimum requirements for copyright protection to which all signatory states must adhere.2 While this idea of
321

See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Draft Conven-

tion onJurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Oct. 30,
1999, at http://wv.hcch.net/e/workprog/dgm.html. Because the Hague Convention focuses on the enforcement of individual nation-state judgments, it is not truly
aimed at the harmonization of substantive norms. Nevertheless, the Convention does
seek to harmonize nation-state procedural rules for recognition and enforcement of
judgments. Moreover, the controversies surtrounding the Convention illustrate some
of the difficulties such formal international efforts are likely to encounter, even when
the goal is something less than substantive harmonization.
2 See Jane C. Ginsburg, International Col,'tght: From a "Bundle" of National
Copyight Laws to a SupranationalCode?, 47J. Coi'vRiGti-r Soc'Y USA 265, 268 (2000) ("The
German delegation, in a diplomatic questionnaire, asked whether it might be better to
abandon the national treatment principle in favor of a treaty that would codify the international law of copyright and establish a uniform law anong all contracting
states."). According to Ginsburg, "[a]lthough most participating countries viewed the
proposition as a desirable one, they voted against it because it would have required
great modifications of their domestic laws, which many countries could not implement
all at once." Id.
323 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright
Order: WMy National Courts Should
Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 490 (2000) ("Proponents of this universalist
vision were rebuffed.... Instead, pragmatism prevailed."); Ginsburg, supra note 322,
at 269 ("I
n general, in comparison to the universalist draft adopted at the 1883 Conference, the ...draft of 1884 moved away from the idea of a comprehensive uniform
international law of copyright."). But see id. at 270 ("Although the Convention did not
achieve every goal outlined at the first Congress of 1858, it represented a major step
towards international copyright protection.... [It also] la[id] the groundwork for
litter
evolution toward the more universalist ideal expressed in earlier drafts.").
324 See Berne Convention, supra note
320, at 35 ("Authors shall enjoy, in respect of
works for which they are protected under this Convention, in countries of the Union
other than the country of origin, the rights which their respective laws do now or tnay
hereafter grant to their nationals .
See Dinwoodie, suira note 323, at 490-91 (discussing minimum substantive
standards agreed upon in the Berne Convention).
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minimum standards could in theory have resulted in a strong set of
international norms, the actual minimum requirements set by the
Convention were extremely weak and relatively easy to meet.3
Thus, the Convention allowed great latitude for signatory states to
develop their own copyright regimes and create their own norms regarding, for example, how to define the "author" for purposes of
copyright protection and how to carve out exceptions to copyright
to respond to free speech concerns 28s or effectuate other social policies."' Throughout the twentieth century, "[t]he process of public international copyright lawmaking tended to be slow and unwieldy because it operated by way of consensus among... countries with a
diverse range of social and economic perspectives. 3 3 0 As a result,
changes to the Berne Convention have generally represented mere
codifications of commonly accepted policies that, in many cases, had
already been implemented in the national laws of most member states

0

See RICKETSON, supra note 320, at 53, 73-74 (noting that in order to include as

many countries as possible, the conference elected to set up a flexible convention).
.27

See STEPHEN M. STEWART,

INTERNATIONAL

COPYRIGHT AND

NEIGHBOURING

RiGirTs § 4.46 (2d ed. 1989) ("The Convention does not define the term 'author'
which it uses throughout ....
In the absence of convention law it is, therefore, for national legislation to decide who the owner of the copyright is."). For example, U.S.
copyright law, taking a market-oriented approach, recognizes employers as authors of
works prepared by employees within the scope of their employment, see 17 U.S.C. §
201(b) (2000) (providing that "the employer or other person for whom the work is
prepared is considered the author" of a work made for hire); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)
(defining "work made for hire" to include "a work prepared by an employee within the
scope of his employment"), whereas French law, focusing on the moral rights of the
creator, treats the employee as the author regardless of the employment relationship,
see Law No. 92-597 of July I, 1992, J.O., July 3, 1992, p.4; D.S.L. 1997 (amended Mar.
27, 1997) (Fr.) (providing for copyright ownership by employers only with respect to
software).
328 For example, U.S. copyright law, unlike the law
in most civil law countries,
permits unauthorized parodies of copyrighted works tinder the rubric of fair use. See
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994) (holding that a rap group
could, under the fair use doctrine, create a parody of another song even if the use was
commercial).
See Dinwoodie, supra note 323, at 492 ("Although these different [national] approaches inevitably privilege many similar acts-such as core educational or research
uses, or uses implicating free speech concerns-many also reflect the exigencies of national cultural policy (or political demands)."); see aLso Sam Ricketson, The Boundaies of
Copyt4ght: Its Proper Limitations and Exceltions: International Conventions and Treaties,
1999 INTELL. PROP. Q. 56, 93 (using Australian copyright law as a "test case" in order to
demonstrate that "the present Berne text, together with the useful overlay of implied
minor exceptions, do[es] provide national legislators with a reasonable degree of.
flexibility").
330 Dinwoodie, sunra note 323, at 492-93 (citation omitted).
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before being incorporated into the Convention. ' Moreover, such
changes have always been developed through the laborious process of
treaty revision
2. The Hague Convention
The Hague Convention has been beset by similar difficulties. The
treaty got its start in 1992, when the United States approached the
other countries that belong to the Hague Conference on Private International Law and suggested that the conference attempt to harmonize international rules for enforcement of judgments across borders.
Almost ten years later, that goal continues to elude
convention delegates, largely because of a lack of consensus about adjudicatory jurisdiction generally, and about jurisdiction over online
commercial transactions in particular.3 Indeed, the disagreements
are now so entrenched that at the most recent meeting of delegates,
the primary agreement reached was to have an informal working
group develop a new draft text to be submitted in 2003.

Both of these attempts at international harmonization reveal the
principal drawback of attempting to establish international norms
through multilateral treaties. Almost by definition, these treaties will
demand prior consensus among many countries with different social
policies and economic interests. Thus, the treaties will tend merely to
codify painstakingly developed conventional wisdom about recognized

See id. at 493 (arguing that the agreements produced were codifications of
commonly held policies).
332 See id. at 494 (describing
treaty revision as "a means of updating the
[C]onvention").

333 See Marc E. Hankin, Proposed Hague Convention
Would Help IP Owners, NAT'L L.J.,
July 23, 2001, at C20 (describing the U.S. government's request "that the Hague Conference on Private International Law, of which the United States is a member state,
negotiate and draft a convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in
foreign countries").
g,, See, e.g., Paul Hofheinz, Birth Pangsfor Web Treaty Seem Endless, WALL ST. J.,
Aug.
16, 2001, at All ("Should a German shopper be able to sue a U.S. Internet retailer in a
Munich court if he is unhappy with something he bought online? Delegations from 53
countries have worked on an answer for more than two years, and it continues to elude
them.").
335 Andrea Schulz, Reflection Paper to Assist in the Preparation
of a Convention onjurisdiction and Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Hague Conference on Private International Law, at ftp://ftp.hcch.net/doc/
jdgm-pdl9e.doc (Aug. 19, 2002).
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problems.'
As a result, such treaties are rarely the best mechanism
for developing new solutions to emerging issues on which there are
widely divergent traditions and interests. Yet "technological pressures
demand a rapidity of lawmaking, a dynamic disposition, and a forward-looking perspective. '" Accordingly, the classical model of public international lawmaking may not be the appropriate mechanism
for achieving international harmonization in a fast-changing world.
F. Teaching the World to Sing in Perfect Harmony II: Supranational
Administrative/AdjudicativeBodies
Given the cumbersome nature of public international lawmaking,
international harmonization efforts, unsurprisingly, have shifted in
recent years to a somewhat more dynamic model, particularly in fields
of rapid technological development. For example, since the 1994
Uruguay Round Revision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT),"" commercial trade issues that were formerly hashed
out through diplomatic channels are now addressed by WTO dispute
resolution panels in a more adjudicatory fashion."' Likewise, the Arbitration and Mediation Center of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) adjudicates fifty-eight percent of the trademark
disputes filed under the Internet Corporation for4 Assigned Names
1
and Numbers's Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy.

See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, The Know-How Gap in the TRIPS Agreement: Why
Software
FaredBadly, and What Are the Solutions, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENTU. L.J. 763, 765 (1995)
(arguing that "both the strengths and weaknesses of [one international treaty] stem
from [the treaty's] essentially backwards-looking character").
.37 Dinwoodie, supra
note 323, at 494.
338 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, Dec. 15, 1993, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, LEGAL TEXTS-TIIE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTIIATEIRAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter DSU] (establishing the rules and procedures to be used in WTO dispute settlement proceedings).
:eeS Dinwoodie, supra note 323, at 502 ("The diplomatic model of the
GATT
gave way to the judicial model of the WTO, reflecting an attempt to shift from a
power-based to a rule-based procedure."); see also Adrian T.L. Chua, Precedent and Principles of WTO PanelfJarisirudence,16 BERKELEY]. INT'L L. 171, 171-72 (1998) (describing
the shift to a rule-based model of dispute settlement within the WTO); Kim Van der
Borght, The Review of the 14/T0 Undestandingon Dispute Settlement: Some Reflections on the
Current Debate, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1223, 1224-25 (1999) (describing the ways in
which the Uruguay Round changed the nature of the dispute settlement process "from
a power-based to a rule-based procedure"). To the extent that parties perceive WTO
rulings as more readily enforceable, this perception could also help account for the
increase in actions filed.
340 Geist, Fair.Corn?,
supra note 147.
336
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The advantages of the more dynamic model are obvious. International institutions with some form of adjudicatory body can react far
more quickly to new developments without the need for diplomatic
conferences or complete consensus.34 And if the amount of activity is
a sign of success, then it appears that the more dynamic model is
catching on. In the first three years of the WTO dispute settlement
system, as many cases were filed as in the entire forty-seven-year period
preceding the Uruguay Round. 42
Nevertheless, there are several reasons to resist this dynamic
model. First, the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO
makes clear that its rulings "cannot add to or diminish the rights and
obligations provided in the covered agreements."3 43 Although the
panels may, over time, expand their ability to "interpret" (and thereby
define or change) international law, the governing documents seem
designed to constrain any truly creative administrative orjudicial role.
Second, as the violent protests at international gatherings over the
last few years144 indicate, bodies such as the WTO and the WIPO face
serious objections from the perspective of procedural transparency
and democratic legitimacy.W' Perhaps because they were developed in
the context of international diplomacy, these bodies assume a model
of mediation, negotiation, conciliation, and secrecy that might make
us pause before endowing them with the power to create international

4

See Dinwoodie, supra note 323, at 494-95 (arguing that "efforts to enable inter-

national institutions to react more quickly to new developments without the need for
diplomatic conferences or complete consensus" are one aspect of the new public international model).
142 See ChUa, supra note 339, at 172 (reporting in 1998 that
"GATT dispute settlement panels resolved more than 100 cases between 1947 and 1994," but "[s]ince the
implementation of the DSU in 1995, the VWO has received over 100 trade disputes
with 28 cases proceeding to a dispute settlement panel" (citations omitted)).
DSU, supra note 338, at art. 3.2.
34.1 See supra note 19 (citing sources
that discuss such protests).
-45As David Post has argued:
[T]he problem of scale in governmental institutions is one we have to think
about again, because I don't see any good solutions, right now at least, to how
we build global institutions that have the trust of the people who are subjected
to their rules and regulations. I think this is related to what we might call the
Seattle phenomenon (or the WTO protests), if you will. I think there is a very
real phenomenon that is going to play itself out on the Net as people ask
themselves: Who or what are these international institutions who have the
authority to make the rules for this global environment? It's an essential
problem and a very difficult one.
Thomas E. Baker ed., A Roundtable Discussion with Lawrence Lessig, David G. Post &.Jefftey
Rosen, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 441,443 (2001).
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norms.:
For example, many observers have urged that the procedures of these bodies be made more transparent, through open hearings, greater access to the submissions of parties, and the ability of
non-state parties to participate.,
Even beyond procedural issues,
however, WTO panels face the objection that they are not accountable
to any electorate. Although all unelected adjudicatory bodies are insulated from democratic pressures to some extent, accountability is
usually built into the system at some stage in the process, through, for
example, appointment, confirmation, or removal of decision makers.
In contrast, WTO panel members are selected through an obscure
process, "45 and no democratically accountable official is involved .

See David Palmeter, National Sovereignty and the World Trade Organization,
2 J.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 77, 80-81 (1999) (arguing that the WTO's diplomatic model
does not fit a traditional legalistic model).
'447See Van der Borght, supra note 339, at 1241-42
(describing WTO procedures
and suggested reforms); see also Sands, supra note 37, at 543-46 (praising recent decisions of the WTO Appellate Body that have begun to permit non-state actors to play a
role in WTO proceedings).
'44 Article 8 of the DSU, supra note 338, provides
the rules for the composition of
panels. The WTO Secretariat proposes nominations to the panel, which can be disputed only for compelling reasons. Id. at art. 8(6). The Secretariat maintains a list of
qualified governmental and non-governmental individuals. Id. at art. 8(4). The qualifications are general. The panelists must be
well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmental individuals, including
persons who have served on or presented a case to a panel, served as a representative of a [WTO] Member or of a contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a
representative to the Council or Committee of any covered agreement or its
predecessor agreement, or in the Secretariat, taught or published on international trade law or policy, or served as a senior trade policy official of a Member.
Id. at art. 8(1). Further, the panel members should be "selected with a view to ensuring the independence of the members, a sufficiently diverse background and a wide
spectrum of experience." Id. at art. 8(2). The panelists generally cannot be from the
disputant country, id. at art. 8(3), and must "serve in their individual capacities and not
as government representatives, nor as representatives of any organization," id. at art.
8(9).
.449See Dinwoodie, supra note 323, at 506 (pointing out the poor
representational
legitimacy of the WTO panels because they are "insulated from democratic pressures"); David M. Driesen, What Is Free Trade?: The Real Issue Lurking Behind the Trade
and Environment Debate, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 279, 315-16 (2001) (explaining that the WTO
lacks democratic legitimacy because the officials are not selected by citizens or legislative bodies, but generally by the GATT Secretariat); Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On
the Creationof a Global Peoples Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of PopularSovereignty, 36
STAN. J. INT'L L. 191, 213-14 (2000) (observing that the denial of citizen participation
in the WTO has raised the concern that "some type of democratic process is needed to
counter growing popular opposition to many of its initiatives").
346

2002]

GLOBALIZA TION OFJURISDICTION

Thus, we see a "democratic deficit '3,10 because lawmakers lack electoral
As
responsibility to the "'people' whose 'sovereignty"' they exercise.
one commentator has argued, "the GATT is not the world constitution, and the WTO is not the World Supreme Court. They both fail to
adhere to some of the essential standards required of institutions that
would claim to exercise prescriptive authority over individuals
Not surprisingly, such unmoored legal
throughout the world.'
authority faces resistance on the ground.
Third, the structure of the WTO process, in which complaints are
brought by countries rather than by individual parties, may tend to
produce norms skewed toward a limited range of interests. For example, in the copyright context, the United States Trade Representative may well take the position in disputes before the WTO or WIPO
that greater copyright protection is beneficial to U.S. industry as a
whole. This position would ignore those who might advocate a lower
level of protection in order to create greater distributional equity between countries or to protect non-trade interests, such as privacy or
free speech. In addition, the lack of procedural transparency or
democratic accountability may make such international administrative/adjudicative bodies more readily subject to industry capture. For
example, a recent study of domain name trademark decisions reached
by WIPO's Arbitration and Mediation Center found that WIPO arbitrators ruled in favor of the trademark holders 82.2% of the time .

350 See Ruth Okediji,
Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 85 (2000) ("The [democratic] deficit refers to the extent that international agencies increasingly have been allocated legislative competencies directly
compromising domestic law and policies that have been established through duly appointed processes so as to ensure transparency, accountability and the opportunity for
citizens to be heard."); see also Francesca E. Bignami, The Democratic Deficit in European
Community Rulemaking: A Call for Notice and Comment in Comitology, 40 HARV. INT'L. L.J.
451, 456-72 (1999) (outlining the democratic deficit critique); Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Characterof Supranationalism: The Example of the
European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 628 (1999) (arguing that the European
Community's "'democratic deficit' flows primarily from an inability to establish democratically-legitimate hierarchical supervision over supranational technocrats-a problem bound up with the historical relationship between demos, democracy and national
political institutions as cultural symbols of popular sovereignty").
351 See Lindseth, supra note 350, at 633 (arguing that
supranational institutions
raise questions of democratic legitimacy due to the "transfer of normative power to
agents that are not electorally responsible" to the people they represent).
3
Dinwoodie, supra note 323, at 505.
353 Geist, Faircom?, supra note 147, at 6. Geist also found that,
in cases where the
parties opt for a single arbitrator rather than a panel of three (90% of the total), the
complainant wins 84.4% of the time. Id. at 18.
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Fourth, the very advantage of these bodies-their ability to address new issues in a changing environment-may also be a disadvantage. After all, a decision of a WTO dispute resolution body may not
only establish international norms, but also may entrench those
norms, freezing them in place and preempting the ability of various
countries to experiment with different approaches. Such international norms may tend to frustrate more local efforts to tailor trade
policy to particular social, cultural, or economic conditions. For example,
different countries with varying educational practices and literacy rates
may permit or prohibit quite different copying practices. The manner in
which authors are compensated may differ from country to country depending upon established labor and employment practices. The ways in
which works are exploited, and thus need to be protected, may hinge
upon social customs unique to particular countries. The extent of reasonable copying privileges may reflect the level of access to public libraries. Commitments to free expression, and hence use of a work in that
cause without the need for permission, may vary in intensity depending
upon the political development of the society in question. Unqualified

respect for the integrity of artistic works might be affected by different
notions of property. And market mechanisms necessary to support
schemes for compensating authors might be more feasible in certain cultures than in others. '

Whether or not one believes that international norms should subsume
local variations, it is surely problematic that such overarching norms
might be established by marginally accountable bodies with input often from only two litigating countries.
Finally, some critics have suggested that the very goal of harmonization may be misguided. For example, Paul Stephan has pointed out
two common outcomes of the harmonization process, 353'" neither of
which is normatively desirable. First, Stephan contends that international-harmonization efforts are often the product of rent seeking by
various industry groups. He suggests that many harmonization efforts
in commercial law are initiated by particular industries seeking particular legal rules. The resulting international norms are usually
drafted by industry experts and, not surprisingly, benefit the industry
seeking the change. Second, he observes a tendency among the various parties to an international harmonization effort to adopt relatively
vague standards in order to smooth over major policy disagreements.
Dinwoodie, supra note 323, at 513-14 (footnote omitted).
Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in
International
CommercialLaw, 39 VA.J. INT'L L. 743, 744 (1999).
354
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These standards, because they are couched in such general language,
become a license for domestic decision makers to exercise broad discretion in interpreting international norms. As a result, the law may
well become even less certain than it was before, thus foiling the harmonization effort altogether. Accordingly, Stephan argues that " [t] he
political economy of [the harmonization] process results too often either in rules written for the benefit of particular industries and other
interest groups, or in the suppression of conflict that in turn increases
legal risk.''356 Instead, he envisions a system that would allow parties
virtually unlimited power to choose among national rules through
Whether or not one embraces
private contractual agreements."
Stephan's alternative, his criticism of international harmonization
should at least raise doubts regarding the efficacy of the enterprise.
G. A Return to Lex Mercatoria
Given the problems inherent in both treaty-based and agencybased efforts to harmonize legal regimes, one possible alternative is to
consider the role national courts might play in developing international norms. In several recent articles, Graeme Dinwoodie has advocated this approach, particularly with regard to copyright law." 8 Essentially, Dinwoodie asks courts to develop an international common
law, resurrecting the "lex mercatoria"'' ' that for centuries governed
international trade. ((
356 Id.
357 Id.

at 789.

358See Dinwoodie, supra note 323, at 475 (arguing for national courts
to be en-

listed in the "task of copyright internationalization by sketching a new choice-of-law
methodology"); see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incotporation of International Norms in the Formationof Copyright Law, 62 0-110 Si. L.J. 733, 777-81 (2001)
(suggesting an enhanced role for private litigation in the development of international
copyright norms and the revision of choice-of law methodology to permit national
courts to consider international norms).
359 Lex mercatoria has been defined as "'a set
of general principles and customary
or
elaborated
in
the
framework of international trade,
spontaneously
referred
to
rules
without reference to a particular national system of law."' Philip J. McConnaughay,
Rethinking the Role of Law and Contracts in East-West Commercial Relationships, 41 VA. J.
INT'L L. 427, 473 n.1 67 (2001) (quoting Berthold Goldman, The Aplicable Law: General Principles of Law-The Lex Mercatoria, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 113, 116 (Julian D.M. Lew ed., 1987)). Lex mercatoria
is not a monolithic body of law and is neither purely national nor purely international.
See Abul F.M. Maniruzzaman, The Lex Mercatoria and InternationalContracts: A Challenge
for InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 657, 672-74 (1999) (explaining the sources of lex mercatoria). It appears to have developed during the middie ages, when transnational merchants resolved their disputes in specialized merchant
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Dinwoodie starts from the observation that all current approaches
to choice of law force courts to localize international disputes and
therefore resolve them under the law of one country or another."'
This process forecloses courts from considering international norms
that might exist "separate and apart from domestic policy objectives.",', 2 As Dinwoodie points out, however, international disputes often "implicate interests beyond those at stake in purely domestic disputes. ' ," Thus, he recommends that national courts develop a
substantive common law for addressing multistate cases.
Many decades ago, conflict-of-laws theorist David Cavers wrote
that, in a conflicts analysis, " [t] he court is not idly choosing a law; it is
determining a controversy.' ,' 4 He therefore reasoned that a court
could not "choose wisely without considering how that choice will affect that controversy.' ' 65 Building on Cavers, Dinwoodie argues that
the judicial role often involves choices among many different substantive solutions and that courts should be free to generate legal standards in multistate cases the same way they do in purely domestic

courts that applied customary transnational commerce norms and trade practices
rather than any particular national positive law. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Erewhon:
The Coming Global Legal Order, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 347, 356 (2001) (describing the origins of lex mercatoria); Philip J. McConnaughay, The Scope of Autonomy in International
Contracts and Its Relation to Economic Regulation and Development, 39 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 595, 610 n.31 (2001) ("'[L]ex mercatoria' ... refer[s] generally to the
norms, principles and customs that emanate from cross-border commerce without reference to any given national law."). This hybrid practice governed exporters and importers, shippers, banks, and marine insurance companies. See HaroldJ. Berman, Law
and Logos, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 143, 157 n.47 (1994) (describing persons engaged in international commerce as an example of an effective international community). The
principal advantage of lex mercatoria is that it eliminates uncertainties regarding
which jurisdiction's law will apply to a given dispute, see Maniruzzaman, supra, at 680
(stating that one of the goals of lex mercatoria is to "get rid of the cumbersome exercise of applying conflict rules"), although as with all common law doctrines, uncertainties may remain with regard to the substantive norms to be applied.
36o See Dinwoodie, supra note 323, at 522
(noting that international copyright
norms may be developed by reference to lex mercatoria); see also Boaventura De Sousa
Santos, Law: A Map of Misreading: Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law, 14 J.L. SOC'Y
279, 287 (1987) (describing the re-emergence of lex mercatoria as an example of one
way in which "[t]ransnational capital has ... created a transnational legal space, a supra-state legality").
36; See Dinwoodie, supra note 323, at 475
("Each of these approaches requires
courts to decide issues raised by such disputes according to a single national law.").
.1I2
3I3
.64

/d.

d. at 476.
David F. Cavers, A Critiqueof the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV.
173, 189

(1933).
465

Id.
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Moreover, "statutory rules enacted by a national legislature
cases.
are rarely enacted with an eye to international disputes or conduct."' 7
As a result, these legislative choices inevitably reflect domestic priorities, and there is no particular reason to apply them reflexively in international conflicts. Finally, Dinwoodie argues that, when a dispute
is multinational, it will always implicate interests in at least two different countries. When courts arbitrarily (or even not so arbitrarily)
choose to apply one country's laws over the other, they are responding only to one country's interests." In Dinwoodie's view, courts instead should develop an appropriate rule "from an amalgam of naThis hybrid form of lawmaking
tional and international norms. ''
would respond to "the reality of modern life" by reflecting "the complex and interwoven forces that govern citizens' conduct in a global
society." 3
Significantly, Dinwoodie's argument reaches back to conflict-oflaws approaches that predate the rise of the Westphalian order of in347'
Indeed, he observes that the idea of a
dependent sovereign states.
substantive body of international common law norms "declined in
significance with the rise of nation-states and with positivistic demands
for a clear connection between law and a sovereign. ,3 72 Dinwoodie arbe
worth congues, however, that these approaches may once again
.
,373
Thus, like
sidering given "the relative decline of the nation-state."
the arguments I make in this Article, Dinwoodie's call for the redevelopment of a lex mercatoria is a response to changing conceptions of national sovereignty.

361

See Dinwoodie, supra note 323, at 548 ("[D]omestic courts frequently develop

the law in a way that does not involve the application of a single pre-articulated rule;
they should be free to do so also in multinational cases.").
367 M. at 548-49.
.68 See id. at 552 ("If the dispute implicates substantial
interests of both State A and
State B, it is inequitable to treat such facts (automatically) in the same way as either a
dispute wholly implicating the interests of State A or wholly implicating the interests of
State B.")
3
Id. at 550.
370 Id. at 544-50.
37

See supra note 24 and accompanying text (describing the centrality of the idea

of state sovereignty in the Westphalian order).
.972
Dinwoodie, supra note 323, at 544.
373

,
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H. The Triumph of NGOs
Because the various questions about extraterritorial lawmaking
and jurisdictional limitations arise primarily with regard to public governmental institutions exercising sovereign powers, some commentators have looked to private, non-governmental organizations wielding
quasi-governmentalpower. As Henry Perritt has recently argued, 'jurisdictional uncertainties associated with transnational commerce on the
Internet can be reduced when rules are made and enforced by private
rather than public institutions."':'
Perritt advocates public-private hybrid governance structures. In
his model, public law sets minimum general standards and provides
enforcement power, while multiple "private regulatory regimes can
work out detailed rules, first-level dispute resolution, and rule en:
And, like the contractarian model discussed
forcement machinery."75
3
previously, 1 Perritt believes that this sort of hybrid governance system
could exercise jurisdiction through contractual agreement, thereby
side-stepping legitimacy concerns.3 7 7
Perritt offers three examples of his hybrid model. First, he points
to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN), the not-for-profit corporation that administers the Internet
domain name system and provides an online dispute resolution forum
for adjudicating domain name conflicts.3 m Second, he notes that the
recent agreement between the European Union and the United States
concerning privacy protection envisions several private regulatory re: '
Third, he argues that credit card companies will provide disgimes.ro
pute resolution mechanisms for virtually all credit card based Internet
commerce.

374

Henry H. PerrittJr., Economic and Other Barriers to Electronic Commerce, 21 U. PA.

ECON. L. 563, 574 (2000).
J. INT'L
375 h. at 575;

see generally Perritt, supra note 319, at 890-94 (highlighting the differences between public and private law).
376 See supra
Part RLB.
377 See Perritt, supro note 374, at 575 (describing the benefits
of contract-based jurisdiction).
37M See Perritt, supra note 319, at 940-44 (discussing the scope of
ICANN's regulatory 379)
responsibilities).
.
See id. at 932-40 (commenting on the procedures envisioned by the European
Commission and the United States in enforcing compliance with the safe harbor
rules).
.80See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace: Demand for New Forms
of
ADR, 15 O-IO ST.J. ON DisP. RESOL. 675, 691-92 (2000) (discussing the most common
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Each of these regulatory regimes is a form of government, with
private intermediaries performing roles traditionally filled by governmental entities. For example, ICANN promulgates rules for issuance
and retention of domain names, administrative panels of WIPO adjudicate these controversies using ICANN regulations, "s' and domain
name registrars revoke or transfer domain names in accordance with
panel decisions.183 Likewise, current privacy regulatory regimes depend upon private third parties who will certify that an Internet site
complies, thereby immunizing members from public regulatory action.3 14 With credit card purchases, the credit card issuers themselves
function as intermediaries, refusing to pay merchants who fail to deliver merchandise or revoking credit from consumers who fail to pay
for products purchased.
Nevertheless, such private regulatory bodies raise serious concerns
about accountability and transparency. For example, in the United
States, under the Supreme Court's traditional interpretation of the so-

form of alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes-the credit card chargeback).
381 See
Uniforn Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, ICANN, at http://
www.icann.org/udrp/ucrp.htm (last updated Aug. 26, 2001) ("Under the policy, most
types of trademark-based domain-name disputes must be resolved by agreement, court
action, or arbitration before a registrar will cancel, suspend, or transfer a domain
name.").
383 See Supplemental Rules for Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, WIPO, at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/rules/supplemental.html (in effect as of Dec. 1,
1999) ("These Supplemental Rules are to be read and used in connection with the
Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, approved by [ICANN] on
October 24, 1999.").
383 See
Registrar Accreditation Agreement § 11(k), ICANN, at http://
wwv.icann.org/nsi/icann-raa-04nov99.htm (approved Nov. 4, 1999) ("[The] Registrar
shall have ... a policy and procedure for resolution of disputes concerning SLD [second-level domain] names. In the event that ICANN adopts a policy or procedure for
resolution of disputes concerning SLD names that by its terms applies to Registrar,
Registrar shall adhere to the policy or procedure.").
384 See, e.g., BBBOnline, at http://www.bbbonline.org (last visited Nov.
20, 2002)
(offering a process by which to file a complaint against an offending website for use of
personally identifiable information); TRUSTe, at http://www.truste.org (last visited
Nov. 20, 2002) (outlining TRUSTe's policy of certifying a subject website with a visible
logo and inclusion of a privacy statement that adheres to privately established privacy
policies).
385 See Perritt, supra note 374, at 577 ("[C] redit card
issuers are intermediaries adjusting disputes between merchants and consumers."); see also Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocationfor ConsumerPayment, 66 TEX. L. REV. 63, 10102 (1987) (describing the rights of card issuers to cancel a cardholder's account under
certain circumstances).
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called "state action doctrine, '' these private entities need not comply
with constitutional norms. Similarly, one wonders how well minority
rights will be protected in these private regimes and by what mechanisms such entities will ensure impartial decision making and fair procedure.
While these same concerns arise in the public arena,
there are likely to be far fewer democratic checks on private entities.
"

I. Challenge? What Challenge?
Over the past several years, Jack Goldsmith has consistently attempted to refute the Johnson and Post view that the rise of cyberspace requires us to rethink issues of sovereignty and territoriality.
Indeed, according to Goldsmith, the Internet and globalization produce no true conceptual challenges at all. Rather, he argues that "ter-

The state action doctrine has its genesis in an 1883 U.S. Supreme Court decision overturning Reconstruction-era civil rights legislation. See The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (holding that "individual invasion of individual rights is not the
subject-matter of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment," but that the amendment governs
the conduct of' the states and those that act in their stead). In its least nuanced form,
the doctrine rests on the observation that most constitutional commandments proscribe only the conduct of governmental actors. For example, the Fourteenth
Amendment provides that "No State shall ....
" U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I (emphasis added). As a result, the Supreme Court has often refused to apply these constitutional provisions to so-called "private action." Thus-and again to express the doctrine in its least subtle form-the state cannot constitutionally exclude AfricanAmericans fr-om a government housing facility, but the Constitution is silent with regard to an individual's choice to exclude African-Americans from her home. Similarly
in cyberspace, so the doctrine might go, the activities of private corporations, such as
America Online, ICANN, or the other bodies that Perritt describes, are not subject to
the Constitution because they are not state actors.
.87 For a discussion of such concerns, see generally
Berman, supra note 258.
See Perritt, supra note 374, at 578-79 (questioning whether minority rights will
be protected by ICANN). ICANN, for example, has ticed particularly searching questions on these issues. See, e.g., Geist, Fair.com?,supra note 147, at 912 (finding that six
panelists in ICANN arbitration sided with the complaining party in ninety-five percent
of cases); Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace, supra note 147, at 24 (arguing that
ICANN "give[s] overwhelming weight to corporate voices" in its internal structure); see
also David McGuire, Internet Governance Group Approves Massive Reform Plan,
NEWSBYTES, June 28, 2002, at http://www.computertuser.com/news/02/06/29/
newsl .html (reporting on controversial ICANN plan to eliminate "a mechanism tnder
which rank-and-file users would have been permitted to elect a portion of the ICANN
board, an approach favored by many public interest groups").
389 See, e.g., CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA:
THE STORY
OF THE CONsTrITuTIONAt. CONVENTION MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787, at 69-74 (1966) (describing the concern of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention that the
method for electing members to Congress protect minority rights); Lindseth, supra
note 350, at 633-35 (discussing the European Community's "democratic deficit").
386
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ritorial regulation of the Internet is no less feasible and no less legitimate than territorial regulation of non-Internet transactions. '90
Goldsmith takes on two related contentions: first, that territorial
regulation is unfeasible because individuals can easily avoid the sovereign's regulatory reach; and second, that territorial regulation means
that a website will be subject to the laws of all jurisdictions simultaneously. Both claims, he argues, are exaggerated because they fail to distinguish between a state's prescriptivejurisdiction and its enforcement jurisdiction. According to Goldsmith, "prescriptive jurisdiction is a
country's power to apply its laws to particular transactions."39' The
question of whether or not that regulation will actually be enforced,
however, depends upon the country's ability to induce or compel
compliance with the law through its enforcement jurisdiction.3 9
Thus, Goldsmith argues, just because individuals may try to evade
a nation's enforcement jurisdiction by, say, relocating off-shore, does
not render the idea of regulating the harms caused by those individuals illegitimate. Goldsmith acknowledges that the regulation of a local
act might not be efficacious if the individual subject to the regulation
is not present within the jurisdiction. But he argues that the sovereign
will still be able to enforce its regulation "to the extent that the agents
of the acts have a local presence or local property against which local
laws can be enforced. ''93
Moreover, even if the content provider has no local presence or
property, the sovereign will be able to regulate harms indirectly. For
example, the sovereign may take action against end users within their
enforcement power or intermediaries that operate within their territory, such as Internet Service Providers or manufacturers of hardware

390

Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Signiflcance of Territorial Sover-

eignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 475, 475 (1998) [hereinafter Goldsmith, Te itorial Sovereignty]; see also Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy,65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199,
1200-01 (1998) [hereinafter Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy] (asserting that territorially based regulation of cyberspace is "feasible and legitimate from the perspective of
jurisdiction"); Jack Goldsmith, The Internet, Conflicts of Regulation, and InternationalHarmonization, in GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL NETWORKS IN THE LIGHT OF DIFFERING LOCAL
VALUES 197, 197-99 (Christoph Engel & Kenneth H. Keller eds., 2000) [hereinafter
Goldsmith, Conflicts of Regulation] (arguing that the local effects of Internet activity
render local regulation legitimate). Others share Goldsmith's view. See, e.g.,
Josef H.
Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1205-08 (2000) (arguing that
the U.S. can regulate the Internet, but that there is a lack of 'jurisdictional predictability" when one is uncertain of whether she is availing herself of the forum).
391 Goldsmith, Conflicts of Regulation,
supra note 390, at 198.
392
Id.
393 Goldsmith, TerritorialSovereignty,
supra note 390, at 479.
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or software. These actions may either encourage local intermediaries
to enforce the local laws against foreign parties or may induce local
parties to include devices to block objectionable content.' In either
scenario, the local jurisdiction turns out to have more extraterritorial
power than originally envisioned .
Likewise, Goldsmith argues that there is nothing inherently illegitimate about a local regulation that happens to affect behavior extraterritorially. As he says, "It is uncontroversial that pollution emitted
'39
in State A that wafts into State B can be regulated in State B. 1 6
Though one might think notice is a more severe problem in the
Internet context-where the material that "wafts" from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction may do so all over the globe simultaneously and unknowingly-Goldsmith argues that geographical filtering technology will
allow content providers to ensure that material deemed objectionable
in ajurisdiction never reaches that jurisdiction.' 7 Moreover, according to Goldsmith, as long as the content provider never sets foot in the
jurisdiction, enforcement power will be lacking:
Goldsmith's analysis, however, is subject to several normative objections. First, Goldsmith's conclusion that the Internet poses no new
jurisdictional issues is premised on the idea that extraterritorial regulation has existed for a long time-which is, of course, true. But the
very idea that Goldsmith takes to be settled and uncontroversial-that
transactions "can legitimately be regulated [by] the jurisdictions

.' For example, a lawsuit filed in France seeks an order requiring French ISPs to
block access to an American portal that allegedly hosts "hate Web sites." See Ned Stafford, French ISPs Fight to Avoid Blocking Nazi, Racist Content, NEWSBYrES, Sept. 4, 2001, at
http://www.infowar.com/law/01/law 090501aj.shtml (detailing the French case).
.195 See Goldsmith, Territorial Sovereignty, suna note 390, at 481-82 (enumerating
various regulatory means employed to combat local harns caused by extraterritorial
content providers); Goldsmith, Conflicts of Regulation, supra note 390, at 199 (arguing
that a country can indirectly regulate offshore content by regulating other actions and
entities within its borders).
"96 Goldsmith, TerritoialSovereignty, supra note 390, at
484.
4
See id. (noting that "content providers can take steps-such as conditioning access to content on presentation of geographic identification-to control content flow
geographically"); see aLso Goldsmith, Conflicts of Reglation, sura note 390, at 201-02
("Content flow can today be regulated geographically though a variety of means ranging from conditioning access to content on geographical identification, to centralized
filtered servers, to mandated end-user filtering, to the imposition of severe penalties
for unloading or downloading certain information.").
3.8 Goldsmith, TerritorialSovereignty, supra note 390, at 485 ("The vast majority
of
individuals who transact on the Internet have no presence or assets in the jurisdictions
that wish to regulate their information flows.").
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where significant effects of the transaction are felt" 39'-was not always
so. To the contrary, as Goldsmith himself acknowledges, prior to the
twentieth century it was "settled" law that a state had no power to regulate beyond its borders at all. 400 Moreover, as we shall see later in this
Article, the shift in jurisdictional law to give states limited extraterritorial reach was itself at least partly a response to changes in communications and transportation technology."" In short, what we take to be
"settled" law shifts over time based on societal changes. Thus, it is not
sufficient simply to rely on what seems to be settled law at this particular moment in history without at least considering the possibility that
the rise of online interaction and the increasing globalization of
transportation and commerce might require new shifts in those settled jurisdictional rules.0 2
For example, even if we have come to accept the reality of extraterritorial regulation, it is reasonable to think that international disputes heretofore generally involved relatively large and sophisticated
parties. Such parties were likely to have some presence in the enforcing jurisdiction and possess the resources to arrange their affairs to
avoid "entering" ajurisdiction with unfavorable laws. Neither of these
assumptions is necessarily true with regard to the Internet. For example, it may be prohibitively expensive for a small business or individual
to filter out users from selected jurisdictions. One might not want the
threat of extraterritorial regulation to curtail such actors from posting
content.
Goldsmith's response to this objection might point out that the
small player is protected by the fact that the distant jurisdiction will
have no means of enforcing any judgment. Such an argument, however, assumes that this individual not only has no presence or assets in
the foreign jurisdiction, but will never have such a presence or mainGoldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy,supra note 390, at
1208.
Id. at 1206-08 (discussing the repudiation of "hermetic territorialism"
in the
twentieth century).
401 See infra text accompanying notes 483-94 (examining the relationship
between
changes in American social and political life and shifts in jurisdictional rules). This
same shift has occurred in international law. See Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarhy, supra
note 390, at 1209 (noting that "it seems clear that customary international law...
permits a nation to apply its law to extraterritorial behavior" when such behavior has
"sUbstantial local effects").
402 See David G. Post, Against "Against Cyberanarchy,"
supra note 39, at 10 (noting
that people "one hundred, or even 50, years ago might have made an argument very
much like Goldsmith's," pointing to what seemed at the time to be settled law to argue
that "rail transport, or the telephone, or radio broadcasting, would (and should) have
no effect on our analysis of jurisdictional problems").
399

410
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tain such assets. This regime could easily have a chilling effect on
travel. For example, if France has ajudgment outstanding against me
for material posted on the Internet, I must now avoid any travel to
France. This is to say nothing, of course, about the very real danger of
international extradition.
Second, Goldsmith assumes that a jurisdiction can pursue claims
against intermediaries as a way of enforcing regulations against distant
parties, but such regulation has very real costs. For example, service
providers might find that the threat of liability makes them filter online activity more aggressively or causes them to spend a tremendous
amount of money attempting to intercept the flow of messages in order to investigate them. Indeed, this is precisely why U.S. Internet
Service Providers have lobbied for and received immunity for defamatory e-mail and websites carried on their services.
Goldsmith appears to recognize this problem. He acknowledges
that the need to filter information to conform with the law of multiple
jurisdictions "places [an] enormous burden on content providers that
might significantly curtail Internet activity."'' " But, he cheerfully responds, "there is nothing sacrosanct about Internet speed, or about a
foreign content provider's right to send information everywhere in
the world with impunity. 0 0 Thus, Goldsmith's analysis embeds the
normative assumption that the distinctive benefits of the Internet
should be jettisoned so that the existing jurisdictional framework can
be preserved. Many will not share that normative viewpoint, however,
and Goldsmith's analysis offers them little consolation.
Finally, despite Goldsmith's claims that these extraterritorial enforcement problems are exaggerated and mostly hypothetical, many
of the challenges discussed in this Article belie that assertion. Indeed,
Yahoo.com appears to have capitulated to the French court order re-

"103
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (Supp. V 1999) ("No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider."); see also Zeran v. Am. Online,
Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (concluding that Congress enacted this provision because of the "threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in the
new and burgeoning lInternet medium"). But see Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional A nalysis in Cyberspace: The Case of Intermediay Liabilityfor Defamation, 14 HARv. J. L.
& TCIi. 569, 631-43 (2001) (arguing that courts are institutionally better positioned
to make liability decisions regarding Internet Service Providers and that the blanket
immunity provided by section 230 therefore is misguided).
401 Coldsmith, TernitopialSovereignty, supa
note 390, at 485.
405 [d.
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garding Nazi memorabilia despite having no presence in France,""
07
and the very real tax dilemmas discussed previously1
indicate that the
jurisdictional problems raised by online activity are not at all hypothetical. In addition, the problems of extraterritorial regulatory evasion will likely persist as well. For example, in a recent case involving
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,415 an American defendant was
enjoined from posting information that allowed circumvention of the
encrypted code on digital video disks.
Such an order, however, will
necessarily have only limited power over non-U.S. sites, and the defendant immediately posted links to those sites.
Goldsmith's assurance that this is not a problem may not satisfy those seeking to regulate online activity, be they governments or private parties.

J.

Common Law Evolution

One reason we need not radically rethink conceptions of jurisdiction, Goldsmith might argue, is that courts are perfectly capable of
adapting established legal doctrine to new contexts. Thus, we can
simply leave it to the common law process ' ' to develop the guidelines

406 See supra Part I.D (discussing the French
court's injunction against Yahoo!).
While Yahoo! had a French subsidiary, the existence of the subsidiary would not usually be considered sufficient to bring suit against the parent corporation. See Phillip 1.

Blumberg, Asserting Human Rights Against Multinational Corporations Under United States
Law: Conceptual and ProceduralProblems, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 493, 495 (2002) (noting
that parent corporations are generally deemed to be "liable only for conduct traceable
to their own officers, directors, and employees," not those of their foreign subsidiaries). For further discussion of this aspect of the Yahoo! case, see infra Part V.B.2.
407 Supra Part

I.C.

Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended
in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C.)
409 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d
429, 441-42, 459-60 (2d Cir.
408

2001).

410

See Mark Sableman, Link Law Revisited: Internet Linking Law at Five Years, 16

TECH. L.J. 1273, 1323 (2001) ("[A]ll of the defendants were enjoined from
posting the [infringing] utility, but they were not enjoined from posting links to sites
that carried the utility. [The defendants] continued to post their links, and described
their acts in doing so as 'electronic civil disobedience."').
411 This can even be said for civil law
countries, where judges must often engage in
"gap-filling" and interpretation. See Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70
U. COLO. L. REV. 225, 236 (1999) (arguing that "'civil lawjudging is less alien to [the
common law] tradition than is usually supposed... [because c]odes can be notoriously vague"' and are often sufficiently general that they require extensive judicial
elaboration (quoting E-mail from Peter Lindseth, Associate Director, European Legal
Studies Center, Columbia University, to Peter L. Strauss, Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University (Apr. 14, 1998))).
BERKELEY
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necessary for addressing the challenges of globalization and the
Internet.
Certainly judges have attempted to do just that. Faced with a set
of new questions raised by increased online interaction, courts have
tried to craft useful solutions to questions ofjurisdiction and choice of
law by adapting established legal frameworks. Nevertheless, even a
brief glimpse at evolving U.S. case law reveals that the fit between traditional doctrines and new contexts is imperfect at best.
1. Personal Jurisdiction
In the area of personal jurisdiction,t 2 U.S. courts have, since 1945,
attempted to apply the Supreme Court's flexible due process standard
first articulated in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington.4"' Thus, courts
ask whether the defendant had sufficient contacts with the relevant
state such that jurisdiction is consistent with "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."""' As transportation and interstate
commerce have continued to grow in the decades since 1945, the Supreme Court has many times been called upon to determine how far
to expand the reach of personal jurisdiction. ' '

,12

Some have argued that the adjudicatory jurisdiction question is not as difficult

a challenge as the question of how a judgment will be enforced. See, e.g., Michael A.
Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certaintyfor InternetJurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY
TECH. LJ. 1345, 1354 (2001) (breaking the issue of Internet jurisdiction into three
"layers": adljtuClicatoty jurisdiction, choice of law, and enforcement of judgments); see
also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Will the.Judgmnent-ProofOwn Cyberspace?, 32 INT'L LAW. 1121,
1123 (1998) ("The real problem is turning a judgment supported by jurisdiction into
meaningful economic relief. The problem is not the adaptability of International
Shoe-obtaining jurisdiction in a theoretical sense. The problem is obtaining meaningful relief."). For further discussion of the relationship of jurisdiction to choice of
law and recognition of judgments, see infra Part V.C.
41. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
1.1
I/d. at 316 (internal quotation marks omitted).
415 Indeed, the Supreme Court issued at least twelve major personal jurisdiction
decisions between 1976 and 1990 alone. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604,
619 (1990) (ScaliaJ., joined by Rehnquist, C]J., White, Kennedy, J.) (ruling that personal jurisdiction existed when a nonresident defendant was served with process while
temporarily visiting the forum state for reasons unrelated to the suit); Omni Capital
Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 103-11 (1987) (holding that personal jurisdiction did not exist because the forum state's long-arm statute did not permit service of process on the defendant, an alien corporation); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108-16 (1987) (dividing on the question of whether the
action of placing a prtduct in the "stream of commerce" automatically subjects a party
to perisonal jurisdiction); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 806-11 (1985)
(determining that otIt-of-state class members can be subject to personal jurisdiction
despite not having minimum contacts with the forum state); Burger King Corp. v.
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By 1995, questions about personal jurisdiction based on Internet
contacts were beginning to arise in district courts around the country.
At first, it appeared that at least some courts would find that the exercise of personal jurisdiction was proper even over defendants whose
only contact with the relevant state was an online advertisement available to anyone with Internet access. For example, in Inset Systems, Inc.
v. Instruction Set, Inc.,41' a federal district court in Connecticut ruled
that it had proper jurisdiction over the defendant, a Massachusettsbased provider of computer technology, even though the company,
Instruction Set, maintained no offices in Connecticut and did not
conduct regular business there. The court ruled that the defendant's
promotional website, because it was accessible in Connecticut, supported the exercise of jurisdiction in the state.1' 7 According to the
court, the website advertisements were directed to all states within the
United States. Therefore, Instruction Set had "purposefully availed
itself of the privilege of doing business within Connecticut."" " Similarly, other courts have at times indicated that the posting of a website
accessible within a state, even without any further contacts, might be
sufficient tojustifyjurisdiction. 49

Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-76 (1985) (holding that personal jurisdiction can be asserted based on contractual relations with a forum state even without physical contact
so long as the out-of-state party had fair notice that she might be subject to suit there);
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413-16 (1984) (ruling that contacts unrelated to the cause of action are insufficient to form a basis for
personal jurisdiction unless those contacts are "continuous and systematic"); Calder v.
jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984) (holding that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident party that commits a tortious act that it knows will have an
effect in the forum state); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779-80
(1984) (ruling that a publisher's regular circulation of magazines in the forum state
was sufficient to permit that state to assert jurisdiction); Ins. Corp. of Ir. v.Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 707-09 (1982) (determining that the "minimum
contacts" standard for personal jurisdiction is met when a part), fails to comply with
court-ordered discovery); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
295-98 (1980) (holding that personal jurisdiction could not be exercised over a party
who sold a product that was later transported by a consumer into the forum state when
the party, did not serve, directly or indirectly, the market in that forum state); Kulko v.
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978) (ruling that a state could not exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident merely because he acquiesced in his daughter's desire
to live with her mother in the forum state); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207-12
(1977) (holding that the "minimum contacts" standard articulated in International Shoe
must be applied to quasi in rem actions).
416 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
17

1I.at 163-65.

418Id. at 165.
,119
For example, in Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo.
1996), the court found jurisdiction in Missouri over a California corporation. Al-
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Although the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of
personal jurisdiction based on Internet contacts, most lower courts,
perhaps concerned over the broad implications of cases like Instruction
Set, have attempted to craft a more moderate rule. The most influential case thus far has been Zippo ManufacturingCo. v. Zippo Dot Corn,
'
Inc.120
There, the district court applied a "sliding scale" to Internet
contacts in order to determine the "nature and quality of commercial
activity that an entity conducts over the Internet. ' 2', On one end of
the court's spectrum was a "passive" website, where a defendant has
simply posted information on the Internet "available to those who are
interested.,1 2' According to the court, such a site, absent additional
contact with the forum state or its citizens, would not be enough to
support jurisdiction.1 At the other end of the spectrum,
the court
placed "active" websites, where the defendant "enters into contracts
with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and
repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet.",42 4 The existence of an active site would be sufficient to establish jurisdiction
42,5
anywhere the site is accessed..
In between, the court identified a

though defendant's web server was located in California, the court noted that the disputed website was "continually accessible to every internet-connected computer in MisSouri." Id. at 1330. According to the court,
CyberGold has consciously decided to transmit advertising information to all
Internet users, knowing that such information will be transmitted globally.
Thus, CyberGold's contacts are of such a quality and nature, albeit a very new
quality and nature for personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, that they favor the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant.
Id. at 1333. Similarly, in Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, hIc., 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1997), the Minnesota Court of Appeals ruled that the state Attorney General's
office could sue an online gambling service in Minnesota even though the service was
based outside of the state. Relying on bIstruction Set and Mafitz, the court determined
that the defendants had "purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of doing
business in Minnesota," id.at 721, based on a finding that "computers located
throughout the United States, including Minnesota, accessed appellants' websites," id.
at 718. See also Telco Communications v. An Apple a Day, 977 F. Supp. 404, 407 (E.D.
Va. 1997) (holding that a website available twenty-four hours a day in the forum state
constituted "a persistent course of conduct" in the state); Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes
Found., 958 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1996) (suggesting that the existence of a website
might be deemed a "sustained contact" with the forum because "it has been possible
for a ... resident [of the forum] to gain access to it at any time since it was first
posted").
4 O 952 F. SUpp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
421 Id. at 1124.
422 1d.
-123

24

Id.
I.

.425 I.
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middle ground "occupied by interactive Web sites where a user can
exchange information with the host computer. In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site., 42 3 Thus, Zippo attempted to chart a course for
analyzing minimum contacts in cyberspace.
Although other courts quickly latched onto the Zippo framework,2 7 ultimately this sliding scale analysis has proven to be unstable
426

id.

427 For

a sampling of decisions utilizing Zippo, see Soma Med. Int'l v.Standard
Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1296-97 (10th Cir. 1999); Nida Corp. v. Nida, 118 F.
Supp. 2d 1223, 1229-30 (M.D. Fla. 2000); Biometics, LLC v. New Womyn, Inc., 112 F.
Supp. 2d 869, 873 (E.D. Mo. 2000); Search Force Inc. v. DataForce Int'l, Inc., 1i2 F.
Supp. 2d 771, 776-77 (S.D. Ind. 2000); Tech Heads, Inc. v. Desktop Serv. Ctr., Inc., 105
F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149 (D. Or. 2000); McRae's, Inc. v. Hussain, 105 F. Supp. 2d 594,
599-600 (S.D. Miss. 2000); Standard Knitting, Ltd. v. Outside Design, Inc., No. 00-2288,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8633, at *5-6 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2000); Citigroup, Inc. v. City
Holding Co., 97 F. Supp. 2d 549, 565-66 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Am. Eyewear, Inc. v. Peeper's
Sunglasses & Accessories, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 895, 900-01 (N.D. Tex. 2000); Berthold
Types Ltd. v. European Mikrograf Corp., 102 F. Supp. 2d 928, 932-34 (N.D. Ill.
2000);
Lofton v. Turbine Design, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 404, 410 (N.D. Miss. 2000); Roche v.
Worldwide Media, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 714, 717 (E.D. Va. 2000); Ameritech Servs., Inc.
v. SCA Promotions, Inc., No. 99C4160, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3067, at *13 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 6, 2000); Butler v. Beer Across Am., 83 F. Supp. 2d1 1261, 1268 (N.D. Ala. 2000);
Online Partners.Com, Inc. v.Atlanticnet Media Corp., No. Civ. A. c98-4146S1ENE,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 783, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2000); Quokka Sports, Inc., v. Cup
Int'l Ltd., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 1999);J.B. Oxford Holdings, Inc. v. Net
Trade, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2dt1363, 1367 (S.D. Fla. 1999); Colt Studio, Inc. v. Badpuppy
Enter., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1108-09 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Harbuck v. Aramco, Inc., No.
CIV. A. 99-1971, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16892, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 1999); CIVIXDDI LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1501, 1504-05 (D. Colo., 1999);
Brown v. Geha-Werke GmbH, 69 F. Supp. 2d 770, 777-78 (D.S.C. 1999); Hasbro, Inc. v.
Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 117, 128 (D. Mass. 1999), aff'd, 232 F.3d 1 (1st
Cir. 2000); Hurley v. Cancun Playa Oasis Int'l Hotels, No. Civ.A. 99-574, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13716, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 1999); Coastal Video Communications, Corp. v.
Staywell Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d 562, 570 (E.D. Va. 1999); Decker v. Circus Circus Hotel,
49 F. Supp. 2d 743, 74748 (D.N.J. 1999); Int'l Star Registry of Illinois v. BowmanHaight Ventures, Inc., No. 98 C 6823, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7009, at *11-16 (N.D. 111.
May 6, 1999); Resnick v. Manfredy, 52 F. Supp. 2d 462, 467 (E.D. Pa. 1999), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 238 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2001); Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp.
2d 717, 724-728 (E.D. Pa. 1999); Fix My PC, L.L.C v. N.F.N. Assocs., 48 F. Supp. 2d
640, 643 (N.D. Tex 1999); Origin Instruments Corp. v. Adaptive Computer Sys., Inc.,
No. CIV.A. 3:97-CV-2595-L, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1451, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 1999);
F. McConnell & Sons, Inc. v. Target Data Sys., Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d1 961, 971 (N.D. Ind.
1999); ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, LLC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 323, 330 (D.S.C. 1999);
LFG, LLC v. Zapata Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 731, 736 (N.D. I1. 1999); Crutkowski v.
Steamboat Lake Guides & Outfitters, Inc., No. Civ.A. 98-1453, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20255, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 1998); K.C.P.L., Inc. v. Nash, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1584, 1588-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Atlantech Distribution, Inc. v. Credit Gen. Ins. Co., 30
F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (D. Md. 1998); Patriot Sys., Inc. v. C-Cubed Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d
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and difficult to apply. First, drawing the distinction between an active
and passive site is often problematic. For example, if my website includes only a list of articles I have written, that site appears to be passive under the Zippo decision. If I then include a sentence at the bottom of the site inviting readers to e-mail their comments about my
articles, or providing links to other sites where the full text of the articles can be found, is the addition of that extra material enough to
transform my passive site into an active one? And while the active/passive distinction was difficult to draw in 1997 when Zippo was
decided, the line between active and passive sites is even more blurry
now and is likely to become increasingly so in the future, as websites
grow ever more complex and sophisticated.2
Ultimately, most sites
probably will fall into the middle ground, and "examining the level of
interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information ' ' is unlikely to yield predictable or consistent results. Moreover,
some sites that seem passive may sell advertising based on the number
of "hits" they receive or may collect and market data about the user, 4311
both of which may seem to render the site more active. Finally, few

1318, 1324 (D. Utah 1998); Vitullo v. Velocity Powerboats, Inc., No. 97 C 8745, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7120, at *15 (N.D. I1. Apr. 24, 1998); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.
Supp. 44, 55-56 (D.D.C. 1998); Blackburn v. Walker Oriental Rug Galleries, Inc., 999 F.
Supp. 636, 638 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Tel. Audio Prods., Inc. v. Smith, Civil Action No. 3:97CV-0863-P, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4101, at *9 n.5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 1998); Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738, 742-43 (W.D. Tex. 1998); Mieczkowski v.
Masco Corp., 997 F. Supp. 782, 786-87 (E.D. Tex. 1998); Mallinckrodt Med., Inc. v. SonIs Pharm., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 265, 273 (D.D.C. 1998); Agar Corp. Inc. v. Multi-Fluid
Inc., Niv. A. No. 95-5105, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17121, at *7 (S.D. Tex.June 25, 1997);
Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356, 1365 (W.D. Ark. 1997); Resuscitation Techs., Inc. v. Cont'l Health Care Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3523, at *11
(S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 1997);Jewish Def. Org., Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d
611, 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
428As Geist states:
When the test was developed in 1997, an active website might have featured
little more than an email link and some basic correspondence functionality.
Today, sites with that level of interactivity would likely be viewed as passive,
since the entire spectrum of passive versus active has shifted upward with improved technology. In fact, it can be credibly argued that... websites must
constantly re-evaluate their positions on the passive versus active spectrum as
web technology changes.
Geist supra note 412, at 1379-80.
429 Zippo Dot Coin, 952 F.
Supp. at 1124.
430 See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace
Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1193, 1226-29 (1998) (discussing the use of "cookies" to track website users and the
selling of that information to advertising companies).
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large organizations or corporations will spend the money necessary"''
to create a sophisticated website without including some mechanism
to earn money back from the site. If all such sites are deemed interactive under the Zippo framework, however, they will all subject the site
owner to universal jurisdiction, returning us to a solution like the one
reached in Instruction Set.
Perhaps because of these difficulties, courts already appear to be
shifting away from the Zippo approach (even while sometimes continuing to cite Zippo itself)
toward
a test based on the effect of the activity
•4
.
,32
within the jurisdiction.
This test derives from the U.S. Supreme
Court's 1984 decision in Calder v. Jones,4" a suit in which a Florida publisher allegedly defamed a California entertainer. In that case, the
Court reasoned that, because the plaintiff lived and worked in California and would suffer emotional and perhaps professional harm
there, the publisher had deliberately caused harmful effects in California and, accordingly, California could assert jurisdiction over the
case.".4 Thus, under Caldes "effects test," personal jurisdiction may
be based on "(1) intentional actions (2) expressly aimed at the forum
state (3) causing harm, the brunt of which is suffered-and which the
defendant knows is likely to be suffered-in the forum state.
Courts have applied the effects test not only to Internet libel
cases,"9 but to a broad range of other Internet-related cases as well.
See David Legard, Average Cost to Build E-Comoerce Site:

431

$1 Million, INDUS.

STANDARD, May 31, 1999, http://www.thestandard.corn/article/0, 1902,4731,00.html.
For a sampling of cases that appear to turn on an effects analysis, see Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998); Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen
Screening, Inc., 109 F. Stipp. 2d 724 (W.D. Mich. 2000), rev'd, 282 F.3d 883 (6th Cir.
2002); People Solutions, Inc. v. People Solutions, Inc., No. 3:99-CV-2339-L, 2000 WL
1030619 (N.D. Tex.July 25, 2000); Winfield Collection, L.td. v. McCauley, 105 F. Supp.
2d 746 (E.D. Mich. 2000); Search Force v. DataForce Int'l, 112 F. Supp. 2d 771 (S.D.
Ind. 2000); Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. Crate & Barrel, Ltd., 96 F. Supp. 2d 824 (N.D.
Ill. 2000); Uncle Sam's Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Uncle Sam's Army Navy OutfittersManhattan, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 2d 919 (E.D. Mo. 2000); Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Coinputer Corp., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (C.D. Cal. 2000), affd, 246 F.3d 675 (9th Cir. 2000);
Neato, Inc. v. Great Gizmos, No. 3:99CV958, 2000 WL 305949 (D. Conn. Feb. 24,
2000); Rothschild Berry Farm v. Serendipity Group LLC, 84 F. Supp. 2d 904 (S.D.
Ohio 1999); Bochan v. La Fontaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d 701 (E.D. Va. 1999); Millennium
Enters., Inc. v. Millennium Music, L.P., 33 F. Supp. 2d 907 (D. Or. 1999); Blakey v.
Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 751 A.2d 538 (N.J. 2000).
43. 465 U.S.
783 (1984).

Id. at 789-90.

43-1
435
436

Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, II F.3d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993).
See, e.g., Planet Beach Franchising Corp. v. C3Ubit, Inc., No. Civ. A. 02-1859,

2002 WL 1870007, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 12, 2002) (using the effects test to justify assertion of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant based on an allegedly de-
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For example, in a trademark suit brought against a California corporation, the plaintiff argued that jurisdiction was appropriate in Texas
because the defendant owned an undisputedly interactive website that
was accessible in Texas. 4" Although the court acknowledged the interactivity of the site,4 "5 it refused to assert jurisdiction absent4 evidence
39'
that residents of Texas had actually purchased from the site.
Likewise, in a case alleging copyright infringement in the design
of craft patterns, a Michigan plaintiff sued a Texas defendant in
Michigan." ' According to the plaintiff, the Michigan court could
properly exercise jurisdiction because the defendant both maintained
an interactive website accessible to Michigan residents and, on two occasions, had sold patterns to Michigan residents. 44' Nevertheless, the
court ruled that jurisdiction was not proper in Michigan. Rejecting
the Zippo framework, the court refused to accept the idea "that the
mere act of maintaining a website that includes interactive features
ipso facto establishes personal jurisdiction over the sponsor of that
website anywhere in the United States. '
Furthermore, the court
deemed the two Michigan sales an insufficient basis for jurisdiction
because they were sold in an eBay auction and therefore the defendant had no say over where the products would be purchased. 4
The discussion of the sales on eBay may signal yet another shift in
the case law. Instead of focusing either on the interactivity of the website or the ultimate effect a defendant's activities may cause in ajurisdiction, courts may base jurisdictional decisions on whether a defendant deliberately targets individuals in any particular state. One
commentator, advocating such a targeting inquiry, has argued:
Unlike the Zippo approach, a targeting analysis would seek to identify tie
intentions of the parties and to assess the steps taken to either enter or
avoid a particular jurisdiction. Targeting would also lessen the reliance
on effects analysis, the source of considerable uncertainty since Internet-

famatoiy article posted on defendant's website); Blakey, 751 A.2d 538 (using the effects
test to determine that jurisdiction existed over nonresident defendants who allegedly

posted defamatory messages on the electronic bulletin board of their New jersey-based
employer).
437 People Solutions, Inc., 2000 WL 1030619
at *3-4.
439Id. at *3.
431)

Id. at *4.

441

Winfield Colection, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 747.
748.

Ild. at

41
4,12

Id. at 75 1.

See id. (stating that the results of the auction sale, over which defendant had
little control, did not create personaljurisdiction).
443
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based activity can ordinarily be said to create some effects in most jurisdictions.441

At least one court of appeals (the Ninth Circuit) has embraced a targeting analysis, ruling that jurisdiction is proper "when the defendant
is alleged to have engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff
4
whom the defendant knows to be a resident of the forum state."' '
Likewise, OECD Consumer Protection Guidelines,' t Securities and
Exchange Commission regulations on Internet-based offerings,44' the
American Bar Association Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Project's
Report on Global Jurisdiction Issues Created by the Internet, 448 and
the Hague Conference on Private International Law's Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments44 ' all include references to
targeting as a basis for the exercise ofjurisdiction.

444Geist, supra note 412, at 1345-46; see also Perritt, sulnpa note
374, at 573 ("Tile
concept of targeting is the best solution to the theoretical challenge presented by ditficulties in localizing conduct in Internet markets.").
44.Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082,
1087 (9th Cir.

2000); seealso Am. Info. Corp. v. Am. Infometrics, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 696, 700 (D.
Md. 2001) (ruling that "[a] company's sales activities focusing generally on customers
located throughout the United States and Canada without focusing on and targeting
the forum state do not yield personal jurisdiction" (internal quotation omitted)).
446 See

ORGANISATION

FOR

ECONOMIC

CO-OPERATION

AND

DEVELOPMENT,

GUIDELINES FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE

14 (2000) ("Businesses should take into account the global nature of electronic commerce and, wherever possible, should consider various regulatory characteristics of the
markets the, target."), at http://vw.oecd.org/pdf/M00000000/M00000363.pdf.
447The regulation of offers is a fundamental element of federal and
some
U.S. state securities regulatory schemes. Absent the transaction of business in
the United States or with U.S. persons, however, our interest in regulating solicitation activity is less compelling. We believe that our investor protection
concerns are best addressed through the implementation by issuers and financial service providers of precautionary measures that are reasonably designed to ensure that offshore Internet offers are not targeted to persons in
the United States or to U.S. persons.
Interpretation: Statement oJ the Commission Regarding Use of Internet Web Sites to Offer Securities, Solicit Securities Transactions or Advertise Investment Services Offshore, Securities and
Exchange Commission, http://%wv.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-7516.htm
(Mar. 23,
1998) (internal citations omitted); see also Interpretation: Use ofElectronic Media, Securities and Exchange Commission, (May 4, 2000) (providing guidance in applying federal
securities law to electronic media), http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/34-42728.htm.
448American Bar Association Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Project,
A Report on
Global Jurisdiction Issues Created by the Internet, 55 BUs. LAW. 1801 (2000) [hereinafter
ABA, GlobalJcrisdiction].
449Hague Conference on Private International Law, supra note 321,
at art. 7, version 0.4a ("[A]ctivity shall not be regarded as being directed to a State if the other
party demonstrates that it took reasonable steps to avoid concluding contracts with
consumers habitually resident in the State.").
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Nevertheless, targeting too ultimately may prove to be an unstable
test. Even if courts embrace this approach they will need to identify
criteria to be used in assessing whether a website has actually targeted
a particular jurisdiction. This will not be an easy task. For example,
the American Bar Association Internet Jurisdiction Project, a global
study on Internet jurisdiction released in 2000, referred to the language of the site as one potentially significant way of determining
whether a site operator has targeted a particularjurisdiction. , With
the development of new language translation capabilities, however,
website owners may soon be able to create their sites in any language
they wish, knowing that users will automatically be able to view the site
in the user's chosen language.""
As one commentator notes,
"[w]ithout universally applicable standards for assessment of targeting
in the online environment, a targeting test is likely to leave further
uncertainty in its wake.""" ' Thus, although the adaptation process
continues, it is unclear whether the results will be satisfying either
conceptually or practically.
2. Choice of Law
In the area of choice of law, we can see a similar process at work.
For example, with regard to international copyright cases, Article 5 of
the Berne Convention and the broader principle of national treatment have long established a relatively stable set of choice-of-law rules
based upon territoriality. 4r"' 3 Under this regime, courts are asked to
450

451

ABA, Globalriiisdiction,supra note 448, at 1923-24.
See Geist, supra note 412, at 1384 n.224 (describing a new automatic translation

service offered by the search engine Google); see also http://wvw.google.com/
machine_ translation.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2001) (stating that pages published in
Italian, French, Spanish, German, o1 Portuguese can be translated into English).
452 Geist, supra note
412, at 1384.
453 Berne Convention, supra note 320, at art.
5(l), 1161 U.N.T.S. at 35 ("Authors
shall enjoy ...the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to
their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this Convention."); see also id.
at art. 5(2), 1161 U.N.T.S. at 35 ("[T]he extent of protectioin, as well as the means of
redress afforded to the author to protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively by the
laws of the country where protection is claimed."). It is commonly understood that
this regime "implicates a rule of territoriality." Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Of course, one could
read Article 5(2) as creating a rule of lexfofi because the forum can be seen as "the
country where protection is claimed." Nevertheless, the usual reading of the provision
is that it refers to the country where the infringement is alleged to have occurred. See
Graeme W. Austin, Domestic Laws an(d Foreign Rights: Choice of Law in TransnationalCopyright infringement Litigation, 23 CoLuM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 1, 24-25 (1999) (noting that, at
least tuntil recently, "the weight of opinion" favored this interpretation); see also Din-
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apply the law of the place where the copying or other allegedly infringing act occurred. In a world of digital technology and global
commerce, however, the assumption that we can necessarily fix a
place of origin or a place of infringement has been undermined.4A
In response, courts have been forced to adapt. For example, in
Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., several Russianlanguage newspapers located in Russia sued a U.S. corporation that
•~.
them,
and crewas taking articles from those newspapers, rearranging
45
ating a Russian-language newspaper for U.S. distribution. '3 The Second Circuit declined to apply exclusively the territorial place of infringement rule derived from Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention.""'
Rather, the court developed a choice-of-law rule as a matter of federal
common law. Looking to the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of
Law, under which courts use the law of the place with the most significant relationship to the parties and the transaction,' 8' the Second Circuit applied Russian copyright law to the question of who holds the
,t6
•
45
copyright, but applied American law to the infringement question.
Nevertheless, even the more flexible analysis of the Second Restatement may ultimately be unsatisfying in complex cases. Indeed,
commentators have often criticized the Second Restatement's "most
significant relationship" test because it tends to devolve into an unguided list of governmental interests with a conclusory decision ap-

woodie, supra note 323, at 533 n.196 (citing Austin and stating that the accepted reading of article 5(2) is that it refers to the country where infringement is alleged to have
occurred).
See e.g., Dinwoodie, supra note 323, at 535 ("The place where an act of alleged
infringement 'occurs' has become difficult to determine in the digital environment;
concepts such as 'place of publication' or 'country of origin' lose meaning in a global
and digital world, where geography holds less significance.").
455 153 F.3d 82 (2d
Cir. 1998).
456

d.
457 Id.

See

at 89-90.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICFS OF LAwS

§§ 6, 145, 222 (1971) (articulating the "most significant relationship" test and listing the choice-oflaw principles according to which courts should determine the place with the most significant
relationship to the dispute).
4
See lItar-Tass, 153 F.3d at 90 (applying the "law of the state with 'the most significant relationship' to the property of the parties").
It is unclear whether the court reached this second conclusion by applying a
fixed rule of lex loci delicti or by using a broader interest analysis akin to the Second Restatement approach. See id. at 91 (stating "[t]o whatever extent lex loci delicti is to be
considered only one part of a broader 'interest' approach, the United States law would
still apply").
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pended."' Moreover, such a list will almost always include the forum
jurisdiction, particularly in the digital world where publication may
occur simultaneously in multiple countries. 46,2 Thus, given that courts
tend to prefer applying their own laws, "' we may find that this flexible
approach begins to look simply like the old lexfori, where the law of
the forum jurisdiction always applied. Such a rule may encourage uncertainty because one will not know in advance which jurisdiction's
copyright law may be applied to a given online posting or transaction.4+ ' To combat this uncertainty, some scholars have proposed that
courts use the law of the place where a website server is located. 4' Be-

461
Even in the U.S. domestic context, scholars have criticized
the Second Restatement approach. See, e.g., William L. Reynoclds, Legal Process and Choice of Law, 56
MD. L. REV. 1371, 1388-89 (1997) (summarizing scholarly criticisms of the Second Restatement); Jeffiey M. Shaman, The Vicissitudes of Choice of Law: The Restatement (First,
Second) and Interest Analysis, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 359-60 (1997) (commenting that
contacts are often "counted up ...at most with conclusory and arbitrary pronouncements concerning their relative value"); seealsoJames A. Meschewski, Choice of Law in
Alaska: A Survival Guide for Using the Second I estatement, 16 ALAsKA L. REV. 1,19 (1999)
(complaining that the lack of guidance prevents any effective restraint on judicial decision making and results in conclusory statements of the most relevant contacts).
462 Nat'l Football League v. TVRadioNow Corp.,
53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1831,
1834-35 (W.D.Pa. 2000) (holding that where defen'dants originated the streaming of
copyrighted programming over the Internet fior a website in Canada, public performances occurred in the United States because users in the United States could access tile
website and receive and view the defenldants' streaming of the copyrighted
material).
463 See, e.g., Antony L. Ryan, Principles of lorut Selection, 103 W. VA. L.
REV. 167, 192
(2000) (providing various examples and noting that, at least in the domestic context,
there is a "marked tendency" for courts to choose to apply their own law).
4S4 See DAVID CAVER-S, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCEss 22-23 (1965) (arguing
that a
firun law solution makes it impossible to know what law will apply until after one
acts); see also Perry Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness, "and Choice of Law, 96 YALE LJ. 1191
(1987) (arguing that a lextbri approach is inconsistent with the rule of law because it
repudiates tile
idea that laws reflect norms that exist apart from their enforcement);
Alfred Hill, The.Judicial Function in Choice of Larw, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1585, 1587-1602
(1985) (describing the move away from lexfori approaches among both commentators
and courts). But see Robert A. Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict
of Laws: A Resiponse to the 'Ner Critics, '34 MERCER L. REV. 593, 595 (1982-1983) (arguing that the application Of frtim law produces the most "functionally sound and fair
results"); Louise Weinberg, On Departingfrom Forua Law, 35 MERCER L. REV. 595, 599
(1983-1984) (arguing that fortnm preference vindicates widely shared policy concerns
becatuse the interests of the plaintiff and the forum are aligned).
465 See, e.g.,Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Without Borders?
Choice ofForum and Choice of
Law for Copyright Infringement in Cyberspace, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 153, 173
(1997) ("[T] he court should either apply the law of the place of the server or of the
clefendant's domicile."). Interestingly, this proposal contrasts with the recent OECD
tax recommendations, which take the position that a server is not stufficient to constitute presence in a jurisdiction for tax purposes. Supra text accompanying note 66.
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cause websites may contain elements stored on multiple servers, however, locating a website may be difficult. Moreover, because servers
can easily be located anywhere, such a scheme may result in a regulatory race to the bottom. 6 Thus, as with adjudicatory jurisdiction, the
evolution of choice-of-law rules in this new environment is still a workin-progress.
III. THE NEED TO CONSIDER THE SOCIAL MEANING
OF LEGAL JURISDICTION

The ten responses discussed in Part II undoubtedly do not exhaust the number of approaches that judges, government regulators,
legislators, and academics have devised or might devise to address the
challenges of cyberspace and increasing transborder interaction. 4t67
More important, the purpose of this survey is neither to embrace nor
reject any of the responses as a normative policy matter. Indeed, although I have noted some of the pros and cons of the various suggestions, I do not intend, in the remainder of this Article, to offer an alternative policy formulation that will "solve" all of their purported
shortcomings. As a result, I will not return to most of these specific
policy issues.
Instead, by surveying this landscape of critical debate we may
emerge with two observations. First, the wide range of opinion, like
the wide range of challenges discussed in Part I, indicates that these
issues are in flux and that the time is therefore ripe for rethinking
core assumptions underlying the application of legal authority and
Scholars seeking to localize an international copyright dispute
at a particular
point, such as the place of the server, have incorporated in their proposed tests a range
of caveats to prevent such "races" from occurring. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 465, at
161 (providing alternative tests to be used if a country's copyright laws are not adequate). But, as Graeme Dinwoodie has pointed out, "these (necessary) caveats inevitably detract from the gains in certainty provided by the localizing rule. If certainty and
predictability are the reasons for adopting an arbitrary and inflexible rule, this approach becomes less attractive when the principal advantages are imperiled." Dinwoodie, su/ra note 323, at 540 (footnote omitted).
467 For example, I have not detailed the various
proposals about how best to apportion taxes for Internet transactions. For a discussion of these proposals, see
RICHARrt D. POMP & OLIVER OLDMAN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 13-1 to 13-97 (4th
ed. 2001); Arthur J. Cockfield, Transforming the Internet into a Taxable Forum: A Case
Study in E-Commerce Taxation, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1171 (2001); Charles E. McClure, Jr.,
Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Economic Objectives, Technological Constraints, and Tax
Laws, 52 TAX L. REV. 269 (1997); Christopher]. Schafer, Federal Legislation Regarding
Taxation of Internet Sales Transactions, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 415 (2001); William V.
Vetter, Preyingon the Web: Tax Collection in the Virtual World, 28 FIA. STr. U. L. REV. 649
(2001).
466
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norms across borders. Second, and even more fundamentally, the
scope of the debate suggests that the discussion has not been framed
broadly enough. While these responses are varied (and often at odds
with one another), they all seem to revolve around either political
theory questions about when a judicial or administrative exercise of
authority is legitimate, or legal policy questions about the most efficient or effective system for solving specific legal dilemmas. Even approaches that advocate decentralized authority (Johnson and Post)"""
t
or the creation of transnational norms (Dinwoodie and Perritt)+'
' do
so based largely on literature from political philosophy and law.
There is more to the assertion of jurisdiction or the extraterritorial imposition of norms, however, than simply questions of political
legitimacy or efficient dispute resolution. The assertion of jurisdiction, like all legal acts, can also be viewed as a meaning-producing cultural product. What does it mean, after all, to say that some person,
corporation, or activity is subject to a community's jurisdiction? And
how does the idea ofjurisdiction relate to conceptions of geographic
space, community membership, citizenship, boundaries, and selfdefinition? Although largely ignored in the debates over Internetjurisdiction and the rise of transnational governing bodies, these foundational issues must be considered seriously if we are to develop a
richer descriptive account of the role of legal jurisdiction in a global
era.
This Part begins to develop such an account by isolating four specific aspects of jurisdiction that are often overlooked: the way in
which jurisdictional rules reflect and construct social conceptions of
space, the role of jurisdictional rules in establishing community dominion over a transgressor, the process by which the assertion of jurisdiction symbolically extends community membership to those
brought within its ambit, and the way in which assertions of jurisdiction can open space for the articulation of norms that challenge sovereign power. Part IV then deepens the inquiry by interrogating further both the presumed tie between a physical location and a
community, and the assumption that the nation-state is the only appropriate community for jurisdictional purposes. Only after displacing these assumptions will we be in a position to construct a more nuanced normative model for understanding and addressing the
globalization ofjurisdiction.
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A. Jurisdictionand the Social Constructionof Space
It has become commonplace for cultural critics and others to
identify the ways in which social structures shape and constrain conduct, yet the link between social structures and physical spaces has received less attention. 47" Nevertheless, "[t] he production of space and
place is both the medium and the outcome of human agency and social relations."''" This cultural construction of space includes the
boundaries drawn between "public" and "private" spaces; the decisions a community makes about land use and zoning; the appropriation and transformation of "nature" as both a concept and as a physical description; the local autonomy of governmental units; the use of
specialized locations for the conduct of economic, cultural, and social
practices; the creation of patterns of movement within a community;
and "the formation of symbolically laden, meaning-filled, ideologyprojecting sites and areas.4 7 2
In addition, topological space, which consists of the formal boundary lines we have chosen, is distinctively different from social space,
which includes the meanings given to space (both local and nonlocal), to the distances between delineated spaces, and to the time necessary to traverse those distances. 7 For example, a one-hundred-mile
automobile trip may seem like a greater journey to residents of the
northeastern United States, who are accustomed to relatively short
distances between destinations, than to residents of the West, where
cities and towns are more dispersed. Similarly, a one-thousand-mile
trip carries a very different social meaning today, in the age of relatively inexpensive air travel, than it did one hundred years ago, even if
the topological space remains the same. 7" And of course America's
For two notable exceptions within legal scholarship, see Terry S. Kogan,
Geography and Due Process: 7he Social Meaning of AdjudicativeJurisdiction,22 RUTGERS L.J. 627
(1991); Richard T. Ford, Law's Territory (A Histo , of Jurisdiction),97 MICII. L. REV. 843
(1999). Kogan's work, although it predated the rise of cyberspace, specifically addressed the social significance of adjudicative jurisdiction and so is particularly relevant
here. My discussion in this Section is heavily indebted to Kogan's argument.
470

ALLAkN PRED, MAKING HISTORIES AND CONSTRUCTING HUMAN GEOGRAPHIES 10

(1990).
472

Id.

Kogan, supra note 470, at 634.
John Tomlinson describes this shift as follows:
In a globalized world, people in Spain really do continue to be 5,500 miles
away from people in Mexico, separated, just as the Spanish conquistadors
were in the sixteenth century, by a huge, inhospitable and perilous tract of
ocean. What connectivity means is that we now experience this distance in
different ways. We think of such distant places as routinely accessible, either
473

474
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well-documented postwar demographic shift from city to suburb is not
merely a change of topology, but a politically and symbolically significant cultural transformation. 75
Moreover, the construction of legal spaces and the delineation of
boundaries is always embedded in broader social and political processes.
"Legal categories are used to construct and differentiate material spaces which, in turn, acquire a legal potency that has a direct
'
For example, in
bearing on those using and traversing such spaces."477
the history of European conquest of Australia, the naming of particular spaces-rivers, mountains, capes, bays, and so on-became a central point of political contest."" The Europeans believed that the aboriginals did not classify or name the landscape and transformed that
purported "spatial deficiency" into a "legal deficiency": if the aboriginals did not name their places, so the thinking went, their "grasp of it
[was] so tenuous... [that] it was hardly a crime to take possession of
7
it,,1 9 To take another example, Jeremy Waldron has observed that increasing restrictions on the use of public spaces for activities such as
sleeping or washing denies homeless people any opportunity to perform those acts because there is neither a public nor a private space to
do so.'5
The social meaning of geographical space also includes the way in
which an individual or community perceives those who are outside the
representationally through communications technology or the mass media, or
physically, through the expenditure of a relatively small amount of time (and,
of course, of money) on a transatlantic flight. So Mexico City is no longer
meaningfully 5,500 miles from Madrid: it is eleven hours' flying time away.
JOHN ToMLINSON, GLOBAI.ZATION AND CUL IURE 4 (1999).
,175For the socio-political history of American suburbanization,
see OEL GARREAU,
EDGE ClOY: LIFE ON THE NEW FRONTIER (1992); KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS
FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNH'FD STATES (1985).
476 See NICiiOlAs K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES
OF POWER, at xi
(1994) ("The legal representation of space must be seen as constituted by-and in
turn constitutive of-complex, normatively charged and often competing visions of
social and political life under law.").
477 ld. at
54.
See PAUL CARTER, THE ROAD TO BOTANY BAY: AN EXPLORAT[ION OF LAINDSCAPE

(describing European exploration and subsequent naming of
various Australian geographical features).
AND HIsroRY (1988)
479

Id. at 64; see also ROBERT D.

SACK,

HUMAN TERRHTORIAITY:

It's

THEORY AND

(describing similarly loose conceptions of territoriality among
members of the Chippewa tribe at the time Europeans settled in the United States).
480 Jeremy Waldron, Honelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39
UCLA L. REV. 295, 315
(1991) ("Since private places and public places between them exhaust all the places
that there are, there is nowhere that these actions [such as sleeping] may be performed by the homeless person.").
1-ISTORY 6-8 (1986)
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community's topological or social boundaries. As people develop attitudes of familiarity toward the spaces in which they reside and conduct their daily activities, they may also come to view unfamiliar people and locations as frighteningly alien. Alternatively, the outside
"other" can be seen as inviting, friendly, and hospitable, or as mysterious, exotic, and romantic. 4 ' There are a seemingly infinite variety of
attitudes one may hold toward unfamiliar social spaces. Such attitudes
are embedded in context and shaped and influenced by manifold factors including politics, socio-economic48 2relationships, and the extent of
contact that one has with the "other.,
Thus, jurisdictional rules have never simply emerged from a utilitarian calculus about the most efficient allocation of governing
authority. Rather, the exercise of jurisdiction has always been part of
the way in which societies demarcate space, delineate communities,
and draw both physical and symbolic boundaries. Such boundaries do
not exist as an intrinsic part of the physical world; they are a social
construction. As a result, the choice ofjurisdictional rules reflects the
attitudes and perceptions members of a community hold toward their
geography, the physical spaces in which they live, and the way in
which they define the idea of community itself.
In order to convey this basic idea, it might be useful to give an
admittedly oversimplified, functionalist account of the change in
American jurisdictional rules over time. In this account, the territorially based jurisdictional principle articulated in the nineteenth century by the U.S. Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff 4 "-which held that
states have complete authority within their territorial boundaries but
no authority outside those boundaries' 8-derives in part from a particular understanding of social space in the United States at that time.

481

As Stuart Hall has described:

To be English is to know yourself in relation to the French, and the hotblooded Mediterraneans, and the passionate, traumatized Russian soul. You
go round the entire globe: when you know what everybody else is, then you
are what they are not. Identity is always, in that sense, a structured representation which only achieves its positive through the narrow eye of the negative.
Stuart Hall, The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity, in CULTURE,
GLOBALIZATION

AND THE WORLD-SYSTEM:

CONTEMPORARY

CONDITIONS FOR THE

REPRESENTATION OF IDENTIT'Y 19, 21 (Anthony D. King ed., 1997).
482Kogan, supra note 470, at 637.
483 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
484See id. at 722 (ruling that a State has power to decide the "civil status
and capacities of its inhabitants" and to regulate how property may be handled, but that "no
State can exercise directjurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its
territory").
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As historian Robert Wiebe has famously observed, "America during
the nineteenth century was a society of island communities. ''48 5 With
weak communication and limited interaction, these "islands" felt
widely dispersed, and it is not surprising that local autonomy became
"[t]he heart of American democracy., 4M Even though France had
long since developed a centralized public administration, Wiebe argues that Americans still could not even conceive of a distant managerial government. In such a climate, geographical loyalties tended to
inhibit connections with a whole society. "Partisanship ...grew out of
lives narrowly circumscribed by a community or neighborhood. For
those who considered the next town or the next city block alien territory, such refined, deeply felt loyalties served both as a defense against
outsiders and as a means of identification within. 487
As the nineteenth century progressed, so this story goes, massive
socioeconomic changes brought an onslaught of seemingly "alien"
presences into these island communities. Immigrants were the most
obvious group of outsiders, but perhaps just as frightening was the
emergence of powerful distant forces such as insurance companies,
major manufacturers, railroads, and the national government itself.
Significantly, these threats appear to have been conceived largely in
spatial terms. According to Wiebe, Americans responded by reaffirming community self-determination and preserving old ways and values
from "outside" invasion.8
Given such a social context, it is not surprising that the jurisdictional rules of the period emphasized state territorial boundaries. Indeed, it is likely that the burdens of litigating in another state far exceeded simply the time and expense of travel, substantial as those
burdens were. Just as important was the psychic burden of being
forced to defend oneself in a foreign state, which may have felt little
different from the idea of defending oneself in a foreign country. An
1874 Pennsylvania state court decision issued shortly before Pennoyer
illustrates the extent of this psychic burden. '' In the case, a resident
of New York had contested jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. The court
acknowledged that the Pennsylvania courthouse was only "a few
hours' travel by railroad" from New York, but nevertheless ruled that
ROBERT |-.WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER: 1877-1920, at xiii ( 1967).
486 Id.
4187 I.at 27.
488 /d.
at 52-58. For a fictional account of this period that gives texture to this dc485

scription, see WILLA CATHER, MYANTONIA (Hoiighton Mifflin Co. 1926) (1918).
'189
Coleman A
Appeal, 75 Pa. 441 (1874).
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the defendant could not be sued personally, in part because "nothing
can be more unjust than to drag a man thousands of miles, perhaps
from a distant state, and in effect compel him to appear."40 The court
disregarded the relatively slight literal burden in the case at hand, and
instead focused on the specter of being "dragged" to a "distant state"
located "thousands of miles" away. Indeed, the decision seemed to
equate other states with foreign countries, referring to a "defendant
living in a remote state or foreign country... [who] becomes subject
to the jurisdiction of this, to him, foreign tribunal.",49 ' These passages
indicate that the psychic significance of defending oneself in another
state was at least as important as the literal difficulties of travel.
Both the literal and psychic burdens associated with out-of-state
litigation changed as a result of the urban industrial revolution at the
turn of the twentieth century, a revolution that profoundly altered
American social space. Increasingly, economic and governmental activities were administered from afar by impersonal managers at centralized locations. In such a world, another state was likely to be
viewed less as a foreign country and more as yet another distant power
center, just one of many "anonymous, bureaucratic, regulatory bodies
"4
in an increasingly complex society. 92
In addition, advances in transportation and communications
helped to weaken territoriality as the central category in which Americans understood their space. "As long as daily lives were focused to a
large extent on the local, a state boundary symbolized the edge of the
world and everything outside that boundary was alien and foreign.
With increased mobility, however, Americans regularly crossed state
boundaries by train, by car, and by airplane, which inevitably diminished the sense that other places were alien. The rise of radio and
television meant that events in other states could become a regular
part of one's daily consciousness. "Physical distance as a social barrier
began to be bypassed through the shortening of communication 'distance."'"
These communication and transportation advances reinforced the functional interdependence that characterized the United
States throughout the twentieth century. As a result, almost all of us

490

Id. at 457 (1874).

Id. Indeed, for juridical purposes, other states had, since the founding, been
treated much like foreign countries, even for some time after the Civil War.
42 Kogan, supra note 470, at 651 (citations omitted).
493 Id. at
652.
491

494JOSHIUA MEYROWITZ, No SENSE OF PLACE:

ON SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 116 (1985).

THE IMPACT OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA
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are now regularly affected by people, institutions, and events located
far away.
In this altered social space, the call to defend a lawsuit in the
courts of another state remained an imposition, but the burdens were
no longer perceived in stark territorial terms. In other words, though
many economic and practical burdens remained, the psychic burden
was no longer as strong. Thus, it is not surprising that International
Shoe substituted a flexible "fairness" test for the more rigidly territorial
scheme of Pennoyer.
As previously stated, this is an oversimplified account of the shift
in American jurisdictional rules. For the purposes of this discussion,
however, it makes the essential point clearly enough: changes in political and social conceptions of space form at least part of the context
for changes in jurisdictional understandings. Thus, although some
might ask why we need to rethink our ideas about legal jurisdiction,
the reality is that jurisdictional rules are always evolving, and this evolution has always responded to changing social constructions of space,
distance, and community.
With the rise of global capitalism and the Internet, the question
becomes whether the sense of social space has shifted once again. Arguably, people around the world now share economic space to a
greater degree than ever before, in large part because of the increase
in online interaction. Modern electronic communications, recordkeeping, and trading capacities have allowed the world financial markets to become so powerful that the actions of individual territorial
governments often appear to be ineffectual by comparison. 41", Essential services, such as computer programming, can easily be "shipped"
across nation-state boundaries and can even be produced multinationally. The international production and distribution of merchandise means that communities around the country-and even around
the world-increasingly purchase the same name-brand goods and
shop at the same stores. Online communities (to the extent that we
are willing to call them communities) ignore territoriality altogether
and instead are organized around shared interests. People fly more
than ever, carry telephones and laptops with them as they travel, and
keep in touch by e-mail.

495 See infira notes 701-04 and accompanying text (discussing the extent of global
corporate and financial market activity and the impact of this activity on governmental
institutions, such as central banks).
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All of these changes radically reshape the relationship of people
to their geography. ' 6 As Joshua Meyrowitz observed nearly twenty
years ago, electronic media create "a nearly total dissociation of physical place and social 'place.' When we communicate through telephone, radio, television, or computer, where we are physically no
longer determines where and who we are socially."4 7 Meyrowitz
pointed out that, historically, communication and travel were synonymous, and it was not until the invention of the telegraph that text
messages could move more quickly than a messenger could carry
them.4 '8 Thus, "informational differences between different places
began to erode. ''4 99 Moreover, many of the boundaries that define social settings by including and excluding participants-including walls,
doors, barbed wire, and other physical and legal barriers-are less
significant in a world where "the once consonant relationship between

,196

Some have conceptualized this shift as a change in the way we experience and

represent space and time. See, e.g., ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF
MODERNITy 64 (1990) (describing the problem of today's higher level "time-space distanciation" which has stretched local and distant social forms); TOMINSON, suptra note
474, at 4-5 (describing the way airline journeys transform "spatial experience into temporal experience"). In that regard, it is interesting to link this change to shifts in the
arts. For example, in visual arts, Friedland and Boden have observed that the fall of
the linear perspective of early Renaissance painting occurred along with the rediscovery of Euclidean geometry and the emergence of spatial representation, such as maps.
Roger Friedland & Deirdre Boden, NowHere: An Introduction to Space, Time and Modernity, in NOWHERE: SPACE, TIME AND MODERNITY 1, 2 (Roger Friedland & Deirdre Boden eds., 1994) (citing Denis Cosgrove, Prospect, Perspective, and the Evolution of the Landscape Idea, in 10 TRANSCRIPTS OF THE INSTITUTE OF BRITISfH GEOGRAPHERS 45, 46-48
(1985)). In the late nineteenth century, the impressionists "fragmented light (and
thus time)." Id. at 1-2. Then, postimpressionists such as Czanne built "a new language, abandoning linear and aerial perspective and making spatial dispositions arise
from the modulations of color." Id. at 2 (citing CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF TIlE
SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 468 (1989)). The cubists went still ftrther, "providing simultaneous images of the same moment from different points in
space and multiple views of a single scene at various points in time." Id. at 2; see also
Stephen Kern, Cubism, Camouflage, Silence, and Democracy: A PhenomenologicalApproach,
in NOWHERE: SPACE, TIME AND MODERNITY, supra t 163, 167 (describing how artists
such as "Picasso and Braque gave space the same colors, texture and substantiality as
material objects and made objects and space interpenetrate so as to be almost indistinguishable"). Likewise the development of the modern novel-with books such as
MARCEL PROUST, REMEMBRANCE OF TiiINGS PAST (C.K. Scott Moncrieff & Terence
Kilmartin trans., 1954); JAMESJOYCE, FINNEGANS WAKE (1939); and VIRGINIA WOOLF,
MRS. DALLOWAY (1925)-also mined changes in the equation between space and time.
497 MEYROW'ITZ, supra note 494, at
115.
498 See id. at 116 (describing the impact of telegraphic technology).
499

d.
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access to information and access to places has been greatly weak-

ened. "5oo

Given such changes, it is possible that the psychic burden of foreign jurisdiction is less significant today because of our increased contact with foreign places. On the other hand, we may feel the need to
cling even more tenaciously to localism in the face of the encroaching
global economic system.'51 Moreover, in either scenario the "we" is
problematic. After all, different social groups, and different individuals, have very different degrees of exposure to and control over global
flows of information, capital, and human migration . Nevertheless,
the important point is that ifjurisdictional rules both reflect and construct social space, further investigation is needed in order to better
comprehend the relationship between community affiliation, physical
location, and personal identity in a world where the importance of
territorial borders and of geographical distance is being challenged.
B. Jurisdictionand the Assertion of Community Dominion
When a transgressor behaves in some way contrary to society's
moral code, the community can come to view the transgressor in one
of two ways. First, the community can close ranks by defining itself in
opposition to the transgressor and by treating the transgression purely
as an external threat. Or, second, the community can claim dominion
over the transgression by conceptualizing the transgressor as a member of the community who has committed what might be considered
an internaloffense.
The definition of a threat as internal or external is, in part, a question of jurisdiction. When a community exercises legal jurisdiction, it

500 1(. at

117.

'lot Cf GIDDENS, so/pra note 496, at 65 ("The development of globalised social relations probably serves to diminish some aspects of nationalist feeling linked to nationstates (or some states) but may be causally involved with the intensifying of more localised nationalist sentiments.")
502 Doreen Massey refers to this as the "power geometry of time-space compression." MASSEY, supra note 30, at 149. She contrasts those who are "in charge" of timespace compression-"the jet-setters, the ones sending and receiving the faxes and the
e-mail, holding the international conference calls ... distributing the films, controlling
the news, organizing the investments"-with those who do a lot of physical mov'ing,
but are not "in charge" of the process in the same way. Id. These people include those
such as Undocumented migrant workers who cross borders illegally or those who lose
theirjobs to less expensive labor abroad, or those whose livelihood is affected by global
currency fluctuations. Thus, social conceptions of space, distance, and community
definition are, of course, themselves varied and contested.
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is symbolically asserting its dominion over an actor. This jurisdictional
reach can serve to transform what otherwise might have been considered an external threat into an internal adjudication. Accordingly,
the assertion ofjurisdiction can be seen as one way that communities
domesticate chaos.
I have written previously about the surprisingly widespread and
elaborate practice in medieval Europe and ancient Greece of putting
on trial animals and inanimate objects that caused harm to human beAlthough such trials may seem far removed from any discusings
jurisdictional rules, I believe they illuminate the
of
contemporary
sion
symbolic content of such rules. In deciding how to respond to acts of
violence or depredation caused by animals, communities were faced
with a choice of whether to view the acts as internal or external
threats. Random acts of violence caused by insensate agents Lindoubtedly brought a deep feeling of lawlessness: not so much the fear
of laws being broken, but the far worse fear that the world might not
be a lawful place at all. 50' To combat such a fear, it may have been essential to view the animals not as uncontrollable natural forces belonging to the outside world, but as members of the community who
could actually break the community's laws. By asserting dominion
over the animals, members of communities could assure themselves
that, even if the social order had been violated, at least there was some
order, and not simply undifferentiated chaos.
Just as the animal trials implicitly communicated a symbolic message that nonhuman transgressors were nevertheless subject to human
control, so too our contemporary notions of jurisdiction continue to
be linked to how we define both the limits of the community and who
should be within its dominion. This exercise ofjurisdiction, in and of
itself, can be part of the process of healing after the breach of a social
norm. For example, a person injured by a defective product may feel
powerless to affect the behavior of a distant, seemingly uncontrollable
503

See Paul Schiff Berman, An Observation and a Strange but True "Tale"': What Might

the Historical Tria/s of Animals Tell Us About the Transformative Potentialof Law in American
Culture?, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 123 (2000) [hereinafter Berman, Transformative Potential of
Law] (using a discussion of animal trials to explore overlooked social benefits of legal
proceedings); Paul Schiff Berman, Note, Rats, Pigs, and Statues on Trial: The Creation of
CulturalNarrtives in the Prosecution of Animals and Inanimate Objects, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv.
288 (1994) (surveying the history of animal trials and analyzing their role in helping a
community heal after a breach of the social order).
504 Nicholas Humphrey, Foreward to E.P. EVANS, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
AND
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF ANIMALS, at xxv (paperback ed., Faber & Faber Ltd. 1987)
(1907) (articulating the strong fear of Greeks and medieval Europeans that "God was
playing dice with the universe").
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corporation. Indeed, while animals may have been viewed as an uncontrollable "other" in medieval Europe, the products of global capitalism today likewise may seem to be external forces of destruction
that obey only their own law. By bringing the corporation within local
jurisdiction, the individual and the community may feel they have regained some control over their world.
Finally, the need to assert community dominion may also be a significant part of the desire to use legal and quasi-legal proceedings to
respond to atrocities such as war crimes, genocide, or crimes against
humanity. For example, the trial of accused Nazi war criminal Klaus
Barbie, held in France several years ago, arguably was concerned less
with punishing the individual (who, after all, was extremely old and in
failing health at the time of the trial), than about asserting France's
authority and sense of control after a horrific and chaotic human
tragedy. 5
The rise of online communication may create increased pressure
to assert community dominion over the activities of outsiders. A foreign website can easily breach community boundaries and threaten
community order. For example, material that a community might
wish to ban nevertheless may be readily accessible from websites outside the bounds of that community. Likewise, a community that
adopts strict consumer protection laws to regulate corporate activity
may feel threatened when outside businesses can ignore the local laws
through Internet sales. '"' These "external" threats appear to flout local norms.
It is against this backdrop that we may understand the seemingly
extreme position of the district court in the Instruction Set case discussed earlier in this Article.0 7 There the court ruled that, if an individual's website is accessible in a community, then the community can
claim dominion over that individual.50' 8 Similarly, the French court in
Yahoo! appears to have conceptualized the website as a force that had
"entered" France and was therefore subject to the community's laws.

50, See Guyora Binder,

Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial of Klaus
Barbie, 98 YALE L.J. 1321, 1322 (1989) (describing the intent of the trial as "pedagogical").
506Such e-connerce issues have caused the European Union to change
course
several times in recent years regarding jurisdiction over Internet sales. See supra text
accompanying notes 57-61 (discussing such c'hanges).
507 Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937
F. Supp 161 (D. Conn. 1996); see
also suroa text accompanying notes 416-418 (discussing the Instruction Set case).
Instruction Set, 937 F. Supp. at 165.
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Thus, the impulse to assert jurisdiction over an outsider who "invades" a community via the Internet is tied to the need to assert dominion in order to domesticate external chaos. On the other hand,
the jurisdictional puzzle will look quite different if online interaction
is conceived not as foreign websites "sending" information into a
community, but rather as members of a community choosing to
"travel" to a foreign site to obtain information. Accordingly, linguistic
metaphors for conceptualizing online interaction may also help determine the way people develop intuitions about jurisdictional questions.
C. Jurisdictionand the Extension of Community Membership
The previous Section discussed how the exercise of jurisdiction
functions in part as a symbolic assertion of community dominion. A
corollary to this observation is that the exercise of jurisdiction also
symbolically extends a form of community membership. As discussed
above, a true outsider is either fought as an external threat or ignored
entirely. By exercising jurisdiction, a community constructs a narrative whereby the outsider is not truly an outsider, but is in some way a
member of that community and subject to its norms.
A rather extreme example of this phenomenon is the death sentence issued by an Islamic leader against author Salman Rushdie.
Chances are that if I had written the same novel as Rushdie, I would
not have been treated in the same way. Instead, it is likely that I would
have been dismissed as a total outsider or targeted in an ad hoc fashion as a purely external threat. The death sentence therefore reflects
the fact that Rushdie was considered a member of the Islamic community. Even this violent exercise of jurisdiction acted to extend community membership.
Similarly, by prosecuting war criminals or human rights abusers
we are insisting that the defendants are members of the world community. Accordingly, the assertion of jurisdiction can be seen as an
educative tool and not simply an exercise of coercive power. The
community, in effect, tells the defendants that they share a membership bond with others and therefore cannot simply impose their will
with impunity. Meanwhile, the assertion ofjurisdiction also implicitly
delivers a message to the public that the defendants are neither subhuman nor the agents of chaotic fate, but are instead members of the
world community to be considered in their full humanity and punished according to human law.
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This idea of jurisdiction as the assertion of community membership may also have relevance in evaluating the usefulness of alternative
legal procedures aimed at restorative justice, such as the growing use
of truth commissions as a mechanism for societal reconciliation.i"0
For example, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) proceedings in South Africa have attempted to restore psychic membership in the South African community to both victims and perpetrators.
The TRC required that those perpetrators seeking amnesty both acknowledge the community's jurisdiction by appearing before the
commission and then address that community by recounting their
misdeeds in an open forum .5'0 Likewise, victims who for years were
not recognized as full-fledged members of the South African community were given an opportunity to speak about their pain and to enter
into the community's legal system instead of remaining outside of it.
The TRC proceedings, therefore, implicitly expressed the hope that
victims, perpetrators, and spectators could all be integrated into the
new South African community.
Even in more commonplace legal proceedings, the idea of asserting community membership through jurisdiction may be important.
For example, while a community may need to assert its dominion over
the products of a distant corporation in order to feel some control
over seemingly random misfortune, a multinational corporation may
come to conceive of itself as a corporate citizen of many different localities because of the potential exercise of local jurisdiction. Accordingly, the exercise ofjurisdiction may encourage corporate officials to

509For example, truth commissions have been established in countries including
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, the Phillipines, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, Uganda, and Uruguay. See PRISCILLA B. HAVINER, UNSPEAKABLE
TRUTHS:

CONFRONTING STATE TERROR ANI) ATROCrIY

truth commissions established since 1982); MARTHA
AND FORGIVENESS:

291-97 (2001) (listing twenty

MINOW,

BFTEAEEN VENGEANCE

FACING HISTORY AF'IER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 53-54

(1998) (describing the establishment of truth commissions in African and South
American countries); Michael P. Scharf, The Case for a Pertaanent International Truth
Commission, 7 DUKEJ. COMI'. & INT'L L. 375, 377-78 (1997) (providing a brief history of
truth commissions and detailing their establishment in particular countries). Indeed,
"truth commissions have proliferated, and now every nation emerging from dictatorship or war wants one. This year Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Peru, Panama, East
Timor, Yugoslavia, Bosnia and South Korea all began commissions or have them under
way." Tina Rosenberg, Designer Truth Conmissions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2001, § 6 (Magaziue), at 66; see also HAYNER, supra, at 5 (discussing the possibility of truth commissions
in Indonesia, Colombia, and Bosnia).
510 See MINOW, supa note 509, at 55-57 (describing the conditions attached
to the
TRC's grant of amnesty).
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rethink their sense of responsibility to communities far beyond the
boundaries of their corporate headquarters.
In addition, the ability to assert the jurisdiction of a court may give
people some sense of their own membership in the community. Prison
inmates bringing civil rights actions against abusive guards, for example, may feel validated simply because they are able to invoke the jurisdiction of a court. Regardless of outcome, the fact that the inmates'
grievances are aired and considered, however briefly, may give marginal members of society a greater sense of community affiliation. 1
As a result, the assertion of community dominion may be beneficial
both for the community, which can assert its control over otherwise
uncontrollable behavior, and for the individual, who achieves a form
of community membership through the legal process. Even a criminal defendant is implicitly deemed to be a member of the community
who has gone astray (and therefore retains certain rights) rather than
512
a purely external pariah (who has no rights).
The assertion of community membership is relevant to discussions
of Internetjurisdiction as well. As discussed previously, the growth of
linked to511our increasing global
electronic communications is closely
•
Online interaction
economic and psychological interdependence.
contributes to our awareness of outsiders and our sense of connection
with them. People develop friendships and business relationships regardless of physical proximity; they may even fall in love online. Many
of the psychic bonds that in a previous era were shared only within the
confines of one's local community now stretch far beyond any single
geographical location. Given this change in economic and psychological interdependence, it would not be surprising to see the definition of community membership change as well. And if jurisdiction is
one of the ways we express our intuitions about community membership, then jurisdictional rules, in turn, must evolve. Otherwise, we will
risk being trapped in a legal doctrine that no longer represents the
reality of modern life,just as the United States was trapped during the

51

See Roland Acevedo, Thoughts of an Ex-Jailhouse Lawyer, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 5, 1998, at

2 (describing the psychological benefit prison inmates receive from being able to bring
a lawsuit in court even if the suit is ultimately unsuccessful).
DAVID GARLAND,THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER
512 But see
IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 1-3 (2001) (charting the retreat in the United States and
Britain, since the early 1970s, from a crime control model concerned with criminal rehabilitation to an "official policy of punitive sentiments and expressive gestures that
appear oddly archaic and downright anti-modern").
See MEYROWITZ, supra note 494, at 115-17 (discussing the relationship between
electronic media and the erosion of social boundaries).
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first half of the twentieth century when courts struggled to expand the
strict territorial rule of Pennoyer.
D. Jurisdictionand the Assertion of Alternative Norms
We are accustomed to thinking of jurisdictional assertions as the
unique province of a sovereign entity. The assertion of jurisdiction,
however, can also open space for the articulation of norms that function as alternatives to, or even resistance to, sovereign power. For example, in seventeenth-century England, common law courts began to
issue writs of prohibition in order to prevent the rival Court of High
Commission from hearing certain cases.5 4 In response, some critics
argued that the common law courts were overreaching and that the
question of which court had proper jurisdiction to hear a case could
only be resolved by the king because the authority of all judges derived from tim. 5 In Prohibitionsdel Roy, Lord Coke describes himself
as having replied to such characterizations of the king's authority:
[T]rue it was, that God had endowed his Majesty with excellent Science,
and great Endownents of Nature; but his Majesty was not learned in the
Laws of his Realm of England.... With which the King was greatly offended, and said, that then he should be under the Law, which was Treason to affirm, as he said; to which I said, that Bracton saith, Quod Rex non
debel esse sub homine, sed sub Deo el Lege [that the King should not be Under
man, but Under God and the Law]."'i

Thus, Coke refused to place the king beyond or above the domain of
law.
By challenging the king and affirming the jurisdiction of the
common law courts, Coke asserted the primacy of law even over sovereign power. In doing so, however, he also stripped the courts of the

very "institutional protection ... that ordinarily stands behind" courts
and enforces their orders.5"'7 After all, who is to enforce legal jurisdiction when the king stands in opposition? This story makes clear both

See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE AND
TIMES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 295 (1956) (explaining how Sir Edward Coke attacked the
Ecclesiastical High Commission through writs of prohibition); 12 EDWARD COKE,
REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE 42 (E. Nutt et al. eds., 4th ed. 1738) (1655) (discussing
the use ofwriLs in Nicholas Fuller's Case).
515See, e.g., 12 COKE, supnra note 514, at 63 (describing the debate
as to who had
authority to decide jurisdiction in Prohibitionsdel Roy, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342 (K.B. 1607));
see aLo BOWEN, supra note 514, at 303-04 (discussing the debate over the king's "absolute power and authority" to decide legal disputes).
12 COKE, su/pra note 514, at 65.
517 Cover, supra note 2, at 186.
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that courts can exercise power separate from (and perhaps contrary
to) the governing power of the state and that the exercise of such
power is risky and always contingent on broader acceptance by communities (and coercive authorities) over time. Nevertheless, despite
the risk, the rhetorical assertion ofjurisdiction itself can have an important effect. For example, Coke's memorialization of thisjurisdictional assertion in his treatise was undoubtedly part of the Enlightenment movement to limit the power of kings and assert a higher rule of
law. Thus, one can see a direct line from Coke to Thomas Paine, who
is King."5"
declared that, in the new United States of America, "law
It is, of course, a commonplace to say that courts lack their own
enforcement power, making them dependent on the willingness of
states and individuals to follow judicial orders. This observation is often used as an argument for the irrelevance of international law itself:
because such "law" is subject to the realpolitik demands of pure
power, so the argument goes, it is not really law at a]l.52 " Domestic law
is substantially similar, however, because courts can only exercise
authority to the extent that someone with coercive power chooses to
carry out the legal judgments issued.'.
There is some evidence that Coke's version of his actions is not accurate and
that he actually capitulated to the king's authority. See BOWEN, supra note 514, at 30506 (observing that some historians have rejected Coke's account, relying on other seventeenth-century evidence, which indicates that Coke actually threw himself on the
mercy of the king). Even if this is so, however, the rhetorical assertion of jurisdiction
in his treatise might still have persuasive value over time.
519THOMAS PAINE, Common Sense, in THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
PAINE
1, 29 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1945) (1776).
520 This position is most often associated with so-called
"international relations realists." See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations
Theoty: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM.]. INT'L L. 205, 206 (1993) (describing the "Realist challenge" embodied in "the defiant skepticism ... that international law could ever play
more than an epiphenomenal role in the ordering of international life"). From the
realist perspective, states in the international realm always act only in their own national interest. Thus, law is irrelevant. The only relevant laws are the "laws" of politics,
and politics is a "struggle for power." See HANS ]. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG
NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 4, 26-27 (1949) ("International politics cannot be reduced to legal rules and institutions.").
521 Of course, the question of whether there is a fundamental
difference between
international and domestic law has been a subject of debate within political theory. See
generally Kimberly Hutchings, Political Theory and Cosmopolitan Citizenship, in
COSMOPOLITAN CITIZENSIIIP 3 (Kimberly Hutchings & Roland Dannreuther eds.,
1999) (providing an overview of the various positions in this debate). That debate is
beyond the scope of this Article. I note only that many of the international relations
realist objections to international law have been made by American legal realists and
critical legal studies scholars with regard to domestic law as well. See, e.g., Laura A.
Dickinson, Using LJegal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions, Interna518
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Thus, the essence of law is that it makes aspirational judgments
about the future, the power of which depends on whether the judgments accurately reflect evolving norms of the communities that must
choose to obey them. If this is so, then we might view extraterritorial
lawmaking as substantially similar to lawmaking within territorial
bounds. To take the French prosecution of Yahoo! as an example' 22 it
is true that the court's command is only enforceable if an American
authority will agree to enforce it, but the same court's decision against
Yahoo!'s French subsidiary is similarly dependent on the enforcement
power of a sovereign. After all, if the executive branch of the French
government were to refuse to enforce the order against the subsidiary,
that order would have no more force than the order against the
American parent.
If the assertion ofjurisdiction is always an assertion of community
dominion, then all judicial decisions rely on both that particular
community's acquiescence and the willingness of other communities
to recognize and enforce the jurisdictional assertion. This is a sort of
"natural law of jurisdiction" ' in which jurisdictional assertions depend solely on the rhetorical force of their articulation of norms to
entice allegiance. Thus, a court asked to enforce a prior court's
judgment would always need to consider whether the prior judgment
properly spoke for a relevant community and whether the substantive
norms articulated in the judgment are attractive in order to determine if the jurisdictional assertion and the substantive norms should
be recognized.

Having identified four ways in which the assertion of jurisdiction
both constructs and reflects social meaning, what remains to be investigated more fully is the extent to which accepted notions of legal jurisdiction actually accord with the social meanings at play in the contemporary world. Territorially fixed boundaries remain the primary
way of differentiating jurisdictional space, and nation-states remain
the primaryjurisdictional community. How well does this legal con-

tional Tbunals, and the Rile of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407, 1477-78 (2002) (linking
international relations realist claims to argumenLs made by critical legal theorists about
domestic law).
522 See supra Part L.D (analyzing the Yahoo! case).
E,2.4
Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 58 (1983). See infra text accompanying notes 783-93 for a discussion of a "natural law of jurisdiction" and the role of norms in creating legal legitimacy.
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ception actually map onto social space? The answer to such a question cannot be left in the legal arena, where the discussion is often
limited to debates about historical precedent, political philosophy, or
economic efficiency. Instead, the relationship between jurisdiction
and social understandings of space, borders, and community is a topic
that should engage theorists from a variety of disciplines. Such theorists might help forge a more complex account of the world onto
which jurisdictional rules are imposed. They also might point the way
to alternative conceptions of jurisdiction grounded in, and reflective
of, this more complex view of the world. New conceptions of jurisdiction could allow for a more pluralist understanding of the variety of
community affiliations people experience in their lives. This Article
next considers some of this scholarship in order to challenge the
authority of physical location, territorial boundaries, and nation-state
sovereignty that is usually assumed in contemporary jurisdictional
schemes.
V. THE NATION-STATE AND THE SOCIAL/HISTORICAl. CONSTRUCTION
OF SPACE, COMMUNITY, AND BORDERS

This Part surveys the vast literature in anthropology, sociology, political science, and cultural studies concerning conceptions of borders,
territoriality, nation-state sovereignty, and the cultural construction of
place and belonging. First, I will address the assumption that there is
somehow a "natural" tie between a culturally or ethnically unified
community and a physical location and suggest that social and political processes tend to construct ideas of physical location as well as to
be constructed by them. Therefore, no jurisdictional scheme is necessarily more "natural" than any other. Second, I will survey the historical rise of the modern conception of the nation-state, revealing that
the idea of sovereign nation-states operating within fixed territorial
boundaries is a relatively recent development and a result of specific
historical and political processes. Third, I will explore in more detail
the idea of community itself and the ways in which we might think of
the nation-state as an imagined community built on a set of narrative
constructions. Fourth, I will consider several forms of community affiliation that offer alternatives to the nation-state.
Taken together, this literature challenges any idea that national
boundaries somehow naturally or inevitably define jurisdiction. Instead, these authors interrogate assumptions about identity, territoriality, community, and sovereignty and reveal that the purported
straightforward tie between geographical boundaries, community,
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personal identity, and nation-state sovereignty is problematic, contingent, socially constructed, and contested. The analyses suggest that
the conception of territorially based jurisdiction is not an ineradicable
fixture of political organization. This necessarily brief overview thus
opens space for creatively imagining more pluralistic conceptions of
jurisdiction that will attend to the wide variety of ways in which people
construct community affiliation and identity.
A. The Unmooringof Cultures,Peoples, and Places
Legal discussions of jurisdiction are often predicated on a seemingly unproblematic division of space, particularly on the idea that societies, nations, and cultures occupy "naturally" discontinuous spaces.
This assumption ignores the possibility that territorial jurisdiction often produces political and social identities rather than reflecting
them.'
Indeed, the very idea of territoriality-which we can think of
as a "geographic strategy to control people and things by controlling
area"..2-is itself socially rooted, 2 ; Thus, conceptions of territoriality
depend on "how people use ... land, how they organize themselves in
space, and how they give meaning to place.'' Absent a rigorous attempt to develop a social understanding of how space is actually construtted, the power of topography tends to obscure the topography of
528
power.

See Ford, supra note 470, at 844 ("Jurisdictions define the identity of the people
that occupy them."). As Henri Lefebvre has observed, "Space is not a scientific object
removed from ideolog , or politics; it has always been political and strategic." Henri
Lefebvre, Reflections on the Politics of Space, in 8 ANTIPODE 30, 31 (1979).
524

525

SACK,

supfra note 479, at 5.

It is the socially constructed nature of territoriality that permits theorists to discuss "deterritorialization" with respect to globalizing processes. For examples of the
526

literature on deterritorialization,

see NF S'OR GARCiA CANCLINI, HYBRID CULTURES:
STRATEGIES FOR ENTERING AND LEAVING MODERNI'IY (Christopher L. Chiappari & Silvia L. L6pez trans., 1995); MIKE FEATHERSTONE, UNDOING CULTURE: GLOBALIZATION,
POSTMODERNISM AND IDENTrIY (1995); GLOBALIZATION AND TERRITORIAL IDENTrrIES
(Zdravko Mlinar ed., 1992); SERGE LATOUCHE, THE WESTERNIZATION OF THE WORLD
(Rosemary Morris trans., 1996); JAMES LULL, MEDIA, COMMUNICATION, CULTURE: A
GLOBAL APPROACH (1995); ARMAND MATELART, MAPPING WORLD COMMUNICATION:

WAR, PROGRESS, CULTURE (Susan EmanuIel & James A. Cohen trans., 1994); DAVID
MORLEY & KEVIN ROBINS, SPACES OF IDENTI'TY:
GLOBAL MEDIA, ELECTRONIC
LANDSCAPES AND CULURAL BOUNI)ARIES (1995); Appadurai, supra note 7.
527
5,28

supra note 479, at 2.
See Akhil Gupta &James Ferguson, Beyond "Culture": Space, Identity, and the Poli-

SACK,

tics of Difference, in CUILTURE, POWER, PI.ACE:
EXPLORATIONS IN CRITICAL
ANTHROPOLOGY , sl/ra note 3, at 33, 35 ("The presumption that spaces are autonomous has enabled the power of topography successfully to conceal the topography of
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In recent years, anthropologists, among others, have increasingly
challenged the assumed correlation between a people, a culture, and
a physical place. Historically, anthropology had been premised on the
idea that a world of human differences could be conceptualized as a
diversity of separate societies each with its own culture. This central
assumption made it possible, beginning in the early years of the twentieth century, to speak not only of "culture," but of "a culture." The
implicit starting point was the presumed existence of separate, individuated worldviews that could be associated with particular "peoples,"
"tribes," or "nations.''
This individuated conception of community, still so powerful in
legal discussions, no longer fits the understanding of anthropologists
or the practice of ethnography. "In place of such a world of separate,
integrated cultural systems ...political economy turned the anthropological gaze in the direction of social and economic processes that
connected even the most isolated of local settings with a wider
world. ,,5' " As many commentators have observed, cultural difference
no longer can be based on territory because of the mass migrations
and transnational culture flows of late capitalism! 1 Thus, the task re-

power."); seealso LIISA H. MALKKI,

PURITY AND EXILE:

VIOLENCE, MEMORY, AND

NATIONAL COSMOLOGY AMONG HUTU REFUGEES IN TANZANIA 5 (1995) (referring to
"ways in which the contemporary system of nation-states composes a hegemonic topography"); cf Ford, supra note 470, at 859 ("The ideological foundation of nation-states is
primarily... organicism; nations are thought to represent 'a people' who are both distinctive and relatively homogenous. The French are united not only by language but
by something called 'culture': a set of practices, significant artifacts, beliefs, styles, a
certainje ne sais quoi.").
529 See Akhil Gupta & James Ferguson, Culture, Power,
Place: Ethnography at the End
of an Era, in CULTURE, POWER, PLACE: EXPLORATIONS IN CRITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY,
supra note 3, at 1, 1 (describing conceptions of "culture"); see also ULF HANNERZ,
TRANSNATIONAL CONNECTIONS: CULTURE, PEOPLE, PLACES 20 (1996) ("The idea of an
organic relationship between a population, a territory, a form as well as a unit of political organization, and.., cultures has.., been an enormously successful one, spreading throughout the world.., at least as a guiding principle."); GEORGE W. STOCKING,
JR., RACE, CULTURE, AND EVOLUTION 202-03 (1968) (discussing Franz Boas's influence
in defining "culture").
530 Gupta & Ferguson,
supra note 529, at 2.
See, e.g.,
HANNERZ, supra note 529, at 8 ("As people move with their meanings,
and as meanings find ways of traveling even when people stay put, territories cannot
really contain cultures."); Appadurai, supra note 7, at 33 (proposing a set of nonterritorial "scapes" to replace "landscapes" as fields of inquiry); Friedland & Boden,
supra note 496, at 42 ("The circulation of populations and symbols is progressively undercutting the essential relation between territory and culture, the link between place
and identity."); see also TOMLINSON, supra note 474, at 106-49 (discussing the mundane
ways in which deterritorialization is experienced in everyday life).
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cently has been to understand "the way that questions of identity and
cultural difference are spatialized in new ways.""'
Accordingly, anthropologists have argued
5 33 that we live increasingly
,,34
in the "global cultural ecumene '""n of a "world in creolization.
Similarly, sociologists have attempted to replace their traditional emphasis on bounded "societies" with "a starting point that concentrates
upon analysing how social life is ordered across time and space ....
In both disciplines, therefore, one can see increasing efforts to explore the "intertwined processes of place making and people making
in the complex cultural politics of the nation-state." :
Nevertheless, the assumption that a culturally unitary group (a
"tribe" or a "people" or even a "citizenry") is naturally tied to
"its" territory is difficult to shake because such assumptions are so deeply ingrained in the modern consciousness."' For example, simply the fact
that contemporary maps refer to a collection of "countries" constructs
a picture of space as inherently fragmented along territorial lines,
where different colors correspond to different national societies, all of
which are made to seem fixed in place. '538 Looking at such maps,
"schoolchildren are taught such deceptively simple-sounding beliefs
as
that France is where the French live, America is where the Americans
live, and so on.'
Yet we all know that not only Americans live in
Gupta & Ferguson, supra note 529, at 3; see also Austin Sarat
& Thomas R.
Kearns, The Unsettled Status of Hurnan Rights: An Introduction, in HUMAN RIGHTS:
CONCEPTS, CONTESTS, CONTINGENCIES 1, 13 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds.,
2001) (noting "a new understanding of culture in which an awareness of internal plurality, fiagmentation, and contestation replaces former tendencies to speak of cultures
as ... unified wholes").
5!3 Ulf Hannerz, Notes on the Global Ecumene, PUB. CULTURE,
Spring 1989, at 66;
Robert J. Foster, Making National Cultures in the Global Ecumene, 20 ANN. REV.
ANTHROPOLOGY 235 (1991); see also Appadurai, supra note 7, at 28 (arguing that "an
overlapping set of ecumenes [has begun] to emerge, in which congeries of money,
commerce, conquest, and migration ... create durable cross-societal bonds"); Arjun
Appadurai & Carol A. Breckenridge, Editors'Comments, PUll. CULTURE, Fall 1988, at 1, 1
("[T]he emergent public cultures of many nation-states... constitute the centers of
new forms of cosmopolitanism in many linguistic and cultural ecumenes.").
534 Ulf Hannerz, The World
in Creolisation,5 AFR. 546 (1987).
535 GIDDENS, supra
note 496, at 64.
536 Gupta & Ferguson, suvra note 529, at 4; see also id. ("[A] II associations of place,
53

people, and culture are social and historical creations to be explained [or justified],
not given natural facts.").
7 See Gupta & Ferguson, supra note 528,
at 40 (challenging "the national habit of
taking the association of citizens of states and their territories as natural").
538 Id. at 34; see also Ford, supra note 470,
at 866-67 (linking the emergence of jurisdiction to the development of cartography).
51,4Gupta & Fergtson, supra note 528,
at 40.
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America and, of course, the very question of what constitutes a "real
American" is contested and variable. Nonetheless, "we assume a natural association of a culture ('American culture'), a people ('Americans'), and a place ('the United States of America')," and we therefore "present associations of people and place as solid,
commonsensical, and agreed on, when they are in fact contested, uncertain, and in flux.", 40 This naturalization ofjurisdiction means that
"space itself becomes a kind of neutral grid on which cultural difference, historical memory, and societal organization [are] inscribed."' 4 '
As a result, although the social and political construction of space is a
fundamental aspect of legal ordering, the constructed nature of the
42
enterprise disappears from analytical purview.
Geographers, though they too historically tended to assume a
"natural" bond between a people, the land, and a set of legal institutions, are increasingly recognizing the power and politics of the construction of space in society r11as well as the symbolic significance of
maps.i Maps often function as "almost the perfect representation [s]

540 Id.

Id. at 34.
See Ford, supra note 470, at 854 (obsening that "jurisdictional space
may serve
to obscure social relations and the distribution of resources").
541

542

5143

See, e.g., ELLEN CHURCHILL SEMI'LE, INFLUENCES OF GEOGRAPiiiC
ENVIRONMENT

51 (1911) ("[H]unan activities are fully intelligible only in relation to the various geographic conditions which have stimulated them in different parts of the world....
Therefore anthropology, sociology, and history should be permeated by geography."),
reprinted in FORMATIVE INFLUENCES OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENT 215, 216-17 (Albert Kocourek &John H. Wigmore eds., 1918).
544 See BLOMLEY, supra note 476, at 42 ("Recent
geographic scholarship ... has
adopted what might be regarded as a relational view of space. Drawing on those such
as Lefebvre, some theorists regard space as both socially produced and as socially constitutive, and as deeply implicated in power relations... " (citation omitted)). For
examples of sich critical geography, see JOHN A. AGNEW, PLACE AND POLIICS: THE
GEOGRAPHICAL MEDIATION OF STATE AND SOCIETY (1987); CULTURAL ENCOUNTERS
WITH TFIE ENVIRONMENT: ENDURING AND EVOLVING GEOGRAPHIC THEMES (Alexander

B. Murphy & Douglas L. Johnson eds., 2000); PRED, supra note 471; ALLAN PRED &
MICHAEL JOHN

WATTS,

REWORKING

MODERNITY:

CAPITALISMS

AND

SYMBOLIC

DISCONTENT (1992); EDWARD W. SOJA, POSTIMODERN GEOGRAPHIES: THE REASSERTION
OF SPACE IN CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY (1989); WINICHAKUL TiHiONGCHAI, SIAM MAPPED:
A HISTORY OF THE GEO-BODY OF A NATION (1994); Doreen Massey, Politics and
Space/Time, NEW LEFT REV., Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 65; Allan Pred, Place as Historically Contingent Process: Structuration and the Time-Geography of Becoming Places, 74 ANNALS ASS'N
AM. GEOGRAPHERS 279 (1984); N.J. Thrift, On the Determination of Social Action in Space
and Time, 1 ENV'"& PLAN. D: SOC'Y& SPACE 23 (1983).
5,15See, e.g., THONGCHAI, supra note 544, at 129-30 ("[Mapping]
became a lethal
instrument to concretize the projected desire on the earth's surface ....
A map anticipated a spatial reality, not vice versa. In other words, a map was a model for, rather
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of the state. ' 4"6 Most maps both evenly cover the territory of a country
and hierarchically organize it with the most significant places "symbolically at the center, and.., states on the periphery marked down,
through the use of symbols, as inferior orders of government. ' ' In
addition, many social and cultural groupings-such as ethnic or relig5"8
ious ties-might not be reflected in state-sponsored maps at all.
4
These cartographic "silences"" ' may be the result of "deliberate exclusion, willful ignorance, or even actual repression.,,550 As contemporary
debates about the distortions caused by various "projections" of the

than a model of, what it purported to represent."); Alan K. Henrikson, The Powe and
Politics oIf Maps, in REORDERING TIE WORLD: GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, sup/ra note 8, at 49, 49 ("To formulate a political plan, diplomats must have a geographical conception, which requires the cartographic image of a
map."). Indeed, maps are often persuasive precisely because, though they always constitute an attempt to portray the world in a specific way, the interests underlying that
attempt tend to remain unacknowledged. See Diane M. Bolz, 'Follow Me... I Am the
Earth in the Palm of Your Hand,'SMITIISONIAN, Feb. 1993, at 112, 113 ("[Maps] are convincing because the interest they serve is masked."). See generally DENIS WOOD, THiE
POWER OF MAPS I (1992) (discussing the ability of maps to represent the past and the
interests served in their creation). In the thrall of such "cartohypnosis," people "accept subconsciously and uncritically the ideas that are suggested to them by maps."
S.W. Boggs, Cartohypnosis, 15 DEI"'T ST. Bul.. 1119, 1119 (1946); see also Ford, supra
note 470, at 856 ("U] urisdiction is a function of its graphical and verbal descriptions; it
is a set of practices that are performed by individuals and groups who learn to 'dance
the Jurisdiction' by reading descriptions of jurisdictions and by looking at maps.").
5116Henrikson, supra note 545, at 59.
547

Id.

Id.; see also Ford, supra note 470, at 853 (observing that jurisdictional lines
tend
to define an abstract area that is "conceived ...independently of any specific attribute
of that space").
549 Seej.B. Harley, Silences and Secrecy:
The Iidden Agenda of Cartography in Early
Modern Europe, 40 IMAGO MUNDI 57, 57 (1988) (describing "the dialogue that arises
from intentional or unintentional suppression of knowledge in maps").
550 Henrikson, supra note 545, at 59. For example, the removal
or alteration of the
place names of conquered peoples or minority groups establishes a silence of subordination. See Harley, supra note 549, at 66 ("Conquering states impose a silence on minority or subject populations through their manipulation of place names."). As one
commentator has observed, cartography has always been "a teleological discourse, reifying power, reinforcing the status quo, and freezing social interaction within charted
lines." J.B. Harley, Maps, Knowledge, and Power, in THE ICONOGRAPHY OF LANDSCAI'E
277, 302-03 (Denis Cosgrove & Stephen Daniels eds., 1988).
r,8
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world make clear,"" our cartographic representations are socially constructed and politically fraught.
Indeed, "[a] lthough the color map of the political world displays a
neat and ordered pattern of interlocking units (with only a few lines
of discord), it is not surprising that the real world of national identifies is one of blotches, blends, and blurs.' ' 5 ' First, many people inhabit border areas, where "[t]he fiction of cultures as discrete, objectlike
phenomena
occupying
discrete
spaces
becomes
implausible." 5 t Such people may feel an affiliation with the state controlling the area, the nation with which most inhabitants identify, or
the borderland itself: Second, many others live a life of border cross-

r551 See,

e.g.,

ARNO

PETERS,

THE

EUROPE-CENTERED

CHARACTER

OF

OUR

GEOGRAI'IIICAl. VIEW OF THE WORLD AND ITS CORRECTION (1979) (analyzing the size
and position of countries on world maps and the Etro-centrism inherent in such
maps); Arthur H. Robinson, Arno Peters and His N(ew Cartography, 12 AM.
CARTOGRAPI E| 103 (1985) (criticizing the "Peters Projection"); see also Henrikson,
supra note 5'5, at 63-64 (describing the "battle of thi maps" pitting the Peters projection against the Mercator projection).
552Seej.M. ROBERTS, THE TRuUMI'HI OF TI [E WEST 127 (1985)

("Maps... are always

more than mere factual statements. They are translations of reality into forms we can
master; they are fictions and acts of iltagination communicating more than scientific
data. So they reflect changes in our pictures of reality.").
553David H. Kaplan, To'ritorial Identities and Geographic Scale, in NESTED IDENTITIES:
NATIONAI.ISM, TERRITORY, AND SCAI' 31, 35 (Guntram H. Herb & David H. Kaplan
eds., 1999).
554Gupta & Ferguson, sulna note 528, at 34. Chicana writer and poet
Gloria

Anzaldlia has captured one experience of a "borderland" existence:
I am a border woman .... I have been straddling that fejas-Mexican border, and others, all my life. It's not a comfortable territory to live in, this place
of contradictions. Hatred, anger, and exploitation are the prominent features
of this landscape.
However, there have been compensations for this mestiza, and certain joys.
Living on borders and in margins, keeping intact one's shifting and multiple
identity and integrity, is like trying to swim in a new element .... There is an
exhilaration in being a participant in the further evolution of humankind ....
GLORIA ANZALD(JA, Preface to BORDERtANDS/I-A FRONTERA: THE NEW MESTIZA (1987).
55SSee ANSSI PRtAsI, TERRITORIES, BOUNDARIES AND CONSCIOUSNESS: THE
CIlANCING GEOGRAPHIES OF THE FINNLSH-RUSSIAN BORDER (1996) (studying the terri-

torial and social consequences of imposed frontie s); Jena Gaines, The Politics of National Identity in Alsoce, 21 CAN. REV. STUD. NATIONAI.SM 99 (1994) (discussing cultural
issues emerging in Alsace resulting from the French-German struggles in the region);
Oren Yiftachel, Regionalism Among Palestinian-Arabs in Israel,
in NESTED IDENTITIES:
NATIONAtIASM, TERRITORY, AND SCALE, supra note 553, at 237, 237 (addressing "the role
of territory, geographical scale, and location as complementing other factors in the
political mobilization and identity formation among the Arabs"). Residents of borderland regions, because they are often so physically removed from the state center, are
often psychologically, as well as physically, isolated. See STEIN ROKKAN & DEREK URWIN,
ECONOMY, TERRITORY, IDENTITY:

POLITICS OF WES'T EUROPEAN PERIPHERIES 3 (1983)
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ings: migrant workers, nomads, and members of the transnational
business and professional elite. For these people, it may be impossible
to find a unified cultural identity. For example, "[w]hat is 'the culture' of farm workers who spend half a year in Mexico and half in the
United States?, 5 '5 Finally, many people cross borders on a relatively
permanent basis, including immigrants, refugees, exiles, and expatriates. 5'" For them, the disjuncture of place and culture is especially
clear. Immigrants invariably transport their own culture with them to
the new location and, almost as invariably, shed certain aspects of that
culture when they come in contact with their new communities. Diasporas therefore are both "transnational" because members of a single
diaspora may live in many different countries, and "extremely national" in their continued cultural and political loyalty to a homeland.
Indeed, such clashes of former culture and present community have led to questions about the so-called "cultural defense" to
certain crimes. " And the divided loyalty of diaspora communities can

("When we say that one area is peripheral to another, this notjust an abstract matter of
geographical location: the peripherality will be expressed concretely in the daily life of
the inhabitants of the area, and in the nature of their links with groups in the centre."). These legions, therefore, provide fertile ground for the introduction of disparate cultural influences. Not surprisingly, states often put extra effort into securing
border communities both culturally and ideologically. Fo, example, the Dominican
Republic forcibly expelled Haitians from border communities and then attempted to
reeducate the remaining population to make the region more "Dominican." See John
P. Augelli, Nationalization of Dominican Borderlands, 70 GEOGRPAPIICAl. REv. 19, 24
(1980) ("[T] he basic aims of the nationalization program were to stamp the Dominican national identity on both people and land of the fr ontier provinces ....");see also
George W. White, Transylvania: Hungarian, Romanian, or Neither?, in NEsrED
IDENTITIES: NIiONALISM, TERRITORY, AND SCALE, sunra note 553, at 267, 280-84 (discussing efforts by the Romanian and Hungarian states to eradicate the national inlinences of the other in the borderland ofTransylvania).
556 Gupta & Ferguson, supra note 528,
at 34.
557

Id.

Kaplan,

supra note

553, at 38.
See generally MODERN DIASPORAS IN
INTERNAI'ONAL POLITICS (Gabriel Sheffer ed., 1986) (examining the influence of
ethnic diasporas on international and trans-state politics).
59 So-called "ctltural defenses" use evidence about a defendant's
Cultural back558

ground to negate or to mitigate criminal liability (with a concomitant sentence reduction). For example, in one early use of a cultural defense in the United States, a court
in Fresno, California took into account a husband's tribal custom of marriage by capture (which involves the kidnap and rape of an intended wife) in permitting a guilty
plea to misdemeanor false imprisonment rather than rape and kidnapping. See Rorie
Sherman, "Cnltural"DefensesDraw Fire, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 17, 1989, at 3 (reporting recent
usage of the "cultu'al defense," including the Fresno case, People v. Mona, No. 315972
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1985)). To its supporters, the "cultural defense is an argument for
tolerance of foreign cultures due to a lack of moral basis fur punishment." Andrew M.
Kanter, Note, TheYenaldlooshi in Court and the Killing of a Witch: The Casefor an Indian
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cause host countries to view members of these communities as potential threats.560 By creating communities of interest rather than place,
diasporas (the number of which is increasing due largely to labor im561
migration)'
pose an implicit threat to territorially based nationstates.'562 In sum, we see that "[p]rocesses of migration, displacement
and deterritorialization are increasingly sundering the fixed association between identity, culture, and place.' 3
In addition, the presumed tie between a territory and a culture
fails to account for the obvious cultural differences that exist within a
locality. "'Multiculturalism' is both a feeble recognition of the fact
that cultures have lost their moorings in definite places and an attempt to subsume this plurality of cultures within the framework of a
national identity.' 4 Thus, even people who remain in seemingly fa-

CulturalDefense, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 411, 413 (1995). But see, e.g., Taryn F. Goldstein, Comment, Cultural Conflicts in Court: Should the American CriminalJusticeSystem
Formally Recognize a "CulturalDefense"?, 99 DICK. L. REV. 141, 144 (1994) ("Permitting
the defense promotes an unfair policy towards the majority to whom the defense is tinavailable, and the defense violates principles of legality .... [O]pponents assert that a
recognition of the cultural defense would, in essence, condone and even encourage[]
the violence toward women that is practiced throughout the world."); Neal A. Gordon,
Note, The Implications of Memeticsfor the CulturalDefense, 50 DUKE LJ. 1809, 1831 (2001)
("The cultural defense is ...condescending toward other cultures-it excuses action
based on foreign cultures by likening it to insanity.... [T]he defense isolates cultural
groups with a patronizing wink. This isolation may lead in turn to a balkanized law
and reinforce the idea that minorities should be treated differently."). Of course,
there are many further questions about what gets presented as "culture" and why, as
well as the relationship between supposed rationality on the one hand and assumed
cultural imperatives on the other. See, e.g., Leti Volpp, (Mis)ldentifying Culture: Asian
Women and the "CulturalDefense, "17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 58 (1994) ("The 'cultural
defense' presents several complex problems inherent in essentializing a culture and its
effect on a particular person's behavior.").
560 See Kaplan, supra note 553, at 38 (noting that host
communities "remain circumspect about any external loyalties and identities").
51, Id.
52

See Robin Cohen, Diasporas and the Nation-State: From Victims to Challengers, 72

INT'L AFF. 507, 517 (1996) (suggesting that people primarily identify with others based
on shared opinions, tastes, ethnicities, religions, and other interests and are indifferent
toward their nation-state); see also James Clifford, Diasporas, 9 CULTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 302, 307 (1994) ("Diasporas are caught tip with and defined
against... the norms of nation-states ....). For a provocative attempt to frame a "diasporan model" of citizenship and the nation-state, see Anupam Chander, Diaspora
Bonds, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005 (2001).
563Gupta, supra note 3, at 196.
564 Gupta & Ferguson, supra note 528, at 35. Even the idea that there are "subcultures" within a society tends
to preserve the idea of distinct "cultures" ... within the same geographical
and territorial space. Conventional accounts of ethnicity, even when used to
describe cultural differences in settings where people from different regions
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miliar and ancestral places are likely to find that their relation to place
continues to change over time. The illusion of a natural and essential
connection between the place and the culture will therefore be consistently challenged
We can see the everyday effects of deterritorialization in all areas
of the world and all sectors of the economy. For example, the "local"
shopping mall is not experienced as truly local at all; nearly "everyone
who shops there is aware that most of the shops are chain stores,"
identical to stores elsewhere and that the mall itself closely resembles
innumerable other malls around the globe.'"3 Thus, while experiencing a "local" place, we recognize the absent forces that structure our
experience. Such forces include the steady decline in local ownership
of public spaces, which can itself be linked to the globalization of capi5 7
ta l.r6
Similarly, we may feel the growing significance of "remote" forces
on our lives, whether those forces are multinational corporations,
world capital markets, or distant bureaucracies such as the European
Union. As John Tomlinson has observed: "People probably come to
include distant events and processes more routinely in their perceptions of what is significant for their own personal lives. This is one aspect of what deterritorialization may involve: the ever-broadening horizon of relevance in people's routine experience .......
The
increased access to media also affects deterritorialization because one
is no longer limited to the perspectives offered from within one's
"home culture." 5' 6 Thus, the "typical" life of a suburban family in the
United States may become as familiar to World citizens inundated by

live side by side, rely on an Unproblematic link between identity and place.
While such concepts are suggestive because they endeavor to stretch the naturalized association of culture and place, they leave the tie between culture and
place largely intact.
Id.

For example, Gupta and Ferguson argue that for the contemporary
English,
"'Englishness[]' . . . is just as complicated and nearly as deterritorialized a notion as
Palestinian-ness or Armenian-ness, for 'England' ('the real England') refers less to a
bounded place than to an imagined state of being or a moral location." Id. at 38; see
also RAYMOND WILLIAMS, TOwARDs 2000, at 177 (1983) (illustrating the cosmopolitan
existence of a typical English person experiencing everyday life); TOMLINSON, sulpa
note 474, at 113-16 (updating Williams's story from the early 1980s to the late 1990s).
566 GIDDENS, supra
note 496, at 140-41.
567 TOMLINSON, sup/ra note
474, at 107-08.
568 Id. at
115.
569 See id. at 116 (describing the choice of perspectives
available through new media and the resultant overlaps between national and local perspectives).
565
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American film and television as their own "home" life.i '7 And, of
course, those with less power to influence the processes of globalization-those forced to cross borders for work, those bankrupted
through global competition, those affected by environmental degradation, and many others-experience this deterritorialization in even
more insidious ways.
Ironically, although actual places and localities are increasingly
blurred and indeterminate, ideas of culturally and ethnically distinct
places may become even more important.'
Imagined communities
attach themselves to imagined places; displaced peoples cluster
around remembered or idealized homelands in a world that seems increasingly to deny such firm territorialized anchors in their actuality.
Indeed, one of the primary illusions of nationalism is the presumption
that one's nation has existed from time immemorial. In case after
case, however, it turns out that most national traditions are inventions
of the past two hundred years, and the principle of nationality itself,
"despite its trappings of misty antiquity, is a defining feature of modernity. ,5 Thus, in the next two Sections I first explore the particular
social and historical context surrounding the rise of the nation-state,
and then survey the many ways that nations imagine themselves as
natural and inevitable communities rather than as historically contingent and ideologically contested ones.
B. The HistoricalContingency of the Nation-State
As discussed in the preceding Section, we tend to assume a correspondence between territory, governance, and people. Yet, by looking at the historical rise of the nation-state, we can see that these ties
are both relatively recent' and the result of a particular sequence of

See id. at 119 ("For where are these places except in our cultural imagination,

570

our repertoire of 'textual locations' built up out of all the millions of images in
films ... we have encountered? And do we really require any of them to correspond all
that closely with our 'real' locality?").

Gupta & Ferguson, supra note 528, at 39.

5,71

Re, Cosmopolitanism and the Experience of Nationality, in
COSMOPOLITIcS: THINKING AND FEELING BEYOND THE NATION, supra note 29, at 77,
81. Indeed, as Re points out, the two "national groups in Europe that have the greatest claims to many centuries of continuous existence are, significantly, those with no
securely held collective territory... [: the] Romanies and [the] Jews." Id. at 89 n. 10.
573 See Immanuel Wallerstein, The National and the Universal:
Can There Be Such a
Thing as World Culture?, in CULTURE, GLOBALIZATION AND THIlEWORID-SYSTEM:
CONTEMPORARY CONDITIONS FOR THE REPRESENTATION OF IDENTITY, supra note 481, at
91,92 ("A world consisting of... nation-states came into existence even partially only
572Jonathan
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events. Thus, instead of simply asserting the inevitability of nationstate sovereignty, we must attempt to understand "why certain forms
of organizing space-specific boundaries, particular places-attain
'7
1 4
the singular importance that they do in a given historical context.
This Section briefly surveys this context.
The words "nation" and "state" are frequently used as synonyms,
despite the significant difference between them. For example, the
United Nations actually represents the states of the world, not national
groups. Similarly, internationalrelations really refers to interstate relations. Whereas a state is an explicitly political entity based on physical
dominion over a placej a nation implies a "natural" ethnic or cul7
tural unity.)5
Yet, as the last Section suggested, there is no necessary
tie between culture and geographical territory.
Accordingly,
"[n]either nations nor states exist at all times and in all circumstances."57
Moreover, state and nation need not evolve together. In some
countries, a formal state came into being prior to a sense of nationhood; in others, national identity may have preceded the emergence
of a state structure. 578 As a result, "a state territory may contain several
groups who define themselves as separate from the majority nation, or
a nation may extend far beyond the boundaries of the existing

in the sixteenth centuly. Such a world was theorized and became a matter of widespread consciousness even later, only in the nineteenth century. It became an inescapably universal phenomenon later still, in fact only after 1945.").
5
Gupta, supra note 3, at 194-95; see also id. at 195 ("[Only by] stepping 'outside'
the nation (and the problematic of nationalism) [can we] see how nations are created
and reproduced as a consequence of the global interstate system.").
Max Weber understood the state as 'a human community that (successfully)
claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physicalforce within a give ternitory." Max Weber,
Politics as a Vocation, Speech at Munich University (1918), in FROM MAX WEBER:
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 78 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1958). Ernest
Gellner, modifying Weber's definition slightly, argues that "[t]he 'state' is that institution or set of institutions specifically concerned with the enforcement of order (whatever else they may also be concerned with)." ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND
NATIONALISM 4 (1983). Regardless of which definition one adopts, for our purposes
the salient point is that the state is a political (not a natural) entity.
576 See GELLNER, supra note 575, at 7 ("Two
men are of the same nation if and only
if they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs
and associations and ways of behaving and communicating ....
[and] if they recognize
each other as belonging to the same nation.").
577

Id. at 6.

578 See

David H. Kaplan & Guntram H. Herb, Introduction: A Question of Identity, in
NESTED IDENTITIES: NATIONALISM, TERRITORY, AND SCALE, supra note 553, at 1, 3 (noting the disconnected evolutions of "nation" and "state").
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state. ''57' For example, the main unifying element of the United States
is not an ethnic identity but simply the fact of being born within U.S.
territorial borders. Not surprisingly, U.S. citizenship, which is based
on birth, is distinctly different from, say, German or Italian citizenship, which is based on blood relation (a rough proxy for ethnic similarity).
The history of the nation-state in the West is relatively familiar,
and I will only sketch its broad outline here." Pre-modern states were
not based principally on territorial sovereignty. Indeed, medieval
Europe was in some ways an archetype for nonexclusive territorial
rule; its "patchwork of overlapping and incomplete rights of government... [was] inextricably superimposed and tangled.''11 In spite of
this fragmentation, however, "[m]edieval actors viewed themselves as
the local embodiments of a universal community,"""' a Respublica Christiana "in which each individual found his definition, identity and purpose, where all lived in common under the same law and morals and
' 3
,58
where none was severed or independent in his authority or beliefs.
Moreover, political power arose not from the sacrosanct notion of
borders, but from personal allegiances between subjects and a wide
variety of authorities, 84 including the Pope, the Holy Roman Em-

579

Id.

580 This

history is a bit distorted because it. focuses on Western Europe. Neverthe-

less, the European experience is the basis for most scholarship on nationalism and
sovereignty and, by most accounts, was the foundation for the law of nations as we conceive it today. SeeJAMES CRAITORD, THE CREATION OF STATEs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

9 (1979) ("Despite its claims to universality, the early law of nations had its origins in
the European State-system."); see also JAMES MAYALL, NATIONALISM AND
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 1 (1990) ("[T] he global system of world politics is historically
derived from the European states-system as it developed between the seventeenth and
twentieth centuries."). For an account of how the European model of statehood
spread to other continents and cultures, see ROBERT H. JACKSON, QUASI-STATEs 59-81
(1990).
581John Gerard Ruggie, Territoriality and Beyond: ProblematizingModernity in
International Relations, 47 INT'L ORG. 139, 149 (1993) (quotingJOSEP-I R. STRAYER & DANA C.
MUNRO, THE MIDDLE AGES 395-1500, at 115 (4th ed. 1959) (internal quotations omitted)).
582 CURTIN, supra note 5, at 8 (emphasis
omitted).
583Daniel Philpott, Sovereignty: An Introduction and Brief History, 48 J. INT'L AFF.
353, 360 (1995); see also Ronald A. Brand, External Sovereignty and InternationalLaw, 18
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1685, 1687-88 (1995) (discussing the medieval concept of Respublica Christiana).
584 Guntram

H.

Herb, National Identity and Territory, in

NATIONALISM, TERRITORY, AND SCALE, supra note 553, at 9-10.
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peror, and various nobles, kings, and clerics. " This was a different
conception from that of sovereign states fixed in place"'. In this
world, the social construction of space was "organised concentrically
around many centres depending upon current political affiliations,
rather than a singular centre with established territorial boundaries. ,, ' 7
Commentators trace the origin of modern Western territorial
states to the emergence of European mercantile capitalism in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries .58

Increasing wealth in Europe re-

sulted in larger and more complex economies, which in turn required
greater central control and administration. "5"" In addition, the declining influence of the church and the development of more sophisticated military technology allowed rulers to begin to assert more exclusive control over geographical territory!"'*1 Overseas discoveries also
spurred the development of territorially based sovereignty because
demarcating territory allowed for exclusive and unambiguous claims

''5 SeeJ. Samuel Barkin & Bruce Cronin, The State and the Nation:
Changing Norms
and the Rules oj Sovereignty in International Relations, 48 INT'L ORG. 107, 111 (1994) (noting the overlapping system of medieval political jurisdictions). Anthony Gidclens describes this as the "absolutist state," in which a "political order [is] dominated by a sovereign ruler, monarch or prince, in whose person are vested ultimate political
authority and sanctions, including control of the m/haus of violence." AN'iHtONY
GIDDENS, SOCIAl. TiEORY AND MODERN SOCIOIOGY 170-71 (1987).

586 See WALTER ULtLMANN,

PRINCIPI.ES OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN THE

MIDDLEi AGES 139 (1978) (arguing that, in the medieval period, sovereign rulers actually possessed little sovereign power). Indeed, Curtin has noted that "the word 'state'
did not exist in political parlance uttil the 1500's." CURTIN, supra note 5, at 9 n.27.
But see HEINRICH MIrrTIs, THE STATE IN THI: MIDD.E AGES:
A COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL. HisrORY or FEUDAl. EUROPE 3-18 (1975) (arguing that the reality of
the state preexisted by several centuries the conscious Formulation of the modern idea
of the state).
587 CURTIN, supra note
5, at 9.
588See, e.g., GIDDENS, stpra note 585, at 171 (describing a close connection
between "the ascendency to power of the bourgeoisie" and the "gradual transformation
of the absolutist state into the nation-state"); Herb, sura note 584, at 10 (noting that,
around the fifteenth century, mercantilism contributed to the shift in a territorial
definition of powers); Alexander B. Murphy, International Law a'nd the Sovereign State:
Challenges to the Status Quo, in REORDERING -TiE WORLD: GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECrTIVES
ON TilE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra.note 8, at 209, 209-10 (linking the rise of territorial sovereignty to the rise of mercantilistm).
5 Seejouni H'ikli, ' enitoriality and
the Rise of/he Modernt State, 172 FENNIA 1,43-45
(1994) (detailing the development of state administrative branches).
590' SeeJEAN Go'rrMIANN, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TERRITORY 36-40 (1973) (discussing
commutnity in terms of spatial territory and identifying the declining role of religion).
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to possessions in the new world." Scholars such as Francisco de Vitoria in Spain and Hugo Grotius in Holland emerged in the sixteenth
century to articulate a theory of territorial sovereignty in which any
political authority exercising control over territory was entitled to govern that territory without outside intervention. 2
Ultimately, the Protestant Reformation weakened the central
authority of the Pope,"" bringing on the Thirty Years War, which culminated in the Treaties of Westphalia,,signed in 1648."" Under these
treaties, each country agreed to honor each others' territorial
boundaries and to refrain from interfering with the internal affairs of
another state, thereby codifying the territorial power of individual
595
sovereign states and limiting the prerogatives of the Pope and Em-

591 See Herb, supra note 584, at 11 ("Overseas discoveries also revealed the advan-

tages of using a territorial definition of power, because it allowed for the exclusive and
unambiguous claims to new possessions without the need to know what these exactly
entailed."). For example, in the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas Spain and Portugal divided
their colonial spheres using a line of longitude. SACK, supra note 479, at 131-32.
592 Murphy, supra note 588,
at 210.
See Mark L. Movsesian, The PersistentNation State and the Foreign Sovereigni hmunities Act, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1083, 1084 (1996) ("By most accounts, the idea of the sovereign state, an entity exercising 'supreme legitimate authority within a [defined] territory,' grew out of the Protestant Reformation." (quoting Philpott, supra note 583, at
357)); see alo JACKSON, supra note 580, at 50 ("Sovereign states first came into view
when medieval Christendom fractured under the combined impact of the Renaissance
and the Reformation.").
594 Westphalia Treaties, supra note 24, at 119-356.
Leo Gross has called Westphalia
the "majestic portal" leading from the medieval world to modernity. Gross, supra note
24, at 10. Others, however, have observed that Westphalia did not create a system of
sovereign states ex nihilo, but rather consolidated three hundred years of evolution toward such a system. See, e.g., Philpott, supra note 583, at 360-64 (arguing that Westphalia "elevated" but did not create the sovereign state). For an argument that Westphalia did not even constitute a decisive break with the medieval order, see Stephen D.
Krasner, Westphalia and All That, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS
AND POLITICAL CHANGE 235 U. Goldstein & R. Keohane eds., 1993). For further discussion of Westphalia, see generally HANS KOHN, THE IDEA OF NATIONALISM 188
(1944); Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, Peace of Westphalia (1648), in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 536-39 (1984). On the Thirty Years War, see generally
GEOFFREY PARKER, EUROPE IN CRISIS, 1598-1648 (1979); C.V. WEDGWOOD, THE THIR'IY
YEARS WAR (1938).
59. See TiiOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS
113
(1990) ("The notion of the sovereign equality of states may be said to have made its
debut, in modern Western civilization, with the Peace of Westphalia."); Brand, supra
note 583, at 1688 (explaining that the Peace of Westphalia formalized "[a] new era of
equal sovereigns"); Eric Lane, Demanding Human Rights: A Change in the World Legal
Order, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 269, 271 (1978) (noting the "Westphalian emphasis on territorial sovereignty and sovereign equality").
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peror.
The treaties gave states the "authority to form alliances...
without imperial or papal approval
and the power to determine
the religions that would be practiced within their territories.' s
Moreover, "as it came to be practiced," Westphalia "removed all legitimate restrictions on a state's activities within its territory.5' Thus,
the sovereign state became the principal political unit, and the control of territory became the primary criterion for assessing the existence of such a state. ' Subsequently, public international law has developed to harmonize and prevent conflicts among these new actors
in human history..'
""

Although Westphalia established a system of state territorial sovereignty, it was not until the Enlightenment that a separate conception
of nation emerged. Whereas the right to control territory had previ-

ously been viewed as the right of a monarch, the contractarian philosophy of Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau grounded political power
in the consent of the people of a given territory." Thus, the legitimacy
of modern states depended on the loyalty of this territorially bounded
group of people. "" Such groups came to be conceived as culturally
cohesive communities with common interests and bonds known as nations, and the political institutions they formed were called nationstates.""' "The Enlightenment ushered in an era in Europe during
su/ra note 5, at II ("This post-medieval epoch was characterised by
the coexistence of a multiplicity of states each sovereign within its ternitory, equal to
one another and free fiom any external earthly authority.").
597 Movsesian, supa
note 593, at 1085.
598 Although this principle of cuius regio, euis religio (whose
the region, his the religion) had been recognized in the Peace of Augsburg one hundred years earlier, it was
not ut into practice Until Westphalia. Philpott, s'npra note 583, at 363.
"i"Id. at 364.
600 See CURTIN, slpra note 5, at I I ("[Westphalia]
made the sovereign state the legitimate political unit and implied that basic attributes of statehood stIch as the existence of a government with control of its territory were the criteria for becoming a
state.").
601See id. ("The new multistate system rested on international
law and the balance
of power, a law operating'between rather than above states and a power operating between rather than above states.").
602See MALCOLM ANDERSON, FRONTIERS: TERRITORY AND STATE FORMATION IN
THE MODERN WORLD 38 (1996) (discussing the contractarian notion that political
596

See CURTIN,

authority rests in the will of the people).
603 See CURTIN, sapra note 5, at 13-14 ("Sovereignty
shifted fiom the person of the
monarch, identitied with a 'divine cosmos[,]' to the territory of the state and state institutions[,] ... and the loyalty of citizens became something that had to be won by
modern states (legitimacy).").
(14 See id. at 15 ("The governing people became
a transformed political subject,
namely a people of citizens which came to be identified with the Nation."); Herb, snpra
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which sovereign nation-states were assumed to be the political geographic ideal.... The notion of territorial sovereignty thus acquired
a new kind of legitimacy,
one premised on the ideological bedrock of
' ' 6°
,national' rights.

'

As discussed in more detail in the next Section,';' these new states
used their administrative power to encourage social cohesion and
identification with the state through the enforcement of uniform languages, the establishment of compulsory education, and the institution of rhetorical and symbolic efforts to erase local differences and
imagine a coherent community. °7 These efforts formed the roots of
nationalism, which can be defined as a political movement seeking to
unite people to a sovereign state based on common ancestry or culture."(
Nationalism "reordered the psychological allegiances of
note 584, at 11 (discussing the development of nationsand nation-states); Murphy, supra
note 588, at 210 (explaining that during the Enlightment people came to be understood as "a culturally cohesive community (a nation) that was entitled to control its
own affairs"). It has been suggested that this development occurred in Europe during
the eighteenth century:
The French Revolution ... marked a watershed: in its aftermath, the nation
was not just the king, his territory, and his subjects ....
[T]he cradle of the
modern nation-state and of the principles of nationalism ... was not strictly
the country but ... all its people. The nation was a pact between the sovereign people and the state ....
HORSMAN & MARSHALL, supira note 8, at 5-6. But see AN[HONY D. SMITH, NATIONALISM
AND MODERNISM 36 (1998) (arguing that the growth of nationalism can be traced to a
period well before the onset of industrialization in many European regions).
60i Murphy, supra note 588, at
210.
W; Infra text accompanying notes 657-75.
607 Spe Herb, supra note 584, at II (discussing state enforcement
of a uniform language and compulsory education as an effort to eliminate local differences); see aL'o
John Borneman, State, Territory, and National Identity Formation in the Two Berlins, 19451995, in CULTURE, POWER, PLACE: EXLt.ORATIONS IN CRITICAL ANTIIROPOLOGY, sup.ra
note 3, at 93, 97 (arguing that "[c]ontemporary state narratives about a national identity are constructed in a long conversation between states and their residents," that the
state proposes a model life course in its laws and policy statements "using tools including educational institutions, housing regulations, fiscal and monetary policy, and marital laws," and that "[t]he citizen reflects on and responds to this model life course in
everyday experiences and ritual encounters"). But cf SMITH, supra note 604, at 40
(cautioning against using a neo-Marxist "top-down" framework whereby elites simply
transmit nationalist sentiment to the "masses"); infra note 660 (discussing Smith's views
on the application of neo-Marxist theory to nationalism).
68 SeeJOHN BREUILLY, NATIONALISM AND THE STATE 2 (2d
ed. 1994) ("The term
'nationalism' is used to refer to political movements seeking or exercising state power
and justifying such action with nationalist arguments."); GELLNER, supra note 575, at 1
("Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the
national Unit should be congruent."); WILLIAM PFAFF, THE WRATH OF NAI'IONS 197
(1993) ("Nationalism is the political ... expression of a form of group identity attached to an existing state, or to a community which is not yet a recognized nation-
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Europe and gave to the state an emotional appeal it had previously
lacked." '" By fostering a sense of "belonging,' 0 of shared participation in a unique, sometimes mythical heritage,"' eighteenth and nineteenth century nationalism provided the basis for powerful new political identities to replace the medieval unity of the Respublica
Christiana." Indeed, as one commentator has argued, the idea that
nationality equals identity became a "social fact or social construction
that is taken for granted, a cognitive frame in which to threaten nationality is to threaten identity.""
Thus, political and social identity
itself came to be linked powerfully with territory."'
Nevertheless, although the American and French Revolutions
provided a context for conceiving of a territorially based "people" as a
unified "nation," problems arose in applying similar conceptions elsewhere. The nation-state system did not track the ethnic identities of
its human subjects. Therefore, the map of the post-Westphalian
Europe showed a mosaic of sovereign powers controlling multiethnic
societies. This arrangement has continued to create tension and con-

state but which believes that it should become one."). For other discussions of nationalism, see ANDERSON, supra note 26; MICHAEL BILLIG, BANAL NATIONALISM (1995);
GIDON Go'rrLIEB, NATION AGAINST STATE (1993); LIAt- GREENFELD, NATIONALISM

(1992); E. j. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780 (1990); MICHAEL
IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING (1993); KOHN, supra note 594; ANTHONYD. SMITH,

THE ETHNIC ORIGINS OF NATIONS (1986); YAEL TAMIR, LiIERAL NATIONALISM (1993);

Lea Brilmayer, The Moral Significance of Nationalism, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 7 (1995);
Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law and Practice, 90 AM.]. INT'L L. 359 (1996). For an essay summarizing recent scholarship on nationalism, see TonyJudt, The New Old Nationalism, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 26, 1994, at
44.
Movsesian, supra note 593, at 1086; see also KoHN, supra note 594, at 4 (asserting
that nationalism "changed" the state "by animating it with a new feeling of life and with
a new religious fervor"); HAROLD J. LASKI, The Foundations of Sovereignty, in TIlE
FOUNDAIIONS OF SOVEREIGN'IY AND OTHER ESSAYS 1, 15 (1921) ("Here the significance of nationality became apparent, for it gave to the glorification of the state an
emotional penumbra it could have secured in no other fashion.").'
610 See Alan Branthwaite, The PsychologicalBasis of Independent Statehood,
in STATES IN
A CHANGING WORLD 46, 51 (Robert H. Jackson & Alan James eds., 1993) (discussing
how statehood gives a group a sense of security and belonging).
611See infra text accompanying notes 633-43 (discussing the social construction

of

community in the modern nation-state).

612See STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT (Thomas

J. Biersteker &
Cynthia Weber eds., 1996) for arguments that state sovereignty continues to be a social
construction.
613

CURTIN, sup.ra note 5, at 15; see also HORSMAN & MARSHALL, supra
note

8, at 10

(noting the contemporary view that the nation-state is "natural and eternal").
614 See CURTIN, supra note 5, at 15 ("(T]he identification
of citizenship with resideuce in a particular territorial space became the central fact of politicalidentity.").
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flict. In Central and Eastern Europe, for example, two different identities formed: one based on ethnic affiliation and the other based on
territorial boundaries. Unfortunately, though these two identities are
quite distinct, they were conflated in the territorial settlements following World War I, which attempted to create new nation-states such as
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. In addition, the United Nations was
established to ensure the territorial integrity of the existing system of
states and therefore, until very recently, tended to recognize only
those self-determination movements brought forth by a majority operating within existing colonial boundaries (such as Nigeria), rather
than ethnic minorities operating within those states.'
Even this cursory survey reveals first that the idea of nation-states
existing within fixed territorial boundaries is a relatively recent phenomenon, and second that the link between nation and state is contingent and often tenuous. Thus, although it is admittedly difficult to
imagine an international geopolitical order that is not based on a
network of nation-states operating in bounded spaces, history suggests
that the nation-state system is neither immutable nor inevitable.
Moreover, to the extent that nations and states do not coincide, alternative conceptions of identity and community that are not based on
state boundaries will continue to challenge the hegemony of this system.
C. The Nation-State as an Imagined Community
If legal jurisdiction is both a symbolic assertion of community dominion and a way of demarcating community boundaries, then it is
essential that we consider more carefully what it means to say that a
coherent community exists and how such a community might be defined. This consideration reveals the act of imagination necessary to
equate community with state as well as the ongoing tug-of-war between
nostalgic and transformative visions of community in mediating the
relationship between Self and World.
The concept of "community" is one of the most widely used in the
social sciences. However, a precise definition has been predictably
elusive. Even as far back as 1955, one study compiled ninety-four social-scientific attempts at definition and found that the only substan-

615 For an argument for the right to personal
self-determination similar to the
right of nation-states, see Francis A. Gabor, Quo Vadis Domine: Reflections on Individual
and Ethnic Self-Determinalion Under an Emerging InternationalLegal Regime, 33 INT'L L-AW.
809,811-14 (1999).
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tive overlap among them was that all the definitions dealt with human
beings!"'1
To many, the word "community" conjures up Norman Rockwelllike images of a small, face-to-face congregation of people sharing
common values, backgrounds, and worldviews. Such a vision seems at
odds with much broader appropriations of the word, such as "the
American community" or "the world community." Thus, it is not surprising that in much sociological and anthropological literature,
community and state are often juxtaposed. For example, Ferdinand
T6nnies, writing in the 1880s, described ways in which gemeinschaftthe community of intimacy, close personal knowledge, and stabilitywas being superceded by gesellschaft-the political society dominated
by social relations that were artificial, contractual, ego-focused, shortterm, and impersonal.'
T6nnies viewed the small, rural community
of the past as a site of solidarity and unity, while portraying contemporary society as incapable of creating such bonds."' His conception of
gemeinschafl was firmly grounded in physical proximity, where community derives from shared territory, blood ties, and constant interaction among community members, rather than shared values or interests. '"' In contrast, according to T6nnies, the modern period of
gesellschaft offered no face-to-face community, but only a set of associations invented for the rational achievement of mutual goals (e.g., corporations, political parties, and trade unions)."")
Other social scientists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries echoed this juxtaposition. Henry Maine's work, though not
specifically focused on the nature of community, also contrasted a society founded on personal relationships and blood-based hierarchies
with a more "modern" social form based on individual freedom to enter into legal agreements.'2 ' Maine saw this transformation from
"status" to "contract" as a shift from defining social relations through

616

George A. Hillery, Jr., Definitions of Community: Areas of Agreement, 20 RURAL

Soc. IH, 118 (1955).
317

See

FERDINAND TONNIES, GEMEINSCHAFF UND GESELLSCIIAFT

SOCIEIY] 202-05 (Charles Loomis trans., 1988 ed.)

[COMMUNITY &

(describing the "order of Gesell-

schaft").
See id. at 65 (contrasting the essential unity of individuals in the geneinschaft
with the essential separation of individuals in the gesellschaft).
1 Id. at 42-44.
(20 Id. at 64-65.
(121 SeeHENRYSUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 165 (Univ. of Ariz. Press 1986) (1864)
("T]he movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from
Status to Contract." (emphasis omitted)).
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kinship networks to defining them based on individual will. 611 Similarly, Emile Durkheim argued that "earlier" communities were characterized by "mechanical solidarity," in which society was founded upon
likeness and unable to tolerate dissimilarity. 3 In contrast, Durkheim
viewed "modern" society as based on "organic solidarity," in which differences are integrated into a collaborative, harmonious whole' 4
For many twentieth-century scholars, community remained a term
reserved only for pre-industrial forms of affiliation. For example,
Raymond Williams, considering the rise of modernity and its challenge to earlier conceptions of community, wrote:
The growth of towns and especially of cities and a metropolis; the increasing division and complexity of labour; the altered and critical relations between and within social classes: in changes like these any assumption of a knowable community-a whole community wholly
625
knowable-became harder and harder to sustain.

Similarly, Robert Redfield attempted to define community as necessarily small in scale, homogenous in both activities and states of
mind, self-sufficient, and conscious of its distinctiveness.112" Redfield
almost seemed to find a kind of nobility and purity in these small
(generally agrarian) communities. In contrast, he viewed urban societies far more negatively. To Redfield, cities were based in "impersonal
institutions
[and] what has been called atomization of the external
''
world .

Other anthropologists, while perhaps not quite as nostalgic as
Redfield, have similarly viewed communities as inherently local.
Ronald Frankenberg suggested that members of a community must
have common work, economic, and religious interests. 628 Such com622

See id.

EMiLE DURKHE1M, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIEv 88-92 (W.D. Halls
trans.,
The Free Press 1984) (1893).
624 Id. at 101-05. Nevertheless, Durkheim observed that
this harmony did not yet
exist. See id. at lv (expressing the need for a "corporative institution"). In his later
work, Durkheim retreated from even this qualified stance, calling instead for new
communal relationships to counteract a modern tendency toward debilitating anomie.
See EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE 361-92 (John A. Spaulding & George Simpson trans.,
The Free Press 1951) (1897) (finding the roots of anomie in "the lack of collective
forces at certain points in society" and the "state of disaggregation").
625 RAYMOND WILLIAMS, THE COUNTRYANI)
THE CITY 165 (1973).
626 ROBERT REDFIEILD,
THE LrILE COMMUNIIY AND PEASANT SOCIE"IY AND
(23

CULTURE 4 (1960).
627 Id. at 5.
62S See RONALD FRANKENBERG, COMMUNITIES IN BRITAIN 238 (1966) ("Community
implies having something in common.").
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munities, in his view, require people to live face-to-face, in a small
group of people, sharing multistranded relations with one another
and maintaining a sentimental attachment to a physical locality and
the group itself.
David Minar and Scott Greer also emphasized geographical proximity. 30 They argued that the realities of living in a locale give rise to common problems, which lead to the development of
organizations for joint action and activities, which in turn produces
common attachments, feelings of interdependence, common commitment, and increasing homogeneity."' Even recent work by communitarian theorists such as Amitai Etzioni demonstrates a similar
view of community. Attempting to stem what he sees as the multicultural drift away from the common values of a liberal democracy, Etzioni clings to the notion that communities of the past shared common
beliefs and values and asks contemporary
members of society to re62
commit to those commonalities.
These ideas of community do not fit comfortably with the sprawling nature of the modern industrialized state. Yet the transformation
of states into nation.-states requires that members of a sovereign entity
come to think of themselves not simply as subjects of governmental
power but as somehow bound to the other subjects within one community. Benedict Anderson therefore refers to nation-states as "imagined communities"-"imagined because the members of even the
smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet
them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image
of their communion."'(

See id. at 237-54 (examining the concept of community and the changes
in faceto-face relationships); see also NIGEL RAPPORT & 'JOANNA OVERING, SOCIAL AND
CuLruiR. ANTIIROP'OLOGY 61 (2000) (discussing Frankenberg's and other theorists'
approaches to community).
00 See DAVID MINAR & Sco-rI GREER, THE CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY
47 (1969)
("[P]lace is important to community for certainly most of the social systems to which
we would apply the concept [of community] are geographic entities of one sort or another.").
631 See id. (discussing the effects of living in the same locale).
6.32 See AMITAI.ETzIONI, TIlE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY 253-67 (1994)
(articulating the
629

rights and social responsibilities of individuals under a communitarian vision of society).
eL)"3
ANDERSON, supra note 26, at 6; see also ERNEST GELLNER, TIIOUGIHT
AND
CHANCE 168 (1964) ("Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to selfconsciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist .... " (emphasis added)).
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This formulation does not imply that such imagined communities
are somehow "false" or "fabricated" in a negative sense.: Anderson
argues that all communities larger than "primordial villages" (and
perhaps even those) are imagined. 3 5 Thus, nation-states are not illegitimate just because their inhabitants imagine and construct psychological bonds of affiliation. Nevertheless, the fact that those bonds are
constructed means that they are neither natural nor inevitable; they
are merely one particular way of imagining community among many.
This is a very different vision of community. Rather than a reified,
natural structure in the relations among people, Anderson (as well as
other theorists' ") focus on the ways conceptions of "community" are
constructed within social life, on how membership in a community is
marked and attributed, and on how notions of community are given
meaning."" Thus, community formation is viewed as a psychological
Some commentators have a more negative view of the way in which
nationalist
movements fabricate many of the "traditions" they purport to restore. See, e.g., FRANCIS
FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 269 (1992) (noting the "deliberate fabrications of nationalists, who had a degree of fieedom in defining who or what
constituted a ... nation"); Anthony D. Smith, Introduction: Ethnicity and Nationalism, in
ETiHNICITY AND NNrIONALISM 1, 3 (Anthony D. Smith ed., 1992) (discussing "modernist" theories of nationalism that rely on notions of "imagined community" and "invented traditions").
635 See ANDERSON, supra note 26, at 6 (suggesting that even
communities characterized by "face-to-face contact" are imagined).
61Y Social psychological research on group identities, which indicates that groups
do not exist because of external factors but only because of members' identification
with the group, echoes this symbolic understanding of community. See HENRI TAJFEL,
HUMAN GROUPS AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES 229 (1981) (relying on a definition of intergroup community based on whether people feel they are a group). According to this
research, the process of group identification proceeds in three stages: First, individuals categorize themselves as part of an ingroup, assigning themselves a social identity
and distinguishing themselves from the relevant outgroup. Second, they learn the
norms associated with such an identity. Third, they assign these norms to themselves,
and "thus their behaviour becomes more normative as their category membership becomes salient." MICHAEL A. HOGG & DOMINIC ABRAMS, SOCIAL IDENTIFICATIONS: A
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND GROUP PROCESSES 172 (1988).
637 See RAPPORT & OVERING, supra note 629, at
62 (discussing modern anthropological views regarding community). In a similar vein, Gregory Bateson and Jurgen
Ruesch argued that the relationship between "indiv;dual," "family," "community," "nation," and world can best be understood through a study of the social and psychological processes of human communication. See GREGORY BATESON & JURGEN RUESCH,
COMMUNICATION: THE SOCIAL MATRIX OF PSYCHIATRY 5 (1951) ("[C]ommunication is
the only scientific model which enables us to explain physical, intrapersonal, interpersonal, and cultural aspects of events within one system."). Likewise, Fredrik Barth observed that social groups are not naturally joined as communities; they achieve an
identity by defining themselves as different from other groups and by erecting
boundaries between them. See FREDRIK BARTH, Introduction to ETHNIC GROUPS AND
BOUNDARIES 9, 15 (Fredrik Barth ed., 1969) ("The boundaries to which we must give
634
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process, not as a naturally occurring phenomenon based on external
realities."18
Significantly, without this kind of expanded vision of community
there is no way to conceptualize a nation-state as a community. Yet at
the same time, if communities are based not on fixed attributes like
geographical proximity, shared history, or face-to-face interaction, but
instead on symbolic identification and social psychology, then there is
no intrinsic reason to privilege nation-state communities over other possible
community identifications that people might share. These other identifications will be explored in the next Section, but for now it is important
to recognize that the very same conception of community upon which
the nation-state relies also provides the basis for critiquing the hegemony of the nation-state as the only relevant community under discussion.
According to Anderson, the nation-state historically has had three
distinct imagined features.
First, the nation is imagined as limited,
S "639
with finite boundaries.
He argues that "[n]o nation imagines itself
our attention are of course social boundaries ...."). Anthony Cohen extended
Barth's critique, arguing that community must be seen as a symbolic construct, not a
natural one. See ANTHONY P. COHEN, THE SYMBOLIC CONSTRUCION OF COMMUNITY
14 (1985) (discussing the "essentially symbolic nature of the idea of community itself"). In Cohen's vision, Community derives not from the type of external characteristics Redfield and others had posited, but from internal perceptions of a boundary that
separates one social group from another. Thus, communities and their boundaries
exist not as geography but as "repositories of meaning" in the minds of their members,
and these socially constructed repositories of meaning come to be expressed as a
community's distinctive social discourse. /d. at 98.
638 See, e.g., Gupta & Ferguson, supra note 529, at 13 (arguing
that "community" is
"a categorical identity that is premised on various forms of exclusion and constructions
of otherness").
6'39 For example, a comparison of medieval and modern
maps indicates very different conceptions of boundaries and place-ness. The older maps tend to depictJerusalem at the center, ROiERTS, supra note 552, at 128; the), typically indicate an incompleteness to the world, with distant lands only sketched in and then fading off without
clear endpoints; and they not only are imprecise as to boundaries but seem to treat
boundaries as relatively insignificant, see BILLIG, supra note 608, at 20 ("Mediaeval
maps represent a world unobsessed with boundaries."). Kingdoms and empires are
depicted in general areas, and little effort is made to define the precise point where
one begins and the other ends. See ROBERTS, supra note 552, at 127-30 (reviewing the
features of medieval maps). In contrast, the modern map, like the modern conception
of sovereignty, is firmly territorial, with precisely drawn boundaries. See BILLIG, supra
note 608, at 20 (recognizing that modern maps depict the world as territorially divided).
Moreover, the evidence seems to indicate that the lack of clear territorial boundaries was not only part of medieval map making but of medieval consciousness as well.
As one commentator points out, medieval Europe consisted of a series of small overlapping power structtlres with no single authority controlling a "clear-cut territory or
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coterminous with mankind. The most messianic nationalists do not
dream of a day when all the members of the human race will join
their nation."7"'O Second, the nation is imagined as sovereign in order
to replace the divinely ordained dynasties that began to give way to
modern states in the period of the Enlightenment and afterwards.
Third, the nation is imagined as a community:

the people within it." Michael Mann, European Development:. Approaching a Historical
Explanation, in EUROPE AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 6, 11 (Jean Baechler et al. eds.,
1988). In addition, medieval monarchs tended to divide their estates among their
heirs, meaning that territories would often change shape with each new generation. See
BILLIG, supra note 608, at 20 (discussing the transitory nature of territorial boundaries
in medieval Europe). The feudal structure rested on loyalties to local lords, not to distant monarchs, and if kings raised armies, they did so through the local lords. See id.
(discussing the methods by which kings raised armies). Not surprisingly, the mass of
inhabitants of what is now France or England did not think of themselves as English or
French and had little conception of a territorial nation-state to which they owed allegiance. See, e.g., 1 FERNAND BRAUDEL, THE IDENTITY OF FRANCE (HISTORY AND
ENVIRONMENT) 18 (Sian Reynolds trans., Collins 1988) (1986) (arguing that "the modern notion of la patrie, the fatherland, had scarcely appeared in the sixteenth century");
HuGH SETON-WATSON, NATIONS AND STATES:

AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF

NATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF NATIONALISM 25-30 (1977) ("One can hardly speak of
an English or a French nation before the thirteenth century ... .
CHO
ANDERSON, supra note 26, at 7.
641 According to Anderson, it is no coincidence that the eighteenth
century, with
its rationalist secularism and its challenge to divine rule, was also the century when nationalism arose. While stoppingjust short of drawing a causal link between the decline
of religious belief and the rise of nationalism, see id. at 12 ("1 am not claiming that the
appearance of nationalism towards the end of the eighteenth century was 'produced'
by the erosion of religious certainties, or that this erosion does not itself require a
complex explanation."), Anderson does argue that the "[d]isintegration of paradise"
required "a secular transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning.... [F]ew things were (are) better suited to this end than an idea of nation," id. at
11.
642 See id. (stating that the Enlightenment marked
"the dawn of the age of nationalism"). Anderson links this transformation to changing conceptions of borders.
Monarchy, he argues, "organizes everything around a high centre. Its legitimacy derives from divinity, not from populations, who, after all, are subjects, not citizens." Id.
at 19. Thus, since states were defined by their centers, "borders were porous and indistinct, and sovereignties faded imperceptibly into one another." Id. According to Anderson, this loose sense of territoriality helps to explain how "pre-modern empires and
kingdoms were able to sustain their rule over immensely heterogeneous, and often not
even contiguous, populations for long periods of time." Id. In contrast, modern state
sovereignty is "ftrlly, flatly, and evenly operative over each square centimetre of a legally
demarcated territory." Id. Similarly, Giddens argues that, whereas the boundaries of
empires and absolutist states were diffuse, the nation-state "is a set of institutional
forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with
demarcated boundaries." GIDDENS, supra note 585, at 171-72. Indeed, according to
Giddens, although all states seem to have been associated with territoriality, "[w]hat is
specifically late European is the fixing of very precise boundaries that actually do effectively mark the realm of the administration of the state." Id. at 172.
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[R]egardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in
each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.
Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two
centuries, for so many millions of eople, not so much to kill, as willingly
to die for such limited imaginings.

Thus, Anderson highlights the social, historical, and psychological
forces that construct conceptions of nationhood.
Moreover, even in seemingly less multiethnic states, the composition of a nation appears to be a political, rather than a natural, process. Although many commentators have assumed that countries such
as China, Korea, and Japan are ethnically homogenous, 44 recent
scholarship has challenged this claim. For example, one study argues
thatJapanese identity and much ofJapanese officialdom have evolved
through interaction with both internal others (minorities) and external others (foreigners), who were just as important for Japanese selfidentification as were internal "cultural" constructions.
Similarly,
movements to define distinctive features ofJapanese culture and identity were launched in the 1970s and 1980s in opposition to Western
influence because the business and administrative elite were concerned about too littleJapanese homogeneity.",
So, how is national community formed? Anderson traces the ascendancy of the nation-state to the development of what he calls
"print-capitalism.117 He argues that the old orders of religiously unified communities, divinely determined monarchs, and static cosmologies were slowly challenged by "the impact of economic change, 'discoveries' (social and scientific), and the development of increasingly

(A3 ANDERSON, sulira note 26, at
7.
644 See, e.g., HOBSBAWNM, supra note 608,
at 66 ("China, Korea and Japan ...are indeed among the extremely rare examples of historic states composed of a population
that is ethnically almost or entirely homogeneous.").
,A5 See Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, A Conceptual
Model for the Historical Relationship Between the Self and the Internal and External Others: The AgmrianJapanese, the Ainu, and the
Special-Status People, in MAKING MAJORITIES: CONSTITUTING THE NATION IN JAPAN,
KOREA, CHINA, MALAYSIA, FIJI, TURKEY, AND THE UNITED STATES 31 (Dru C. Gladney
ed., 1998) [hereinafter MAKING MAJORITIES] (examining the relationships between

Japanese maiority groups and foreigners).
641

See Kosaku Yoshino, Culturalisin, Racialism, and Internationalism in the Discourse on

Japanese Identity, in MAKING MAJORITIES, supra note 645, at 13, 13 (linking the "resurgence of cultural nationalism" to "the vast number of publications that the Japanese
cultural elites produced to define and redefine the distinctiveness of Japanese society,
culture, and national character").
647See ANDERSON, supra note 26, at 36 (suggesting that print-capitalism
offered a
"new way of linking fraternity, power and time meaningfully together").
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rapid communications."'I 8 According to Anderson, the new order of
print-capitalism "made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of
people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others,
in profoundly new ways.""'4 9
Anderson argues that the development of the printing press and
the relative ease with which literary works came to be disseminated
laid the basis for national consciousness in three distinct ways. First,
the spread of printed languages meant that there were "unified fields
of exchange" operating "below" Latin, but "above" the locally distinct
Thus, "[s]peakers of the huge variety of
spoken vernaculars.'O
Frenches, Englishes, or Spanishes, who might find it difficult or even
impossible to understand one another in conversation, became capable of comprehending one another via print and paper. " ', In the
process, according to Anderson, these readers became aware of a
broader community of readers to which they belonged that was beyond the local, but not as large as the world." Newspapers enabled
the nation to be represented by the juxtaposition of stories from different "parts," which were then assimilated within one polity.'" The
newspaper .also allowed the nation to differentiate itself from others
by the presentation of "international" and "foreign" news as something separate from "domestic" or "national" news." 4 Second, according to Anderson, the rise of print-capitalism allowed languages to become more fixed, therefore further cementing identity based on
shared linguistic tradition. "' Third, Anderson argues that those vernaculars that were closest to the print languages rose in status and began to form something approaching an "official" language that would
be understood by a broader group .
Other theorists have explored the myriad ways in which national
identification, once introduced, is continually reinforced in the mod-

648

Id.

649

Id.

650Id.at 44.

Id.
652

Id.

653

Id.

See BILLIG, supra note 608, at 118-19 (describing the way in which newspapers
segre ate the news "so that nationhood operates ...as a context for awareness").
See ANDERSON, supra note 26, at 44-45 (arguing that because "the printed book
kept a permanent form," nations could create "that image of antiquity so central to the
subjective idea of the nation").
65, See id. at 45 (observing that "[c]ertain dialects inevitably
were 'closer' to each
print-language and dominated their final forms").
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ern era. For example, Michael Billig has studied what he calls "banal
nationalism": the everyday habits of life that serve subconsciously to
remind citizens of their affiliation with a particular nation-state in a
world of nation-states.
Billig writes:
In so many little ways, the citizenry are daily reminded of their national
place in a world of nations. However, this reminding is so familiar, so
continual, that it is not consciously registered as reminding. The metonymic image of banal nationalism is not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed on
58
the public building.

Thus, Anderson's conception of nation-state as imagined community
allows us to see that, although we often reserve the term "nationalist"
for extremist groups seeking recognition from a modern state,"' the
state itself often operates as a nationalist enterprise, encouraging
identification in a community that matches the state's geographical
borders. This nation-state nationalism is often overlooked because we
assume that such nationalism is "natural." Accordingly, we believe
that "It]he separatists, the fascists and the guerrillas are the problem
of nationalism. The ideological habits, by which 'our' nations are reproduced as nations, are unnamed and, thereby, unnoticed."';

657 See generally BitLuG, supra note 608
(examining the powerful presence of nationalism in everyday life).
658 Id. at 8. Similarly,
Gupta has observed:
In addition to practices oriented externally--that is, toward other statessome of the most important features that enable the nation to be realized are
flags, anthems, constitutions and courts, a system of political representation, a
state bureaucracy, schools, public works, a military and police force, newspal)ers, and television and other mass media.
Gupta, supra note 3, at 185.
659 See BILLIG, supra note 608, at 5 (observing
that both popular and academic writings associate nationalism "with those who struggle to create new states or with extrenie right-wing politics," so that "[a]ccording to customary usage, [the American
President] is not a nationalist; but separatists in Quebec or Brittany are; so are the
leaders of extreme right-wing parties such as the Front National in France").
1 Id. at 6. Anthony D. Smith has argued that some scholarship on nationalism
relies too much1 on a "top down" method whereby elites manipulate "the people" into
feelings of nationalist identification. SMrI'HI, supra note 604, at 95-96. Instead, Smith
argues that "[t] he passion that the nation could evoke, especially in time of danger,
the sacrifices it could command from 'the poor and unlettered' as well as the middle
classes, cannot he convincingly explained by the propaganda of politicians and intellectuals, or the ritual and pageantry of mass ceremonies." Id. at 130. While I believe
Smith's objection to be valid, my argument here (and Billig's as well, I think) is not
that the masses are manipulated by some devious elites to believe in nationalism, but
rather that nationalism is a socially constructed, constitutive, and self-perpetuating
phenomenon, and all members of society are simultaneously agents and recipients of
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In response to the inherently imagined nature of their existence,
nations make claims upon something called national "identity." Such
national identity is formed through self-categorization: articulating
attributes that make "us" of one group different from "them" in another group.6 One such attribute is the telling of a unified national
"history." Indeed, it is no coincidence that the ascendency of nationstates was accompanied by the creation of national historical tales"'32

nationalist sentiment. Thus, Smith's objections to a neo-Marxist view of nationalism
seem to have less weight with regard to Billig's more Foucauldian approach.
See BILLIG, supra note 608, at 60-61 (observing that feeling patriotic about one's
nation requires preexisting assumptions about what a nation is and what patriotism
means). Ernest Gellner and Anthony Giddens likewise emphasize that nation-states
are not founded on "objective" criteria. Rather, identification with a national community is a phenomenon of social psychology. Indeed, on the first page of Nations and
Nationalism, Gellner asserts that "[n]ationalism is primarily a political principle, which
holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent." GELLNER, supra
note 575, at 1. According to Gellner, nationalism cannot exist as a concept unless it is
taken for granted that the state is the legitimate political entity. See id. at 4 (opining
that "nationalism emerges only in milieux in which the existence of the state is already
very much taken for granted"). Accordingly, the national state becomes linked with a
national culture that comes to be seen as the "natural repositor[y] of political legitimacy." Id. at 55. Gellner not only links national consciousness to the existence of the
state, but also highlights the political reasons it becomes necessary to make the bridge
between nation and state appear natural.
Giddens has focused on the new forms of governance that arose concurrent to the
rise of the nation-state. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE NATION-STATE AND VIOLENCE 118
(1985) ("A 'nation' ... only exists when a state has a unified administrative reach over
the territory over which its sovereignty is claimed."). He defines the nation-state as "a
set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over
a territory with demarcated boundaries (borders), its rule being sanctioned by law and
direct control of the means of internal and external violence." Id. at 121. In Giddens's
view, the nation-state is a "bounded power-container": fixed boundaries and ability to
wreak official violence are its key attributes. Id. at 120. He argues, moreover, that nation-states cannot exist in isolation, but only as part of a worldview that sees "a complex
of other nation-states" knitted together in a world system. GIDDENS, supra note 585, at
171.
Accordingly, we have a system of nations who go to war against each other. "In
this new world of nations-at-war, there was little room for a Duke of Burgundy or an
Earl of Warwick to march into the fray at the head of a private retinue." BILLIG, supra
note 608, at 21. Rather, local warlords appear in places where state authority has disappeared. See id. (pointing to Beirut and Somalia as examples of states where warlords
have emerged). Finally, the geographical boundedness of nations and the nationstate's monopolization of violence are both constantly reflected in rhetoric, symbolic
imagery, and habits of thinking until they appear to be not only the primary means of
organizing political community, but the most natural ways of doing so.
662See, e.g., LINDA COLLEY, BRITONS: FORGING THE NATION 1707-1837,
at 5-6
(1992) (describing the "invention" of a British national identity in the eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries); Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction: Inventing Traditions, in THE
INVENTION OF TRADITION 1, 1 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1983) ("'Tra-
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and the rise of the professional historian.16 These state-funded historians were a mechanism by which states bolstered their power and in64
tegrated linguistically and ethnically diverse populations.
Thus, as
Edward Said has made clear, nation-states are interpretive communities as well as imagined ones.
For example, when Scots get together to celebrate their national
identity, they appear to be steeped in tradition, with men wearing
kilts, each clan having its own tartan, and bagpipes wailing.'
By
means of these symbols, they show their loyalty to seemingly ancient
rituals-rituals whose origins go far back into antiquity. Yet, as Hugh
Trevor-Roper has argued, these symbols of Scottishness were actually a
creation of the Industrial Revolution. '7 Indeed, the short kilt was invented by an English industrialist to allow Highlanders to work in factories.' Moreover, Anthony Giddens observes that even the notion of
a "tradition" is itself the product of modernity. In medieval times, by
contrast, there was no separate conception of tradition "precisely be-

ditions' which appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented.").
fiG3 See Friedland & Boden, supra note
496, at 10 ("[T]he professional historian
emerged in the nineteenth century at the same time that states were struggling to create a unified nation in the territories over which they claimed sovereignty.").
664 See id. (observing that "historians were funded
by the state, which saw the creation of a 'national' history as a way to bolster its power and integrate linguistically and
culturally diverse populations under its control").
665 See EDWARD W. SAID, THE WORLD, TIE
TEXT, AND THE CRITIC 11 (1983) (tying
the state to "the entire matrix of meanings we associate with 'home,' belonging and
community"); seealso Friedland & Boden, supra note 496, at 10 ("[T]erritorial historicity is the core of the nation-state's legitimacy and an element in the narrative of modernity."); Gupta, supra note 3, at 191 ("[Nationalism is] a distinctively modern cultural
form [that] attempts to create a new kind of spatial and mythopoetic metanarrative ....). Such national histories "tell of a people passing through time-'our' people, with 'our' ways of life, and 'our' culture." BILLIG, supra note 608, at 71. See generally MARGARET WETHERELL & JONATHAN POYITER, MAPPING THE LANGUAGE OF RACISM:
DISCOURSE AND THE LEGITIMATION OF ExPLOITATION (1992) (discussing the use of
discourse in studying racism). Pop cultural forms may also tell nationalist histories.
See, e.g., PURNIMA MANKEKAR, SCREENING CULTURE, VIEWING POLITICS:
AN
ETHNOGRAPHY OF TELEVISION, WOMANHOOD, AND NATION IN POSTCOLONIAL INDIA
165 (1999) (discussing the relationship between a nationally broadcast television
dramatization of an important Hindu epic tale and the consolidation of Hindu nationalism in subsequent years).
666 Hugh Trevor-Roper, Thme Invention of Tradition: The Highland Tradition
of Scotland, in TIlE INVENTION OF TRADITION, sulra note 662, at 15, 15.
667 See id. (characterizing the concept of a distinct
Highland tradition as a retrospective invention).
6I8 ld. at 21-22.
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cause tradition and custom were everywhere.'
Thus, the idea of a
traditional national culture is an imagined narrative, passed on like an
inheritance from one generation to the next.7' Through such an invention of tradition, the nation becomes conceptualized in kinship
terms: the nation is a "family" passing
down identity over time, living
671
"fatherland.,
or
"motherland"
the
in
This reference to land brings forth a final crucial attribute in the
imagining of a national community: the idea of a homeland. Indeed,
this tie between group identity and land is essential to the modern
idea of the nation-state. After all, many peoples "have nurtured a
sense of their own communal distinctiveness 'in the specific history of
the group, and, above all, in the myths of group origins and group
liberation.'-6 72 Nationhood, however, requires the added element of
place. Thus, what makes a nation-state distinctive is the imagining of
an overall "country" in which lived-in localities are united within a
wider homeland. The inhabitants of that homeland will generally be
personally familiar with only a small part of the land, but the nation is
conceived as a totality. Thus, of necessity it must be imagined as a totality, rather than directly apprehended. Yet, again and again, these
"images of virgin territories, self-evident boundaries, and datable
original occupation turn out to be mere mirages: territorial claims
become
more obscure, not clearer, the further you dig into their
73
past.

669

GIDDENS, supra note 7, at 57.

670See Etienne Balibar, Is There a 'Neo-Racism'?, in ETIENNE
BALIBAR & IMMANUEL
WALLERSTEIN, RACE, NATION, CLASS: AMBIGUOUS IDENTITIES 17, 24-25 (1991) (dis-

cussing the way in which conceptions of national culture inscribe racist assumptions).
For a further discussion of the "racialization" of the idea of national culture, see
MARTIN BARKER, THE NEW RACISM:

CONSERVATIVES AND THE IDEOLOGY OF THE TRIBE

(1981); TEUN A. VAN DIJK, ELITE DISCOURSE AND RACISM (1993).
671 See NIRAYUvAL-DAvIs, GENDER & NATION
15 (1997) (arguing that in a "naturalized image of the nation ....nations not only are eternal and universal but also constitute a natural extension of family and kinship relations"); Gary R.Johnson, In the Name
of the Fatherland: An Analysis of Kin Term Usage in Patriotic Speech and Literature, 8 INT'L
POL. Sci. REv. 165, 168-71 (1987) (discussing the use of terms such as "motherland"
and "fatherland" "to inspire in the listener or reader a feeling of unity with his or her
fellow citizens").
672 BILLIG, supra note 608, at 74 (citation omitted)
(quoting ANTIONY D. SMITH,
TIHE ETINIC REVIVAL 65 (1981)).
673 Roe, supra note 572, at 81; see also Sheldon Pollock
et al., Cosmopolitanisms, 12
PUB. CULTURE 577, 579 (2000) ("Pakistan[,] ... while definitely imagined from as
early as the 1920s as a homeland for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent, had only
the vaguest geographical referent for a long time in its career as a concept.").
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Finally, as the social psychological literature suggests, there can be
no "us" without a "them." Accordingly, the national community can
only be imagined by also imagining foreigners.
The structures of feeling that enable meaningful relationships with particular locales, constituted and experienced in a particular manner, necessarily include the marking of "self" and "other" through identification

with larger collectivities. To be part of a community is to be positioned
as a particular kind of subject, similar to others within the community in
some crucial respects and different fiom those who are excluded from
It.

For some nations, the claim to ancient roots will often involve the nostalgic invocation of a continuous chain of racial inheritance deriving
from an imagined, biologically pure past6 75 For others, it will be
founded in stories about exceptionalism: that which makes our nation superior to all others on the planet. In either case, the imagined
community of the nation-state is very different from the localism of
the small agrarian community discussed earlier.
Thus, we see again that the nation-state is a particular type of
imagined community, one that could not have existed prior to modernity and the increasing awareness of an international system. The
nation-state, socially constructed and historically contingent, is only
one way of parsing the modern world, however. In the next Section, I
will consider several alternative visions.
D. Conceptions of Subnational, Transnational,Supranational,
and Cosmopolitan Identities
Although nation-states have become the dominant form of organizing space in the contemporary world, there are other ways of imagining community and constructing identity. As we have seen, not only
are processes of place-making always contested and unstable, but relations between places are continuously shifting as a result of the political and economic reorganization of space in the world system.
Moreover, "[j]ust as the formation of nation-states was one of the defining characteristics of an earlier era, their rapid and often radical
7
transformation is one of the defining characteristics of ours.,"1
' Thus,

'7,4
675
676

Gupta & Ferguson, supna note 529, at 17.
RCe, supna note 572, at 81.
Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingolt, State

"ravnsfrmation,Globalization, and the

Possibilitiesof Cause Lawyering: An Introduction, in CAUSE

LAWYERING AND THE SArE IN A

GLOBAL ERA 3, 3 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001) [hereinafter CAUSE
LAWYERING].
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we need to look at nation-state sovereignty against the backdrop of alternative transnational, international, or subnational identities, as well
as possible ways of imagining community that are not based on physical territory at all. 7 As Akhil Gupta has pointed out, "[t] he structures
of feeling that constitute nationalism need to be set in the context of
other forms of imagining community, other means of endowing
sig1' 8
nificance to space in the production of location and 'home.'' 6
1. Subnational Communities
Subnational communities can include political identifications that
are more local than the nation-state, such as provinces, states, towns,
and voting districts; affiliations that form around specific functions or
activities, such as water regions, geographical areas, block associations,
bowling leagues, religious institutions, and schools; or commonalities
that derive from a purported ethnic identification that is not coterminous with the nation-state, such as Basques in Spain, Sikhs in India,
Tamils in Sri Lanka, or even white supremacist militias in the United
States. All of these communities are often spatially localized and
therefore may play a more tangible role in everyday life than broader
community allegiances.
It is unclear whether all subnational community identification is
on the rise. Certainly, commentators have noted an increase in subnational political identifications in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse and the internationalization of economic activity. 7 Most often
this rise in "tribalism" is viewed as a response to globalization: the argument is that people "seek a level of comfort in their communities to
withstand the complexity and atomization that modern capitalism has
wrought on their lives and to free themselves from domination by
'alien' elites.
Thus, Richard Falk suggests that one response to
economic globalization is a form of "backlash politics that looks either
to some pre-modern traditional framework as viable and virtuous ...
or to ultra-territorialists that seek to keep capital at home and exclude
foreigners to the extent possible."S These responses tend to empha677

Gupta & Ferguson, supra note 529, at 17; see also Gupta, supra note 3, at 181

("[W]e need to pay attention to the structures of feeling that bind people to geographical units larger or smaller than nations or that crosscut national boundaries.").
678 Gupta, supra note 3, at 193.
679 See, e.g., HORSMAN & MARSHALL, supra note
8, at 185 (explaining the increasingly8lobal nature of economic transactions).
ld.
681

RICHARD FALK, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION 142 (1999).
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size a "sacred religious or nationalist community of the saved that is at
war with an evil 'other,' either secularist or outsider."6 2 Such subnational communities are therefore viewed as oppositional and reactive.
Alternatively such communities may grow more salient not in opposition to global events, but simply to fill a power vacuum in moments
when the nation-state loses authority. Thus, for example, the dissolution of Yugoslavia quickly degenerated into tribalism and a war waged
among people allied to various imagined ethnic and historical communities.1 8 3 If every nation-state is multiethnic at least to some degree,
then constructed communities along those ethnic cleavages will always
be available.
We might also view subnational communities in a less negative
light, as the building blocks of civil society. My seemingly fanciful inclusion of bowling leagues as an example of subnational affiliation was
not accidental. Robert Putnam recently has argued that the decline of
bowling leagues and other localized civic group activities in the
United States is a serious problem that has harmed the American polity.1184 According to Putnam, such groups foster the development of
"social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that
arise from them." ;8t ' Without these social networks, Putnam argues,
core societal institutions suffer.6 8
Those promoting global civil society initiatives also tend to focus
on subnational affiliations. For example, Michael Edwards, Director
of the Ford Foundation's Governance and Civil Society Unit, stresses
three ways in which communities might respond to global problems
such as income inequality or environmental degradation. First, in the
realm of formal politics, he suggests that various forms of civic, business, governmental, and donor groups might collaborate to develop

(82 Id. The Islamic fundamentalist regimes
in Iran, Algeria, and Afghhanistan in
recent years are examples of the backlash Falk describes. See, e.g., GIDDENS, su]nYa note
7, at 66 ("One might think that fundamentalism has always existed. This is not so-it
has arisen in response to the globalising inlluences we see all rotnd us.").
683 See HORSMAN & MARSHALL, supra note 8, at 188 (describing the return to tribal

rule in Yugoslavia after the collapse of the Soviet bloc).
684 See ROiERr D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE:
THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 27-28 (2000) ("[O]ur schools and neighborhoods don't work
so well when community bonds slacken, [and] our economy, our democracy, and even
our health and happiness depend on adequate stocks of social capital.").
685

/d. at 19.

686

See id. at 288-89 (arguing that social capital built from local groups "allows citi-

zens to resolve collective problems more easily," provides the trust required for economic transactions, and serves as a conduit for the free flow of information necessary
to a ftinctioning democracy).
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regional initiatives for economic development or natural resources
management.
Second, in the economic realm, subnational coalitions can help markets "work to the benefit of smaller [communities]8
by reducing the benefits that are siphoned off by intermediaries."
Accordingly, "peasant foresters in Mexico [have begun] to negotiate
higher prices directly with the timber companies, [and] rubber tappers in Brazil have been able to retain a higher" price for their produce, solely by organizing themselves into coordinated groups.
According to Edwards, collective community action of this sort
"stimulates both equity and efficiency, and builds a sense of solidarity
among people who are sharing risks as well as benefits."'' ° Finally, he
argues that local pressure groups, membership associations, and specialized authorities are essential to "build the preconditions for democracy by injecting a wider range of views and voices into the political arena."6 9'
Similarly, Richard Falk advocates "globalization-from-below" as the
best response to "globalization-from-above.
He notes, for example,
that green parties in Europe in the 1980s were able to expose the
drawbacks
of global capitalism, particularly in the environmental
663
arena.
Other local affiliations have formed around specific encroachments, such as the siting of a nuclear power plant or dam,
which• have
mobilized residents or areas facing displacement or loss of
•
694
livelihood.
Nevertheless, though these subnational affiliations have

687 SeeEDWARDS, suprra note 7,
at 136.
688

Id. at 151.

689 Id. (citation omitted); see also MEDIATING SUSTAINABILTY: GROWING POLICY
FROM THE GRASSROOTS autta Blauert & Simon Zadek eds., 1998) (exploring ways that
rural communities have sought to influence policies affecting their livelihoods and the
quality of their natural environment through collaboration and mediation involving
producer organizations, non-governmental organizations, and advisers); CI-IICO
MENDEs, FIGHT FOR THE FOREST 10-27 (1989) (describing how rural Brazilian rubber
tappers formed a union to effect political, social, and economic change).
690 EDWARDS, supra note 7, at 151.
691 Id. at 178.
See FALK, supra note 681, at 127-36 (comparing top-down hierarchical politics
with bottom-up participatory politics).
693 See id. at 143 ("This green movement often exhibited tactical brilliance in its
r92

moves to expose the deficiencies of global trends, especially their dangers to the environment.").
694 See id. (explaining how specific incidents have spurred local populations to act
to protect their way of life or income).
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had some success,"""" Falk ultimately concludes that transnationalcivil
society efforts are likely to be even more effective91
2. Transnational Communities
Turning to such transnational affiliations, we can differentiate
them from international affiliations because transnational communities do not necessarily envision common world membership or global
governmental institutions. Rather, transnational communities are
communities of interest that cut across nation-state boundaries.
Perhaps the most important transnational force in recent years
has been the transnational corporation itself.697 "[T] he global capitalist system increasingly operates on bases other than [the] national,
and effective means of asserting political control over the transnational economy and of requiring [transnational corporations] to be
accountable to political institutions have yet to be developed.' ' 5 Cities were once used as trading centers to connect firms. In that context, "[m]arket geographies were so powerful that what was produced
was determined by where it was produced.

Now, it is corporategeog-

raphy, rather than territorialgeography, that determines what is produced and where. "Because of their newfound capacity to instantaneously coordinate production and distribution around the globe, to
downsize and subcontract, factories and firms have lost their depend,,700
ence on particular cities or regions.

1195See,

e.g.,

BRUCE

RICH,

MORTGAGING

T1-E

EARTH:

THiE

WORLD

BANK,

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPOVERISHMENT, AND THE CRISIS OF DEVELOPMENT 283-93 (1994)

(describing ways in which "local populations long marginalized from the grand narrative of modern history are mobilizing to de[end ecological balance and fight against
the destruction of resources upon which their survival depends"); Vandana Shiva, People" Ecology: The Chipko Movement, in TOWARDS A JUST WORLD PEACE: PERSPECTIVES
FROM SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 253 (Saul H. Mendlovitz & R.BJ. Walker eds., 1987) (discussing the emergence of grassroots ecological movements in India).
696See FAIK, sn/ra note 681, at 143-44 (opining that transnational
organizations
such as Greenpeace will likely be most successful in effecting change).
697 Cf Sarat & Scheingold, supra note 676, at 5 ("[T]he hallmark
of globalization
as it is generally understood is the worldwide spread of corporate capitalism and neoliberal values." (citation omitted)).
698 HORSMAN & MARSHALL, supra note 8, at 172.
69.Friedland & Boden, supra note 496,
at 12.
700 Id. at 13: see also Donald A. Palmer & Roger Friedland,
Coqoration, Class and
City System, in INTERCORPORATE RELATIONS 145, 147 (Mark S. Mizruchi & Michael
Schwartz eds., 1987) (arguing that corporate elites are the dominant force in creating
intracity links).
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Examples of such transnational corporate activity abound. Indeed, the volume of production by transnational corporations outside
their "home bases" now exceeds the volume of all world trade, indicating that trade within firms, rather than among them, is a growing
proportion of world commerce.70 1 Sales figures for many transnation702
als rank higher than the gross domestic products of some countries.
And because money can so7113
easily be transferred through global capital
markets around the world, central banks
are severely limited in their
•• 704
ability to affect national monetary polcy.
Regional trading blocs and free-trade zones create another form
of transnational economic space that is both related to geography and
yet beyond the bounds of nation-states. These zones have proliferated
705
Although NAFTA is perhaps the most familiar to
in recent years.
Americans, trade groups now exist in South America 70 1and Southeast
Asia 70 7 (not to mention the European Union itself), and others cut
across even regional identification.
See HORSMAN & MARSHALL, supra note 8, at 201 (explaining that transnational
corporations produce more goods abroad than in their home countries).
702 See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 32 tbl.l.1 (1999)
701

(collecting statistics).
703

Cf Ted C. Fishman, The Joys of Global Investment, HARPER'S, Feb. 1997, at 35, 36

("[T]he desire for international stocks remains so strong that nearly every American
investor owns them .... ).
704

See, e.g.,

SASKIA SASSEN,

LOSING CONTROL?

SOVEREIGNT1Y

IN

AN AGE OF

GLOBALIZATION, at xi-xii (1996) (noting that "[s] tate sovereignty, nation-based citizenship, the institutional apparatus in charge of regulating the economy, such as central
banks and monetary policies-all of these institutions are being destabilized and even
transformed as a result of globalization and the new technologies"); David G. Oedel,
Puzzling Banking Law: Its Effects and Purposes, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 477, 537 (1996) (observing that the "general significance of centralized supervision of the money supply is
rapidly declining in the modern global economy"); Dani Rodrik, Governance of Economic
Globalization, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 347, 351 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. &
John D. Donahue eds., 2000) ("A familiar result of open economy macroeconomics is
that countries cannot simultaneously maintain independent monetary policies, fixed
exchange rates, and an open capital account.").
705 See William H. Lash, Il, The Decline of the Nation State
in International Trade and
Investment, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1011, 1012 (1996) (citing statistics illustrating the
growth of trade within regional free-trade associations).
7016 The Andean Community (CAN) includes Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,
Who
Are
We?,
Andean
Community,
at
http://
and
Venezuela.
vvw.conunidadandina.org/ingles/who.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2002).
707 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) inclides
Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and
Vietnam.
Member Countries, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, at http://
www.aseansec.org/74.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2002).
708 For example, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group (APEC)
includes
Atistralia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malay-
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All of this commercial activity inevitably affects cultural identification. "In the transnational public sphere, peoples' identities as citizens of a nation are multiply refracted by their inventive appropriation of goods, images, and ideas distributed by multinational
corporations. '7° ' Arjun Appadurai highlights international fashion as
one field in which the global impact goes far beyond "cross-nationalstyle cannibalism" to the "systematic transnational assemblage[] of
production, taste transfer, pricing, and exhibition."' 0 Elsewhere, we
see concerns about the impact of American food, clothing, or mass
entertainment and the postcolonial imposition of homogenized taste
that were so memorably captured by Benjamin Barber in the title of
his 1995 book, Jihad vs. McWorld.7'
Nevertheless, in many areas it is increasingly difficult to define
corporate activity with a particular national moniker. Even leaving
aside transnational mergers such as Daimler-Chrysler, is an automobile sold by an "American" corporation really a U.S. product, when
most of its component parts are manufactured and assembled abroad?
Do jobs created by Japanese plants in the United States reflect the
health of the American economy or the Japanese economy?' Does a
film released by the Sony corporation (nominally Japanese) represent
American mass culture?

sia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taipei, Taiwan, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam. Member Economies,
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, at http://wwwl.apecsec.org.sg (last visited Nov.
18, 2002).
709

Gupta, sulira note 3, at 193-94.

710Arjun Appadurai, Patriotism and Its Futures, in MODERNIYAT LARGE:
CULTURAL

DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 7, at 158,167.
711 BENJAMIN BARBER, JIIAD VS. MCWORLD (1995).
On the other hand, Aihwa
Ong has argued that globalization has not led to cultural homogenization:
The dispersal of Coke, McDonald's Restaurants, and American TV soap operas to villages in West Africa or to Cairo, Beijing, or Sydney is not bringing
about a global cultural uniformity; rather, these products have had the effect
of greatly increasing cultural diversity because of the ways in which they are
interpreted and the way they acquire new meanings in local reception or because the proliferation of cultural difference is superbly consonant with marketing designs for profit making.
AIHWA ONG, FLEXIBLE CITIZENSHIP: THE CUuURAL LOGICS OF TRANSNATIONALIry 10
(1999). For further discussion of this "cultural imperialism" question, see IEN ANG,
LIVING ROOM WARS: RETHINKING MEDIA AUDIENCES FOR A POSTMODERN WORLD
(1996); Stuart Hall, Cultural Identity and Diaspora, in IDENTITY: COMMUNI'IY, CULTURE,
DIFFERENCE 222 (1. Rutherford ed., 1990); Hannerz, supra note 533.
712 This example is taken fiom Kenichi Ohmae, The
End of the Nation State, in THE
GLOBALIZATION READER 207, 208 (Frank J. Lechner &John Boli eds., 2000).
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Moreover, the modern corporation, the central bank, the freetrade region, and the global commodities market form only one area
in which transnational affiliation has become significant. The impact
of transnationalism is far broader. Indeed, looking more closely, we
can see a wide variety of "complex, postnational social formations. ''77
Simply listing examples gives a sense of the scope. Diaspora communities play an increasing role in the globalization of capital."' Transnational philanthropic movements such as Habitat for Humanity send
volunteers around the globe to build new environments. 71 ' The
emergence of a diffuse, overarching European identity, while not replacing national identification, has begun to create "'a shift towards
multiple loyalties, with the single focus on the nation supplanted by
European and regional affiliations above and below.' ' 7 ' Global public
policy networks, ranging in subject matter from crime to fisheries to
public health, have emerged during the past decade, bringing together loose alliances of government agencies, international organizations, corporations, and NGOs. 7
In addition, such global public policy networks form only one part
of a "nascent international civil society '75 that includes NGOs; busi71 Appadurai, supzra note 7, at 167; see also id. ("These formations are now organ-

ized around principles of finance, recruitment, coordination, communication, and reproduction that are fundamentally postnational and not just multinational or international.").
714 See, e.g., Chander, supra note 562, at 1060-74 (describing
a debt instrument offered by a homeland government. to raise capital principally from its diaspora); id. at
1012 n.29 (summarizing a World Bank report on diasporas' important role in facilitating the dissemination of information and capital across borders).
Appadurai, supra note 7, at 167.
716 HORSMAN & MARSHAL.L, suptra note 8, at 179 (quoting WILLIAM WAVALLACE, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WESTERN EUROPE 33 (1990)); see also Lindseth, supra note 350, at
682 ("The notion of multiple membership in overlapping dernoi may in fact be an accurate reflection of the undoubted fragmentation of power and sovereignty in the modern state, of which the [European Community] is both an agent and a consequence."
(citation omitted)).
717 See Wolfgang H. Reinicke, The Other World Wide
Web: Global Public Policy Networks, FOREIGN PoI.'Y, Winter 1999/2000, at 44, 45 ("[G]lobal public policy networks
have emerged over the last decade, experimenting vith new ways to gather knowledge
and disseminate information on specific issues.").
718 EDWARDS, supra note 7, at 179; see also FALK, supra note 681, at
138 (describing
"global civil society"); THOMAS PRINCEN & MATHI-AS FINGER, ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS IN
WORLD P1OLrICS: LINKING THE LOCAL AND TIE GLOBAL 10 (1994) (noting that environmental NGOs have shifted from operating solely at. the national level to operating
at the local and global levels); MARTIN SHAW, GLOBAL SOCIETY AND INTERNATIONAL
RIlATIONS 5-9 (1995) (arguing that the only way to discuss society is in the international context); Richard Falk, An Inquiry into the Political Economy of World Order, I NEW
POL. ECON. 13, 24 (1996) (describing "grassroots globalism" as a "movement of social
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ness and trade union networks; and cooperative efforts of government
actors including banking regulators, law-enforcement officials, intelligence agencies, judiciaries, and other local authorities 1 ' Such civil
society initiatives function sometimes as. an aspect of globalization by
challenging nation-state sovereignty, particularly with regard to human rights norms, and other times as an organized resistance to globaliza-

tion, particularly with regard to economic, trade, environmental, and
labor policy. While some NGOs, such as Amnesty International,
monitor the activities of the nation-state, others "work to contain the
excesses of nation-states ...

by assisting refugees, monitoring peace-

keeping arrangements, organizing relief in famines, and doing the
unglamourous work associated with oceans and tariffs, international
health and labor. '72 Transnational networks of lawyers also work to
challenge many of the perceived injustices of globalization.7 "
Such transnational policy efforts have been deployed with increasing frequency. The international anti-apartheid movement was perhaps the first successful global civil society effort to combine shareholder, consumer, and governmental action, persuading many
corporations, universities, and pension funds to divest themselves of
South African investments long before official national sanctions were
in place."' Similar boycott efforts have resulted in changes to tuna-

forces, with a transnational democratising outlook"); Miguel Darcy de Oliveira & Rajesh Tandon, An Emengig Global Civil Society, in CITIZIENS STRENGTIIENING GLOBAL
CIvILt SOCiEiv 1, 2 (Miguel Darcy de Oliveira & Rajesh Tandon eds., 1994) (discussing
the extension of "solidarity and responsibility to the public sphere on a global scale");
Paul Wapner, Politics Beyond the State: Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics, 47
WORLD POL. 311, 312-13 (1995) (describing global civil society as "the collective life,"
which "exists above the individual and below the state, but across national boundaries").
719 See EDWARDS, supra note 7, at 179 (asserting that "building
upwards from new
experiments in local politics and constitutional reform at the national level" will help
in constructing international civil societies); see also .JOHN VOGLER, THE GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL GOVERNANcE 20-41 (2d ed. 2000)
(using "regime analysis" to review such complex international cooperative efforts).
Appadurai, supra note 7, at 168.
7I See Sarat & Scheingold, supra note 676, at 4 ("[D]emocratization and globalization confront cause lawyers with new issues and new burdens while altering their resources and their tactical and strategic options.").
722 See Peter J. Spiro, New Global Potentates: Nongovernmental Organizations and
the
"Unregulated" Marketplace, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 957, 959 (1996) (detailing how interest
groups, even "[w]here stymied by national regulators[,] ... can accomplish equivalent
results by commanding consumer preferences, which in turn works to constrain corporate or state behavior").
COMMONS:

20021

GLOBALIZATION OFJURISDICTION

fishing practices so as to protect dolphins, a decision by the French
government to suspend its nuclear testing program,'2 ' and alterations
2
in Shell Oil's decommissioning of a rig in the North Atlantic.1 5
In addition, NGOs increasingly formulate global standards of corporate behavior. These "codes of conduct" have appeared most
prominently with regard to human rights, environmental protection,
and fair labor standards. As The Economist has observed, "a multinational's failure to look like a good global citizen is increasingly expensive in a world where consumers and pressure groups can be quickly
mobilised behind a cause. 72' In response, prominent corporate leaders, including AT&T, Federal Express, Honeywell, and AOL TimeWarner, have established Business for Social Responsibility-"[a]
global nonprofit organization that helps member countries achieve
commercial success in ways that respect ethical values, peoples, communities, and the environment. 7 27 Furthermore, especially in the
wake of the global movement against sweatshops, s NGOs have been

See Stop This Carnage: Hundreds of Our Dolphins Are Dying, W. MORNING NEWS
(U.K.), Feb. 7, 2002, at I (reporting that "wall of death nets" regularly threatened dolphins a decade ago, but now successful public awareness campaigns have led to
changes in tuna-fishing techniques, and tuna manufacturers routinely label their tuna
containers as "dolphin safe"); 45 NOAA SEAPOWER (Jan. 1, 2002) (reporting a "notable
success" in forging "international cooperation that allows 'dolphin-safe' tuna to be
harvested, while ensuring the health of dolphin stocks"), 2002 WL 13922711. For a
discussion of the tuna-dolphin controversy as part of a consideration of the potential
role of unilateral trade sanctions in protecting environmental resources, see Parker,
supra note 216.
724 See Greenpeace InternationalFounder Dies in Car Crash,
ENV'T NEwS SERVICE (Mar.
23, 2001), at http://ens-news.com/ens/mar200l/2001-03-23-12.asp (crediting Greenpeace for creating pressure that helped push the French government to end its nuclear testing program).
725 See Allan Pulsipher & William Daniel IV, Onshore-Only
PlatformlDisposition Needs
Exceptions, OIL & GASJ., Jan. 15, 2001, at 64, 64 (reporting that Shell's decision to cancel its plan for an "at-sea disposition" of an oil rig followed an unexpectedly fierce
campaign and public boycott).
26 Multinationalsand Their Morals, ECONOMIST, Dec.
2, 1995, at 18.
727 Mission, Business for Social Responsibility, at http://wwV.bsr.org/meta/ab)out/
mission.cfm (last visited Nov. 18, 2002). Similarly, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development evinces a "shared commitment to sustainable development via
the three pillars of economic growth, ecological balance and social progress." About
Us, World Business Council for Sustainable Development, at http://wwv.wbcsd.ch/
aboutus/index.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2002).
72
Many prominent companies
723

began to experience the full force of NGO and media rage [regarding sweatshops,] with a barrage of stories and Internet-based campaigns aimed against
their products. Students lobbied their universities to sever business ties with
companies that employed sweatshop labor. As a result, several firms changed
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able to persuade many corporations to accept independent monitoring of adopted standards.7 ' *
Finally, in the area of human rights, NGOs have actively pursued
transnational public law litigation, while continuing to lobby on behalf of humanitarian intervention around the globe. Indeed, in the
last fifteen years we have seen that various events, "such as the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the mistreatment of Kurds in Iraq, the starvation and [lawlessness] in Somalia in 1992-1993, and the brutal human
rights abuses in [Kosovo]," have all brought international intervention
in defiance of the old idea that national borders and sovereignty were
sacrosanct. ' Former Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali has even gone so far as to state that "the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty... has passed. ''7a
In contrast to the development of global civil society, the development of transnational terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda is a
much darker example of transnational affiliation. Such organizations
can mobilize personnel and deploy money around the world,'" func-

their behavior, raising standards abroad and inviting independent monitors to
assess their progress.
Ethan B. Kapstein, The CoiporateEthics Crusade, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 105,
105. For a recent argument that American corporations affiliated with sweatshops
abroad might be liable under the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of slavery, see
Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendinent and Slavery in the Global Economy, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 973 (2002).
729 See Spiro, supira note 722, at 962 (remarking
that corporations reacted positively
to proposed independent monitoring). For an overview of the various forms the imposition of human rights norms has taken, see Chris Avery, Business and Human Rights
in a Time of Change, in LIABILITY OF MULTINAIIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (Menno T. Karsminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000).
7.30 See, e.g., Jane Perlez, Indonesia's Guerilla War Puts
Exxon Under Siege, N.Y. TIMES,
July 14, 2002, at A3 (describing a lawsuit brought in the United States by the International Labor Rights Fund on behalf of Indonesian villagers who claim that Exxon is
involved in human rights abuses in connection with the operation of its plant in the
province of Aceh).
Demko & Wood, supra note 8, at 10.
7342An Agenda for Peace: Prementive DI)iploiacy,
Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping: Report of
the Secretaiy-General,U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc. S/24111 (1992).
734 See Foreign & Commonwealth Office, U.K., Responsibilityfor
the Terrorist Atrocities
in the United States, 11 September 2001: An Updated Account 2 (Nov. 14, 2001) ("Al Qaida
is a terrorist organisationi with ties to a global network ....
[The organization] includes training camps, warehouses, communications facilities and commercial operations able to raise significant sums of money to support its activity."), available at
http://www.pm.gov.uk/files/pdf/culpability-docuLentl.pdf; Sam Dillon, Indictment by
SpanishJndgePortraysa Secret Teror Cell, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2001, at A] (describing the
formation and emergence of a European Al Qaeda cell); StIsan Sachs, An Investigation
in Egypt IllustratesAl Qaeda's Web, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2001, at Al (describing the ease
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tioning as quasi-state entities. Indeed, it is significant that the United
States has been willing to treat Al Qaeda almost as if it were a sovereign state to be fought in a "war." NATO invoked Article V of the
North Atlantic Treaty, which pledges each signatory country to defend
the others in the event of an armed attack,"' thereby treating the attack more as a military action than a criminal one.'3" The Bush ad-

ministration has asserted the authority to try Al Qaeda operatives before military commissions, apparently based in part on the belief that
the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon were not simply
crimes, but violations of the laws of war, which have customarily been
Moreover, although some argue that the
reserved for state entities.
September 11, 2001 attacks signal a reassertion of the primacy of the
nation-state as the locus for ensuring security and world order, both
the attacks and the responses necessary to combat global terrorism

with which Al Qaeda "move[s] money around the globe"); Benjamin Weiser & Tim
Golden, Al Qaeda: Sprawling, Hard-to-Spot Web of Terrorists-in-Waiting,N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
30, 2001, at B4 (discussing the training and mobilization of A] Qaeda militants). Other
terrorist (or revolutionary) movements have similarly global links. See, e.g., Vladimir
Kucherenko, Cause and Effect Nature of Globalization and Terror Argued, WORLD NEWS
CONNECTION, Sept. 13, 2001, 2001 WL 27854157 (citing "the Tamil movement fighting
in Sri Lanka and southern India"; "[t]he guerrilla armies of Latin America which work
closely with the drugs barons; the Kosovo terrorists in cahoots with the Albanian mafia
in Europe; certain Arab groups; and the Chechen bandit[s]" as examples of quasi-state
entities that utilize global technology to facilitate the flow of money and coordination
of their activities).
734 The North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241,
2244, 34 U.N.T.S.
243, 246, declares:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and
consequently the), agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them ...
will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and
in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
735 See NATO
to Support U.S. Retaliation, CNN.COM (Sept. 12, 2001), at http://
www.cnn.com/200 /WORLD/europe/09/12/nato. us (reporting that NATO had invoked Article V in response to the September 11 attacks, the first invocation of the
provision in fifty-two years).
73
See, e.g., Hearingon Military Tribunals 'Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary (Dec. 4,
2001) (testimony of Pierre-Richard Prosper, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes)
("As the president's order [establishing military commissions] recognizes, we must call
these attacks by the rightful name, 'war crime."'), 2001 WL 1591408, at *17.
737 See, e.g., Dominique Moisi, Early Winners and Losers in a Time of
War, FIN. TIMES
(U.S.), Nov. 19, 2001, at 15 ("In the post-cold-war global age, the state's legitimacy and
competence appeared to be waning. Caught between the emergence of civil society
and the growing power of transnational corporations, the state appeared to be fighting
a rearguard battle. Now, with security a priority, it is back with a vengeance.").
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demonstrate the need for increasing transnational and international
cooperation. As Harold Hongju Koh has argued, the real challenge in
the face of these attacks is to figure out how to use "the constructive
7 38
face of globalization to overcome its most destructive face.
3. Supranational Communities
Whereas transnationalism binds people to communities of interest
across territorial borders, supranationalism asserts the primacy of governing norms that exist above the nation-state. Perhaps the most obviOtis example of such affiliation is the United Nations, which insistently
evokes an overarching narrative of world community]" Another example that has drawn considerable attention in recent years is the effort to construct a European identity that operates beyond the individual nation-states on the continent.
In the post-Maastricht European Union, the line between a "national" and a European unit has become increasingly blurred. 740 We
now see a common currency, the ability to travel without visas, and the
development of a European parliament, along with a European administrative and judicial bureaucracy, the relaxation of trade barriers,
tariffs, and taxation, and the free movement of labor.7" Such practices certainly resemble the activities and concerns of traditional nation-states. 74' Though it may be unlikely that the nation-states constituting Europe will disappear,74 : the shift is nevertheless a real and

738

Harold Hongju Koh, Preserving American Values:

Abroad, in THE AGE OF TERROR:

The Challenge at Home and

AMERICA AND THE WORLD AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at

145, 147 (Strobe Talbott & Nayan Chanda eds., 2001).
739Nevertheless,

as Gupta points out, this supranational ideal is still premised on

the idea "of the world as a body of equal but different nation-states." Gupta, supra note
3, at 185. Thus, the United Nations does not fully challenge the system of nation-state
sovereignty.
740 See ALLAN M. WILLIAMS, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIIv:

OF INTEGRATION 206 (2d ed.

THE CONTRADICTIONS

1994) (arguing that "the importance of the Single Euro-

pean Act was not to be seen in any resultant institutional changes but in that it reopened the debate about the inevitabilitiy of [European Community] integration, or
the survival of the nation-state" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
741 See generally Paul Teague, Between
Convergence and Divergence: Possibilitiesfor a
European Community System of Labour Market Regulation, 132 INT'L LABOUR REV. 391
(1993) (examining the influences for and against the establishment of a new European labor market regulation).
742 Cf CURTIN, supra note 5, at 42 (describing the "usurping
of national legislative
power by the European Community" as "direct and striking").
74 See Lindseth, supra note 350, at 680-83 (describing
the "continued pull of the
nation-state" in Europe); cf Alec Stone, Ratifying Maastricht: France Debates European
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important one. Indeed, we may be seeing the emergence of a hybrid
form of governance that is neither a unified federation nor a single
European state, but is perhaps some combination of the two. As one
commentator points out, "[t]his tension between a federation and a
confederation, between integration and interdependence,
has been im7+
1
plicit in the notion of 'Europe' since the beginning.",
In order to understand whether the European Union is really inculcating notions of supranational community, one might look to the
schools that have been established for the fifteen thousand children
of the employees of the European Community. The explicit aim of
these schools is to "'create a whole new layer of identity in these
kids. ' -' 71 ; According to reports, "[giraduates emerge [from these
schools] superbly educated, usually trilingual, with their nationalism
muted-and very, very European.7 4" This seems to be the intent. Indeed, the schools strive to educate students
"not as products of a
7 ' 47
Europeans.
as
but
fatherland
or
motherland
This effort has been contentious, particularly in the study of history, where textbooks from a particular country tend to portray events
in the past from that country's point-of-view1 4s Nevertheless, "[tihe
European Community schools are creating new sets of relationships
between peoples and spaces, forging a different type of identity in
their students."74 ' It will be interesting to see whether these schools
ultimately adopt a broader cosmopolitan perspective or whether they
simply reconstruct Europe as a "homeland" that, while not national, is
nevertheless viewed as a territorial fortress to be protected from "out-

Union, I FRENCH POL. & SOC'Y 70, 85 (1993) (arguing that the idea of "Europe" has
arrived "as a domestic political issue").
744 Gupta, supra note 3, at 186. Alan Milward and
Vibeke Sorensen argue that
while the European Union may be integrationist with respect to its plans for monetary
union, its immigration, defense, and foreign policies are based on a model of interdependence. Alan S. Milward & Vibeke Sorensen, Interdependence or Integration? A National Choice, in THE FRONTIER OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGN I': HISTORY AND THEORY 19451992, at 20, 30 (Alan S. Milward et al. eds., 1993); see aLso Etienne Balibar, Racism and
Politics in Europe Today, 186 NEW LEFI REV. 5, 16 (1991) ("The state today in Europe is
neither national nor supranational,and this ambiguity does not slacken but only grows
deeper over time.").
45 Glynn Mapes, Polyglot Students Are Weaned Eorly off Mother
'ongue,
WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 6, 199(0, at Al (quoting Desmond Swan, Professor of Education at University College, Dublin).
74 Id. (emphasis
added).
747 Id.

See id. (quoting one European school history teacher as saying that such
textbooks "tend to be blinkered histories of the great powers").
749 Gupta, supra note 3,
at 186-87.
748
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siders. '' 5 0 Sadly, the evidence thus far indicates that a coordination of
immigration policies is leading to precisely this kind of "fortress" mentality, whereby "Europe" must be defended against immigrants. 5
Thus, though the European Community schools are engaged in the
reconstruction of an identity not based on old nation-state boundaries, new territorial boundaries may be substituted.
4. Cosmopolitan Communities
Another way of constructing supranational identity is to view the
relevant community as truly global and plural-a cosmopolitan community. 5 2 We can think of cosmopolitanism as an extension of Anderson's idea of the nation-state as an imagined community. Anderson argued that the rise of print capitalism allowed people to feel as
though they were part of the same community with others whom they
would never meet, thus providing the basis for imagining the nationstate.' Cosmopolitanism takes this argument a step further.
If people can get as emotional as Anderson says they do about relations
with fellow nationals they never see face-to-face, then now that printcapitalism has become electronic- and digital-capitalism, and now that
this system is so clearly transnational, it would be strange if people did
not get emotional in mtIch the same way, if not necessarily to the same

See Carlos Closa, 'The Concept of Citizenship in the Treaty on European Union, 29
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1137, 1141 (1992) ("Within the community framework, the enjoyment of certain rights and privileges depends on the person holding the citizenship
or nationality of a member state which is still the predominant criteria [sic].");
Dietrich Thr~inhardt & Robert Miles, Introduction to MIGRATION AND EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION: THE DYNAMICS OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION I, 3 (Robert Miles &
Dietrich Thrfinhardt eds., 1995) (challenging the "popular conception" of Europe as a
"fortress" because the "fortress... is constantly breached by 'illegal' immigrants"); cf
Biddy Martin & Chandra T. Mohanty, Feminist Politics: What's Home Got to Do with It?, in
FEMINIS'I STUDIES/CRITICAL STUDIES 191, 192 (Teresa de Lauretis ed., 1986) (discussing the challenge of finding different ways to conceptualize community).
751 See Gupta, supra note 3, at 187 (asking, "Will Europe become a 'fortress'
to be
750

defended against immigrants?").
752 For a sampling of the scholarship in this
area, see generally JESSICA

BERMAN,

MODERNIST FICTION, COSMOPOITANISM, AND THE POITICS OF COMMUNI-fY 1-27
(2001); COSMOPOLITICS: TIINKING AND FEELING BEYOND THE NAFION, supra note 29;

GLOBALIZATION (Arjun Appadurai ed., 2001); HANNERZ, supra note 529; MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM ET AL., FOR LOVE OF COUNTrRY: DEBATING THE LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM
(Joshua Cohen ed., 1996); BRUCE ROBBINS, FEELING GLOBAL: INTERNATrIONALISM IN
DISTRESS (1999).

For a discussion of Anderson's analysis of the relationship between the rise of
print capitalism and the nation-state, see supra notes 647-56 and accompanying text.
753
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degree, about others who are not fellow nationals, people bound to them
by some transnational sort of fellowship.754

Thus, a sense of diminishing distance among peoples may lead to
greater identification across borders.
Indeed, a cosmopolitan perspective may cause us to feel connected to others in a way that breeds empathy and, perhaps, political
engagement. Cosmopolitans recognize that "[w]e are connected to
all sorts of places, causally if not always consciously, including many
that we have never traveled to, that we have perhaps only seen on television-including the place where the television itself was manufactured. ''7:5,5 If we truly feel that connection, we may be more likely to
concern ourselves with the plight of those who manufactured the
product.
Cosmopolitanism can be traced at least as far back as the Stoics,
who argued that each of us dwells in two communities: "the local
community of our birth, and the community of human argument and
aspiration that 'is truly great and truly common, in which we look neither to this corner nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our nation by the sun.' 75 ' Recognizing the dangers of factionalism that
come from allegiance to the political life of a group, the Stoics contended that only by placing primary allegiance in the world community can mutual problems be addressed.
Martha Nussbaum has recently elaborated on the Stoic ideal in an
essay touting the cosmopolitan perspective. According to Nussbaum,
cosmopolitanism does not require one to give up local identifications,
77
which, she acknowledges, "can be a source of great richness in life., "5
Rather, following the Stoics, she suggests that we think of ourselves as
surrounded by a series of concentric circles:
The first one encircles the self, the next takes in the immediate family,
then follows the extended family, then, in order, neighbors or local
groups, fellow city-dwellers, and fellow countrymen-and we can easily
add to this list groupings based on ethnic, linguistic, historical, professional, gender, or sexual identities. Outside all these circles is the largest
one, humanity as a whole.7" 8

Robbins, supra note 29, at 7.
Id. at3.
756 Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosnopoltitanism, in
NUSSBAUM El AL., supra
note 752, at 3, 7 (quoting Roman playwright Lucius Annaeus Seneca).
757 Id.
at9.
758 Id. One could also imagine the circle expanding still
farther to include nonhuman animals, see, e.g., PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 8 (2d ed. 1990) ("If a be754
755
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The task then, is to draw the circles together. Therefore, we need not
relinquish special affiliations and identifications with the various
groups. "We need not think of them as superficial, and we may think
7'
of our identity as constituted partly by them.''
But, Nussbaum argues, "we should also work to make all human beings part of our
community of dialogue and concern, base our political deliberations
on that interlocking commonality, and give the circle that defines our
humanity special attention and respect. ,7
In this vision, people could be "cosmopolitan patriots,' 7 ' accepting their responsibility to nurture the culture and politics of their
home community, while at the same time recognizing that such cultural practices are always shifting, as people move from place to place.
"The result would be a world in which each local form of human life
was the result of long-term and persistent processes of cultural hybridization-a world, in that respect, much like the world we live in
,,762

now.

Iris Young has used the ideal of the "unoppressive city" as a model
763
for a similarly multifaceted understanding of community.
She argues that "community" is always a politically problematic term because
"those motivated by it will tend to suppress differences among themselves or implicitly to exclude from their political groups persons with
whom they do not identify. ''7"-4 Thus "[t]he desire for community re-

ing suffers there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into
consideration. No matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally with the like suffering ... of any other being."), and the environment, see, e.g., Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?
Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 450 (1972) ("Originally
each man had regard only for himself and those of a very narrow circle about him;
later... 'his sympathies became more tender and widely diffused, extending ... finally
to the lower animals."' (quoting CHARLES DARWIN, DESCENT OF MAN 119-21 (2d ed.
1874))). For a comparison of the two movements, see Megan A. Senatori, The Second
Revolution: The Diveiging Paths of Animal Activism and Environmental Law, 8 WiS. EN'TL.

L:l.31 (2002).

759Nussbaum, supra note 756,
at 9.
7 o;Id.
761

Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitan Patriots, in COSMOPOLITICS: THINKING

ANI) FEELING BEYOND THIE NATION, supra note

29, at 91.

762

Id. at 92.

763

See Iris Marion Young, The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference, in

FE.MINISM/IOS'IMODERNIS,\I 300, 317 (Linda ..Nicholson ed., 1990) ("Our political

ideal is the unoppressive city."); see alsoJerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 SITAN.
L. REV. 1047, 1048-49 (1996) (invoking Young's ideal city to reclaim the idea of cornmunity as "the being together of strangers," rather than limiting community to "feelings of identity or unity").
764 Young, snpra note 763,
at 300.
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lies on the same desire for social wholeness and identification that
underlies racism and ethnic chauvinism on the one hand and political
sectarianism on the other. 7 65 Instead, she envisions ideal city life as
the "'being-together' of strangers."7"' These strangers may remain
strangers and continue to "experience each other as other.' 7 7 Indeed, they do not necessarily seek an overall group identification and
loyalty. Yet, they are open to "unassimilated otherness. 7' 68 They belong to various distinct groups or cultures and are constantly interacting with other groups. But they do so without seeking either to assimilate or to reject those others. Such interactions instantiate an
alternative kind of community,7 9 one that is never a hegemonic imposition of sameness but that nevertheless prevents different groups
from ever being completely outside one another.770 In a city's public
spaces, Young argues, we see glimpses of this ideal: "The city consists
in a great diversity of people and groups, with a multitude of subcultures and differentiated activities and functions, whose lives and
movements mingle and overlap in public spaces."77"' In this vision,
there can be community without sameness, shifting affiliations without
ostracism.777
Although Young does not refer to her vision as cosmopolitan, it
fits comfortably within the alternative understanding of community I
am sketching here. Cosmopolitanism is emphatically not a model of
international citizenship in the sense of international harmonization
and standardization, but instead is a recognition of multiple refracted

765 Id. at 302.
7 IJd. at 318.
767

Id.

768Id. at 319.

Young resists using the word "community" because of the "urge to
unity" the
term conveys, but acknowledges that "[i]n the end it may be a matter of stipulation"
whether one chooses to call her vision "community." Id. at 320; see also Frug, supra
note 763, at 1049 ("Unlike Young, I do not cede the term community to those who
evoke the romance of togetherness.").
770 See Young, supra note 763, at 319
(positing that a group of strangers living side
by side "instantiates social relations as difference in the sense of an utnderstanding of
groups and cultures that are different, with exchanging and overlapping interactions
that do not issue in community, yet which prevent them from being outside of one another").
769

771

d.

772 This

vision is not exclusive to Western thought. See, e.g., Pollock et al., supra
note 673, at 586 (noting "the Asia-wide circulation of Sanskrit poetry in the first millennium whereby participation in a translocal culture, uneven and restricted by life
chances though it was, neither required enforcement at the point of a sword nor entailed the obliteration of everything already in place").
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differences where (as in Young's ideal city) people acknowledge links
with the "other" without demanding assimilation or ostracism. Cosmopolitanism seeks "flexible citizenship," 7 1 in which people are permitted to shift identities amid a plurality of possible affiliations and
allegiances.
These allegiances could also include non-territorial
communities, such as those found in Internet chatrooms. The cosmopolitan worldview shifts back and forth from the rooted particularity of personal identity to the global possibility of multiple overlapping
communities. It requires a "translation or transmutation of cosmopolitanism, usually understood as a detached, individual view of the
global, into the more collective, engaged, and4 empowered form of
worldliness that is often called internationalism.,11
Thus, cosmopolitanism forms perhaps the strongest alternative vision to the territorially bounded sovereignty of the nation-state. But
what would a system of legal jurisdiction look like in a world based on
cosmopolitan pluralism? The next Part takes up this question.
V. A

COSMOPOLITAN PLURALIST CONCEPTION OFJURISDICTION

As we have seen, the story ofjurisdiction is a story of social space
and community definition. But the very ideas of space and community are themselves narrative constructions that are always contested.
Thus, the problem with assuming that nation-state identities are the
relevant matrix for understanding community is that such a conception "serves to foreclose a richer understanding of location and identity that would account for the relationships of subjects to multiple
collectkivties. ,776 Rather, we must recognize that the ability of people
to confound the established spatial orders, either through physical
movement or through their own conceptual and political acts of reimagination or jurisdiction-making, means that space and community
affiliation can never be "given" and that the process of their sociopolitical construction must always be considered. A jurisdictional system

773 See ONG, supra note 711, at 6 (describing how "the cultural
logics of capitalist
accumulation, travel, and displacement that induce subjects to respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing political-economic conditions" foster a form of transnationality she calls "flexible citizenship").
774 ROBBINS, supra note
752, at 5.
775 See BERMAN, supra note 752, at 3-4 (arguing
that, when we speak of community,
we necessarily "move in a realm of being-in-common that rests upon the border between 'I'and 'we,' a border that may not necessarily coincide with the political
boundaries that surround us").
776 Gupta, supra note 3, at 196.
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whose objects are no longer conceived as "automatically and naturally
anchored in space" can therefore "pay particular attention to the way
spaces and communities are made, imagined, contested, and enforced.' 7 In this final Part, I attempt to sketch the contours of such a
multivalent jurisdictional system, which I call a cosmopolitan pluralist
conception ofjurisdiction.
The cosmopolitan pluralist conception of jurisdiction aims to capture a jurisdictional middle ground between strict territorialism on
the one hand and expansive universalism on the other. As we have
seen, a territorialist approach to jurisdiction fails to account for the
wide variety of community affiliations and social interactions that defy
territorial boundaries. A more universalist perspective, by contrast,
which seeks to imagine people as world citizens first and foremost,
might seem to be a useful alternative. After all, universalism recognizes (and indeed celebrates) non-national identification."" This alternative, though attractive in its idealism, strikes me as misguided for
several reasons: First, it asks that we see ourselves solely as citizens of
the world and therefore dissolves the multirootedness of community
affiliation into one global community. Second, it fails to capture the
extreme emotional ties people still feel to distinct transnational or lo777 Gupta & Ferguson, supra note 529, at 47. One
might also extend the approach
offered here to consider the ways in which ideas such as "the Self" and "the subject
matter" are also "made, imagined, contested, and enforced." Id. Thus, for example,
the doctrines of standing and subject matter jurisdiction might be analyzed more
closely in order to consider possibilities of fragmented, partial, or multiple assertions
ofjurisdiction over aspects, parts, or elements of the individual or the subject matter.
Although such exploration is beyond the scope of this Article, a recognition of the social meaning of legal jurisdiction opens space for consideration of these important issties by focusing on the socially constructed nature of the assertion of legal authority.
Indeed, with regard to subject matter jurisdiction, an analysis of the relationship between state and tribal courts might be fruitful. For example, the Indian Child Welfare
Act establishes presumptive tribal court jurisdiction over child custody proceedings
involving an Indian child, even if the child does not reside in Indian country. See 25
U.S.C. § 1911 (a) (2000) ("Where an Indian child is a ward of a tribal court, the Indian
tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding the residence or domicile of
the child."). Thus, the statute seems to evince a vision of tribal community membership not based on territory. In addition, the question of tribal court jurisdiction over
non-Indians has long been controversial. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has denied tribes' criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978), and has also denied tribes' jurisdiction over nonIndians in many civil cases, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-67 (1981),
a more flexible understanding of the multiple nature of community affiliation would
likely support the idea of concurrent state and tribal courtjurisdiction.
77 See, e.g., Pollock et al., supra note 673, at 581 ("Modernity
has never fallen short
of making universalist claims to world citizenship, based on the spectacular success of
the Enlightenment as a pedagogical and political project.").
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cal communities. 77 ' Thus, universalism tends to ignore the very attachments people hold most deeply. Third, as Anupam Chander has
pointed out, the aspiration that we become solely citizens of the world
is at least partly based on an internationalization of John Rawls's theory ofjustice'8° and is therefore subject to the same criticism Rawls has
long faced: that his theory assumes a Self detached
• 781 from the social
and cultural context that makes such a Self possible.
Fourth, an ongoing system of comprehensive universal jurisdiction poses such a
strong challenge to our current notions of nation-state sovereignty
that, as a practical matter, it seems unlikely to be adopted widely in
the foreseeable future. Fifth, and perhaps most important, a universalist conception of jurisdiction tends to presuppose a world citizenry
devoid of both particularist ties and normative discussion about the
relative importance of such ties. Thus, universalism cuts off debate
about the nature of overlapping communities just as surely as territorialism does.
A cosmopolitan conception ofjurisdiction, in contrast, makes no attempt to deny the multirootedness of individuals within a variety of
communities, both territorial and non-territorial. Indeed, the basic
tenet of cosmopolitanism, as I define it, is the acknowledgment of
multiple communities, rather than the erasure of all communities except the most encompassing. Thus, although a cosmopolitan conception of jurisdiction acknowledges the potential importance of asserting universal jurisdiction in specific circumstances, 782 it does not
require a universalist belief in a single world community.
In addition, a truly pluralist conception of jurisdiction recognizes
that law does not reside solely in the coercive commands of a sover-

779 See Thomas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan:
Loyalty, Identity and Community in
Law and Practice,90 AM.]. INT'L L. 359, 374 (1996) ("The powerful pull of loyalty exerted by the imagined nation demonstrates that, even in the age of science, a loyalty
system based on romantic myths of shared history and kinship has a capacity to endure....").
78) See Brian Barry, Statism and Nationalism: A Cosmopolitan
Clitique, 41 NOMOS 12,
36 (1999) (noting that a number of philosophers take a global version of Rawls's theory of ustice as their starting point).
See Chander, supra note 562, at 1047 (criticizing cosmopolitanism because it
embraces an image of the Self that "removes the aspects that make the self special").
Chander ascribes this position to cosmopolitanism. While I agree with his critique, I
believe he is actually targeting what I call "universalism." As this Part makes clear, I
view cosmopolitanism as the recognition of multiple attachments, not the desire for a
single world citizenry.
782 See supra Part 1.1 (discussing the assertion of universal
jurisdiction over alleged
htunan rights violators).
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eign power. Rather, law is constantly constructed through the contest
of various norm-generating communities.
As Robert Cover argued
nearly two decades ago, "all collective behavior entailing systematic
understandings of our commitments to future worlds" can lay equal
claim to the word "law. 78 4 Thus, although "official" norms articulated
by sovereign entities obviously count as "law," a pluralist framework
acknowledges that such official assertions of jurisdiction are only one
of the many ways in which normative commitments arise. Accordingly, a more comprehensive conception of jurisdiction must attend
to the jurisdictional assertions of nonsovereign communities as well.7s '
Such jurisdictional assertions are significant because, even though
they lack coercive power, they open a space for the articulation of legal norms that are often subsequently incorporated into official legal
regimes.
Indeed, once we recognize that the state does not hold a monopoly on the articulation and exercise of legal norms, then we can see
law as a terrain of engagement, where various communities debate different visions of alternative futures. And the idea of jurisdiction necessarily becomes a locus for this debate because it is in the assertion of
jurisdiction itself that these norm-generating communities seize the
language of law and articulate visions of future worlds. If jurisdiction
is, literally, the ability to speak as a community, then we can begin to
develop a "natural law ofjurisdiction," 7s ; where communities claim the
authority to use the language of the law based on a right or entitlement that precedes the particular sovereignties of the present moment.
By acknowledging the ways in which the language and forms of
law are deployed by individuals and communities both inside and outside the territorial bounds of the state system, the cosmopolitan plu-

783

See Cover, supra note 523, at 43 ("The position that only the state creates law...

confuses the status of interpretation with the status of political domination."); see also
Cover, supra note 2, at 176 (arguing that law functions as a "bridge in normative
space," a way of connecting the "world-that-is" with various imaginings of "worlds-thatmight-be").
784 Cover, supra note 2, at 176 (emphasis
added).
785 Cover argues that such a capacious understanding
of "law" would "deny to the
nation state any special status for the collective behavior of its officials or for their systematic understandings of some special set of 'governing' norms." Id. According to
Cover, such "official" norms may count as law, but they must share that title with
"thousands of other social understandings." Id.
786 Cover, su/na note 523, at 58.
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ralist conception of jurisdiction recalls not only Robert Cover,7"7 but
also the pioneering work of Myres McDougal, Harold Lasswell, and
the New Haven School of International Law. These scholars argued
that international legal regimes were not concerned primarily with
fixed rules but with procedures for interaction.7 8 Thus, the School
saw international law as a "world constitutive process of authoritative
decision," rather than a set of coercive requirements."" ' Not surprisingly, these scholars focused attention on the idea ofjurisdiction itself,
analyzing the way in which processes of international order could be
applied to new places, such as Antarctica 7" and outer space 79'-the
"cyberspaces" of a previous generation. Indeed, they emphasized that
jurisdiction is asserted not through "naked force or calculations of expediency... [but by] participants established by community expectation ... [making] reasoned decisions, justified by relation to policy
criteria established by community expectation .' 7))2 Moreover, they
recognized that people form multiple community attachments and
argued that "[t]he individual should be able to become a member of,
and to participate in the value processes of, as many bodies politic as
his capabilities will permit."' 7 ' ' Building on these observations, a cosmopolitan pluralist framework emphasizes the process of interaction
among a wide variety of norm-generating communities that are based
on the entire panoply of multiple overlapping affiliations and attachments people actually experience in their daily lives, from the local to

787

Cover, of course, wrote long before the rise of the Internet or the burgeoning

interest in globalization. Yet I believe that his evocative musings on the nature ofjurisdiction provide a useful starting point for developing a more conceptually satisfying
understanding of legal jurisdiction in the twenty-first century.
788 See Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification
and Appraisal of
Diverse Systems of Pnlblic
Order, 53 AM. J. lN'T'L L. 1, 9 (1959) ("Within the decisionmaking process our chief interest is in the legal process, by which we mean the making
of authoritative and controlling decisions."); see also id. ("Authority is the structure of
expectation concerning who, with what qualifications and mode of selection, is competent to make which decisions by what criteria and what procedures. By control we refer to an effective voice in decision, whether authorized or not.").
789)

Myres S. McDougal et al., The World Constitutive Proess of Authoritative Decisions,

19J. LEGAL EDUC. 253, 255 (1967).

790See generally EMIIio J. SAHURIE, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
ANTARCIiCA
(1992) (describing the laws of Antarctica as they relate to the international legal order).
791

See generally MYRES S. MCDOUGAL ET AL.,

LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE

(1963) (outlining a framework for the study of law and public order in space).
712 ld. at
95.
M Myres S. McDougal et al., Nationality and Human
Rights: The Pratectionof the Individual in External Arenas, 83 YALE L.J. 900, 903 (1974).
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the global (including some affiliations not based on territory at all).
In this vision, as in the work of the New Haven School, ajurisdictional
assertion is part of an international process of community definition
and norm creation.
This Part first develops the cosmopolitan pluralist framework for
analyzing questions of jurisdiction and recognition of judgments. It
then applies that framework to a few of the jurisdictional conundrums
discussed in Part I. I conclude with some thoughts about the ways in
which cyberspace legal issues and traditional international law concerns are converging, both in debates about jurisdiction and in the
creation of a transnational common law.
A. The Cosmopolitan PluralistJurisdictionalFramezvork
As previously discussed, a cosmopolitan conception of community
recognizes the interrelatedness of peoples and cultures around the
world while nevertheless attending to local variations among groups
and the wide variety of ways that individuals come to understand their
identification with those groups. This view imagines overlapping webs
of relation, some woven out of local affiliation and some unbounded
by geography. Cosmopolitan communities are rooted in the local "as
a structure of feeling, a property of social life, and an ideology of situ794
Instead of an
ated community," while still remaining unbordered .
ideal of detachment or universalism, cosmopolitanism recognizes
multiple attachments across time and space.
Moreover, there are always multiple norm-generating communities; the assertion of jurisdiction is therefore the act that sets these
normative views in conflict. Accordingly, a cosmopolitan pluralist
conception ofjurisdiction would provide all the multiple attachments
we might call "community" with an opportunity to establish both their
claim to community status and their particular normative commitments on the legal stage ofjurisdiction. Jurisdiction thus becomes the
locus for debates about the appropriate definition of community and
the articulation of norms.
In practice, this means that territorially based limitations on the
assertion ofjurisdiction are inappropriate because they reify arbitrary
boundaries and foreclose debate about either community definition
or the evolution of substantive norms. In a cosmopolitan pluralist
conception of jurisdiction, courts could not simply dismiss assertions

794

Appadurai, supra note 7, at 189.
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ofjurisdiction based on a mechanical counting of contacts with a geographically based sovereign entity. This is just as well because, as we
have seen, such jurisdictional tests are routinely acknowledged as
problematic in a contemporary world of interconnection and crossborder interaction. Instead, jurisdiction must be based on whether
the parties before the court are appropriately conceptualized as
members of the same community, however that community is defined.7
Then a court subsequently asked to enforce a judgment
would need to address in a more nuanced way both the question of
whether the assertion of jurisdiction that led to the judgment was legitimate and whether the substantive norms announced by the prior
court should be deemed enforceable.
Although the cosmopolitan pluralist conception implies the possibility for jurisdictional assertions by non-state communities (and I
will address such assertions in detail below), it in no way denies the
continued importance of nation-states or state-sanctioned courts. After all, cosmopolitanism recognizes multiple attachments, and there
can be little doubt that, even if-as I have argued-the nation-state is
an imagined community, socially constructed and historically contingent, it is still a particularly powerful imagined community and one
that generates real feelings of loyalty and attachment. 7"6 People obviously are far more willing to die for their nation-state than, say, for
their bowling league.
In addition, as a practical matter, statesanctioned courts and nation-state boundaries are likely to be an enduring part of the political landscape for the foreseeable future.
Thus, I begin by looking at the implications of a cosmopolitan conception of jurisdiction for assertions of jurisdiction by such statesanctioned courts. I then consider the broader question of jurisdictional assertions by non-state communities.

795 Such an inquiry is not so different from those
undertaken in cases that hinge
on the legitimacy of tribal identification. For a discussion of the issues involved in such
cases, see, for example,JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE: TWENTIETHCENTURY ErINOGRAPHiY, LITERATURE, AND ART 277-346 (1988).
796 See Pollock et al., supra note 673, at 579 (describing
the power of the imagined
nation of Pakistan "to address the experience of cultural and political displacement
that colonialism had meant for many Muslims in South Asia" and arguing that although "the nationalist search for home and authenticity may have been modern ... it
was not, for that reason, inauthentic or illegitimate in itself').
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1. AJurisdictional Framework for State-Sanctioned Courts

A cosmopolitan pluralist conception ofjurisdiction would change
the analytical framework for assessing jurisdiction in several respects
from that which is currently used in most courts, both in the United
States and elsewhere. The changes are actually not so dramatic, however, because courts have already begun to use an analysis of community ties as the rubric for determining jurisdiction even while purporting to count contacts. Thus, in many respects the cosmopolitan
pluralist framework merely makes explicit the analytical steps judges
are already using implicitly.
Under most current jurisdictional analyses, a court assumes that
the plaintiff is appropriately within the court's jurisdiction because the
plaintiff, by bringing the lawsuit, has voluntarily submitted to its jurisdiction and is physically present within its territorial bounds. A court
employing a community-based jurisdictional analysis, however, would
need to determine if either (1) the plaintiff can appropriately be defined as a member of the community asserting jurisdiction, or (2)
even if the plaintiff is not a community member, the issue the plaintiff
raises is of such significance to the community that jurisdiction can be
justified." 7
As to the first inquiry-the plaintiff's community membership-a
number of factors may be relevant. Some are familiar from current
jurisdictional analyses: What is the plaintiffs citizenship? Where is
the plaintiff usually found? But others are significantly different. For
example, while jurisdictional inquiries often look only to the citizenship or primary residence of the party, a community-based model
might find relevant community ties anywhere the party resides for a
significant period of time, regardless of whether or not it is a primary
residence. In addition, the presence of a relevant subcommunity
within the jurisdiction might be a factor (for example, if the plaintiff

This inquiry is sometimes captured by a court's consideration of the
plaintiff's
standing to bring suit. The doctrine of standing, however, often incorporates other
inquiries-such as whether the plaintiff suffered sufficient harm-that are distinct
from an investigation of the nexus between the dispute and the community where the
court sits. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1990) (listing the various requirements to establish proper standing).
See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) ("The state which accords
[a defendant] privileges and affords protection to him and his property by virtue of his
domicile may also exact reciprocal duties."); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAws § 11 (1971) ("Every person has a domicil at all times and ... no person has
more than one domicil at a time.").
797
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has ties to others within the community based on common kinship,
ethnicity, or interests).
Even if the plaintiff does not possess such ties, jurisdiction would
still be appropriate ifthe issue raised in the suit is of great importance
to the community. For example, as we have seen, grave human rights
violations might trigger various forms of universal or transnationaljurisdiction.7 : Jurisdiction might also be appropriate over a defendant
who is a member of the community even if the plaintiff is not, because
the community still has an obligation to police one of its own.
Turning to the defendant, under a community-based analysis jurisdiction is proper if (1) the defendant can be deemed a member of
the same community as the plaintiff, or (2) the defendant can be
deemed a member of the forum community. Thus, for example, if
plaintiff and defendant are bound by ethnic ties or are linked through
transnational networks, jurisdiction might be appropriate even if the
defendant lacked specific ties with the territorial location of the court.
Conversely, even if plaintiff and defendant were not particularly
linked, if the defendant can be deemed a member of the community
where the court sits,jurisdiction would also be proper.
In order to determine the community affiliation of the defendant,
courts again could consider a variety of factors. These include the
citizenship and residence of the defendant, the amount of activity the
defendant conducts in the forum community, and the extent of the
defendant's impact on the community. The jurisdictional analysis in
criminal cases would be similar, focusing on the defendant's own
community identification as well as the extent of the defendant's
community activities or the impact of defendant's activities on the
community. Such traditional factors as "purposeful availment" or "volitional contacts" could be substantially retained, but recast as an
analysis of whether the defendant has become aligned with or bound
to the community at issue.
In all of these inquiries, the determination of community affiliation contains both a subjective and an objective element. The felt and

See supra text accompanying notes 186-204 (describing international human
rights suits brought against the likes of Chile's ex-head of state, Augusto Pinochet;
Chad's Hiss~ne Habr6; and the former Serbian president, Slobodan Milogevi6). Although a cosmpopolitan conception of jurisdiction rejects a universalist approach that
seeks to make world community citizenship the only relevant jurisdictional affiliation,
see supra text accompanying note 782 (defining cosmopolitanism as "the acknowledgement of multiple communities, rather than the erasure of all communities except
the most encompassing"), it in no way denies the importance of local communities'
asserting universal jurisdiction in specific cases.
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expressed bonds of individuals are relevant to the calculus, but such
bonds might have objective indicia, such as citizenship, travel patterns,
telephone records, social activities, financial transactions, and so
forth. In addition, a community severely affected by transnational activity might see fit to assert community dominion even over a distant
actor, based solely on the impact of the defendant's activities.
I have already discussed the uncertainty in U.S. law concerning jurisdiction based on a product's presence in a territorial location beA community-based analysis,
cause of the "stream of commerce.,8
because it focuses less on the amount of volitional contact with a territorial entity, would likely result in the assertion of jurisdiction over
such a territorially distant defendant if its products regularly end up in
a given community and cause harm there. In such circumstances,
courts following this approach would recognize that the reality of
global capitalism means that companies form transnational bonds
with consumers territorially removed from them.
Other aspects of traditional minimum-contacts inquiries would
also be less important under a community-based approach. For example, the purported inconvenience to the defendant of having to
defend a suit far from home can be part of the analysis of whether a
defendant should be deemed a member of the community, but it no
longer takes on such significance as an independent factor. This is
appropriate because in a world of rapid transportation, instant wireless communication, and even virtual courtrooms, defending a lawsuit
in a distant physical location is far less burdensome (both literally and
psychically) than it once was. Likewise the "foreseeability" of being
brought into a particular court, though often invoked in U.S. Supreme Court doctrine, 0 ' is of little help given that, in an increasingly
interconnected world, it is always foreseeable that activity in one place
will have effects in many far away locations. Moreover, as many scholars have pointed out, "foreseeability" is a circular test because whether
one foresees being subject to jurisdiction in a particular court depends in large part on what courts have previously determined is rea-

800 See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. Supreme
Court's

stream-of-commerce decision, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102
(1987)).
801 See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)
("[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is ...that the defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.").
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sonably foreseeable
Thus, little is lost byjettisoning this analytical
metric.
Nevertheless, itis important to emphasize that a community-based
analysis would not necessarily result in broader assertions of jurisdiction than under current jurisdictional schemes. For example, the requirement that the plaintiff have community ties with the forum
might well make forum-shopping more difficult because plaintiffs
could not simply choose the community with the most convivial law
regardless of social ties. Likewise, a community-based approach might
not permit so-called transient-presence jurisdiction, where the defendant is present within the physical boundaries of a territory only
briefly, or for an unrelated reason&i Such transient-presence jurisdiction is generally permissible under territorial schemes, leading to such
ludicrous activities as service of process in an airplane as itflies over a
territorial jurisdiction. 804 By inquiring about substantive ties to a
community rather than formal contacts with a location, a communitybased approach would render such jurisdictional assertions more
amenable to challenge. Finally, there might be occasions when a
"minimum contacts" inquiry would find, say, that a couple of web
"hits" in a jurisdiction would be sufficient to render a defendant subject to suit there. A community-based approach, however, would go
beyond counting contacts to inquire about the substantive bonds
formed between the member of the forum community and the territorially distant actor.

See, e.g.,
David Wille, PersonalfJurisdiclionand the !nternet-ProposedLimits on State
.Inrisdictionover Data Communications in Tort Cases, 87 KY. L.J. 95, 136 (1998) ("The purposeful availment requirement stems from the notion that defendants should be able
to plan their conduct knowing where that conduct will subject them to jurisdiction.
But ...[d]efendants only have reasonable expectations about where they will be haled
into court because courts have created such expectations." (citation omitted)); Burk,
supra note 119, at 1118 (opining that a forseeability inquiry amounts to nothing more
than the idea that "defendants should reasonably anticipate being haled into any court
into which they should reasonably anticipate being haled"); cf Luther L. McDougal 1II,
JudicialJutisdiction:From a Contacts toan Interest Analysis, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1, 10 (1982)
(noting the impossibility of predicting how a court will rule on the "fairness" element
of minimum contacts). For a discussion of this problem within a more general analysis
of circularity in constitutional adjudication, see Michael Abramowicz, ConstitutionalCirculality, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1, 64-65 (2001).
80. See, e.g.,
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610-19 (1990) (Scalia,
J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White, Kennedy, JJ.) (finding jurisdiction based on mere
transient presence consonant with traditional practice at the time of the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
804 See, e.g., Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 447 (E.D.
Ark. 1959) (permitting assertion ofjurisdiction in such circumstances).
8{)2
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Most important, the cosmopolitan pluralist approach to jurisdiction requires that courts make explicit an inquiry that currentjurisdictional rules obscure. If jurisdiction is in part about the assertion of
community dominion over a distant actor, then courts should consider the nature of the community that has allegedly been harmed,
the relationship of the dispute to that community, and the social
meaning of asserting dominion over the actor in question. Accordingly, the jurisdictional inquiry becomes a site for discussion both
about the nature of community affiliation and the changing role of
territorial borders. The precise contours of the jurisdictional norms
that would develop from this process are impossible to predict and
would undoubtedly evolve over time. The crucial point, however, is
that these discussions would not be truncated by a formulaic test that
bears scant relationship to the core questions underlying the social
meaning ofjurisdiction.
2. A Jurisdictional Framework for Non-State Communities
A truly pluralist conception of jurisdiction also allows us to make
sense of non-state assertions of jurisdiction. Consider the bold (or
utopian) impulse of a non-state actor to assertjurisdiction:
Imagine yourself a tribunal. Pretend you have an audience-a community of some sort that will recognize you as a tribunal. Now, go all the
way. What grandeur of transformation of the normative universe would
you perform? Will you simply issue a general writ of peace? A warrant
for justice notwithstanding facts and law? Will you order everyone to be
good? Perhaps, perhaps you will judge the dead? Or even bring God as
a defendant? The possibilities are endless and the question arises
whether or why one should or should not try something outlandish, irpossible, or just plain daring.

The idea of imagining oneself a tribunal sounds fanciful. After all, we
might think, people cannot simply construct their own legal jurisdiction. But that is true only if we accept a reified conception ofjurisdiction based on state sovereigns acting within an unchanging set of legal
boundaries.
Such a conception, however, has been challenged
throughout this Article both because it is normatively unjustifiable as a
way of capturing actual community identifications and. social understandings of space, and because it fails to describe adequately the increasingly extraterritorial and non-state nature of actual legal practice.
Moreover, by imagining the creation of jurisdiction we can see the

805 Cover,

supra note 2, at 187.
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transformative way in which alternative assertions of legal jurisdiction
can be linked to the articulation and development of alternative
norms and community definitions.
Looking more closely at the process of jurisdiction-creation, we
can imagine a non-state community coming together and purporting
to adjudicate a dispute...
Obviously, its judgment is not selfexecuting; some entity with police power must enforce it. Thus, the
question becomes not whether a community can assert jurisdiction,
but whether other communities are willing to give deference to the
judgment rendered and enforce it as if it were their own. This is the
process of judgment recognition familiar to those who study conflict
of laws. A tribunal asserts jurisdiction over a dispute, and then other
jurisdictions must decide whether to confer legitimacy on that tribunal by recognizing and enforcing its iudgment. Thus, even at the
moment that a community daringly invents its own legal jurisdiction,
it is immediately forced to acknowledge that its invention is limited by
the willingness of others to accept the judgment as normatively legiti-

mate.s"7
We have already seen how formal international tribunals, though
established by agreements of nation-states, can contribute to the generation of international human rights standards that ultimately limit
state prerogatives. 8 Here the process of jurisdictional assertion and
rhetorical persuasion has helped to develop norms over time. For example, one of the great accomplishments of the war crimes tribunals
established after World War II was "the capacity of the event to project
a new legal meaning into the future. '..." As Charles Wyzanski, who
906Robert Cover offers the example of a group of Jews in a small city in
Galilee in
1538. This group attempted to constitute a Jewish court even though its authority to
do so was dubious. Significantly, the leaders of the group apparently determined that
they could not assert jurisdiction on their own. Thus, they proclaimed their act in a
message sent to Jerusalem seeking recognition. Id. at 190-92. Cover suggests that such
approval was necessary not only as a matter of religious doctrine, but also because,
without assent from Jerusalem, it was hardly likely that the rest ofJudaisin would take
the experiment seriously. /d. at 193.
As Cover points out, though law is a bridge to an alternative set
of norms, the
bridge begins not in "alternity" but in reality. Therefore there are real constraints on
the engineering of that bridge. See id. at 187 ("If law.., is a bridge from reality to a
new world there must be some constraints on its engineering. Judges must dare, but
what happens when they lose that reality?").
88 Supra note 172 and accompanying text.
Cover, supra note 2, at 196. RobertJackson, chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg
trials, made a similar argumnent at the time:
We have also incorporated [the trial's] principles into a judicial precedent.
"The power of the precedent," Mr. Justice Cardozo said, "isthe power of the
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originally opposed the creation of the Nuremberg tribunals, later acknowledged, "the outstanding accomplishment of the trial, which could
never have been achieved by any more summary executive action, is that it
crystalized the concept that there already is inherent in the international community a machinery both of the expression of international
criminal law and for its enforcement." 8'0 Significantly, Wyzanski's
statement reveals that he came to believe not only that the tribunals
were legitimate, but also that they served a norm-creating function
that went beyond the realm of political or military power and that
could not have been achieved through the use of such power. Thus,
sometimes the assertion of legal jurisdiction, even more than the assertion of military or political muscle, may help inculcate norms for
the future.81
Moreover, these norms, once created and developed into a functioning body of human rights law, are not so easily circumscribed.
Therefore, although it has been said that the Nuremberg and Tokyo
trials after World War II themselves represented mere victors' justice, the norms established in those trials have helped spawn a large
body of human rights norms and a working consensus (fragile though
it sometimes is) regarding enforcement of those norms.1s I have already discussed the case of Augusto Pinochet, in which a Spanish
judge asserted jurisdiction over the former Chilean dictator and almost succeeded in convincing the world to accede to that assertion.
Other transnational human rights actions, both criminal and civil,
have been attempted or are pending around the world, and the In-

beaten path." One of the chief obstacles to this trial
path. A judgment such as has been rendered shifts
dent to the support of these rules of law. No one can
know that the principles on which the Nazi leaders
their lives constitute law-and law with a sanction.
REPORT

OF

ROBERT

H.

JACKSON,

UNITED

STATES

was the lack of a beaten
the power of the precehereafter deny or fail to
are adjudged to forfeit
REPRESENTATIVE

TO

THE

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILI'ARY TRIALS 437 (Int'l Org. & Conference SeriLs
II, U.S. Dep't of State Publ'n No. 3080, 1945).
810 Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., Nuremberg in
Retrospect, 178 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 56
(1946) (emphasis added), reprinted in THE NEW MEANING OFJUSTICE 137, 144 (1965).
811For a recent article using Cover's work to support the idea that
international
trials help create and develop norms, see Dickinson, supra note 521, at 1477-90.
812 See, e.g., MONTGOMERY BELGION,
VICTORS' JUSTICE 42-131 (1949) (arguing that
the alleged crimes were acts of war in which both sides were engaged and therefore
did not warrant criminal punishment).
See Cover, supra note 2, at 196-97 (noting the precedents created by
the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials).
814 See supra notes 34-37, 186-88 and accompanying
text (discussing the international reaction to the attempt to prosecute Pinochet in Spain).
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ternational Criminal Court, though controversial, has been established.
This normative universe of human rights enforcement
through legal apparatus is a direct result of the jurisdiction-creation at
Nuremberg.
Formal international trials such as those held at Nuremberg are
not the only ways in which non-state legal jurisdiction can be created
and exercised, however. Non-state communities also assert lawmaking
power through more informal networks and organizations and
through the slow accretion of social custom itself. Prior to the rise of
the state system, much lawmaking took place in autonomous institutions and groups, such as cities and guilds, and large geographic areas
were left largely unregulated " Even in modern nation-states, we see
a whole range of non-state lawmaking in tribal or ethnic enclaves,8 "
religious organizations, 8117 corporate bylaws, social customs,' private
regulatory bodies, and a wide variety of groups, associations, and nonstate institutions."'
For example, in England bodies such as the
815 See EUGEN EIIRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 1438 (Walter L. Moll trans., 1936) (analyzing and describing the differences between legal and nonlegal norms). See generally OTTO GIERKE, ASSOCIATIONS AND LAW: THE
CLASSICAL AND EARLY CHRISTIAN STAGES (George Heiman ed. & trans., Univ. of Toronto Press 1977) (n.d.) (setting forth a legal philosophy based on the concept of association as a fundamental human organizing principle); Orro GIERKE, NATURAL LAw
AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY: 1500 TO 1800 (Ernest Barker trans., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1934) (1913) (presenting a theory of the evolution of the state and non-state
groups according to the principle of natural law).
12 See, e.g., Walter Otto Weyrauch & Maureen Anne Bell, Autonomous
Lawmaking:
The Case of the "Gypsies," 103 YALE L.J. 323 (1993) (delineating the subtle interactions
between the legal system of the Romani people and the norms of their host countries).
817 See, e.g., CAROL WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES OF UTOPIA (1980)
(examining the
contractual underpinnings of four nineteenth-century American religious utopian
communities: the Shakers, the Harmony Society, Oneida, and Zoar). As Marc Galanter has observed, the field of church and state is the "locus classicus of thinking about
the multiplicity of normative orders." Galanter, supra note 33, at 28; see alo Carol
Weisbrod, Family, Church and State: An Essay on Constitutionalismand Religious Authority,
26J. FAM. L. 741 (1988) (analyzing church-state relations in the United States from a
pluralist perspective).
8
See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE lAw 43-49 (1968) (describing
"implicit law," which includes everything fiom rules governing a camping trip among
friends to the customs of merchants).
819 See, e.g., ROIERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:
How NFIGHBORS
SEYt'LE DISPUTES (1991) (drawing on an empirical study of relations among cattle
ranchers to develop a theory of nonlegal norms as a source of social control); Stewart
Macaulay, hnages ofLaw in Eveiyday Life:The Lessons of School, Entertainment, and Spectator Sporls, 21 LAW & Soc'v REV. 185 (1987) (discussing the concept of legality as reflected in popular culture); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminaty St'rdy, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963) (presenting empirical data on nonlegal
dispute settlement in the manufacturing industry); Stewart Macaulay, PopudarLegal Cul-
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church, the stock exchange, the legal profession, the insurance market, and even the Jockey Club opted for forms of self-regulation that
included machinery for arbitrating disputes among their own members. 20 Even more informally, day-to-day human encounters such as
interacting with strangers on a public street, waiting in lines, and
communicating with subordinates or superiors are all governed by
8 2'
what Michael Reisman has called "microlegal systems.,"
Thus, law is
found not only in the formal decisions of judges, legislators, and administrators, but also
"any place and any time that a group gathers together to pursue an objective. The rules, open or covert, by which they govern themselves, and
the methods and techniques by which these rules are enforced is the law
of the group. Judged by this broad standard, most lawmaking is too
ephemeral to be even noticed. But when conflict within the group ensues, and it is forced to decide between conflicting claims, law arises in
an overt and relatively conspicuous
fashion. The challenge forces deci8 2'
, 2
sion, and decisions make law.

In some circumstances, official legal actors may delegate lawmaking authority to non-state entities or recognize the efficacy of nonstate norms. For example, commercial litigation, particularly in the
international arena, increasingly takes place before non-state arbitral
panels. 8 3 Likewise, non-governmental standard-setting bodies, from
Underwriters Laboratories (which tests electrical and other equipment) to the Motion Picture Association of America (which rates the
content of films) to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and

ture: An Introduction, 98 YALE L.J. 1545 (1989) (surveying the sources of popular per-

ceptions of the law).

See F.W. Maitland, Tnst and Corporation, in MAITLAND: SELECTED
EssAYs 141,
189-95 (H.D. Hazeltine et al. eds., 1936) (1905) (describing the sophisticated nonlegal
means of enforcing order among members of these institutions).
821 For discussions of verbal and nonverbal cues that govern social behavior,
see
Michael Reisman, Lining up: The Microlegal System of Queues, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 417
(1985); Michael Reisman, Looking, Staring and Glaring Microlegal Systems and Public Order, 12 DENV..J. INT'L L. & POLY 165 (1983); Michael Reisman, Rapping and Talking to
the Boss: The Microlegal System of Twoo People Talking, in CONFLICT AND INTEGRATION:
COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE WORLD TODAY 61 (Inst. of Comparative Law in Japan, Chun
Univ. ed., 1988).
922 Weyrauch
& Bell, supra note 816, at 328 (quoting THOMAS A. COWAN &
DONALD A. STRICKLAND, THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF A CONFINED MICROSOCIETY, at i
(Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Internal Working Paper No. 34, 1965)).
823 See,
e.g., YVEs DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN
VIRTUE:
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 5-9 (1996) (noting the "tremendous growth" in international commercial arbitration over the past twenty-five to thirty years).
820
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Numbers (which administers the Internet domain name system), construct detailed normative systems with the effect of law. Regulation of
much financial market activity is left to private authorities such as
stock markets or trade associations like the National Association of Securities Dealers. And, to take a rather mundane example, lawmaking
authority over sports events is generally left to non-state entities (such
as referees) whose decisions are not usually reviewable except within
the system established by the sports authority or leagueY
Significantly, the jurisdiction of all of these non-state actors may
be formally limited to their particular bounded communities, but the
norms they articulate often seep into the decisions of state legal institutions. The most obvious example of state law's recognition of nonstate lawmaking is in the common law's ongoing incorporation of social custom and practice.
As scholars have recognized,
"[d]ecisionmakers work under a continuing pressure to incorporate
customary rules into their decisions.8 2" Sometimes such incorporation is explicit, as when a statute is interpreted (or even supplanted)
by reference to industry custom2 or when a law of sales that would
accord with merchant reality was adopted in the Uniform Commercial
Code.8 2 7 Even when the impact of non-state norms is unacknowledged, however, state-sponsored law may only be deemed legitimate
to the extent that its official pronouncements reflect the "common
understandings of private laws and customs. '' 82s Indeed, the invention

8'4

See, e.g., Ga. High Sch. Ass'n v.Waddell, 285 S.E.2d 7, 9 (Ga. 1981) (holding

that a dispute over a referee's decision affecting the outcome of a high school football
game was nonjusticiable). But see PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 690 (200 1)
(ruling that a golf association had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by preventing a partially disabled golfer from using a golf cart to compete); Bart Aronson,
Pinstripes and Jailhouse Stripes: The Case of "Athlete's hnnunity," FindLaw Corporate
Counsel Center (Nov. 3, 2000), at http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/aronson/
20001103.html (criticizing the blanket refusal to apply criminal law sanctions to athletes' actions during sporting events).
825 Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 816, at 330.
8216 See, e.g., FULLER, suna note 818, at 57-59 (arguing that the act of interpretation
permits courts to adjust official legal norms to match custom or usage); JAMES
WILIARD HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWITH: THE LEGAL. HISTORY OF TIHE LUMBER
INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN 1836-1915, at 289-94 (1964) (describing the ways in which local norms in the Wisconsin lumber industry played a significant role in the way contract law was applied).
827 See Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn
and the Mechant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 503-19 (1987) (describing Karl Llewellyn's initial
drafts of what later became Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code).
M28 Weyrauch & Bell, supra note 816, at 329.
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of legal fictions often indicates that official norms are being adjusted
to reflect more closely the dictates of non-state norms and practices.
In addition, non-state assertions of jurisdiction may sometimes
take the guise of more formal legal proceedings. For example, in
1933, as five Communists accused by Hitler of setting fire to the
Reichstag building in Berlin were tried in Germany, Arthur Garfield
Hays-counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union-helped to organize a "Counter Trial" in London.'
This "trial" used the formalities of legal process to enact a "publicly deliberative drama." 3' According to Hays, the Counter Trial helped "to engage 'public opinion'
and to set a 'valuable precedent' by which the actions of the German
tribunal could be measured." 3 ' Even the German court ultimately felt
the need to refute the findings of the London proceedings in order to
combat the international impact of the Counter Trial.
According to
Arthur Koestler, the Counter Trial "was a unique event in criminal
history" because it caused the German court to "concentrate
its efforts
3'
on refuting accusations by a third, extraneous party." 'i
The following year, Hays and others organized a trial styled the
"Case of Civilization Against Hitler" as part of a rally at Madison
Square Garden in New York City.' 3 4 Twenty thousand people in attendance and thousands more listening live over the radio heard an indictment, testimony from nearly two dozen witnesses, a summation by
a former New York Court of Appeals judge, and a judgment of the
court pronounced by a local minister.
Newspaper accounts the following day reported that Hitler had been found guilty of high "crime
against civilization' 36 and that the trial "rendered solemn judgment
that the Nazi government stood convicted before the world."'3 7 Thus,

829

See Louis Anthes, Publicly DeliberativeDrama: The 1934 Mock Trial ofAdolph Hitler

for "Crimes Against Civilization," 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 391, 398-99 (1998) (describing
the trial).
830 Id. at 393. Anthes defines this term as "the
improvising of legal formality to foster debate." Id.
831 Id. at 399.
82 See id. (noting that in doing so, the German court was apparently seeking "to
minimize the loss of international goodwill").
833 ARTHUR KOESTLER, THE INVISIBLE WRITING:

ARROW IN THE BLUE, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY

200

BEING THE SECOND VOLUME OF

(1954).

See Anthes, supra note 829, at 391-94 (describing the trial in terms of both culture and politics).
835 Id. at 391-92.
836 Nazis "Convicted" of World "Crime" by 20,000 in Rally, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 8, 1934, at
I1. 89

7 ld.
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non-state assertions of jurisdiction may mobilize popular opinion in
resistance to state-sanctioned norms and may also create a context for
telling a counternarrative about historical events.
The "Women's International War Crimes Tribunal 2000" represents a more recent, though similar, use of legal forms to construct an
alternative history. This self-styled "peoples' tribunal"-convened in
Tokyo from December 8 to 12, 2000-heard evidence concerning the
criminal liability for crimes against humanity of both Japan and its
high-ranking military and political officials for rape and sexual slavery
arising out of Japanese military activity in the Asia-Pacific region during the 1930s and 1940s8 Frustrated by the denials
of Japanese gov8: :
ernment officials and by failure in lawsuits before state-sanctioned
courts,... survivors of these alleged offenses turned to international
NGOs.' t' After initial conferences were held in Tokyo and Seoul, an
International Organizing Committee for the tribunal was formed.4
Indictments were presented by prosecution teams from ten countries, including North and South Korea, China,Japan, the Philippines,
Indonesia, Taiwan, Malaysia, East Timor, and the Netherlands. 43 Indeed, "[t]he shared experience of Japanese colonization brought
North and South Korean prosecutors together with a joint indictment-an expression of common purpose that continues to be unthinkable at the governmental level.",4 4 The prosecution presented
evidence for three days.Yr' More than seventy-five survivors were present. Many of those present gave evidence, and other survivors recorded video interviews or signed affidavits that were entered into evidence by the prosecution.s" The panel of judges "represented a
broad geographical distribution, expertise in diverse and relevant arChristine M. Chinkin, Women

Ilnternational Tribunal on Japanese Military Sexual
Slavery, 95 AM.j. INT'1. L. 335, 335 (2001).
See id. (describing Japan's continued official denial of legal responsibility).
840 See, e.g., Japan Overtzurns Sex Slave Ruling,
BBC NEWS (Mar. 29, 2001), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/1249236.stm (discussing the decision
by Hiroshima's High Court to overturn the only successful claim for compensation in
Japanese courts).
See Chinkin, supra note 838, at 336 (noting that the primary NGO
was a group
called Violence Against Women in War Network, Japan, "which was founded in 1998
after the International Conference on Violence Against Women in War and Armed
Conflict Situations was held in Tokyo in 1997").
838

842 /d.
843 Id.
84

.

845

Id. at 337.
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eas of domestic and international law, a mix of practitioner, judicial,
and academic expertise, and ... an equitable gender balance. 47
After the closing of evidence and argument, the judges began deliberating, assisted by a team of legal advisers.
They prepared a preliminary judgment, which was presented to an audience of more than
one thousand people. 849 The judgment found Emperor Hirohito
"guilty of the charges on the basis of his command responsibility."' s
In addition, the panel ruled that Japan was "responsible under international law applicable at the time of the events for violation of its
treaty obligations and principles of customary international law relating to slavery, trafficking, forced labor, and rape, amounting to crimes
against humanity.4 "' The judges subsequently proposed a range of
reparations and made other recommendations4
Other non-state tribunals have similarly sought to inculcate the
norms embodied in international or international human rights law.
For example, the 1967 "International War Crimes Tribunal" convened
by Bertrand Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre purported to adjudicate
whether the United States had violated international law in prosecuting the Vietnam War. s"S Likewise, "private citizens of high moral
authority" from several countries established a "Permanent People's
Tribunal" in Italy in the 1970s. 4 This tribunal existed for a number
of years and examined a series of alleged violations of international
law to which there had been inadequate official response, including
the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, that of Indonesia in
East Timor, and the alleged genocide of Armenians by the Turks in
the period from 1915 through 1919.855 In 1984, another People's Tribunal was convened to gather evidence concerning the Armenian
genocide 4. "' A recent film, The Tials of Henry Kissinger (based on a
141

847

Id. at 338.

848 Id.

Id.
850

Id.

851

Id.
L

852

See Cover, supra note 2, at 198-201 (describing this non-state tribunal as arising
from a lack of state opposition to the war). For the report of this tribunal, see AGAINST
TIHE CRIME OF SILENCE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE RUSSELL INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNAL (John Duffett ed., 1968).
Richard Falk, The Rights of Peoples (in Pat1icular Indigenous Peoples), in THE
RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 17, 28 (James Crawford ed., 1988).
855Id. at 28-29.
856 See generally THE PERMANENT PEOPLES' TRIBUNAL,
A CRIME OF SILENCE:
THE

ARMENIAN GENOCIDE

(1985).
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2001 book of the same name by Christopher Hitchens), assembles historians, politicians, and others to assess the former U.S. Secretary of
State's criminal responsibility for U.S. military activities in Vietnam
and Cambodia. 57
In some ways, of course, such assertions of jurisdiction are purely
symbolic acts. Yet, by claiming authority to articulate norms, these
tribunals insisted that "'law is an instrument of civil society' that does
not belong to governments, whether acting alone or in institutional
arenas. ' 858 Moreover, the reports issued by such tribunals provide a
valuable alternative source of evidence and jurisprudence pertaining
to contested applications of international law. And even these "quasilegal" fora can constitute a form of public acknowledgment to the survivors that serious crimes were committed against them.
Thus, calling the tribunals "extralegal" or "symbolic" does nothing
to lessen their claims to produce norms or to affect people. After all,
even state entities pursue trials that are largely symbolic, such as the
French trial against Klaus Barbies"" and the proposed Spanish trial of
Pinochet himself. In the past three decades, we have also seen the rise
of truth commissions, the primary aim of which is story-telling in order to create a record of past abuses s6' Lawsuits in the United States
seeking reparations for slavery serve as another example of the way

857 See Ronnie Scheib, Film Review: The Trials of Henry Kissinger, VARIETY,
July 15-

21, 2002, at 27 ("Is Henry Kissinger, America's revered elder statesman and Nobel
Peace Prize winner, a war criminal? That's the question posed by this startling BBC
docutmentary] that starts with the accusations leveled by Christopher Hitchens in his
recent book.").
8 8 Chinkin, supra note 838, at 339 (quoting
Falk, supra note 854, at 29).
859Of course, such tribunals' impact undoubtedly depends in part
on the power
and resources of the entities or individuals sponsoring and publicizing them.
8,0Indeed, Guyora Binder has argued that many of those most interested in the
trial viewed its role as pedagogical or symbolic. See Binder, sunpa note 505, at 1322 (observing that the trial was viewed by some as "aln occasion for self-improvement").
Binder quotes French government officials referring to the proceedings as "a pedagogic trial," Israeli governmental officials describing the trial as 'justice that has educational significance," a New York Times editorial expressing hope that the trial would
"educate a new generation," a statement from a representative of French Resistance
veterans that he hoped the trial would "deepen our understanding," and a comment
from Nazi hunter Simon Wiesenthal that "the trial would be 'a proper history lesson,'
and that its true significance was 'symbolic."' Id.
961See, e.g., HAYNER, supra note 509, at 32 (listing twenty-one truth commissions
convened between 1974 and 2001); MiNOW, supra note 509, at 52-54 (recounting the
creation of several truth commissions contemporaneously with the establishment of
South Africa's in 1995).
862 See, e.g.,
Joe R. Feagin & Eileen O'Brien, The Growing Movement for Reparations,
in WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY OVER APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS
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in which juridical mechanisms can be used to affect collective memory. Finally, one might see the creation of the International Criminal
Court
(a new form of international jurisdiction-assertion) as evidence that the norms these non-state tribunals sought to inculcate
have taken hold.
Of course, some communities may embrace norms that many
would find undesirable. For example, white supremacist militia
groups might well attempt to assert jurisdiction over their perceived
enemies. Other communities might seek to impose norms that conflict with evolving international human rights standards. Hierarchy
and oppression abound within many communities, and merely uttering the talismanic word "community" does not transform human behavior into sweetness and light. Thus, any theory of jurisdiction that
requires deference to these sorts of alternative normative visions
would likely prove unacceptable.
Yet, it is important to recognize that, in order for the legal norms
of a non-state community to be enforced, such norms must be
adopted by those with coercive power, and abhorrent assertions of
community dominion are unlikely to achieve widespread acceptance.
Thus, the enforcement arena would provide a powerful incentive to
communities not to move too far away from a developing international consensus. In a sense, this is how even state-sanctioned courts
operate because they lack their own enforcement power. Courts always issue decisions at the sufferance of their "sovereign," and if they
choose to defy the entity that enforces their judgments, they must appeal to a broad base of popular support or risk being treated as politically irrelevant. Likewise, a non-state jurisdictional assertion, such as
the decision to apply the norms of merchants or the pronouncements
of the permanent people's tribunals, must make a strong case to the
governments of the world and other political actors that the assertion
of community dominion is appropriate and that the substantive norms
expressed are worth adopting. The cosmopolitan pluralist conception
of jurisdiction does not imply that all assertions of jurisdiction (much
less all normative rules imposed) are justified; it only argues that we

FOR HUMAN INJUSTICE 341 (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999) (describing the growing reparations movement within the United States).
86. Despite U.S. resistance to the ICC, see supra note 209 (describing the
Bush administration's objections to the ICC), an overwhelming percentage of the world's
countries have signed the ICC treaty, and the court held its first assembly in September
2002, Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Pressesfor Total Exemption from War Crimes Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 2002, at A6.
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extend the term jurisdiction to these non-state norm-producing acts.
In this way, multiple communities can attempt to claim the mantle of
law, making it more likely that we will at least notice these alternative
visions, regardless of whether such visions are ultimately adopted
broadly or roundly rejected."4
B. Application of the Framework
I leave to another day the task of applying the cosmopolitan pluralist conception ofjurisdiction to all ten problems identified earlier.
Indeed, given that the framework described above explicitly relies on
the common law development of jurisdictional norms, a programmatic mapping of the contours of the framework is inappropriate.
Nevertheless, by focusing on a few particularly rich examples, we can
gain some sense of the conceptual space opened up by this framework
and the useful insights that may result. Thus, I return to three sites:
the American jurisprudence of minimum contacts in cyberspace; the
French prosecution of Yahoo!; and the question ofjurisdiction in international human rights law, focusing in particular on the Spanish
prosecution of Augusto Pinochet and the assignment of community
membership in the detention and prosecution of accused Al Qaeda
supporters. I choose these because they derive from doctrinal areas
(cyberspace law, civil procedure/conflict of laws, international law)
that are usually treated as quite distinct. Indeed, I believe we lose a
great deal because we tend to segregate these questions into different
areas of law rather than viewing the problem of jurisdiction as a
whole. By exploring these examples, we may begin to appreciate important ways in which international law and cyberspace law are converging around common questions concerning the social meaning of
legal jurisdiction.
1. The Minimum Contacts Inquiry
As previously discussed, American courts have struggled in recent
years to apply the InternationalShoe minimum-contacts test in cyberspace.8 65 This struggle has resulted in a series of analytical frameworks
quickly taken up and just as quickly discarded. The instability of the
Cf. Cover, supra note 2, at. 176 (referring to law as the bridge in normative
space that connects reality to "alternity").
865 See supra Part 1l.J.1 (surveying various judicial
attempts to establish a workable
test for personal jurisdiction in cyberspace cases, and concluding that no approach has
yet proven sucessful).
864
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doctrine indicates that courts are straining against the existing jurisdictional tests because those tests are in tension with a felt imperative
about when the assertion ofjurisdiction seems appropriate.
Surveying the development of American jurisdiction jurisprudence, we saw a similar instability during the decades between Pen867
888
noyer and InternationalShoe. During that transitional period, courts
used Pennoyer's territorial framework, but repeatedly carved out legal
fictions to respond to social change.
Ultimately, International Shoe
recognized the fictions and codified a new framework based not on
pure territorial power but on contacts.
Since International Shoe,
courts have used the language of minimum contacts, but have in fact
used the InternationalShoe test as a proxy for analyzing the "fairness" of
asserting jurisdiction.8 6 Now, with regard to cases involving cyberspace contacts, courts are continuing to articulate the International
Shoe test and to use the language of fairness, but they increasingly appear to be responding to a somewhat different concern: Is this far-off
website operator properly considered a member of my community?
Indeed, a survey of the cyber-jurisdiction case law from the past
few years indicates that courts may be analyzing cases through the lens
of community definition and the social meaning of legal jurisdiction,
even while continuing to use the language of fairness and minimum
contacts. For example, in Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,"" the Sec866
867
868

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
See Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Perso-

namJurisdictionof State Courts, From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. Ciii. L. REv.
569, 585-86 (1958) (describing the difficulty in applying Pennoyds principles to a
world facing changes in economic activity, means of transportation, and communication).
869 In InternationalShoe, the
Court admitted that
some of the decisions holding the corporation amenable to suit have been
supported by resort to the legal fiction that it has given its consent to service
and suit, consent being implied from its presence in the state through the acts
of its authorized agents. But more realistically it may be said that those
authorized acts were of such a nature as to justify the fiction.
326 U.S. at 318 (citations omitted).
870

See, e.g.,
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987)

(plurality opinion) (using InternationalShoe's "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" language to support the need for a separate inquiry (in addition to
minimum contacts) that focuses on "the burden on the defendant, the interests of the
forum State.... the plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief[,] ...the interstate judicial
system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies and the
shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
871 126 F.3d 25 (2d
Cir. 1997).
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ond Circuit construed New York's long-arm statute for conferring jurisdiction over a foreign domiciliary. The court concluded that an
owner of a Missouri cabaret called "The Blue Note" could not be sued
in New York for trademark infringement, despite the fact that the
cabaret's website included an unauthorized link to the website of a
famous New York jazz club also called "The Blue Note. ' 72 The court
rebuffed the plaintiff's efforts to show a number of contacts between
5
New York and the Missouri Blue Note (including the website itself),""
concluding instead that the Missouri club was of "local character" and
therefore not subject to jurisdiction in New York.17 ' By focusing on
the "character" of the Missouri business, the court appears implicitly
to have concluded that the Missouri club was properly deemed a
community member of Missouri, despite its contacts with New York.
Similarly, in Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.,7 r an Internet domain
name dispute between corporations based in Florida and Arizona, the
Ninth Circuit eschewed a strict reliance on minimum contacts. Instead, the court ruled that physical contacts with the forum state were
unnecessary if the defendant "has created continuing obligations to
forum residents. 8 7"' Although the court ultimately declined to exercise jurisdiction, its analysis focused on whether or not the Florida
corporation, through its website, had created any substantive ties to
Arizona, rather than on the number of contacts.
Finally, although many courts have formally adopted the Zippo 7"
test that looks to the degree of interactivity of the website, 88 courts
have often refused to assert jurisdiction despite the undisputedly interactive nature of the site in question when there were insufficient
community ties to the forum.872 In the same vein, an "effects" test that
finds jurisdiction anywhere the impact of a website is felt seems to
make judges uneasy, perhaps because the test seems divorced from an

Id. at 27.
The plaintiff attempted to establish New York's jurisdiction over
the Missouri
website by focusing on the booking of nationally recognized acts at the Missouri club
and the revenues earned from customers who, although students of the University of
Missouri, were domiciliaries of other states. Id. at 29.
872

873

874
875

Id.

130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).

876

Id. at 417.

877

Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa.
1997).
See supranote 427 (listing cases applying the Zippo test).

878

879 See supra notes 432-43 and accompanying
text (discussing cases in which courts
have departed from the Zippo test and instead have applied an "effects" test based on
the Supreme Court's opinion in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 703, 751 (1984)).
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analysis of community affiliation. Thus, in some cases the idea of jurisdiction based on the viewing of a website in a distant location seems
attenuated despite the existence of a "contact" between the site and its
viewer.i In other cases, however, courts are aware of the potentially
deleterious effects of a far-off
website
on a community and, hence,
....
881
feel compelled to assert jurisdiction.
In either instance, a contactsbased framework does not seem to capture the true analytical tug-ofwar that is taking place.
A jurisdictional analysis focusing on community affiliation, however, has the virtue of placing the core questions ofjurisdiction front
and center. Courts would be able to articulate the substantive concerns about both overly broad and overly narrow assertions ofjurisdiction and thereby begin to delineate jurisdictional norms that respond
to the social meaning of community affiliation. Thus, in Bensusan, the
court could have inquired further into the question of the Missouri
nightclub's community ties to New York. For example, is the community of musicians and audience members sufficiently interrelated that
it would make sense to say that there is a common community affiliation between The Blue Note in New York and the one in Missouri?
Indeed, the fact that the Missouri club named itself The Blue Note
(probably as a homage to the New York club) and posted a link to the
New York club on its website indicates a felt connection between the
two parties because of the musical heritage that they share. On the
other hand, further inquiry might indicate no real overlap in the
community of audience members (who are, presumably, the consumers of the website at issue in the case) and predominantly local ties in
Missouri. Additionally, a court could ask to what degree the purported harm suffered by the New York club implicates core notions of
community such that it is necessary to assert New York's community
dominion over the Missouri club.
Similarly, in Cybersell a community-based approach would go beyond a mechanical counting of web "hits" in Arizona of a Floridabased website.8
Instead, the inquiry would focus on whether the
Florida website had created ties with the Arizona community and the

880

See, e.g., Winfield Collection, Ltd. v. McCauley, 105 F. Supp. 2d 746, 751 (E.D.

Mich. 2000) (refusing to assert jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant despite webbased sales in the forum state).
881 See, e.g., supra notes 416-19 and accompanying text (discussing some courts'
willingness to extend jurisdiction based on Internet contacts).
See supra text accompanying notes 875-76 (discussing Cybersell).
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degree to which it was necessary for Arizona to assert dominion over a
harmful (though territorially distant) actor.
2. The Yahoo! Case
The Yahoo! case " ' illustrates the way a community-based analysis
changes the structure of thejurisdictional debate. The French court's
decision to assert jurisdiction over Yahoo.corn for material on its nonFrench servers set off alarms because the ruling raised the specter of
website operators' being subject to suit anywhere their sites are accessed. .. Theoretically, this could lead to a form of universal jurisdiction because sites are routinely accessible throughout the world, potentially permitting almost any governmental entity to assert
jurisdiction. And as discussed previously, geographical filters may be
ineffective""' and overly burdensome
while greatly diminishing the
• • 888
value of online communication.
We have seen three main alternative theoretical approaches in response to such a jurisdictional problem. First, the Johnson and Post
approach would deny the sovereign authority of territorially based
governments, such as France, to regulate Yahoo. 8 Second, the Lessig approach would look for reciprocal governmental agreements
whereby different countries agree
to police each other's norms with
888
S
respect to online transactions.
Third, the Goldsmith approach
would assume that the French judgment is unenforceable in the
United States (or elsewhere), making the power of the French judgment dependent on the enforceability of the order within France it889

self.

883

For a discussion of the decision by a French court to issue an injunction against

Yahoo!, see supra Part I.D.
884 See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing the extraterritorial impact
of the French court's decision).
85' See supra text accompanying note 273 (noting that only about seventy percent
of French Internet users could be filtered).
886 See sulra notes 293-95 and accompanying text
(explaining the difficulty of using
geographical location as the basis For permitting access to websites); see also supra text
accompanying notes 313-19 (speculating that filters might diminish certain benefits of
cybersace communication by zoning content based on geography).
See supra Part I.A (discussing arguments put forth by Johnson and Post in favor
of decentralized decision making over the Internet).
888 See supra Part lI.D (examining Lessig's
approach to the regulation of cyberspace through reciprocal enforcement).
889 See supra Part 11.1 (presenting Goldsmith's view that the
regtlation of cyberspace does not present new conceptual challenges).
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In analyzing the way in which a cosmopolitan pluralist conception
of jurisdiction differs from each of these three approaches, it is essential to emphasize once more that the question of jurisdiction has two
different components: first, the assertion of jurisdiction by one community; and second, the willingness of other communities to recognize and enforce the judgment that results from the initial jurisdictional assertion. Of course, these two inquiries often overlap. For
example, if the second community decides that the initial assertion of
jurisdiction was invalid, it will be reluctant to enforce the judgment
rendered. Nevertheless, for a cosmopolitan conception of jurisdiction, the distinction is crucial because the assertion of jurisdiction
represents not only an effort to impose coercive authority but also the
very ability to assert community dominion, articulate norms, and
thereby generate debate. This jurisdictional assertion, therefore, may
have an important symbolic or rhetorical value in and of itself, even if
thejudgment rendered does not initially persuade other communities
to enforce the norms articulated. Indeed, in a cosmopolitan pluralist
conception, the assertion of jurisdiction is first and foremost a
mechanism for opening space for debate about community affiliation
and substantive norms. Such norms, even if they are not able to persuade others in the near term, may gain traction over time and may
ultimately be accepted more broadly. In contrast, ifjurisdiction is not
asserted at all, courts cannot reach the "merits" and no substantive
norms are articulated.
Accordingly, a cosmopolitan pluralist approach would take seriously the Johnson and Post challenge to the legitimacy of France's assertion of jurisdiction. Instead of simply denying the ability of territorially based sovereigns to exercise jurisdiction, however, it would
require the French court to articulate the rationale for treating Yahoo.com as a member of the French community. Such an approach
would allow us to see that the French assertion of jurisdiction in this
case was not the wholly arbitrary exercise of territorial jurisdiction that
has often been portrayed. Rather, Yahoo! is a sophisticated, multinational operator, with a business plan aimed at reaching web users
worldwide, 8 a marketing strategy touting its "global footprint, ''89' and

SeeYahoo! Inc., 1999 Annual Report Form 10-K (filed with the SEC Mar. 30,
2000) [hereinafter Yahoo! 1999 Annual Report] ('Yahoo! Inc.... is a global Internet
communications, commerce and media company that offers a comprehensive branded
network of services to more than 120 million users each month worldwide."),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data 1011006/0000912057-00-014598-d I .html.
990
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a French subsidiary in which it owns a seventy percent ownership
stake." " Indeed, Yahoo! exerted substantial control over this subsidiary, dictating some of the links and content of the French site and requiring the subsidiary to maintain links to its United States-based
8'i
site.
Moreover, Yahoo! routinely profiled French users in order to
target them with advertisements written in French.8 ' These facts
might well make the assertion ofjurisdiction in France reasonable.
Assuming the French assertion of jurisdiction is legitimate, the
Lessig and Goldsmith approaches concern the extent to which such a
judgment should be enforceable outside of France. Lessig's approach
envisions the United States government agreeing to enforce the
French judgment so long as France agrees to police French websites
for content that the U.S. government deems objectionable. As discussed previously, however, such an agreement seems unlikely, particularly in a case like Yahoo! that implicates core First Amendment
values under the U.S. Constitution.
Indeed, U.S. government enforcement of the French judgment could trigger a separate First
Amendment lawsuit. ; Goldsmith, however, moves too far in the
other direction, assuming that if the French court is unable to satisfy
itsjudgment by acting against Yahoo!'s French assets no further action
will be possible. In making such an assertion, Goldsmith assumes a
rigidly formalist world of nation-state sovereignties whereby a judgment in one country will necessarily remain unrecognized elsewhere.
In contrast, a cosmopolitan pluralist conception acknowledges
that norms articulated by a court in one country might well be recognized and adopted in another country depending on the logic of the

See Press Release, Yahoo! Inc., Yahoo! Reports Fourth Quarter, Year End
2000
Financial Results (Jan. 10, 2001), at http://docs.yahoo.com/docs/pr/4q00pr.html
(stating that Yahoo! "remained committed to broadening its global footprint and
maintaining a leadership position worldwide").
802 Yahoo! 1999 Annual Report, supra
note 890.
89 See Yahoo! France License Agreement, art. 3
(Nov. 1, 1996), in Yahoo! Inc.,
1997 Annual Report Form 10-K (filed with the SEC Mar. 30, 1997) (setting forth the
terms of the licensing agreement between Yahoo! Inc. and Yahoo! France),
http://www.sec.gov/Arch ives/edgar/clata/101 1006/0000912057-97-011353.txt.
894 See T.G.I.
Paris, May 22, 2000, http://wvw.juriscom-.net/txt/jurisfir/cti/
891

tgiparis20000522.htm (describing Yahoo!'s practice of profiling and targeting French
users).
895 See supra Part II.D (recognizing that U.S. enforcement
of the French order
might raise First Amendment issues).
896 But see supra note 305 (questioning whether mere
enforcement of a foreign
judgment is sufficient to be deemed state action under U.S. constitutional law).
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jurisdictional assertion and the force of the norms.
At the same
time, however, a community-based conception of jurisdiction would
require the original court to set forth a rationale for asserting community dominion over the case, a rationale that subsequently would
be scrutinized by courts asked to enforce the judgment elsewhere.
Turning again to Yahoo!, under a cosmopolitan pluralist approach,
a U.S. district court faced with the question of whether the French
judgment was enforceable in the United States... should have paid
greater attention to the various facts tying Yahoo! to France and rendering assertion of French community dominion reasonable. On the
other hand, the U.S. court may have been correct in deciding that the
judgment was unenforceable because First Amendment norms, a core
component of the American constitutional order, would forbid U.S.
enforcement. Such an enforceability question, however, is not as easy
as the district court assumed. Indeed, in a cosmopolitan pluralist approach, the French court, by asserting jurisdiction and articulating a
norm against neo-Nazi hate speech, would force an American court to
grapple with the contested question of the degree to which hate
speech, particularly speech that could be deemed an incitements 99 or a
threat, ° is necessarily protected by the First Amendment.'' A U.S.
897

The enforcing court might also consider the extent to which the rendering

court's judgment actually can be said to represent the voice of the "community" it
claims to reflect. For example, a court's decision in country A might be roundly criticized by the executive or legislature in that country. Such displeasure could range
from public denouncement, to a decision not to bring future legal actions based on
the judgment, to an outright refusal to enforce the judgment. In such cases of interbranch conflict, an enforcing court in country B might consider these nonjudicial actions when assessing the authoritative force of the initial community's assertion of jurisdiction and its resolution of the dispute.
898 See supra text accompanying note 104 (discussing the U.S. district
court's decision not to enforce the French judgment against Yahoo! on First Amendment
grounds).
899 See, e.g., Berhanu v. Metzger, 850 P.2d 373, 373-76
(Or. 1993) (upholding ajury
finding that racist teachings of a white supremacist group, coupled with the paramilitary training of skinheads, was sufficient to impose vicarious liability on the group's
leader in a civil wrongful death action following a murder committed by members of
the group).
oo See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am.
Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (plurality opinion)
(ruling, over the dissent of five judges, that actions of anti-abortion activist organizations in publicly disclosing in a suggestive website display the names and addresses of
abortion providers constituted true "threats of force" and thus were not protected
speech under the First Amendment).
901 See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGAUGE
24980 (1989) (arguing that certain threats and incitements should be deemed speech that
does something rather than says something and should therefore fall outside a principle
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court might also consider possible tensions between the First
Amendment and many countries' interpretations of international
human rights norms regarding hate speech. 2
Thus, by employing a cosmopolitan pluralist conception of jurisdiction and judgment recognition, the U.S. court could first give some
deference to the French assertion of community dominion and take
seriously the fact that strict territoriality does not accurately capture
the nature of community affiliation in today's world; and second consider the substantive norms articulated by the French court and weigh
them against competing normative systems. Such an approach would
recognize that the assertion of jurisdiction and the norms deriving
therefrom are part of a fluid cosmopolitan system of multiple attachments and multiple norms. Moreover, the alernative approach-the
assignment of a single jurisdictional membership to Yahoo! based on a
formal territorial analysis-does not adequately capture the social
meaning ofjurisdiction and community definition.
Because the assertion of jurisdiction opens up space for articulating alternative norms, a more fluid conception of jurisdictional rules
might also serve a democratizing function. For example, the Internet
for many years was largely an American creation, and its architecture
(both technical and legal) tended to embed American values such as
free speech within it. Yahoo! raised the possibility that other countries
might begin to challenge America's legal dominance by advancing alternative normative visions about the shape of online regulation!'" If

of free speech); MARl J. MAI'SUDA ET AL., WORDS THIAT WOUND:

CRITICAL RACE

THEORY, ASSAULILIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 35-38 (1993) (arguing that

racist speech should not be protected under the First Amendment).
102 See, e.g., COMM'N TO STUDY GLOBAL NETWORKS & LOCAL VALUES, NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL., GLOBAL NETWORKS AND LOCAL VALUES: A COMPARATIvE LOOK
Nr GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 108-14 (2001) (comparing U.S. and German
hate speech laws); Kevin Boyle, Hate Speech: The United States Versus the Rest of the World?,
53 ME. L. REV. 487, 493-97 (2001) (describing the tension between First Amendment
and international standards, particularly as embodied in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, and the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966,
660 U.N.T.S. 195); Laura R. Palmer, A Vety Clear and Present Danger: Hate Speech, Media
Reforn, and Post-Conflict Democratization in Kosovo, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 179, 182-214
(2001) (comparing various approaches to hate speech in Germany, the United States,
and postconflict transitional societies); Wendy McAuliffe, Europe Hopes to Outlaw Hate
Speech Online, CNET NEWS.COM (Nov. 12, 2001), at http://news.com.com/2100-1023275708.html (describing the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly's unanimous
vote to draft a protocol defining and outlawing hate speech on computer networks).
903SeeJoel R. Reidenberg, Yahoo and Democracy on the Internet, 42JURIMETRICSJ. 261
(2002) (arguing that the French Yahoo! decision signals that the Internet regulatory
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multiple communities are affected by online activity (and almost inevitably multiple communities will be affected), then giving the court
systems of those communities greater latitude to weigh in on the best
regulatory approach may be desirable. The French jurisdictional assertion therefore creates an opportunity for ongoing international
debate about the appropriate rules for speech in online interaction.
This debate is important (and might have long-term consequences)
even if in this particular instance a U.S. court decides not to enforce
the French order.
The Canadian Human Rights Commission's recent decision ordering American resident Ernst Ziindel to remove anti-Semitic hate
speech from his California-based website provides a similar example of
the way even possibly unenforceable decisions may nevertheless be
important:
Indeed, the Commission's order explicitly acknowledged the difficulty of enforcement, but insisted that there was "a significant symbolic value in the public denunciation" of Ziindel's actions and a "potential educative and ultimately larger preventative
benefit [to be] achieved by open discussion of the principles" enunciated in its decision.9
By refusing to dismiss the case on jurisdictional
grounds, the Commission was able to articulate norns that might have
persuasive value in Canada and elsewhere over time. And if a U.S.
court subsequently were to refuse to enforce the order on First
Amendment grounds (as in Yahoo!) , such a decision would likewise
provide an opportunity for debate about both the most appropriate
community to exercise dominion over Zfindel and the most attractive
normative stance with regard to Internet freedom of expression.
For this same reason, a cosmopolitan pluralist conception of jurisdiction might prompt rethinking about how best to handle lis pendens issues in the international context. Generally, if two parties to a
suit each file complaints in differentjurisdictions, the suit filed second
in time is suspended until the first suit has reached a judgment, at

framework must recognize values adopted by different states and can no longer be dictated by technical elites).
904 See Citron
v. Zfindel (Canadian Human Rights Trib. Jan. 18, 2002),
http://www.chrt-tcdp.gc.ca/decisions/docs/citron-e.htm (discussing the Canadian
order that required Zfindel to remove hate speech from his website).
905Id

For discussion of a federal district court's order declaring the French judgment
in Yahoo unenforceable, partly because of First Amendment concerns, see supra text
906

accompanying note 305.

UNIVEIRSTY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REIEW

522

[Vol. 151: 311

In a cosmopoliwhich time the second case is dismissed altogether.'
tan understanding of jurisdiction, however, the prospect of multiple
communities reaching varying decisions in the same dispute is not a
problem; indeed, it might even foster greater norm development because other jurisdictions would need to determine which of the judgments to recognize.
One might think that foreign enforcement of judgments is more
automatic than I have posited because of treaties that, for example,
require enforcement of foreign countries' judgments or (in the
criminal context) require extradition of defendants in one country
when wanted in another. However, local public policy exceptions to
the enforcement of foreign judgments are relatively commonplace,
especially when the foreign judgment flies in the face of the enforcing
state's regulatory regime.' 5 Even in the arbitration context, the principal treaty on the enforcement of arbitral awards also contains a public policy exception. ' 0' Thus, although as a practical matter the question of enforcement often will be automatic, on the most controversial
questions the process of rhetorical persuasion I describe will be applicable.
Conceiving of jurisdiction in terms of community membership
and dominion would not only lead to more explicit discourse regarding subsequent enforcement of judgments, but might change the outcome of the original court's jurisdictional analysis as well. For example, in a recent case brought in California, the plaintiffs alleged that

See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Summary of the Outcome
of the Discussion in Commission I1of the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference,
June 6-22, 2001, at art. 21, http://wwv.hcch.net/e/workprog/jdgm.html (discussing
the Convention's procedural rules with regard to the enforcement of judgments for
nation-states).
908 See, e.g., Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ'ns Inc.,
585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664-65 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1992) (declining to enforce an English moneyjtdgment for libel against a
newspaper whose activities would have been protected by the First Amendment in the
United States). See generally GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
IrrIGA'rrON IN UNITFED STAIES COURTS 35-42 (2d ed. 1996) (examining lawsuits involving foreign parties in U.S. courts).
909See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, art. 5, § 2(b), 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, 42
(authorizing nonenforcement if enforcement would be contrary to the public policy of
the enforcing state); id. § 1 (b) (authorizing nonenforcement if "[t]he party against
whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case");
see also Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1992) (invoking Article
5, Section 1(b) to deny enforcement of an arbitral award made by the U.S.-Iran Claims
Tribunal).
907
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they were subject to forced labor in the construction of an oil pipeline
in Myanmar and sued the company allegedly responsible for the pipeline.1 0 The Ninth Circuit dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction
because the defendant was a French corporation, despite the fact that
the corporation was directly involved in the operations and decision
making of a California-based subsidiary.9" Had the court focused on
community membership in a more comprehensive way, it might have
pierced the parent-subsidiary relationship to consider enterprise liability, recognizing the importance of bringing the nominally French
corporation within the dominion of California, particularly since the
French corporation was conducting major business activities in California and the underlying substantive issues implicated international
humanitarian norms.
Similarly, a focus on community membership might lead us to rethink the scores of cases in which American courts have dismissed, on
forum non conveniens grounds, human rights claims brought by foreign nationals against American corporations.
In these cases, courts
have applied the so-called public and private interest factors that were
laid out by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1947 case of Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert. "' The difficulty with the Gilbert factors, however, is that they

Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. For a discussion of Unocal, focusing on the law of corporate groups, see
Blumberg, supra note 406, at 498-99.
912 See Blumberg, supra note 406, at 502
n.35 (collecting cases). For discussions of
corporate responsibility to obey human rights norms, see generally Avery, supra note
729; Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations, 35 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 801 (2002); Steven R. Ratner, Corporationsand Human Rights: A Theory
of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001).
330 U.S. 501 (1947). Gilbert's private interest factors
are:
the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing[,] witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to
the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforcibility
of ajudgment if one is obtained.
Id. at 508-09. In delineating the public interest factors, the court noted the following:
Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden
that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no
relation to the litigation. In cases which touch the affairs of many persons,
there is reason for holding the trial in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the country where they can learn of it by report only. There is a
local interest in having localized controversies decided at home. There is an
appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at
home with the state law that must govern the case, rather than having a court
910
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leave little, if any, room for argument that American society and
American courts have a social responsibility to provide an American
•
• 914
hearing for alleged misconduct of U.S.-based multinationals.
In
contrast, a conception of jurisdiction based on community membership and responsibility would offer more space to consider such an argument.
A cosmopolitan pluralist approach to jurisdiction might encourage forum-shopping if plaintiffs have more jurisdictions available to
hear their claims. As previously discussed, however, under the approach I suggest assertions of jurisdiction will not necessarily be more
broad than under current jurisdictional rules, 1 5 particularly given re6
cent trends toward an expansive, effects-based jurisdictional scheme!)'
Indeed, a court focusing on the definition of community might refuse
jurisdiction in situations where an inquiry analyzing solely the contacts
with, effects on, or interests of a geographical territory would counsel
in favor of asserting jurisdiction. And because a cosmopolitan pluralist vision requires that the plaintiff establish a connection with the
community where the court sits, the ability to pick a forum arbitrarily is limited. Moreover, the idea that forum-shopping is necessarily
such an evil that it provides a sufficient reason, in and of itself, to
choose one jurisdictional scheme over another deserves closer scrutiny. As Larry Kramer has pointed out, "[t]he assumption that it is unfair to allow plaintiffs to [forum-shop] presupposes a 'correct' or 'fair'
baseline defining how often the plaintiffs choice ought to prevail.' ' ls
After all, if it is legitimate to have different jurisdictional entities applying distinct bodies of law, why should the law not vary depending
on where a suit is brought, and why is it necessarily unfair to give
plaintiffs this choice? Brainerd Currie, arguably the most influential
American choice-of-law theorist, downplayed the importance of foin some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign
to itself.
Id.

Cf Blumberg, supra note 406, at 509 ("International human rights
cases are
tort cases arising in a foreign jurisdiction, and the private interest factors exert a near
irresistable pressure for foreign trial where the events took place.").
915See supra text accompanying notes 803-04 (discussing
possible limitations on
jurisdictional assertions tinder a cosmopolitan pluralist approach).
See supra text accompanying notes 432-43 (identifying cases that permit
effectsbased jurisdiction and discussing application of the effects test).
91)See su/na text accompanying notes 797-98 (discussing the need
to focus on the
plaintiff's connections to the forum).
918 Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
277, 313 n.117
(1990).
94
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rum-shopping, particularly if preventing it requires sacrificing substantive policies.1 9 And even if one believes forum-shopping is a problem, it is difficult to evaluate this concern without empirical data. For
example, other factors beyond choices about substantive norms may
well have a strong impact on forum choice. If most plaintiffs consult a
local attorney, how many attorneys are willing or able to file suit and
litigate in a foreign jurisdiction? How might the existence (or nonexistence) of regular referral arrangements affect this choice? Thus, on
both normative and empirical grounds there is at least some cause to
question the reflexive concern about excessive forum-shopping without further exploration of the extent of the problem.:"o
Finally, the mere assertion of jurisdiction will not lead to a nightmarish world of multiple liability around the globe because enforcement will remain a contested issue. Just because a tribunal asserts jurisdiction does not mean that its judgment will be recognized and
enforced elsewhere. But whereas Goldsmith assumes that ajudgment
issued by one sovereign will necessarily be unenforceable elsewhere, a
cosmopolitan pluralist approach requires that the enforcing court
scrutinize the original judgment both for its assertion of community

91 See Brainerd Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the
Conflict of Laws, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 128, 169 (1963) (suggesting that, at least in some circumstances, forum-shopping is "positively commendable" and arguing that "we need to take a harder and closer look at the ideal of uniformity and the condemnation of forum-shopping"). Currie has, of course, been
criticized for emphasizing the policies underlying substantive laws to the exclusion of
more general choice-of-law policies, such as the need to minimize forum-shopping and
enhance uniformity and predictability. See, e.g., Alfred Hill, Governmental Interest and the
Conflict of Laws-A Reply to ProfessorCurrie, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 463, 502-07 (1960) (criticizing Currie's approach on the grounds that it multiplies the number of potential
conflict situations and does not provide an adequate framework for addressing such
conflicts); Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choire-of-Law Methodology, 60
CORNELL L. REV. 927, 938 (1975) (arguing that Currie's approach to multistate situations is "simplistic").
920Lary Kramer has argued that assertions of unfairness regarding plaintiffs'
power to shop for a forum "rest[] on an unarticulated-and unexplained-assumption
about what each party is entitled to expect in a 'fair' system." Kramer, supra note 918,
at 313-14 n.117. He "share[s] the intuition that it is 'unfair' if plaintiffs can always
choose among the potentially applicable laws," but is "loath to rely on an intuition that
[he] cannot satisfactorily defend simply because it is widely shared." Id. at 314 n.117.
Of course, to the extent forum-shopping creates uncertainty, parties may attempt to
contract around the problem through forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses (at
least in contractually based cases), or may contractually choose nonlitigation alternatives. These "solutions" depend in part, however, on the law applied to the contractual
provisions. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (recognizing that contractual
agreements might not be enforceable due to the invocation of public policies concerning parties' unequal bargaining power).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LA WREVIEW

526

[Vol.
151: 311
[

dominion and for its substantive norms. Therefore, if the decision
persuades other communities, it will be entitled to recognition. And
even if it fails to persuade in the particular case, a cosmopolitan pluralist conception explicitly contemplates the possibility that the norm,
through its rhetorical force, may subsequently achieve wider acceptance and enforcement. To use the Yahoo! example again, the French
court must persuade the American court both that the affiliations between Yahoo! and France and the needs of French citizens justify the
assertion of French community dominion over Yahoo!, and that, in
this instance, the norms embodied in the First Amendment must yield
to concerns about hate speech and neo-Nazi propaganda or memorabilia. What neither court could do in a cosmopolitan pluralist understanding, however, is simply throw out the case for lack ofjurisdiction.
Eschewing the formalistic application of mechanical jurisdictional
rules ensures that substantive discussion of both community definition
and evolving substantive norms will always take place:
3. International Human Rights
Turning to international law, we can see the cosmopolitan pluralist approach similarly operating to encourage development of customary norms that transcend nation-state boundaries. Replacing the
rigidly statist view of international law, a cosmopolitan pluralist approach recognizes multiple interconnections among shifting communities acting transnationally.
The Pinochet case provides a useful example of the way in which a
cosmopolitan pluralist model can operate. A Spanish judge asserted
jurisdiction over the former Chilean dictator based on Spain's ties to
complainants affected by Pinochet's alleged human rights abuses and
on a general principle of accountability for gross violations of human
rights. 22 This assertion of jurisdiction, however-like the Canadian
Human Rights Commission's decision about Ernst Zandefll-carried
921

Courts are not the only forum for such debate, of course, but adjudicatory pro-

cesses form a useful site for discourse because they are premised on the idea of multivocal conversation and the evolution of norms. See Berman, TransformativePotentialof
Law,supra note 503, at 171-73 (arguing that courts (and legal discourse more generally) provide a forum for dialogue among multiple narratives). A detailed review of
the longstanding debates about the institutional benefits and limitations of courts,
however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
922 See supra text accompanying notes 186-88
(discussing the assertion of jurisdiction over Pinochet).
text (describing the Commission's
923 See supra notes 904-05 and accompanying
refusal to dismiss the case 6n jurisdictional grounds).
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with it no enforcement power unless the Spanish judge could rhetorically persuade other countries (in this case Great Britain, where Pinochet was undergoing medical treatment) to recognize the jurisdictional assertion and extradite Pinochet. 4
Although Pinochet
ultimately was not extradited and was instead returned to Chile,
Spain's assertion ofjurisdiction (and the formal recognition given to
the jurisdictional assertion by the British House of Lords) has created
an important shift in international human rights norms, reinforcing
the idea that even heads
of state can be held accountable for acts per925
past.
the
in
petrated
Moreover, the assertion of jurisdiction over Pinochet strengthened the hands of human rights advocates within Chile itself and provided the impetus for a movement to strip Pinochet of his immunity
there and begin prosecution of him locally.926 Although that effort
may be stymied because of Pinochet's failing health , the case against
Pinochet appears to have stimulated a new round of human rights enforcement actions in South America. For example, in Argentina, one
judge has recently authorized the arrest of former military dictator
Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri after ruling that two amnesty laws protecting former military officers from prosecution were unconstitutional;"128 Meanwhile, another Argentinian judge has finally convinced
Chilean lower courts to allow her to interrogate five former members
of Pinochet's secret police in an investigation of the murder of a former Chilean general and his wife in Argentina in 1974.929

924

Although the extradition request was made pursuant to an international treaty,

see supra note 186 (noting that the British House of Lords found jurisdiction based on
the International Convention Against Torture), extradition agreements generally contain public policy exceptions that often come into play in controversial cases such as
this one. Thus, the extradition in the Pinochet case was certainly not automatic, and
rhetorical persuasion was necessary.
925 See supra text accompanying notes 185-209 (describing legal developments
that
have eroded the assumption that heads of state are immune from suit).
D26 See Pinochet Said Serene About Ruling Stripping
Him of Immunity, DEUTSCHE PRESSEAGENTUR, June 13, 2002, LEXIS, DPA File [hereinafter Pinochet Serene] (reporting on
the Chilean Supreme Court's ruling that Pinochet should be stripped of lifetime immuni2).
See Heather Walsh, Chilean Court Upholds Ruling that Pinochet Unfit to Stand Trial,
BLOOMBERG NEWS,July 1, 2002, LEXIS, Allbbn File ("Chile's Supreme Court upheld a
ruling that blocked former dictator Augusto Pinochet from being tried on charges he
covered up army killings, saying he was mentally unfit to face prosecution.").
928 See Galtieri Arrested in Argentina on Human Rights Abuse
Charges, DEUTSCHE
PRESSE-AGENTUR,July 11, 2002, LEXIS, DPA File (reporting Galtieri's arrest).
929 See PinochetSerene, supra note 926 (noting that approval of Judge Servini's
interrogation of former secret police is pending in an appeals court).

528

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 151: 311

These activities demonstrate the rhetorical power of a jurisdictional assertion even when literal enforcement power is lacking. Indeed, a cosmopolitan pluralist approach to jurisdiction allows us to divorce the assertion ofjurisdiction and the subsequent articulation of
norms from the pure power of the sovereign state. Because the international system is fluid and dependent on changes in custom, which
in turn harden into law over time, it is essential to maintain ajurisdictional model that can account for such alternative repositories of
power and influence.
A corollary to the assertion ofjurisdiction is the assignment ofjurisdictional membership. While there have always been confusions
about how to classify and regulate people who feel loyalties to multiple communities, such questions are even more urgent given the
globalization of communication and transportation, as well as growing
economic integration across territorial borders. These phenomena
make it clearer than ever that law attaches labels of citizenship and
other types of community membership without sufficient consideration for the ways in which people actually experience community.
Nowhere are these concerns more pressing today than in the assertion ofjurisdiction and assignment of community membership with
regard to those accused of aiding Al Qaeda terrorists. Indeed, much
of the debate about the appropriate treatment of accused terrorists
springs from the fact that the U.S. government has accorded itself unilateral authority to assign community membership to detainees and
then to act based on the legal consequences of that membership. For
example, Yasser Hamdi is a U.S. citizen'3 °' who contends that he has
been held since the fall of 2001 in military detention without any formal charges and without being provided any of the rights of citizens.9
To date he has not even been permitted to meet with an attorney.932
Civil libertarians and others urge that although Hamdi is of Saudi
Arabian ethnicity, he is an American citizen under the Fourteenth
Amendment because he was born within U.S. territorial boundaries:
Therefore, they argue, he is entitled, as a citizen (and thus, a member
,30 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 280 (4th Cir.
2002) (indicating that
Hamdi was born in Louisiana).
See id. at 283 (recounting Hamdi's argument that judicial review is necessary
to
determine whether he "could be detained indefinitely without charges or counsel on
the government's say-so").
C
See id. at 284 (reversing and remanding the district court's order
permitting
Hamdi access to counsel).
933 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("All persons born
or naturalized in the
United States ... are citizens of the United States .... ).
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of the American community), to the full panoply of constitutional
rights accorded other criminal suspects. "i In response, the government essentially argues that Hamdi has given up his American citizenship and therefore is not entitled to any of the, rights American citizens enjoy
In support of this sort of detention power (as well as the power to
try accused Al Qaeda operatives before military commissions without
any right of appeal to an independent judicial body), government officials cite the U.S. Supreme Court's approval of a military commission's power to try a group of submariners who had fought for Germany during World War II. "" Although one of those defendants was
an American citizen, the Court permitted the use of a military commission because "[c] itizens who associate themselves with the military
arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction 'T attempt to attack the United States are no longer entitled to
the civil liberties that community membership in the United States entails.9
The problem, of course, is determining at what point (and
based on what evidence) it can be said that someone like Hamdi has
"associated" himself with Al Qaeda or the Taliban such that his citizenship rights can be stripped away.
A cosmopolitan pluralist model of jurisdictional affiliation would
recognize that all people have multiple attachments and that sympathy (or even some form of association) with groups that the U.S. government opposes cannot be enough to strip an American of his community membership and the rights that accompany such membership.
Thus, although some news accounts about Hamdi refer to him as an

034

See, e.g.,
Editorial,Justice Detained, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2002, at A24 ("The Bush

administration's post-Sept. 11 assault on civil liberties reached a new low recently when
the Justice Department argued in court that an American-born detainee, who may be a
United States citizen, should not be allowed to talk to a lawyer.").
935 SeeKatharine Q. Seelye, Lawyer Asks for Access toPrisonerBorn
in U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
June 21, 2002, at A16 ("In a broad assertion of presidential authority that could ultimately be tested in the Supreme Court, the government said in court papers on
Wednesday that anyone it designated an 'enemy combatant' did not have to be provided the legal protections accorded most American citizens.").
936 SeeEx pate Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 45 (1942) (concluding that "the Fifth
and Sixth
Amendments did not restrict whatever authority was conferred by the Constitution to
try offenses against the law of war by military commission" and that such offenders "not
required to be tried by jury at common law, were lawfully placed on trial by the Commission without ajury").
937Id.

at 37-38.

See, e.g., id. at 44 (stating that trying "citizen offenders against the law of war"
without ajury is not repugnant to Article Ill, Section 2 of the Constitution).
938
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"American-born Saudi, '
a cosmopolitan pluralist approach recognizes that community membership is a fluid process and that the
community designations surrounding the hyphen can just as easily be
reversed, rendering Hamdi a Saudi Arabian-American. Moreover, in
light of the Fourteenth Amendment's citizenship command, this conception of multiple community ties (United States by birth, Saudi
Arabia by ethnicity) is both completely appropriate and constitutionally embedded.
In addition, by de-emphasizing the importance of territorial borders, a cosmopolitan pluralist conception would not permit the U.S.
military to evade constitutional scrutiny merely by locating a detention
facility offshore in Guantanamo Bay. ' Just as a community-based approach to offshore website regulation or offshore tax enforcement
would look beyond formal territorial boundaries and instead consider
the substantive ties to a community, so too an offshore detention center controlled and operated by the U.S. government is properly considered an arm of the U.S. community and should be subject to the
941
community's norms (including the U.S. Constitution).
While noncitizen detainees who have never set foot in the United States normally might not have sufficient community ties to invoke the aid of
U.S. courts, the fact that the U.S. government has confined them in
See, e.g., Saudi Kept from Laryers, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2002, at A26 ("A
federal
appeals court in Richmond has again blocked a meeting between an American-born
Saudi captured in Afghanistan and lawyers seeking to represent him.").
940 Cf Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 72 (D.D.C.
2002) (ruling that federal
courts have no jurisdiction over claims based on military detentions in Guantanamo
Bay).
941 An important statement of this principle can be found
in United States v. Tiede,
86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979). In that case, a foreign national accused of hijacking a Polish aircraft abroad was tried under German substantive law in Berlin in a court
created by the United States. The U.S. court held that, despite the use of German substantive law, the foreign national was entitled to jury trial as a matter of U.S. constitutional right because the U.S. court must act in accordance with the Constitution even
when situated beyond U.S. territorial borders. Id. at 247-51. According to the court,
"[lit is a first principle of American life-not only life at home but life abroad-that
everything American public officials do is governed by, measured against, and must be
authorized by the United States Constitution." Id. at 244; see also DKT Mem'l Fund
Ltd. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 307-08 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Ginsburg, R.B.,J,
dissenting in part) ("U] ust as our flag carries its message ... both at home and abroad,
so does our Constitution and the values it expresses." (alteration in original) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)); cf United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 70102 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (expressing the view that "the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination prescribes a rule of conduct generally to be followed by our Nation's officialdom" and "should command the respect of United States
interrogators, whether the prosecution reasonably feared by the examinee is domestic
or foreign").
939
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military detention camps should, under a community-based understanding of jurisdiction, bring even these noncitizens within federal
courtjurisdiction.
Kenneth Anderson has recently used a community-based approach to argue that the detainees should be classified not as "criminals," but as "enemies" who should be deemed external to the U.S.
of U.S. law. 91
community and therefore external to the protections
Accordingly, Anderson argues, military commissions are the appropriate forum for bringing such detainees tojustice. Aside from the many
moral or policy reasons for rejecting Anderson's argument, 9 43 a cosmopolitan pluralist approach to jurisdiction, even assuming the detainees are deemed external to the U.S. community, would still accord
the detainees membership in some other matrix of community affiliations, including the community of international justice. Therefore,
the appropriate forum for trying such external enemies would be an
international tribunal, not a U.S. military one. In addition, permitting
the executive branch unilaterally to determine who is within the domestic community and who is an enemy serves to deprive even community members of their membership rights because they will always
be at risk that their community membership may be extinguished at
the whim of the President, as the Hamdi case illustrates. As discussed
above, in a non-territorial approach to legal norms, U.S. constitutional
requirements follow U.S. governmental actors wherever they go; thus,
a military commission proceeding, even if held outside U.S. territorial
borders, must be subject to constitutional protections and nonmilitary
judicial oversight.
Finally, though one can see the President's proposed use of mili9,4
tary commissions as an example of jurisdiction creation of the sort
contemplated in a cosmopolitan pluralist framework, there is, as always, the question of recognition. The long-term willingness of others

942 See Kenneth Anderson, What to Do with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda
Terrorists?: A
Qualified Defense of Militaty Commissions and United States Policy on Detainees at Cuantanamo Bay Naval Base, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 591, 609-11 (2002) (arguing that
U.S. district courts, which treat crime as "a deviation from domestic legal order," are illsuited to handle those who are not criminals within this order, but enemies of it).
943 See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Beware the Trumpets of War:
A Response to Kenneth
Anderson, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 965, 966 (2002) (arguing that "Anderson would
turn back the clock on one of the most important legal developments over the past
half-century-the individualization of international law").
944 See Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833,
§ I(e)-(f) (Nov. 16,
2001) (providing for trials before military tribunals without many procedural protections guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution or international law).
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to accept such a tribunal depends on its ability to convince others of
the legitimacy of its norms and procedures. Indeed, for better or
worse, we see in the military commissions another example of the way
in which assertions of jurisdiction open a space for debate. In this
case, the creation of military jurisdiction has become a flashpoint of
dispute. The tribunals face serious attacks on their legitimacy under
both domestic constituionall"' and international"' law. In addition, it
remains unclear whether other countries will be willing to extradite
suspects given the limited due process protections of the tribunal and
the possibility of an eventual death sentence.
Moreover, we are
likely to see communities-including nation-states, religious organizations, transnational NGOs, and others-disagree with the proposed
commissions and use various forms of diplomatic pressure, as well as
transnational lobbying and activism efforts, to resist this jurisdictional
assertion. Indeed, the administration has already qualified the original order authorizing the commissions, 1 and these qualifications ap9115Compare Dickinson, supra note 521 (arguing
that military commissions violate
U.S. and international law, whereas multilateral legal process advances U.S. strategic
interests, and suggesting various options for introducing an international component
into the accountability process), Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Conmissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 337 (2002) (arguing against the use of military commissions
and advocating U.S. domestic criminal trials for terrorist acts committed on U.S. soil),
and Slaughter, supra note 943 (advocating the use of international tribunals), with Anderson, supra note 942 (defending military commissions' authority to try detainees at
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base), Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, The Constitutional
Validity of Military Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 249 (2002) (defending the constitu-

tionality of the President's authority to establish military tribunals with jurisdiction
over terrorists involved in the September I I attacks), and Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda,
Terroism, and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 328 (2002) (arguing that the jurisdiction of military commissions over Al Qaeda terrorists is valid).
946 See, e.g., Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe,
Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying
the Military Tribunas, 11 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002) (arguing that the President has no
constitutional authority to deny constitutional rights to persons facing military tribunals when no immediate threats to the nation or the Constitution are present).
947 See, e.g.,
Koh, supra note 945, at 338-39 (indicating that the tribunals violate the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 902, and the Third
Geneva Convention, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135). Although the regulations for the
proposed commissions promulgated by the Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No. I (Mar. 21, 2002) [hereinafter Military Commission Order],
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/mar2002/d2002o321ord.pdf, address some of the
objections under U.S. constitutional and international law, on further examination,

the "rights" conveyed by the DOD regulations are not enforceable rights at all, see, e.g.,
Dickinson, supra note 521, at 1416-18 (describing the inadequacy of the regulations).
'148 Dickinson, supra note 521, at 1450-52.
9)49 See Anderson, supra note 942, at 592-93 ("[Tlhe Bush Administration has
moved to mollify opponents by promising additional regulations outlining the actual
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pear aimed at responding to some of the criticisms already leveled.
Ultimately, even a country as militarily powerful as the United States
may find itself stymied by coordinated resistance in the development
of norms (as the United States encountered when it attempted to insist on permanent immunity for U.S. peacekeepers before the new International Criminal Court).950 The point is that the mere assertion of
jurisdiction does not itself make the assertion legitimate-the body asserting jurisdiction always must convince others.
C. The Convergence of CyberspaceLaw and InternationalLaw in the
Development of TransnationalCommon Law Norms
As indicated by the conceptual tie between offshore websites and
offshore military commissions, a cosmopolitan pluralist conception of
jurisdiction allows us to see ways in which legal issues in cyberspace
and international law are converging. Since 1995, cyberspace law
theorists have considered the possibility that the rise of online interaction could pave the way for a revival of lex mercatoria, wherein thousands of individual transactions slowly harden into a form of customary law that eventually is adopted as state sovereign law. Perhaps the
most detailed articulation of this approach is Graeme Dinwoodie's
application of the substantive law method to questions of choice of
law.'
Dinwoodie explicitly argues for lex mercatoria, 5 suggesting
that the judicial role in multistate cases
953 should permit common law
By definition, a dispute indevelopment just as in domestic cases.
volving multiple communities means that multiple norms will be
available to apply. Instead of using mechanical choice-of-law rules to
choose one set of norms or the other, Dinwoodie argues that courts

procedures for the military commissions (to be drafted by the General Counsel of the
Department of Defense)."); see also Military Commission Order, supra note 947 (prescribing procedures for trials before military commissions).
950 See, e.g., Serge Schmemann, U.S. Peacekeepers Given Year's Immunity
from New
Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2002, at A3 ("The dispute evolved, however, into the first
public test of wills between the administration of a lone superpower generally suspicious of multilateral institutions and a galaxy of smaller nations increasingly looking to
such organizations."); see also id. (quoting a European diplomatic saying that "[t]he
United States learned it can't shout loud and make everyone move").
951 See supra Part II.G (referring to the development of a body of transnational
law
to resolve disputes according to customary norms rather than positive law).
952 See supra note 359 (describing lex mercatoria as a hybrid practice governing
transnational merchants).
9,13See Dinwoodie, supra note 323, at 548 (arguing that
a middle ground between
the laws of different nations should be sought through common law).
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should be free to develop an appropriate rule from an amalgam of
these norms.
Ironically, this "bottom-up" conception of law formation, embodied in lex mercatoria, was the pre-Westphalian international law. Although a more statist conception has reigned in the centuries since
Westphalia, international law is increasingly adopting a weakened
conception of state prerogatives. As discussed previously, universal
and transnational jurisdiction, though controversial, have been invoked in the area of human rights law.' 54 In addition, many individual
countries have shown their willingness to relinquish aspects of their
sovereign adjudicatory authority to transnational or international bodies, whether it be an international court, such as the European Court
of Justice, or an administrative body, such as the WTO. Meanwhile,
private parties engaged in transnational business activity often eschew
the law of either party's nation-state and instead opt for the norms of
the international business community embodied in the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.9' Although
territoriality and nation-state sovereignty are not likely to disappear in
the foreseeable future, the traditional image of the state may be
changing. Agencies of the state are now likely to be linked in networks to private actors as well as international or transnational agencies. Mixed coalitions of governments, non-governmental agencies,
and (soinetimes) transnational corporations will help redefine the
role of government. In short, global networks will become more
complex. "[G]overnance will require extensive networked cooperation, and hierarchical rules are likely to become less effective. ' 51 In
this altered framework, the old distinction between public and private
international law is rapidly eroding.
Thus, as cyberlaw scholars increasingly recognize the regulatory
role of sovereign states, and international law increasingly recognizes
the importance of non-state entities' forging customary norms, cyberlaw's traditional focus on bottom-up norm creation and international
law's' traditional focus on top-down norms articulated by sovereign
states are both weakening. Moreover, it seems to me that the two
fields are converging in the domain of jurisdiction. And this conver-

954 See supra Part 1.1 (discussing expansive assertions ofjurisdiction in
human rights
litigation).
1,5r,
Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3.
956 Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye Jr., Introduction, in GOVERNANCE
IN A

GLOBALIZING WORLD, supra note 704, at 1, 19.
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gence is driven by the development of a transnational common law
system of lawmaking based on cosmopolitan pluralist principles.
Such a transnational common law could take a number of different forms. I have already noted Graeme Dinwoodie's proposal that
domestic courts explicitly look to international norms in interpreting
the law governing multistate disputes. 957 Anne-Marie Slaughter has
observed similar phenomena occurring somewhat less explicitly in the
development of what she calls 'judicial globalization.' ' 8 These transnational court interactions include the emergence of 'judicial comity"
in transnational litigation, nascent efforts at constitutional crossfertilization, and increasing face-to-face meetings among judges
around the world.'59
Although comity has existed as an international law concept for a
long time, judicial comity reflects deference not simply to foreign law
or foreign national interests, but to foreign courts as well, accompanied by a recognition that foreign courts are "co-equals in the global
task ofjudging."1 ° We can see the roots of this type ofjudicial comity
in the United States as far back as Justice Blackmun's separate opinion
in the 1987 case Socit Nationale IndustrielleAdrospatiale v. United States
District Court. In that opinion, Justice Blackmun articulated a strong
form of comity "under which judicial decisions reflect the systemic
value of reciprocal tolerance and goodwill. 962 In this vision, judges
owe their allegiance to an international system of norms, not simply to
their own domestic law.96 3 And when there is a conflict among multiple norms, "a court should seek a reasonable accommodation that

957 Supra Part II.G. Dinwoodie's application
of the substantive law method, like a
cosmopolitan pluralist conception of jurisdiction, also rests on the idea of multiple
overlapping spheres of prescriptive authority. See Dinwoodie, supra note 323, at 551
n.252 (claiming that no single country's laws have exclusive application in interl.ational contexts where multiple countries' laws speak to a substantive legal issue).
958 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization,
40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1104

(2000) (describing a "diverse and messy process of judicial interactions" involving multiple nations).
959 See id. at 1112-23 (describing "horizontal"
relations among national courts as
examTles ofjudicial globalization).
Id. at 1112-13.
961482 U.S. 522, 547 (1987).
962 Id. at 555 (Blackmun,J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
963 As then-Chief Judge Breyer has written, the appropriate
inquiry for judges is
how to "help the world's legal systems work together, in harmony, rather than at cross
purposes." Howe v. Goldcorp lnvs., Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 950 (lst Cir. 1991).
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reconciles the central concerns of both sets of laws." °" Likewise, in a
more recent case, the Second Circuit ruled that a U.S. discovery statute "contemplates international cooperation, and such cooperation
presupposes an on-going dialogue between [sic] the adjudicative bodies of the world community."'' '5 This statement is distinctive both because its focus on "adjudicative bodies of the world community" seems
to transcend individual territorial courts and because it emphasizes
dialogue among courts rather than mere deference. Thus, we see a
move "from passive acceptance to active interaction, from negative
comity to positive comity."""" Moreover, there is at least some evidence
that the idea of such dialogue is not simply a rhetorical flourish, but a
practical reality. For example, in bankruptcy law, judges increasingly
communicate directly with each other to resolve transnational insolvency issues, even in the absence of international treaties or guidelines." Employing such judicial comity, either or both courts in Yahoo! might have sought to construct a rule that attempted to balance
free speech concerns and emerging international human rights
norms. Such a rule then might have helped frame future judicial, leg-

9,14 Socitg Nationale IndustrielleAgrospatiale,482 U.S. at
555; see also Dinwoodie, supra
note 323, at 551 n.252 ("[C] hoice of law methods fail to recognize.., that the limits of
prescriptive jurisdiction should be set by a claim to have some but not exclusive application to a set of facts. The substantive law method, by giving prescriptive effect to
both laws, permits this normative limitation to be recognized." (parentheses omitted)).
9%5 Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51 F.3d
1095, 1101 (2d Cir. 1995).
966 Slaughter, supra note
958, at 1114.
967 For example, in simultaneous insolvency proceedings
involving Maxwell Communication Corporation,judges in both the United States and Great Britain appointed
administrators who developed a set of joint procedures, which were then memorialized
in a "Protocol" approved by both courts. See Maxwell Communication Corp. v. Barclays
Bank, 170 B.R. 800, 802 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("The joint administrators in England
and the examiner in New York; subject to the jurisdiction of both courts, have carried
out the administration ... in unprecedented cooperation with each other."); see also
Lore Unt, InternationalIelations and internationalInsolvency Cooperation: Liberalism, lnstitutionalism, and TransnationalLegal Dialogue, 28 l.Aw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1037, 1073-84
(1997) (describing the communications between U.S. and British courts during Maxwell Communication). See generally .lay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in
Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457, 461 (1991)
(claiming that "nearly unanimous agreement" exists with regard to resolving multinational financial disputes in a cooperative, central forum). Of course, transjudicial relations will not always be so solicitous. See, e.g., Slaughter, sulpra note 958, at 1114-15
(providing examples of conflicts between judges from different jurisdictions). Nevertheless, even if judges spar over governing procedures and norms, the resulting judicial dialogue creates a useful forum for developing transnational common law over
time.
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islative, and non-governmental regulatory activities on similar issues
around the world. 68
Legal cross-fertilization also is not a new phenomenon (particularly between imperial powers and their colonies), "c but in the past
decade we have seen an increase in the willingness of courts (especially those outside the United States) to use foreign materials in interpreting constitutional norms. For example, as one British scholar
has noted, "[s] everal senior members of the British judiciary have recently suggested that they are.., increasingly prepared to accord persuasive authority to the constitutional values of other democratic nations when dealing with ambiguous statutory or common law
provisions which impact upon civil liberties issues.,9 7') Even some of
the current U.S. Supreme Court Justices have stated their willingness
to consider rulings from abroad as persuasive authority.7 Indeed, the
recent case of Atkins v. Virginia, in which the Court declared the execution of mentally retarded people to be unconstitutional, 2 provides
an illustration of the way in which transnational norms can develop
968

Because state-sanctioned courts are, by definition, creatures of their own na-

tion-state, one might think that any application of external norms is illegitimate. However, if (as in a contractarian model) courts derive their legitimacy ultimately from the
people, it is important to recognize that "the people" are cosmopolitan citizens with
multiple overlapping affiliations, many of which extend beyond the nation-state. In
addition, at least in the United States, international law is the foundation of the
American common law. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is part of our law, and.., resort must be had to the customs and usages
of civilized nations .... ).
969 See Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill
of Rights, 88 COLUM.
L. REv. 537, 537-41 (1988) (describing the way in which the legal ideas expounded in
the U.S. Constitution influenced the framing of the French Declaration of the Rights
of Man and of the Citizen, ultimately spreading to other continents through imperial
rule).
970 Ian Loveland, The Crininalizationof Racist Violence?,
in A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP?
AMERICAN INFLUENCES ON PUBLIC LAW IN THE UK 253, 275 (lan Loveland ed., 1995).
971 See, e.g., Sandra Day O'Connor, Broadening Our Horizons:
Why Amecan lawyers
Must Learn About Foreign Law, FED. LAW., Sept. 1998, at 20, 20 ("1 know from my experience at the Supreme Court that we often have a lot to learn from other jurisdictions."); Elizabeth Greathouse, Justices See Joint lssues with the EU, WAsH. POST, July 9,
1998, at A24 (quoting Justice O'Connor as expressing her willingness to consult the
decisions of the European Court of Justice "and perhaps use them and cite them in
future decisions"); id. (quoting Justice Breyer's statement that "[l]awyers in America
may cite an EU ruling to our court to further a point and this increases the crossfertilization of U.S.-EU legal ideas"). Among lower court judges, Judge Calabresi has
perhaps led the way toward embracing foreign authority, observing that the United
States no longer holds a "monopoly on constitutional judicial review" and arguing that
"[w]ise parents do not hesitate to learn from their children." United States v. Then, 56
F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995).
972 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2252
(2002).
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and then harden into state law. In 1994, Justice Blackmun famously
dissented from the denial of certiorari in a capital case, flatly declaring that the "death penalty experiment has failed" and proclaiming
that he would no longer "tinker with the machinery of death."' 7' Although no other Justice joined Blackmun's opinion, the language of
Blackmun's dissent was subsequently used as persuasive authority by
the South African Constitutional Court in its decision barring capital
punishment. 74 In turn, the U.S. Supreme Court's Atkins decision relied in part upon a growing international consensus against the death
penalty, a Sconsensus
that included the South African Constitutional
••
975
Court decision.
This increasing willingness to consider transnational norms may
stem in part from the increase in face-to-face interaction among
judges from around the world. Foundation and government funding
for a wide variety of "rule of law" programs that include judicial seminars, training programs, and educational materials have provided fora
for interaction .
In addition, judges themselves have organized
meetings with their counterparts around the world. For example, in
recent years several delegations of Supreme Court Justices
have met
T ,977
with top jurists in France, Germany, England, and India.
In 1998,
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer traveled to Brussels to meet with judges from the European Court of Justice (ECJ),'
and in 2000, several members of the ECJ visited the Supreme Court
973

Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun,J., dissenting).

State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391, 422 (CC) (referring to "the
difficulties experienced in the United States in the designing of a system [of capital punishment] that avoided arbitrariness and delays" and citing Callins); see also id. at 456 (Ackermann, J.) (accepting and endorsing the views of Justice Blackmun); id. at 471
(Kentridge, Acting].) (citing Justice Blackmun's dissent in Callinsas authority); id. at
491 (Mahomed, J.) (agreeing with Justice Blackmun that arbitrariness is "inherent in
the process").
,J7r See Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2249 n.21 ("Moreover, within the world community,
the
imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders
is overwhelmingly disapproved." (citing Brief of Amicus Curiae European Union at 4,
McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (No. 00-8727) (acknowledging the
South African Constitutional Court ruling), 2001 WL 648609, at *8 n.9)).
976 See, e.g., Jacques deLisle, Lex Americana?:
United States Legal Assistance, American
Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 179, 184-93 (1999) (surveying governmental and non-governmental rule of
law programs); Joseph P. Nadeau, Judges Abroad, Algeria 2001: Quest for Democracy,
JUDGESJ., Summer 2001, at 38, 38-40 (describing one judge's participation in an advocacy training program held in Algiers and sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development and several foundations and NGOs).
977 Slaughter, supra note
958, at 1120.
974

078

Id.
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Justices in Washington."' Elsewhere, judges from European constitutional courts have met every two to three years since the 1980s,"'8
Worldwide Common Law Judiciary Conferences have been held since
1995,981 and formal transnational organizations of judges have been
established in the Americas' 2 and in the Baltics. 983 Less formal meetings have also been convened by various aid agencies, NGOs, and law
schools.9 4 Additionally, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the U.S. Judicial
Conference have created a new Committee on International Judicial
Relations, the stated purpose of which is to "coordinate the federal
judiciary's relationship with foreign judiciaries and with official and
unofficial agencies and organizations interested in international judicial relations and the establishment and expansion of the rule of law
and administration ofjustice. '89 Such efforts to promote awareness of
the judiciary around the world may help judges see their work as part
of a common transnational enterprise.
These forms of 'judicial globalization" do not exhaust the ways in
which transnational norms might arise. For example, a cosmopolitan
pluralist approach to jurisdiction might attempt to accommodate multiple community affiliations, both in cyberspace and in international
law more generally, by attempting to insure that the legal decision
makers asked to resolve a conflict always include members of the various normative communities represented in that conflict. Indeed, this
is not a new idea. From 1190 until 1870, English law used the socalled "mixed jury," or 'jury de medietate linguae," with members of two
different communities sitting side by side to settle disputes when people from the two communities came into conflict.9 9 Sir Edward Coke

979 Id.
980

981Judges from Ten Common-Law Countries Meet in Washington
for Five-Day Conference,
INT'LJUD. OBSERVER, June 1997, at 1, l; Justices,Judgesfrom Common Law CountriesMeet
in Williamsburg and Washington, INT'LJUD. OBSERVER, Sept. 1995, at 1, 1.
982See Slaughter, supra note 958, at 1120 (describing the
creation and mission of
the Organization of Supreme Courts of the Americas).
983 See Hon. Rait Maruste, Estonia: Leading Central Europe
in Judicial Reform, INT'L
Jue. OBSERVER, Jan. 1996, at 2, 3 ("Estonian judges have joined their colleagues in
Latvia and Lithuania to form the Association ofJudges of the Baltic States .... ").
984 See Slaughter, supra note 958, at 1121-22 (noting the international
outreach efforts of various NGOs and law schools).
985 Hon. Michael M. Mihm, InternationalJudicial Relations
Committee Promotes Com-

munication, Coordination,INT'LJUD. OBSERVER, Sept. 1995, at 1, 1.

986 Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial by
Jury De
Medietate Linguae: A History and Proposalfor Change, 74 B.U. L. REV. 777, 781 (1994);
see also MARIANNE CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER: THE MIXED JURY AND
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attributed this practice "to the Saxons, for whom 'twelve men versed
in the law, six English and an equal number of Welsh, dispense justice
to the English and Welsh." 7 Regional differences, however, were not
the only type of community variation recognized in the mixed-jury
custom. Mixed juries were also used in disputes between Jews and
Christians," city and country dwellers,9s and merchants and nonmerchants. '' ) In the United States, the custom of mixed juries was imported from England and used in disputes between settlers and indigenous people""' and in other intejurisdictional disputes at least
through the beginning of the twentieth century.' 9 2' Karl Llewellyn's
proposal that merchant experts sit as a tribunal to hear commercial
disputes relies on a similar idea that specialized communities may possess relevant knowledge or background that should be called upon in
rendering just verdicts.'' :" And the principles underlying mixed juries
can still be found today. Indeed, the line of U.S. Supreme Court decisions involving peremptory challenges of jurors could be seen as responding in part to a felt imperative thatjury panels reflect both racial

CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP, LAW, AND KNOWLEDGE 8 (1994) (explaining

the practice of mixed juries in early England).
CONSTABLE, sapra note 986, at 17 (quoting SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART
OFTHE INSTITUTES OFTHE LAwS OF ENGLAND § 234 (1628)).
988 See id. at 18-21 (noting that half-Jewish,
half-Christian juries heard suits between Jews and non-Jews in England during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries); Ramirez, su/ra note 986, at 783-84 (arguing that mixed juries originated in part from the
king's desire to protect Jewish capital, which was subject to high assessments and escheatment to the crown, rather than lose it to Christians in an unfair trial).
989 SeeCONSTABLE, supra note 986, at 17 (recounting an action involving
a countrydweller in twelfth century London that required that at least one of the jurors be of
"the county in which the foreigner dwells" (citation omitted)).
99 See id. at 23-25 (exploring the evolution of "mixed merchant juries"
in early
England); Ramirez, sula note 986, at 784-86 (recognizing the king's regard for foreign merchants, which prompted the use of mixed juries in order to promote a "perception of fairness" to outsiders and attract their capital and goods). Indeed, mixed
juries for merchants apparently helped spawn the lex mercatoria on which Dinwoodie's conception builds. See CONSTABLE, supra note 986, at 23-25 (arguing that
mixed juries helped establish the legal customs of the merchant community).
91 See Katherine A. Hermes, jurisdiction in the Colonial
Northeast: Algonquian, English, and French Governance, 43 AM.J. LEGAL HIST. 52, 64-65 (1999) (discussing the implementation of a mixed-jury system in colonial Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts).
992 See Ramirez, supra note 986, at 790 (noting that "[a]t
various times between
1674 and 1911, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, Virginia,
and South Carolina each provided for mixed juries").
9.9 See Wiseman, supra note 827, at 512-15 (describing
Llewellyn's merchant-tribunal proposal).
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and gender diversity.
More explicitly, international tribunals are
generally staffed by judges from multiple countries, and recent international efforts to create hybrid domestic-international courts in postconflict situations place local judges alongside international ones.995
The custom of the mixed jury could be revived and expanded to encourage the development of norms that cut across boundaries of sovereign territorial states.
Finally, there can be little doubt that transnational adjudicatory,
quasi-governmental, or private regulatory bodies are also a source for
the development of transnational common law norms. Although
ICANN has been subject to criticism because of the composition of its
governing body and the lack of transparency in its processes,
the
idea of a regulatory body with authority based on activity rather than
territory is an example of one way that alternative forms ofjurisdiction
can be exercised and transnational law developed. Similarly, nongovernmental entities such as stock exchanges or bond and stock rating services may exercise significant regulatory authority within their
substantive (non-territorial) realms.
Although all such nongovernmental regulation is subject to criticism from the perspective of
democratic legitimacy,' the indeterminate nature of recognition and
enforcement means that private regulation is always subject to challenge and debate.
Thus, the articulation of norms by judges, juries, and nongovernmental entities is part of the process of creating international
custom which, like lex mercatoria, can then become integrated within
state sovereign law. In this way, globalization and online communication are processes that help to articulate customs across nation-state
boundaries. The challenge posed by a cosmopolitan pluralist conception of jurisdiction is: Will law recognize these and other similar developments or will it continue to divide communities formally by territory?

994 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986)
(forbidding prosecutors from
challenging jurors solely on the basis of race);J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 130-31
(1994) (extending Batson to peremptory challenges based on gender).
995 For a discussion of such hybrid tribunals,
see Laura Dickinson, TransitionalJustice in Afghanistan: The Promise of Mixed Tribunals, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY (forthcoming 2003).
96 See supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms
of ICANN).
97 See supra notes 386-89 and accompanying
text (discussing concerns about the
accountability of non-state regulatory bodies and the transparency of their processes);
see also supra notes 344-53 and accompanying text (discussing similar concerns about
quasi-governmental bodies such as the WTO and WIPO).
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CONCLUSION

At nearly the same historical moment that the Peace of Westphalia
established the spatial jurisdictional orientation of the modern nationstate, Isaac Newton also established a new way of thinking about
In place of the medieval conception of the physical world as
space.
a living organism, Newton argued that space was "absolute, always
similar and immovable. 9"
Both the Newtonian and the Westphalian understandings of space
survived and thrived into the twentieth century. Newton's formulation of mathematical laws for physical space was developed and refined, and it became part of the accepted understanding of the uniSimilarly, the territorial boundaries that define legal
verse.
jurisdiction, though often arbitrary, have continued to be absolutely
compelling. "[A]n unwavering faith in the necessity and legitimacy
of... [urisdictional] boundaries would seem to be not only a foundation of our government, but a precondition of any government."'0 0
As Richard Ford has observed, our reaction to the formality of jurisdictional arrangements is "something akin to the reverence and awe
we reserve for natural phenomena beyond our control or comprehen• 1001
Sion.
In the past century, Albert Einstein and Stephen Hawking have
challenged the Newtonian understanding of space and introduced
conceptions of fragmentation and indeterminacy into the Newtonian
model. 1002 Could we stand to introduce those same elements into our
understanding of jurisdiction? And if we did, what might the world
look like? Would nation-states necessarily crumble? Would all that is
solid melt into air?
I think not. To assert that geographical boundaries and nationstate sovereignty are no longer the only relevant way of defining space
or community in the modern world is not to deny that they retain
some salience as influences on personal identity. Indeed, even if we
were all cosmopolitans in Nussbaum's sense, with concentric circles of
9,9 This analogy is derived from
099 Id. at 1.

CURTIN,

supra note 5, at 1-2.

See generally EDWARD NEVILLE DA COSTA ANDRADE, SIR ISAAC NEWTON

(1954) (exploring Newton's life and contribution to the development of scientific
thought).
Ford, supra note 470, at 851.
1001Id.
1002 See, e.g., STEPHEN HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 55-63, 188-90 (20th anniversary ed. 1998) (discussing the uncertainty principle, which acknowledges the impossibility of complete accuracy in quantum mechanics).
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allegiance, at least one of those circles would almost certainly include
our geographical locale and another might include the nation-state in
which we hold citizenship.
Nevertheless, although such identities remain important, they are
not the only ways of conceptualizing space or identifying with a community. Allegiances to a physical location or a national identity are
only two of the multiple conceptions of belonging and membership
that people may experience. In our daily lives, we all have multiple,
shifting, overlapping affiliations. We belong to many communities.
Some may be local, some far away, and some may exist independently
of spatial location.
Jurisdiction is the way that law traces the topography of these multiple affiliations. A jurisdictional assertion extends a community's
dominion over the parties to a legal action. Thus, it is a statement
that all those before the court are at least in some way members of the
same community and that they can appropriately be bound together
in the physical space of the courtroom to resolve the particular issue
in dispute. An assertion ofjurisdiction, therefore, is never simply a legal judgment, but a socially embedded, meaning-producing act. Conceptions ofjurisdiction become internalized and help to shape the social construction of place and community.
In turn, as social
conceptions of place and community change,jurisdictional rules do as
well. But if that is so, then what are we to make of the fact that our
current jurisdictional system seems to correspond so poorly to contemporary social conceptions of space, distance, borders, and community?
The challenges posed by the rise of online communication and
more generally by the forces of globalization have brought this question to the fore. Repeatedly over the past several years, legal conundrums have arisen around a range of issues that can broadly be defined as jurisdictional in nature. These challenges, some of which
were surveyed in Part I, are not necessarily unanswerable, but at the
very least they indicate that the reality of human interaction is chafing
against the strictures our current conception of legal jurisdiction imposes. In such moments of transition, as legal forms adapt to a changing social environment, a window of opportunity opens. For a brief
moment, we have the chance to rethink established verities and question whether a particular set of doctrines-even if they can be cobbled
together to work one more time-makes sense anymore given the
changing context of social life.
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In this Article I have embraced the opportunity to interrogate the
dominant assumptions underlying legal jurisdiction. Instead of focusing on doctrinal questions regarding how best to "solve" the specific
jurisdictional dilemmas that have been raised to date, I have taken a
step back and asked a series of foundational questions. What does it
mean in social terms to assert jurisdiction? How are conceptions of
jurisdiction related to the ways people experience physical space, territorial borders, distance, and community? Why should the nationstate be the only player on the field of legal jurisdiction? Are there
other forms of community affiliations that the law might recognize?
In asking these questions, this Article has offered four central contributions. First, I have identified the social meaning ofjurisdiction as
an important field of discourse, which brings together the fields of cyberspace law, international law, civil procedure, and cultural analysis
and provides a useful way of understanding the effect of globalization
on legal systems. Such study affords us a better understanding of the
world of experience on which the legal world of jurisdiction is
mapped and allows us to develop a richer descriptive account of what
it means for ajuridical body to assertjurisdiction over a controversy.
Second, I have argued that existing jurisdictional models are not
properly attuned to questions of social meaning. Instead, most jurisdictional systems (both in the United States and elsewhere) are
moored to geographical territory and take for granted that territorially defined sovereign entities-nation-states (or individual states
within federal systems)-are the only possibly relevant category of
community affiliation. Both of these assumptions are problematic because, as we have seen, physical territory and geographical boundaries
are not necessarily the only, or even the most appropriate, way of defining community, and an overly narrow focus on nation-states does
not do justice to the multiple, overlapping, and often non-territorial
conceptions of community that exist in the world. Thus, we can begin
to conceive alternative approaches to jurisdictional questions that
might better respond to the contested and constantly shifting processes by which people imagine communities and their membership in
them.
Third, I have offered one such alternative approach here, which I
call a cosmopolitan pluralist conception of jurisdiction. This conception offers a more capacious view of what constitutes a relevant jurisdictional community-one that neither limits the jurisdictional assertion based on contact with a geographical locality nor limits the range
of possible community affiliations that might be relevant. Myjurisdic-
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tional framework is, of course, only one possible alternative, and there
are surely others that await future elaboration. But I have argued that
any such model must, at the very least, account for the social meaning
of legal jurisdiction. Thus, it is less important that others embrace this
particular conception of jurisdiction than that they begin to see the
social meaning of legal jurisdiction as an important field of discourse
and study. Indeed, even if one were to reject a more pluralist conception and retain current jurisdictional frameworks, this Article makes
clear that simply assuming that territorial boundaries and nation-state
communities are somehow the natural and inevitable bases for a system of jurisdictional rules is not an option. Rather, any jurisdictional
system must be justified (both descriptively and normatively) as the
appropriate way of organizing space and conceiving of community affiliation in the contemporary world.
Fourth, I have attempted to demonstrate that a focus on the social
meaning of legal jurisdiction illuminates a wide variety of doctrinal
areas and that future teaching and scholarship on jurisdiction might
profitably be oriented not along doctrinal lines such as international
law, law and anthropology, cyberlaw, or civil procedure. Rather, we
must conceptualize these questions more thematically so that we can
better come to grips with the convergence of these fields in an era of
globalization.
In the end, I see jurisdiction and recognition of judgments as
fruitful sites for thinking about the relationship between the "local,"
the "national," and the "global" and for mapping the evolving ways in
which people construct identity by reference to places and/or communities. No one really knows whether the nation-state is dying or
thriving, whether globalization is truly a new phenomenon or a lot of
hype, whether the Internet defies territorial borders or whether geographical boundaries can be reinscribed into cyberspace, whether the
world is fragmenting into subnational conflicts, or conversely, whether
it is moving towards an era of global cooperation and international
governance. Or perhaps a cosmopolitan future awaits us, when people will come to interpret themselves without using the nation-state as
their principal frame of reference.
Whatever the answers to these imponderables, they will be reflected and constructed in the domain of legal jurisdiction. And if we
pay attention to the social meanings embedded in jurisdictional debates, we might just possibly catch a glimpse of where we are headed.
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